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Abstract 
Anthropology and literary criticism can interact fruitfully in the investigation of 
theoretical, general and specific issues concerning literature. Anthropological 
concepts of magic and ritual are useful to account for those fictions which defy 
neat labels and sit at the crossroad between the fantastic and the mimetic 
impulses. Furthermore, the reading process of such fictions can be interpreted 
as a liminal experience, whereby the reader’s consciousness is ritualized. 
Adopting a phenomenological stance and a socio-anthropological methodology, 
the thesis presents the author’s auto-ethnography of reading, also integrating 
the latest findings of cognitive linguistics and psychology of fiction into the 
theoretical reflection. Other conceptual tools, such as ideas concerning 
performative language, the hero quest and epiphany, metaphor and symbolism, 
are elaborated in order to illustrate the reading of ‘hybrid’ fictions, and how the 
reader is actively involved in the process. Moreover, three sample novels are 
analysed in the light of concepts of magic from a thematic and structural point 
of view, as texts which posit the issue of the de-reification of the real and of the 
imagination itself as a critique of the discourses of modernity. Overall the thesis 
supports an ecological view of the (literary) imagination, conceived as a 
relational process whereby nature and culture are seen as co-extensive and not 
in opposition to each other.
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Introduction  
Both anthropologists and literary scholars have recently investigated novels and 
stories as literary anthropology.  In doing so, they have been pursuing different 
agendas. The anthropologists have tried to use fiction as an artefact of material 
culture that may be useful to trace the origins and developments of customs, 
beliefs, and socio-cultural patterns of behaviour in different historical times and 
places. The literary scholars have been interested in the anthropological 
contribution to the issue of fictionality and of why, as human beings, we need 
fictions. Among the former, we can mention Nigel Rapport (1994), among the 
latter, Wolfgang Iser (1993) is perhaps the most famous. This broad division can 
be traced back to different ‘national traditions’, with the British pursuing an 
anthropological reading of fictions as an ethnographic field, while the Germans 
have looked to broad anthropological questions regarding human ‘nature’. 
Both tendencies have been fruitful in that they have produced original 
interpretations in their respective fields. Interesting anthropological readings 
have been applied in particular to postcolonial fiction, which, because of its 
obvious ethnic content, has lent itself to such an enterprise quite easily. 
However, although I have spoken of ‘traditions’, these attempts have been far 
from systematic and have had a certain provisional or tentative character. The 
very fact that ‘literary anthropology’ or ‘anthropology of literature’ is not an 
institutionalized discipline, with its specific lecturing posts, but has been 
practiced by anthropologists and literary scholars at the juncture of their 
respective disciplines, bears witness to its fragmentary condition.  
In this study, I intend to pursue the practice of literary anthropology both 
as a privileged channel/inlet into what happens to us as readers of literary 
fiction, and as an ethnographic enterprise, by focusing on readings of specific 
texts. My thesis is that we can consider literary fiction as a magical supplement 
to reality, and reading it as an act of ‘ritualization’, whose significance I shall 
explain in due course. What I intend to highlight now is that what Austin called 
the ‘parasitic’ nature of literary language, far from being a negative 
characteristic, is the very condition for understanding fiction as magical 
supplement. Furthermore, recent findings in cognitive linguistics confirm that 
everyday language and literary language are continuous and not in opposition. 
However, literary language is special because of the creative metaphoricity 
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which characterizes it. This, in turn, facilitates heightened emotions in the 
reader. 
I suggest that there are three levels that work towards a magical effect in 
fiction: linguistic, structural-thematic, and technical. I am drawing on Kenneth 
Burke’s ideas, as well as on anthropologist Tambiah’s rhetorical interpretation of 
magic, in order to account for the first level. As to the second level, what I have 
called structural-thematic, I am going to show how mythical and ritual elements 
or ‘motifs’ crop up in fictional texts, while, as far as the third, technical level is 
concerned, I am referring to the magical ‘know-how’, where the distinction 
between natural, supernatural and secular interpretations of magic blurs and 
conjuring ‘tricks’ lend a hand to narrative composition.  
The rationale behind my study is the attempt to provide a unified theory 
which brings together the reader and the fictional text as two elements of the 
same dynamic process, one necessary to the other in order to bring out fiction’s 
potential magic. I will also be reviewing classical theoretical texts about the 
fantastic and magical realism, not in order to follow in their tracks but to 
provide a background to my alternative approach. In fact, it is my contention 
that literary scholars have concentrated on notions of the fantastic, the uncanny 
and magical realism, without interrogating the most profitable and elusive 
conceptual category for the advancement of critical discourse about literature, 
namely, ‘magic’. 
By reading fiction as ‘magic’, I also intend to ‘anthropologize’ Western 
discourses of rationality, science, religion, culture, and capitalism through the 
reading of specific texts, as an ethnographic ‘fieldwork’. When I use this 
neologism in the form of a verb, I intend to point to the self-reflexive gaze that 
underlies my conception of literary anthropology in this study, in that an 
anthropological eye is turned inward in order to unveil the ‘Other’ inside 
Western culture, rather than projecting it on different cultures.  
The thesis adopts a phenomenological stance in order to account for the 
effect of reading ‘hybrid fictions’ (which I illustrate later) on the reader. 
Phenomenology is appropriate to inquire into the structure of the reading 
experience as a dynamic encounter between text and reader(s). However, in this 
study, it is necessarily informed by the latest findings of cognitive science and 
linguistics, and psychology of fiction, empirical disciplines capable of answering 
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questions about the human cognitive make-up at the base of our thought and 
emotions.  
In Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson reveal 
three fundamental findings of cognitive science: the ‘cognitive unconscious’ as 
the bedrock of our thought, the embodiedness of our minds, and the 
metaphorical character of all thought, including abstract concepts and notions 
of ‘reason’. If we take into account these fundamental factors and human 
beings’ embeddedness in their environment‒‒both natural and cultural‒‒it is 
possible to go beyond the millennia-old split between subject and object in 
epistemology and to found an anthropology of literature which accounts for the 
specifics of the reading encounter, embedded in the reader’s environment and 
anchored in his/her embodied existential condition. This is what I attempt here.  
I elaborate some conceptual tools based on anthropological concepts of 
magic, myth and ritual that account for the effects of a specific kind of fiction, 
which I call ‘hybrid’. Accordingly, the first chapter provides a framework and a 
methodology, while the second explains what ‘hybrid fictions’ are: fictions 
which blend fantasy and mimesis in conspicuous ways and are performative in 
character. The third chapter considers the role of the reader of fiction as an act 
of ritualization, whereby s/he marks off the fictional world as special and 
liminal. Here the role played by ‘myth’ also finds its place. The fourth chapter 
introduces the notion of ‘magic’ as an alternative analytical tool for 
contemporary cross-genre fiction, by which I mean works that span from the 
realistic to the fantastic and magical realist modes. Different ‘kinds’ of ‘magic’ 
will be investigated and the general role of ‘magic’ in the formation of the 
modern mindset will also find its evaluation here. The fifth investigates the two 
concepts of quest and epiphany in hybrid fictions and the latter’s relation to 
romance. In fact I maintain that hybrid fiction reworks the quest romance in 
conspicuous ways. Epiphany is considered both as ‘literary’, thus pertaining to 
the characters, and ‘readerly’, impacting on the reader. Moreover, it concerns 
the author’s vision too, which is not necessarily mediated or conveyed through a 
character. This chapter considers the idea of ‘deformed romance’ and focuses 
on ‘quest and epiphany’ as two pivotal elements in fiction that do not always 
coincide. Thus ideas on the ‘quest of the hero’ by Campbell and also the 
spiritual aspect of the quest as interpreted by Jung and Eliade will be taken into 
account here.  The sixth chapter dwells on the role of emotions in reading and is 
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composed of my auto-ethnography of reading, where I adopt a socio-
anthropological method in order to access the novels selected for later analysis. 
Then, the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters elaborate on some of the findings of 
cognitive linguistics. The seventh chapter deals with ‘history, magic and flux’, 
closely interweaving a narrative idea of history with the insights of magical 
thought and the ethos of process philosophy. It shows how the chosen novels are 
permeated by magical and alchemical ideas both thematically and structurally. 
It is the focus of this chapter to show how these novels expose the reification 
tendency at work inside modern and (post)industrial Western cultures and point 
to alternative approaches for de-essentializing cultural discourse. 
I have chosen three contemporary novels by authors who did not influence 
or acknowledge each other. They belong to different generations and have 
different concerns and worldviews, yet they all show different stages of what we 
could call the cultural ‘genealogy’ of the West. They are the Scottish Alasdair 
Gray, the Austro-German Daniel Kehlmann and the Italian Anna Maria Ortese. 
The three writers belong to different generations; Alasdair Gray was born in 
1934, Daniel Kehlmann in 1975 and Anna Maria Ortese in 1914 (she died in 1998). 
In reading their novels, I show how ‘magic’ is a fruitful and flexible analytical 
tool and also how it confronts dialectically the logic of rationalism and 
capitalism. 
The thesis ends with a concluding statement on its interpretive effort, 
where its diverse facets are brought together. Two are the objectives of my 
work: to inquire into the reading of ‘hybrid fictions’ and its characteristics, and 
to show how they can be subversive and critical in the reading process. My 
overall aim is to set up an anthropology of literature as an alternative 
methodology for studying literature. I have applied this methodology to the 
specific issue of ‘hybrid fiction’ in order to provide an example of a holistic 
mode of literary interpretation. 
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1 Framework for an Anthropology of Literature 
1.1 Why Literature and Anthropology 
How can anthropology and literature interact in scholarly research and 
literary criticism? And why is it worth attempting to set up a space for their 
interaction? This study deals with these and related questions. It also pushes the 
boundaries even further to show, in the end, that the literary critic can be an 
ethnographer, if s/he recognizes what van Oort considers as the paradox of 
being human: ‘Only humans have evolved the paradoxical ability to represent 
their own origin,’1 through ritual first and then through art and literature. Let us 
start by defining literature.  
Literature is that form of art that uses language as its medium. As a form 
of art, it is not useful in a directly practical sense, yet it has undoubted 
aesthetic, psychological and social functions that have been discussed ever since 
the time of Plato. R. G. Collingwood in his The Principles of Art (1938) exposes 
the common misunderstanding of Plato and Aristotle’s views on art.2 ‘The 
doctrine that all art is representative is a doctrine commonly attributed to Plato 
and Aristotle; and something like it was actually held by theorists of the 
Renaissance and the seventeenth century’ (43). By quoting Plato at some length, 
he shows how his banishment of the poet from the city was intended only for a 
certain kind of poet, namely ‘the entertainer who […] represents trivial or 
disgusting things’ (47), and later extended to the whole of ‘representative 
poetry’ (48): ‘the accused is never poetry, but “poetry for pleasure’s sake, i.e. 
representation”’ (49). In fact, Plato illustrated his philosophical points with 
astounding poetical fables, such as the fable of the cave. Collingwood explains 
how, in the Poetics, Aristotle defended that very representative poetry, 
produced merely for pleasure, a poetry that was superseding ‘the old magico-
religious art’ (52) dear to Plato. In spite of many exceptions, the concept that 
art is mere mimetic representation, which took hold with the Renaissance’s 
readings of the classics, held sway in Western culture till the Romantics reacted 
to these views, upholding Shakespeare’s irregular plays as the mark of genius. In 
                                         
1
 Richard van Oort, ‘The Critic as Ethnographer’, New Literary History, 35; 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 621-61. 
2
 Robin G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). 
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the twentieth century, experimentalists such as Bertolt Brecht practiced an 
estranging form of art that would counteract the identification and cathartic 
effect theorized by Aristotle. In Brecht’s opinion art has a revolutionary 
function: it should make the audience uncomfortable and thus facilitate the 
awakening of their consciousness. Yet, in spite of conspicuous examples, such as 
the Romantics, the Experimentalists, or the avant-garde of the early twentieth 
century, the idea of art as mirror of reality has continued to be the centrepiece 
of Western aesthetic debates, as the great realist novels of the nineteenth 
century and the Neo-realist poetics in the 1950s testify. 
The preponderance of sight underpinning traditional Western aesthetic 
thought, the privileging of the gaze over the ‘lower’ senses as the medium of 
knowledge has been elaborated in modern times by Kant in Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View (1798) and in the twentieth century by Rudolf Arnheim 
in Visual Thinking (1972). The pervasiveness of the gaze and its geometrical 
grasping of phenomena is at work in the Structuralists, for example, who adhere 
to a spatial visual metaphor when they state that literature is all about surface 
and deep relationships between words. They stick to binary oppositions in order 
to define the functions of language and art. Poststructuralists on the other hand, 
have exposed symbolism as ideologically charged and have deconstructed 
entrenched intellectual claims and naturalized prejudices. Their foremost 
thinker, Jacques Derrida, elaborated his own mystique of language, which, of 
course, has a paradoxically religious element to it, going back to the kabbalistic 
idea of a language made up of sacred signs (which are characteristically visual).3 
Indeed this mystical element is an undercurrent that has flowed into 
several religious and artistic movements in Western history. Collingwood points 
out both the similarities and the differences between magic and art, and 
recognizes the existence of a kind of magical art, like that produced by 
prehistoric ‘cave men, the ancient Egyptians, the Greeks and medieval 
Europeans’ (77). While I agree with Collingwood that ‘magic consists essentially 
in a system of practices, a technique’ (63), I find that his theory underplays the 
aesthetic significance of magic when he states: 
                                         
3
 For a thorough treatment of the convergence of Derrida’s thought and Jewish mysticism and the latter’s 
influence on the former, see Gideon Onfrat, The Jewish Derrida (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2001); Eric R. Wolfson, ‘Assaulting the Border: Kabbalistic Traces in the Margins of Derrida’, Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, 70.3 (September 2002), 475-514; Sanford L. Drob, ‘Jacques Derrida 
and the Kabbalah’ (2006), www.newkabbalah.com, [accessed 20 July 2012]. 
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Magic is a representation where the emotion evoked is an emotion 
valued on account of its function in practical life, evoked in order that 
it may discharge that function, and fed by the generative or focusing 
magical activity into the practical life that needs it. Magical activity is 
a kind of dynamo supplying the mechanism of practical life with the 
emotional current that drives it. Hence magic is a necessity for every 
sort and condition of man, and is actually found in every healthy 
society.  (68 – 9) 
 
Collingwood is not referring to crass superstition, obviously, but to an organic 
worldview that makes sense of life and generates ‘morale’ (67) for the members 
of a certain society. Certainly magic has this function too, but it is not limited to 
these utilitarian aspects. It is not so obvious in fact that magic works only to 
evoke specific emotions, given their ineradicable subjectivity. Magic has to do 
with heightened perception and imagination too, with a shifting of boundaries, 
and in this sense it is also a mode of consciousness, as it will be seen later. 
The idea that there is a magical-religious component to art has been 
enthusiastically upheld by the Romantics and their admirers ever since. Before 
Rationalism came to the fore, there was no concept of a split between the 
sensuous and the spiritual dimensions, which, in fact, coexisted and interacted 
in the art of poetry.4 The case of alchemy is illustrative of the coexistence of the 
sensuous and the mystical. This coexistence is an important characteristic of 
verbal magic. Alchemy, which was both a practical discipline in a home-made 
laboratory, and a spiritual practice, was an example of this sensuous logic, or 
thinking by images. H. Stanley Groves in his Alchemy, Ancient and Modern––first 
published in 1912––explains:5 
[…] although there cannot be the slightest doubt that the great 
majority of alchemists were engaged in problems and experiments of 
a physical nature, yet there were a few men included within the 
alchemistic ranks who were entirely, or almost entirely, concerned 
with problems of a spiritual nature; Thomas Vaughan, for example, 
and Jacob Boehme, who boldly employed the language of Alchemy in 
the elaboration of his system of mystical philosophy. [...] In modern 
times there has come about a divorce between Religion and Science in 
men’s minds (though more recently a unifying tendency has set in); 
but it was otherwise with the alchemists, their religion and their 
science were closely united. We have said that ‘Alchemy was the 
                                         
4
 See for example T. S. Eliot’s essay on ‘The metaphysical poets’, The Times Literary Supplement (20 
October 1921). [Eliot was vehemently anti-Romantic. In this essay he refers to an older ‒ classical, 
medieval, and Renaissance sense of wholeness.] 
5
 <forgottenbooks.com>: [accessed 22 September  2010]. 
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attempt to demonstrate experimentally on the material plane the 
validity of a certain philosophical view of the Cosmos’; now, this 
‘philosophical view of the Cosmos’ was Mysticism. Alchemy had its 
origin in the attempt to apply, in a certain manner, the principles 
of Mysticism to the things of the physical plane, and was, therefore, 
of a dual nature, on the one hand spiritual and religious, on the other 
physical and material. (7 – 8, emphasis in the original) 
The famous axiom beloved by every alchemist — ‘What is above is as 
that which is below, and what is below is as that which is above’— 
although of questionable origin, tersely expresses the basic idea of 
Alchemy. The alchemists postulated and believed in a very real sense 
in the essential unity of the Cosmos. Hence, they held that there is a 
correspondence or analogy existing between things spiritual and things 
physical, the same laws operating in each realm. (10, emphasis in the 
original)  
Subsequently, the Enlightenment would confine alchemy and other 
magical-religious practices to the realm of superstition or playfulness. Yet, 
as it will be shown at a later stage, there have been illustrious examples 
drawing on the ‘logic’ of magic in art. This is important to bear in mind, in 
order to foreground the ideological import of the official function of art as 
portraying life and the human condition in general. 
On the other hand, literature that has refused to portray life has often 
been tainted with the accusation of escapism or seen as ‘mere’ entertainment. 
Yet, visionary and subversive art tells quite another story. In fact it engages the 
reader in an active way, by appealing to his imagination and capacity to 
envisage things, rather than relying on plausibility and belief only.  
The opposition between imagination and belief is a more or less 
concealed key issue that has shaped Western historical consciousness since 
Descartes. For the Rationalists, belief became a matter of exclusive intellectual 
plausibility, and imagination became just an inferior and vague faculty for which 
they had not much use.  
Although sceptical about imagination as a way to knowledge, the great 
Scottish philosopher David Hume assigned to it a threefold role. In Mary 
Warnock’s exegesis of The Treatise on Human Understanding:  
 
[…] in the first place, he regarded imagination as the reproductive 
faculty by which we are enabled to recreate in ourselves, in the form 
of ideas, experiences we have once had immediately, through 
impressions. […] It is worth remarking that Hume here makes no 
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distinction between imagination and memory. It is the function of 
imagination, he says, to enable us to relive the past. […]  
Hume gave imagination a second role which introduced that idea of 
freedom invoked by poets such as Sidney, when they think of the 
creativity of the imagination. Imagination enables us to bring together 
a number of different impressions we have had in the past, in order to 
make up general, even abstract, ideas. […] 
A third and crucial role of the imagination in Hume’s theory is that 
which it exercises when objects of sense are actually before us. […] 
Imagination is said by Hume to perform the feat of making us believe 
that the world is peopled by continuous and independent objects by 
filling in the gaps in our actual experience. […] And yet he retained 
the commonly held view that the imagination is a pretty poor thing, 
certainly not fit to be relied on for such a momentous responsibility as 
that of furnishing the world with those solid separate objects which 
we all assume are its proper furniture.6  
 
When in his Biographia Literaria (1817) Samuel Coleridge wrote about 
‘the willing suspension of disbelief’ (Chapter 14, CCII.6), he was trying to bridge 
the opposition between imagination and belief once again. As Mary Warnock puts 
it, in his famous statement on the nature of the imagination: 
Coleridge divides imagination itself into the primary and the 
secondary. Primary imagination is that which we deploy in all 
perception, by which in some inexplicable manner we create the real 
world, with which we are familiar. Without it the world of sense 
would be unintelligible and indeed uninhabitable. Primary imagination 
thus corresponds to the imagination in Hume’s epistemology, about 
which he somewhat tentatively speaks of necessary principles. More 
directly, it is derived from Kant’s a priori imagination, that capacity 
which, apart from any actual experience, provides the means by 
which our concepts can apply to the world that is given us in 
experience. It is common to all of us; one person is not, in this sense 
of ‘imagination’, more imaginative than another.  
 Secondary imagination is, Coleridge says, ‘an echo’ of primary. It, 
unlike the primary, ‘coexists with the conscious will’. ‘It dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate.’ It is the imagination at work 
in great works of art. We are taken back, here, to Kant’s genius, who 
strives, never with total success, for the expression of Aesthetic 
Ideas. Such imagination is essentially creative and vital. […] 
 In Biographia Literaria (vol. 2, ch. XIV, p. 11) Coleridge makes it 
plain that secondary imagination is not less inexplicable than primary. 
He refers to it as ‘that synthetic and magical power’. For, though 
primary and secondary imagination can be distinguished, yet they 
operate in fundamentally the same way, the one ‘making’ the world 
in which we normally lead our lives, the other ‘making’ new worlds. 
Fancy, on the other hand is, according to Coleridge, ‘no other than a 
                                         
6
 Mary Warnock, Imagination and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, repr. 1996), pp. 6-10. 
  16 
form of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and 
blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will 
which we express by the word CHOICE.’ (1996: 41-2) 
As all Romantics and Post-romantics ever since, Coleridge probed the dynamics 
of the human psyche and made it the subject of his art. Because the Romantics 
shifted the centre of art to the regenerating potential of the human mind and 
heart, their literature was revolutionary and visionary, and is particularly 
suitable to be considered a form of magic. Magic has been a much debated 
anthropological concept since the inception of anthropology itself. Therefore the 
anthropology of magic is especially relevant to our study of the literature of 
magic. 
Although Herodotus is regarded as the mythical founder of anthropological 
discourse,  anthropology, ‘study of man’, has its more recent predecessors in 
many travel accounts that European explorers, missionaries and merchants 
produced as a result of their contacts with extra-European cultures, starting 
from Marco Polo down to the many explorers of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, in the works of the French Encyclopedists, in Voltaire’s, Rousseau’s 
and Montesquieu’s philosophical reflections about ‘the noble savage’ and ‘the 
state of nature’, in Romantic exoticism (even if in German Romanticism the very 
word anthropology had the literal meaning of ‘the study of man’, which also 
involved theory about ‘human nature’ and ethics)  and in the colonial enterprise 
of the Victorian era. However, not all anthropologists were interested in the 
anthropological discussion of an abstract human nature: in fact, the first 
anthropologists engaged with the colonized people in order to serve the imperial 
urge to classify. Missionaries and explorers engaged in the study of ethnic 
customs and later a generation of professional anthropologists came into being, 
first relying on the missionaries and explorers’ accounts, later engaging in first-
hand ethnographic research, or ‘fieldwork’. Ethnography is the writing of 
empirical case studies based on the practice of ‘participant observation’ in the 
‘field’. Anthropology is the the study of human cultures and includes both 
ethnography and theoretical frameworks and concepts of interpretation. 
Anthropology as the ‘scientific’ study of man was put on sure ground at 
the beginning of the twentieth century by Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Maria 
Czaplicka and Bronislaw Malinowski, who claimed to have been the first to 
practice fieldwork and to establish ethnographic classical practice as an 
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anthropological method. In his view, the ethnographer’s task is ‘to grasp the 
native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world.’7 
Traditionally, generations of Western anthropologists went out to the 
colonies to ‘study’ the colonized people, their customs and institutions, 
believing in their own scientific mission, objectivity, intellectual neutrality and 
detachment. Moreover, not all anthropologists were complicit with colonialism. 
For example, in the USA the anthropological school founded by Franz Boas, not 
only produced excellent ethnographies, but also advocated a cultural relativism 
that allowed him to understand Native American cultures on their own terms and 
to take a stand against the federal legislation impinging on the rights of the 
Native American people. Thus, anthropologists such as Alfred Kroeber, his wife 
Theodora Kroeber, and Oliver La Farge worked actively to defend the rights of 
the Native Americans, the latter also serving as president of the National 
Association on Indian Affairs (1933–37) and as president of the Association on 
American Indian Affairs (1937–42, 1946–63). 
After the emancipation of the colonies, postcolonial intellectuals and a 
new generation of anthropologists, often coming from these very colonies, 
questioned and debunked Western premises and prejudices. The neutrality of 
the traditional ethnographic method of ‘participant observation’ has been 
exposed as an impossibility, and many contemporary anthropologists have 
addressed this epistemological and methodological issue by involving the people 
they worked with in their own anthropological accounts, as co-authors or 
acknowledged sources.8 This can be defined as the ‘literary turn’ of 
anthropology: anthropology as literature, inausmuch as the authorial role in the 
crafting of a text is foregrounded. In spite of this important change, however, it 
is still to be determined whether anthropology can overcome its colonialist 
origins and past fully. But the fact remains that anthropological accounts at 
their best aspire to literary status. What does this mean? 
It can be stated safely that anthropology offers a paradigm of 
representation, rather than a ‘truthful’ portrayal of native customs. And 
representation is not necessarily mimesis, as Iser pointed out in his seminal book 
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The Fictional and the Imaginary (1993).9 In fact, representation can be 
performative and expressive, rather than aiming at a specular image of ‘reality’. 
Also, as Kenneth Burke said, a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing (1935: 
70), and what is left out is determined by what is looked for.10 What one looks 
for depends on the intellectual, cultural and social premises of the whole 
anthropological project at hand and the particular characteristics (both socio-
cultural and psychological) of the individual anthropologist. In other words, by 
representing other people’s cultures, anthropologists reveal a lot about the 
unstated side of their own cultures. Many anthropologists who have realized this 
have turned to the study of their own cultures and societies. It is certainly worth 
attempting to anthropologize the West through a self-reflexive practice of 
cultural observation, as we increasingly recognize our projections on the ‘Other’ 
as ghosts and revenants of our own ‘home’. Let us, then, take back these 
projections and work on them from the ‘inside’, from what I call ‘the inner 
frontier of colonialism’. In fact as Western history demonstrates, the extra-
European colonial enterprise would have not been possible without the on-going 
marginalization of deviant ideas and practices ‘at home’. For example, both 
peasants in remote areas of the European countries and ‘primitives’ in the 
colonies were often considered as the last remnants of a previous, backward 
stage of evolution and were stigmatized and assimilated for their ‘superstition’. 
At the same time, as the works of Michel Foucualt have demonstrated, the rise 
of bio-power and its means of control of the masses, and of dissidents, has 
ensured compliance, eradication, or pathologization of difference. Rationalism 
and scientism have been such powerful discursive constructs in the violent 
handling of marginal groups, their worldviews and activities that their genealogy 
and development are worthy subjects of study even in literary criticism. Or 
rather, literary criticism can be an elective locus of historical and philosophical 
insights. 
Literary texts are privileged repositories of data for this task and that is 
why an anthropology of literature can be established and practiced. Although 
anthropological ideas have often been used to make sense of ethnic customs and 
rituals in postcolonial literary texts, few attempts have been made to study 
literature as an anthropological ‘field’. Fewer still are the studies of Western 
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literary texts from this point of view.11 As far as I am aware, nobody has tried to 
anthropologize Western culture(s) through the study of its (their) literature(s). 
This is what I do here. I support the idea and practice of an anthropology of 
literature, but I do not impose ideas from anthropology and literary criticism on 
each other in an external way. Rather, I allow for a space of fruitful interaction 
and interplay between the two disciplines. In this sense, I take on board the 
ethnographic way of seeing and consider literature as a ‘field’ for an 
anthropologically informed literary criticism, within the wider context of an 
anthropology of literature, whereby I aim at providing ‘readings’ of literary texts 
that are potentially new.  
A few words on the notion of ‘field’ are necessary. In fact I use this word 
in a broader sense than is usually implied in anthropology, where it is modelled 
on the research method of data collection. The way I use the word ‘field’ 
resonates with the notion in the physical and biological sciences, as employed by 
Rupert Sheldrake (1994).12 In other words, I see literature as a ‘field’, an 
interconnected whole made up of several interlocked and recursive patterns, 
both as information and form, as it will be explained later; literature as a ‘site’ 
where you can pick up different (subterranean) threads of thought and also see 
their interaction in the shaping of what Castoriadis calls the ‘social-historical’ 
dimension.13  
What is an anthropology of literature good for? To be aware of the lenses 
we have used to look at the ‘Other’, and what these reveal us about ourselves, 
our own cultures and self-perceptions. In this sense, I advocate a 
phenomenological approach to the study of literature, the personal, cultural and 
historical dimensions of one’s experience being the condition sine qua non for 
literary research and analysis. In the process of reading Western literature in this 
way, we may be in for some surprises about the stakes of the so called ‘project 
of modernity’ and discover that it is a well thought-out construct, nonetheless 
ridden with ambiguities, contradictions and unacknowledged hybridization 
practices. In order to be able to do this kind of reading, we need to adopt 
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simultaneously what anthropologists call etic and emic perspectives, being at 
once ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’, able to see how our cultural history has been 
shaped by a set of specific presuppositions, going back to ancient Jewish and 
Greek classical thought, as some anthropologists have forcefully demonstrated in 
their studies.14  
 
1.2 Why Magic 
It becomes evident when we try to understand the presuppositions that have 
moulded Western culture and thought as we know it today that ‘magic’ is a 
fundamental concept, which, since the Enlightenment, has been used as a ‘foil’ 
in shaping Western self-images. For this reason it is useful to be aware of the 
origins and history of magic as an anthropological concept.  
What we call ‘magic’ is as old as humanity itself. However, as a 
conceptual category, it is extremely unstable and vague, at least in the way it 
was laid out by British and French anthropologists and sociologists in the second 
part of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Here I look 
at the various formulations and evaluate them, pointing out their limits. It is 
worth bearing in mind that before the Enlightenment branded magic as 
‘superstition’, there was a widespread magical and mystical consciousness in 
Europe, even among the educated classes. A conspicuous example is Sir Isaac 
Newton, the father of modern science and a convinced alchemist too. Ronald 
Hutton, in his The Triumph of the Moon (1999), sets out to distinguish ‘high 
magic’ as part of the Renaissance intellectual tradition, and ‘low magic’ as a set 
of folk beliefs and practices.15 However, ‘magic’ and ‘rationality’ as mutually 
exclusive are products of Enlightenment discourse and later of Positivism. I refer 
to ‘magic’ and ‘rationality’ in inverted commas because they are concepts which 
were constructed in the way we are familiar with today in that age. The former 
has been the foil which has enabled ‘Western rationality’ to constitute itself. In 
this sense, the two concepts are interdependent. 
The first to develop the concept of ‘magic’ in anthropology was Edward 
Tylor. He saw ‘magic’ as a pseudoscience, a mistaken attempt to find solutions 
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to problems and mastery over natural laws. Sir James Frazer took this view on 
board and refined it further. ‘Magic’ was to be considered as the first and most 
primitive stage of ‘unenlightened’ and ‘pre-rational’ thinking, to be supplanted 
by religion at a higher stage of intellectual development and, finally, by science, 
which was the apotheosis of the entire human intellectual rise. This stage, of 
course, was reached by Victorian evolutionist scientists and anthropologists 
themselves. In other words, ‘magic’ was just ‘fallacious science’. 
At the same time in France, the school going back to Emile Durkheim, and 
then continued by Marcel Mauss, developed a strong distinction between ‘magic’ 
on one hand and ‘religion’ on the other. The latter was considered as eminently 
social in its structures, institutions, dogmas and beliefs and was seen as 
essentially cohesive in function. ‘Magic,’ instead, was the domain of the 
individual, the antisocial desire of a marginalized or somewhat socially and 
psychologically frustrated sorcerer. Both these traditions of thought considered 
‘magic’ in the light of, or in opposition to something else. ‘Magic’ was the 
domain of the irrational and antisocial, and as such it was to be frowned upon. 
In fact, Tylor marvelled at the extent of the survival of ‘superstition’ in the 
beliefs of the uneducated classes even in the progressive Europe of his days.  
Before Edward Evans-Pritchard published his masterpiece on Zande 
witchcraft Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937), an 
overlooked letter exchange between French philosopher Lévy-Bruhl and the 
younger British anthropologist put forward the much contested idea that 
‘primitive’ people do in fact think in a completely different way, which is not 
irrational but a-rational, or rather founded on a completely different logic from 
the rational one. Lévy-Bruhl called this different way of thinking participation 
mystique. Evans Pritchard, who admired him greatly, thought nonetheless that it 
would be necessary to refine the terms used to describe this mentality, as it was 
not something confined to ‘primitive’ thinking, but was a mode of thought 
available to everyone behind the surface of rationality. In fact, he argued, they 
coexisted in ‘modern’ man too. Evans Pritchard was interested not so much in 
comparing ‘primitive mentality’ to rationality; rather he thought it would be 
fruitful and insightful to compare participation mystique among primitive 
societies and modern ones. The official account of Lévy-Bruhl’s intellectual 
development emphasizes his later perplexity and rejection of his previous ideas 
about participation mystique. However, as Susan Greenwood (2009) has 
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convincingly argued in her The Anthropology of Magic, this was not the case.16 
The letters and the notebooks in fact prove the contrary, namely that Lévy-Bruhl 
went on thinking about his concept of participation mystique and refined it 
further throughout his life. This fact is important in order to understand magic 
as a specific kind of mental and emotional state. 
Another anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski advanced an alternative 
theory about ‘magic’. He had an emotionalist view of ‘magic’ as arising in 
stressful situations, when technical methods are ineffective and cannot achieve 
desired results. Magic can release such stress in rituals that imitate and advance 
the desired results.17 Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, on the other hand, rejected 
Malinowski’s views of magic psychological function and endorsed a Durkheimian 
perspective, in that he stated that magic has to do with social structures, whose 
internal characteristics magic articulates. However, he argued against the 
Durkheimian dicothomy between ‘magic’ and ‘religion’, because he saw them 
both as pertaining to the wider field of ‘ritual’.18 
Later, the father of structuralism, Lévi-Strauss, considered ‘primitive 
mentality’ as not at all mystical, but rather profoundly rational and logical. He 
did this by analysing a great number of myths from Amazonia and showed how 
these myths expressed sets of binary oppositions that, once seen and 
conceptualized, were a link in an unbroken chain of relationships whereby their 
whole worldview and mode of life hung together and could be made sense of 
with a little ‘translation’ practice. 
These are some of the most famous theories of ‘magic’ in British and 
French anthropology and sociology. They stressed different elements, but they 
all tended to analyse magic in the light of something else or to make sense of it 
by superimposing the Western mind-set on the observed phenomena. The only 
exception was Lévy-Bruhl’s participation mystique which, in spite of a certain 
black and white opposition between ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’, ‘mystical’ and 
‘rational’, allowed for the possibility that an a-rational mode of thought might 
exist.19  
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Apart from Lévy-Bruhl, other anthropologists have provided symbolic 
approaches to the interpretation of ‘magic’. Arnold Van Gennep in Rites of 
Passage (1908) laid the groundwork for future theories of ritual.20 He argued for 
the co-existence of ‘magic’ and ‘religion’, the latter being a theoretical addition 
to a set of techniques that constitute ‘magic’. Particularly famous among 
anthropologists is his division of ritual in three stages or categories: ‘separation, 
transition and incorporation’. Of these, the second is deemed to be endowed 
with a specific regenerative and transformational power, especially in the ‘rites 
of passage’ (for example from childhood to adulthood). This condition is called 
‘liminality’ and has been elaborated further by anthropologist Victor Turner in 
The Ritual Process (1969), as being characterised by ‘egalitarianism’ and the 
spirit of ‘communitas’, that is anti-hierarchical and anti-structural, when 
compared to the social order.21 Mary Douglas, the author of Purity and Danger 
(1966) and Natural Symbols (1970), argues against the rigid separation of 
‘religion’ and ‘magic’, because both are symbols of social structure and entail 
similar ideas of contagion.22 Instead, she suggests a distinction between ‘high 
ritualism’ and ‘low ritualism’: an example of the latter is Protestantism, while 
Catholicism is characterised by a high degree of ‘ritualism’, which is the 
emphasis placed on the right succession and manipulation of symbols and words. 
Clifford Geertz in his The Interpretation of Cultures, published in 1966, states 
that there are three factors an anthropologist has to take into account when 
observing human behaviour: the psychological, the cultural beliefs and ideas, 
and the social order. Accordingly he defines religion as:  
(1) A system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.23 
From this multi-layered definition of religion, Geertz goes on to argue for the 
power of ritual to change a man and his outlook on the world.  
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In the 1980s and 1990s, the highly original anthropologist Alfred Gell 
focused on the way language and objects are used in magical activities, thereby 
coming to the conclusion that magic is a kind of ‘technology’, which makes use 
of words and artefacts and applies cognitive strategies in order to achieve its 
purposes. In his view, no essential feature distinguishes ‘magical’ from 
‘technical’ activities, which are often found together: 
I take the view that ‘magic’ as an adjunct to technical procedures 
persists because it serves ‘symbolic’ ends, that is to say, cognitive 
ones. Magical thought formalizes and codifies the structural features 
of technical activity, imposing on it a framework of organization 
which regulates each successive stage in a complex process. […] Magic 
consists of a symbolic ‘commentary’ on technical strategies in 
[economic] production, [sexual] reproduction and psychological 
manipulation. I suggest that magic derives from play. When children 
play, they provide a continuous stream of commentary on their own 
behaviour. This commentary frames their actions, divides it up into 
segments, defines momentary goals, and so on. It seems that this 
superimposed organizational format both guides imaginative play as it 
proceeds, and also provides a means of internalizing it and recalling 
it, as well as rawn materials for subsequent exercises in innovation 
and recombination, using previously accumulated materials in new 
configurations.24 
 While on one hand, it is fruitful to de-emphasize the difference between 
‘magical’ and ‘technical’, on the other this is not sufficient to distinguish the 
specificity of so-called magical activities: Gell referred to cognitive strategies, 
but he did not take into account the emotions of the agent who performs magic 
and of the audience. It is true that he considered magic as a psychological 
weapon capable of influencing the recipient and forcing him into compliance, 
but other than that, he did not elaborate on positive or subversive aspects of the 
emotional involvement of both agent and recipient.25 On the contrary, in 
considering the close relation between magic and art, he saw the latter as 
invariably promoting acquiescence and defending the status quo‒‒a rather 
reductive view of art, and of magic.  
Stanley Jerayah Tambiah’s views on magic and ritual are particularly 
important for the development of an anthropology of literature. In fact he 
defines ‘magic’ as a ‘rhetorical art’ and also incorporates many of the themes 
developed by his predecessors. He states that: 
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Magical acts are ritual acts, and ritual acts are performative acts 
whose positive and creative meaning is missed and whose persuasive 
validity is misjudged if they are subjected to that kind of empirical 
verification associated with scientific activity.26 
 
A performative act is an act that by being enacted only effects a change of 
state, while ‘magic’ involves both object manipulation and words (spells or 
incantations). For Tambiah, ‘magic’ can be analysed both from the point of view 
of its end, and within its semantic frame. He reworks Frazer’s distinction 
between homeopathic and contagious magic, adding an analogy with metaphor 
and metonymy, respectively. In fact, homeopathic magic and metaphor both 
rely on similarities, while contagious magic and metonymy depend on the 
displacing of a quality from an object to another which is perceived as 
contiguous. These and many more interesting reflections are contained in his 
collection of essays Culture, Thought and Social Action (1985). In a later chapter 
some of his arguments will be analysed and related to fiction in detail. While 
Tambiah distinguishes between the ‘causal’ and the ‘participatory’, he believes 
that they are not so much innate cognitive modes of thought as socially 
constructed ways of seeing the world. However, he leaves open the question of 
how the passage from one to the other occurs. In his Magic, Science, Religion 
and the Scope of Rationality (1990), Tambiah analyses the way the early 
distinctions between ‘magic’ and ‘religion’ were laid out.27 He suggests that the 
legacy of Judaism that opposed true religion to idolatry coloured the early 
anthropologists’ reflections and formulations. The other element that shaped 
their definitions was the Protestant condemnation of magic as inefficacious and 
as a futile attempt to coerce God into a specific course of action. Obviously, the 
Protestant propagandists of the beginning of the seventeenth century had in 
mind Catholicism as an example of ‘magic’. His genealogy, then, tracks the 
origins of a fundamental Western intellectual distinction back to culture-specific 
legacies. 
This overview of some of the major theories of ‘magic’, ‘religion’ and 
‘ritual’ is selective and lays no claim to completeness. Its purpose in this context 
is to show the importance of the reflection on ‘magic’ for the contribution that 
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it can give to an understanding of specific features of Western intellectual 
history, characterized by a strong push towards abstraction and dichotomous 
thought. Furthermore, the term ‘magic’ is fruitful to illuminate some 
fundamental aspects of reading fiction, as will be shown at a later stage. 
No matter how different these approaches to ‘magic’ are, all recent 
scholars agree on the paramount importance of ‘magic’ to define groups and 
individual identities. In fact, they highlight how ‘magic’ is a somewhat shadowy 
notion, which, however, has helped (mostly) Westerners to shape their 
perceptions and definitions of themselves and of others; better still, to define 
themselves in opposition to the ‘Other’. In fact Westerners elaborated the 
theoretical construct of ‘magic’ because it served the pragmatic purpose of 
distinguishing the ‘civilized man’ from the ‘others’, and therefore, it was 
instrumental to the construction of the official images of ‘modernity’ and 
‘progress’.  
Accordingly, in Making Magic (2004), Randall Styers tracks the ‘emergence 
of magic in the modern world’:28 
My basic argument in this text is that debates concerning magic have 
maintained a great appeal for social theorists in large measure 
because they provide such a rich site for articulating and contesting 
the nature and boundaries of modernity. (21) 
He sets out to answer the following questions: 
How has magic functioned in modern thought to demarcate the limits 
of religion? How have constructions of magic served to give definition 
to science and scientific rationality? Finally, with magic positioned as 
a buffer between religion and science, what social and political norms 
have been promoted through these theories? (22) 
One of the primary functions of magic in […] scholarly literature has 
been to serve as a foil to religion. […] Magic has been configured as 
the illegitimate (and effeminized) sibling, and through contrast with 
this form of deviance, scholars have sought to give religion clearer 
definition. […] Magic not only has offered a foil for religion but also 
has been positioned in the scholarly tradition as occupying some sort 
of middle ground between religion and that other great Western 
formation, ‘science’. […] And with magic positioned as a middle 
ground between religion and science, it has functioned in the 
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scholarly literature to mediate‒‒even police‒‒relations between the 
two. Throughout the history of modern Western social science and 
religious studies, numerous scholars have struggled to reify magic as a 
discrete entity and to map the precise relations among magic, 
religion, and science. (6-7) 
While it is not possible to follow Styers’ passionate and insightful study in 
detail, I would like to stress the similarity of intent underlying my project. In 
fact, what Styers does for anthropology, I would like to do for literary criticism. 
However, the attempt at ‘anthropologizing the West’ by focusing on the 
category of ‘magic’ in my case is renewed with a few additional characteristics. 
First and foremost, this attempt passes through a redefinition of what I see as 
the ‘magic’ of fiction reading: beyond the specific positions assumed by 
different scholars, I view ‘magic’ as both a way of thinking and acting, bridging 
the eminently Western opposition between theory and praxis. I venture out in 
new territory, building up a new methodology for an anthropology of literature, 
and then reading three literary texts accordingly. Secondly, by embracing an 
alternative definition of ‘magic’ as both a universal mode of consciousness and a 
technology in the form of a ‘rhetorical art’ (more on this later), I also focus on 
the problem of ‘modernity’ in the selected novels, in order to show the 
deconstructive tendencies at work in some Western contemporary literature. 
Thus my intent has a double perspective: I link up a theory of reading as ‘magic’ 
to a focus on ‘modernity’ as the issue dealt with in the chosen novels and 
confronted by the readers themselves. The novels analysed are very different 
from each other and show varying degrees of mimesis and fantasy. They are: 
Lanark (1981) by Alasdair Gray, The Iguana (L’Iguana, 1965) by Anna Maria 
Ortese and Measuring the World (Die Vermessung der Welt, 2005) by Daniel 
Kehlmann. In spite of their diversity, these texts engage in their own ways with 
the concept of ‘modernity’ in its various stages and meanings within their 
cultural frames of reference, respectively industrial and post-industrial urban 
Scotland, Italy and the post-colonial world (albeit in a fantastic key) in the 
1960s, and Germany at the intersection of Enlightenment and Romanticism. 
Indeed, the dialectics between Enlightenment and Romanticism are a key 
element for the comprehension of the origins of ‘modernity’ as an intellectual 
category. 
In his literary study on The Romantic Fantastic (1984), the comparatist 
Tobin Siebers tries to account for the nineteenth century fantastic tale through 
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what he calls the ‘logic of superstition’, defending an anthropological 
interpretation whereby the Romantic exaltation of superstition against the 
Enlightenment’s ‘intolerance and rationalist fanaticism’ towards deviance and 
marginality produced the fantastic tale with its own specific characteristics, as a 
reaction.29 Siebers’ approach to literature is based on the premises of the 
sociological view of a ‘disenchanted’ world, first pioneered by Max Weber in 
‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ (1919).30  
According to this point of view, rationalism, capitalism and modernization 
brought about ‘disenchantment’: by ‘taking away the magic’ from daily life and 
reducing mystery, and, at the same time, constantly enlarging science’s compass 
for rational knowledge and explanation. While no one would deny the evidence 
for this stance, it is still necessary to allow for a flexible and non-monolithic 
approach to the phenomenon of ‘modernity’ and ‘rationalism’. In fact, the 
Enlightenment Age produced such playfully serious masterpieces as Mozart’s Die 
Zauberflöte, The Magic Flute (1791), which contains many Masonic symbols, and 
Goldoni’s playful drama Il mondo della luna, The Moon World (1777), set to 
music by Joseph Haydn. Furthermore, as a recent project directed by Dan 
Edelstein at the University of Stanford has shown, there was a ‘dark side’ to the 
Enlightenment, an age of proliferation of secret societies with their own 
complex rituals and reconstructionist tendencies.31 
I consider literature as a nodal centre for dealing with the issue of the 
fantastic in a creative way, through the dynamics of the reading process, that is, 
the interaction between text and reader, which, through both the symbolic 
mode of myth and the discursive mode of logos, provides an enhanced (magical) 
supplement to consensus reality and, in the best of cases, facilitates a shift in 
the reader’s consciousness. 
In subsequent chapters, some ideas concerning ‘myth’ and ‘ritual’ will be 
introduced; however, now it is necessary to recall Catherine Bell’s objection to 
the traditional, established, way of categorizing the two, both in anthropology 
and in religious studies. In Ritual Thought, Ritual Practice (1992) Bell argues 
that the opposition between ‘thought’ and ‘action’ or ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’ has 
tainted the whole Western intellectual enterprise and is specifically at work in 
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definitions of ‘ritual’ as a repetitive activity the ‘body’ engages in according to a 
set of rules, while the ‘mind’ is not engaged.32 ‘Myth’, on the other hand, would 
count on the side of ‘thought’, or symbolic explanation of specific natural 
phenomena, social practices, institutions and taboos. What is obsolete in this 
approach is that it is unaware of being the product of a specific and historical 
frame of mind, that of the cosmopolitan educated classes from the West. It does 
not even start to contemplate the possibility that there may be alternative 
perspectives or categories. This is where reading literature anthropologically 
yields rich possibilities for cultural observation and reflection on the way what 
sociologist and psychoanalyst Castoriadis (1987) calls the ‘social-historical’ 
dimension and the ‘imaginary’ constantly shape and constrain each other into 
specific forms. Later chapters provide the reader both with an introduction to 
Castoriadis’ ideas and a more holistic definition of ‘myth’ and ‘ritual(ization)’, 
for the purpose of reading literature anthropologically. 
For the time being, however, it is useful to bear in mind the following two 
points: 1. Regardless of whether ‘myth’ or ‘ritual’ precede or depend on each 
other, they often (but not always) interact in ‘religion’ and ‘magic’. 2. ‘Religion’ 
and ‘magic’ are concepts beset with difficulties when it comes to defining them 
from an analytical perspective. It all depends on the focus of the specific 
discipline dealing with these ‘practices’ or ‘phenomena’. Thus an 
anthropological stance emphasizes the social praxis people engage in, while 
historians of religion often assume a phenomenological stance. With this broad 
generalization we touch upon a core issue: that of the viewpoint in the 
observation of ‘magic’ (and ‘religion’). While social anthropologists in the past 
tended to adopt an etic point of view, a detached and ‘objective’, ‘neutral’ 
approach to the subject, historians of religion have hypothesized the existence 
of an (abstract) homo religiosus par excellence, and have proceeded to see each 
religion as a particular expression of the homo religiosus’ sensibility and 
outlook. They have assumed a perspective that tries to make sense of the 
religious ‘phenomenon’, focusing on the participants’ experiences and beliefs. 
More recently, anthropologists have reached the point of questioning the 
opposition of etic/emic and have argued for the need of adopting both, 
switching from one to the other as required by the circumstances and the task at 
hand. I agree with this most recent anthropological stance. However, I would 
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like to push it a bit further, and state that reading literature anthropologically 
entails more than switching from one modality to the other at will; rather, being 
able to hold both perspectives, etic and emic, at once, thus situating oneself in 
an imaginary fluid in-between space. In this sense, fiction that blurs mimesis and 
fantasy facilitates the enactment of this very process in the reader’s 
consciousness, as I will argue later. In other words, literature can be considered 
a privileged ‘field’ where the reader can reconcile divergent and convergent 
thinking, action, thought and feeling. Logos and mythos are not so much 
opposites as complementary modes of consciousness, which play a key role in 
reading (and enjoying) literature fully. So far ‘magic’ has been considered as an 
anthropological concept. Let us turn to the relation between ‘magic’ and 
literature, or, better still, to literature as ‘magic’. 
 
1.3 The ‘Magic’ of Literature since the Inception of 
‘Modernity’ 
As T. S. Eliot stated in the famous essay ‘The metaphysical poets’ (1921), 
the English metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century had the ability to 
conceive ‘sensuous thoughts’: for them thought and images were, apparently, 
one and the same unified process.33 The advancement of modernization, 
technological and industrial development, rationalism and science has brought 
about the progressive erosion of this ability and of the value ascribed to it. 
Instead, as Bruno Latour has shown (1993), ‘modernity’ has gone in the direction 
of conceptualizing purity as the separation of the material and the spiritual, 
while simultaneously allowing for the proliferation of hybrids as the very basis of 
Western ‘nature-cultures’, whereby he concludes that ‘we have never been 
modern’.34 In my analysis of Lanark, I dwell on this topic. Here, however, it must 
be stressed that as far as magic is concerned, it cannot be denied that during 
the Renaissance it was still considered a worthy intellectual pursuit amongst the 
educated classes, while the popular classes would preserve their own folklore 
and practices even until much more recent times. On the other hand, even if the 
Enlightenment’s campaign against ‘superstition’ brought this era to a close 
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officially, the eighteenth century was a remarkable time for the invention and 
re-creation of ritual, especially in the context of Freemasonry, such as 
Cagliostro’s renowned ‘Egyptian rite’.35 
Literature has frequently been conceived as ‘magic’ in reaction to 
modernization itself between the end of the eighteenth and the end of the 
nineteenth centuries,and it was appropriated by innovative artistic movements 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, following the ‘discovery’ of 
the unconscious, and, finally, it has been reworked in contemporary fiction. All 
these different ways of envisioning literature as magic and/or incorporating 
magical motifs in literature have been shaped by specific and unique historical 
conditions. Accordingly, many writers devised creative solutions, which have ― 
explicitly or implicitly ― linked the practice of literature with the practice of 
‘magic’.  
However, this study focuses on a less explored aspect of the literary 
magic, the reading process. While examining the way different literary 
movements posited the relation between magic and literature ―mainly from the 
author’s perspective and implicitly from the audience’s― the focus is directed 
on the creative interaction between text and reader during the reading process, 
an interaction which fulfils a specific aesthetic response, as described by 
Wolfgang Iser in The Act of Reading.36 This focuses on the way a reader’s 
aesthetic response is in great measure pre-structured by the way the text is 
organised, and can only produce a limited plethora of meanings as a result of 
this pre-structuring. This is in fact the guarantee of the reader’s creative 
involvement in the text. However, as Michael Burke has suggested in his survey 
of the cognitive study of literary reading processing and discourse analysis 
(Literary Reading, Cognition and Emotion: 2011), the reader provides affective 
inputs which are of an unconscious nature during his reading and indeed also 
before and after it, while preparing himself and reflecting or elaborating what 
he has read.37 This means that literary reading involves both ‘mind-fed’ and 
‘sign-fed’ elements which interact in a continuous back and forth movement or 
‘oceanic’ flow.   
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Burke shows how the different elements of mood and location of the 
reading, together with literary styles, themes and reading imagery interact in 
the reading process in a sort of ‘literary reading loop’ (2011: 153). Burke also 
considers the topic of reader’s epiphany, or what he calls ‘disportation’. He is 
only interested in what happens to real readers of literary texts. On the other 
hand, this present study does consider what happens while reading what I later 
define as ‘hybrid fiction’, but postulates the existence of a virtual space 
between text and embodied consciousness, where what is expected of the 
implied reader and what happens in an embodied reader cross and blend. 
Winnicott’s ideas about ‘transitional objects’ or stages, expressed in his Playing 
and Reality (1971), are important here.38  
According to this psychiatrist, the space which the mother had occupied is 
filled with toys and play, and later with culture and art: transitional objects and 
phenomena, which play a fundamental role in human culture. Thus, to Iser’s 
project of an anthropology of literature based on the interplay of ‘the fictive 
and the imaginary’, as laid out in his 1993 volume of the same name and in 
subsequent papers,39 I suggest adding the element of ‘ritualization’, as a 
transitional stage and a process specific to non-realistic fiction reading, and 
particularly the hybrid genre of what, in a subsequent chapter, will be called 
‘deformed romance’. This ritualization process in turn can reshape, alter, or de-
structure readers’ perceptions and predispositions. Thus reading is a practice 
which can be both etic and emic in the way these terms are used in 
ethnography, objectivised and detached on one hand, subjective on the other. 
The first revival of the ‘fantastic’ and the strange in Britain was linked to 
the very process of rationalization and the rise of scientific knowledge and 
                                         
38
 Donald W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (1971; London: Routledge 1991). 
39
 Wolfgang Iser defines the act of fictionalising in the following way, among others: 
‘Fiction and fictionalizing entail a duality, the liar must conceal the truth, but the thruth is potentially 
present in the mask disguising it. In literary fictions, existing wolrds are overstepped, and although 
they are individually still recognizable, they are set in a context that defamiliarizes them. Thus both 
lie and literature contain two worlds: the lie incorporates the truth and the purpose for which it must 
be concealed; literary fictions incorporate an identifiable reality that is subjected to an 
unforeseeable refashioning. And when we describe fictionalizing as an act of overstepping, we 
must bear in mind that the reality overstepped is not left behind: it remains present, thereby 
imbuing fiction with a duality that may be exploited for different purposes.’ ‘The Significance of 
Fictionalizing’, Anthropoetics III, no. 2 (Fall 1997 / Winter 1998), 
http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0302/iser_fiction.htm, [accessed 08/08/2010]  
As to the imaginary, Iser borrows the notion from Cornelius Castoriadis, who, in The Imaginary 
Institution of Society (1987), defines it as ‘magma’, an indefinite, fluid and diffuse matrix of original 
creativity, not only at individual level, but also of all social and historical institutions. Later in the 
text, Castoriadis’ point of view will be explored in some detail. 
 
  33 
mentality following in the wake of the first industrial revolution. This coupled 
with the widening market for novels opened up new possibilities for writers. The 
classical gothic novel The Castle of Otranto by Horace Walpole ‘was the earliest 
and most important manifestation of late-eighteenth-century revival of 
romance’.40 In Walpole’s own words:  
It was an attempt to blend the two kinds of romance [romance proper 
and the novel], the ancient and the modern. In the former all was 
imagination and improbability: in the latter, nature is always intended 
to be, and sometimes has been, copied with success. Invention has 
not been wanting; but the great resources of fancy have been 
dammed up, by a strict adherence to common life. But if in the latter 
species Nature has cramped imagination, she did but take her 
revenge, having been totally excluded from old romances. The 
actions, sentiments, conversations, of the heroes and heroines of 
ancient days were as unnatural as the machines employed to put them 
in motion. (quoted in Punter, 1980: 50) 
If ‘Walpole deliberately sets out to flout realist conventions’ (Punter 
1980: 50), in Anne Radcliffe’s Udolpho, the boundaries of reality and fantasy 
[are] blurred and softened, although she usually finished her books with rational 
explanations of seemingly uncanny events: Matthew Gregory Lewis (in The 
Monk), taking the anti-realist process a step further, begins the essentially 
Gothic construction of a world of mutually self-validating fictions which are 
texturally more ‘real’ than reality itself’ (70). Lewis had been influenced by the 
German Schauerroman, and his novel was the most scandalous example of the 
Gothic.  
The German Gothic, however, had its own distinct characteristics. 
According to Barry Murnane (2012), 
[…] the term Schauerroman shows how the German gothic was part of 
late-Enlightenment anthropological and aesthetic traditions. The basis 
of this dimension of affective poetics was the concept that a reader 
can experience a form of pleasure through fearfulness. […] If the 
(super)-natural horrors can be rationally explained or if the violence, 
wild landscapes, and labyrinthine dungeons in these novels can be 
identified as providing a reassuring effect for the readers, then the 
frisson of the Schauerroman can hardly be considered a form of 
counter-Enlightenment fiction anymore […]. Instead it appears to be a 
medium in which rationally thinking readers can engage in a form of 
self-fashioning by which they portray themselves as having overcome 
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the archaic fear of the sublime and can now enjoy such titillating 
pleasures.  
Nonetheless, 
Perhaps it makes sense to view the gothic novel around 1800 as a 
black box containing those difficulties being negotiated by a society 
thrust headlong into the capitalist, bureaucratic, and industrial 
conditions of modernity; by this logic the discourse of ‘Lust an der 
Angst’ [pleasure of horror] in the Enlightenment was no more than a 
Trojan horse leading to a challenging of Enlightenment principles 
through the forms of Schauerromantik.41 
The Gothic trend was to remain an undercurrent throughout the 
nineteenth century, in Walter Scott’s historical novels and in the most 
sensational passages of Charles Dickens’ fiction. It is also significant that the 
Surrealist manifesto would refer later to Lewis’ fiction as a supreme example of 
the total liberation of the imagination. 
 As far as the Romantics are concerned, M. H. Abrams, in his classic study 
of German and English Romanticism, Natural Supernaturalism (1971), tracks 
points of continuity and rupture between Romanticism and the Christian legacy 
in some detail.42 German and English Romantics drew on Renaissance 
philosophical and mystical thought (i.e. Hermeticism, Jacob Boehme and 
Giordano Bruno), as well as on Plotinus’ thought, in order to formulate their own 
visions of life as a journey or pilgrimage back to the Source. However, they 
replaced the static Neoplatonic symbol of the circle with the spiral, which 
symbolizes upward movement and integration of different stages of spiritual 
evolution on a higher plane of existence. The metaphor of life as a journey or a 
quest and the vision of man as a wanderer or pilgrim go back both to Pagan and 
Christian notions. The Romantics infused man’s quest with infinite aspiration and 
approximation to, rather than attainment of, perfection. For some of them the 
object of the quest was immanent, for others it had a transcendental character. 
At the same time, some Romantics usually trust in the goodness of man and in 
his inner progress, while others are much more sinister and use irony to express 
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the precarious condition of the human being, his alienation in the context of a 
philistine daily life which can be redeemed only by art and the imagination. 
Novalis, the Schlegels, Hölderlin, Blake, Wordsworth and Shelley are all 
visionaries in their own ways, the last three being respectively a prophet, a bard 
and an utopian revolutionary, while Walpole, Lewis, Tieck, Brentano, Hoffmann 
are more pessimistic, albeit advocating the possibility of healing the split 
individual, usually an artist, through the imagination. The German Romantics 
invented the literary fairy tale, which to Novalis was ‘the canon of poetry’43 and 
was characterised by the conflation of the everyday with the supernatural or the 
uncanny. In Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen, for example, ‘Die Welt wird 
Traum, der Traum wird Welt’ (Gesammelte Werke, I, p. 304). Novalis links the 
fairy tale to a new way of perceiving the world: ‘Der Welt muss romantisiert 
werden’, the poet perceives the world through the magical mirror of the 
imagination and creates something anew: 
The world must be romanticized. This yields again its original 
meaning. Romanticizing is nothing else than a qualitative 
potentization. In this operation the lower self becomes identified with 
a better self. Just as we ourselves are a potential series of this kind. 
This operation is still entirely unknown. By giving the common a 
higher meaning, the everyday, a mysterious semblance, the known, 
the dignity of the unknown, the finite, the appearance of the infinite, 
I romanticize it—For what is higher, unknown, mystical, infinite, one 
uses the inverse operation—in this manner it becomes 
logarithmicized—It receives a common expression. Romantic 
philosophy, Lingua romana. Reciprocal raising and lowering.44 
This new creation is something, I argue, that the reader is called to do by 
enacting and recreating imaginatively the various possibilities opened up in the 
text. 
Whether in poetry or fairy-tales, the German and English Romantics 
usually articulate the condition of the artist as a unique individual (although for 
Wordsworth the poet is ‘a man speaking to other men’). In most Romantics, this 
individualism exists side by side with admiration for folk culture. Their attitudes 
towards the reader would constitute an interesting and useful study in itself. 
The tension between individualism and admiration for folk culture was 
expressed through the exploration of the supernatural and the secret folds of 
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the individual’s soul through the medium of fantasy. Indeed fantastic literature 
became increasingly popular and almost all Romantic authors explored it in 
various degrees. The debate on ‘the marvellous’ was open.  
For example, in an article for The Foreign Quarterly Review, Sir Walter 
Scott stated his dislike of Hoffmann’s fantastic tales on the grounds that ‘the 
marvellous, more than any other attribute of fictitious narrative, loses its effect 
by being brought much into view. The imagination of the reader is to be excited 
if possible, without being gratified.’45 Yet, Hoffmann’s tales were highly 
fashionable and were to influence many eminent writers. Here, for example, is 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s address to the reader in his Der Goldne Topf (The Golden 
Pot), ‘A Modern Fairy-Tale’: 
[…] You are now, kind reader, in the fairy realm of glorious wonders, 
whose mighty strokes summon up both supreme bliss and extreme 
horror, and where the grave goddess raises her veil so that we may 
fancy we see her face—but her grave expression often breaks into a 
smile, and that is the impish humour that teases us with 
bewilderments of magic, as a mother often teases her dearest 
children. In this realm, which our spirit so often reveals to us, at least 
in our dreams, try, kind reader, to recognize the well-known shapes 
that, as the saying goes, cross your path every day. You will then 
believe that this magnificent realm is much nearer at hand than you 
had previously thought; and that is what I heartily wish you to 
believe, and what the strange story of Anselmus is supposed to 
convey.46 
‘Magic’ is recognized as the key factor necessary to reveal a shadow dimension 
of ordinary reality, contiguous and continuous with it, to the reader. Indeed 
ordinary reality and the ‘fairy realm’ turn into each other quite seamlessly in 
Hoffmann’s tale and also in The Iguana by Anna Maria Ortese, who expressed her 
admiration for the English and German Romantics, and Measuring the World by 
Daniel Kehlmann. While Ortese intends to convey the ‘mystery of the Universe’ 
(Corpo Celeste: 1997) embodied in a monster that represents the most abjected 
aspects of nature,47 together with its deep impenetrability, Kehlmann employs 
humour in order to satirize our contemporary apprehension of the 
transcendental thrust of German high romanticism and to show how it was 
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different from our own age. However, both make a conspicuous use of ‘magic’ to 
entice the reader. Ortese, like Hoffmann, makes appeals to the reader directly 
and, by so doing, intends to enmesh him into this strange ‘fairy realm’ in order 
to leave him stranded on the beach of epistemological uncertainty. In Lanark a 
dystopian ‘fairy realm’ swallows up, quite literally, the ordinary: the latter, we 
are told, exists in the framework of the former, while the reader’s and author’s 
roles are discussed in the meta-fictional ‘Epilogue’. ’ Although the setting of 
Lanark has dystopian and science-fictional overtones, Gray himself recognizes 
the importance of ‘nursery tales’ in the ‘Epilogue’, albeit ironically, and more 
explicitly in interviews.48 
 The ‘fairy realm’ is of fundamental import for all three authors, who 
rework its codes and strategies in different ways. Why is this realm so 
important? The pages of the novels function as a neutral space, where the 
imaginary reshapes the ordinary and, through constellations of mythical and 
ritual motifs and images combined in strange ways, they allow for the 
ritualization of the reader’s embodied consciousness. By this expression I mean 
the empowerment of the reader through the reading process which entails his 
inhabiting of a liminal dimension, by following pre-structured patterns and 
engaging in creative meaning-making through the co-existence of a double 
focus, both detached and subjective. In particular, this double perspective can 
come about only as a consequence of the patterning of fiction and is a 
prerogative of texts that criss-cross different genres and modes and blend the 
most fantastic elements with the most ordinary. Nathaniel Hawthorne, who like 
Poe was particularly influenced by E.T.A. Hoffmann, thus defined the term 
‘romance’ in ‘The Custom House’ Preface to The Scarlet Letter: ‘a neutral 
territory, somewhere between the real world and fairyland, where the Actual 
and the Imaginary may meet, and each imbue itself with the nature of the 
other.’49  
Indeed Ortese, Kehlmann and Gray all use this romance ‘strategy’, in 
various ways, and exaggerate its grotesque potential for deformation and 
estrangement of ‘the well-known shapes’ of every day life. They also deform the 
structure of the mythical quest by baffling the protagonist’s heroism in the sense 
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conceived by Joseph Campbell in his The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), 
whereby the mono-myth always entails the departure, adventure and coming 
back of the hero with treasure for his fellows.50 Indeed, Campbell adopted the 
idea of the ritual’s threefold structure (separation, trials or symbolic death and 
reintegration into society), elaborated by anthropologist Van Gennep in his The 
Rites of Passage (1908). While the hero or the heroine of a romance goes out on 
a ‘quest’, it is worth focusing on what the reader is doing in following the 
vicissitudes of the protagonist. Whereas realistic fiction and formulaic fantasy 
foster a high degree of identification or, an utter critical distance, fictions that 
blend ‘the actual’ and ‘the imaginary’ go beyond this stark opposition. What is 
at stake is no longer intellectual belief or disbelief, for the ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief’ postulated by Coleridge is only the first stage of the reading 
experience. Imagination is not linked primarily to abstract belief, but is in itself 
an elemental force51 which, I add, is unleashed in the liminal space inhabited by 
the reader’s embodied consciousness for the time of the reading. Imagination is 
sensuous and embodied: a heightening of the senses and perception, whereby 
the engaged reader recreates what is familiar in a sort of numinous experience. 
The Irish poet William Butler Yeats is explicit in his collection of essays 
Ideas of Good and Evil (1903) in linking up ‘magic’ and ‘imagination’.52 He 
upholds the following ‘doctrines’ which have been ‘the foundation of nearly all 
magical practices’: 
(1) That the borders of our minds are ever shifting, and that 
many minds can flow into one another, as it were and create or reveal 
a single mind, a single energy. 
(2) That the borders of our memories are as shifting, and that our 
memories are a part of one great memory, the memory of Nature 
herself. 
(3) That this great mind and great memory can be evoked by 
symbols. (‘Magic’, p. 29) 
He then continues, expounding on ‘emotional’ and ‘intellectual’ symbols, and 
the activity of the imagination: 
I cannot now think symbols less than the greatest of all powers, 
whether they are used consciously by the masters of magic, or half 
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unconsciously by their successors, the poet, the musician and the 
artist. (‘Magic’, p. 64) 
 
[…] imagination is always seeking to remake the world according to 
the impulses and the patterns in that great Mind, and that great 
Memory […] (‘Magic’, p. 68) 
 
Although these statements may sound too mystical to some contemporary 
ears, contemporary biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s insight into the interplay of 
creativity and patterning in the context of the wider cosmos is based on a similar 
view. In fact, in his holistic perspective expressed in the book The Rebirth of 
Nature: the Greening of Science and God, first published in 1991, he presents a 
systematic reconstruction of the historical circumstances that brought about the 
‘disenchantment of the world’ from the Protestant Reformation to rationalism, 
secularization, and technological advancement in the West. He shows how 
Descartes envisioned a mechanical and soulless world of mechanical matter, 
while ‘[t]he soul was also withdrawn from the human body, which became a 
mechanical automaton, leaving only the rational soul, the conscious mind, in a 
small region of the brain […]’ (50). However, ‘the machine analogy breaks down 
when it comes to understanding the growth and development of organisms, their 
morphogenesis’ (103). Sheldrake also shows how contemporary science has 
moved far away from this conception, through the idea of ‘gravitational field’, 
which explains the phenomenon of gravitation: 
Like the anima mundi, Einstein’s gravitational field is not in space and 
time; rather, it contains the entire physical world, including space 
and time. The gravitational field is space-time, and its geometrical 
properties are the cause of gravitational phenomena; it acts as a 
formative or formal cause, like the souls of medieval philosophy. […] 
In the present century, the field concept has been extended to 
gravitation and to the matter fields of quantum physics, making field 
more fundamental than matter. (82-83) 
These matter fields are states of space, or of the vacuum. But the 
vacuum is not empty; it is full of energy and undergoes spontaneous 
fluctuations that can create new quanta ‘from nothing’. (87) 
 
The result is that all nature is now thought to consist of fields and 
energy. Energy, like Aristotelian matter, can exist in many different 
forms. In Aristotelian physics, these forms were organised by souls; in 
modern physics, they are organised by fields. (89) 
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Where does this leave us for the purposes of the present study concerned 
with an anthropology of literature and the reading experience? The definition of 
morphogenetic fields provides the necessary conceptual link: 
According to the hypothesis of formative causation, they are a new 
kind of field so far unknown to physics with an intrinsically 
evolutionary nature. The fields of a given species […] contain a kind of 
collective memory on which each member of the species draws and to 
which it in turn contributes. The formative activity of the fields is not 
determined by timeless mathematical laws […] but by the actual 
forms taken up by previous members of the species. […] The fields are 
the means by which the habits of the species are built up, maintained, 
and inherited. (110, my emphasis) 
 
This inherited ‘collective memory’, which is the biological equivalent of Jung’s 
notion of the Collective Unconscious, extends to humans and their societies. 
Sheldrake thus explains ‘rituals’ as a way of really bringing the past into the 
present through repetitive and, also, patterned activity, which taps into the 
morphogenetic field handed down by the ancestors. The fact that new 
generations of individuals also contribute to this morphogenetic field through 
their own activities means that an interplay of creativity and habit takes place 
at all times, as variation is always possible.  
What do nature, a ritual dance and literature have in common? They all 
have in common patterning, the interplay of recurrences and variations. When 
we read fiction we are drawing from and contributing to this collective memory 
and activate cognitive and emotional patterns in our body-mind continuum 
through the transmission of information and energy. The movement of this 
energy is the flow of the imagination, a flux in the fluid reservoir of the 
imaginary, which is indistinct, yet takes on concrete shapes in social and 
psychological life. When the focus of the artist is on the inner realms of the 
imagination, on what is not given, Surrealism is the result. On the contrary, 
when the artist focuses on the social dimension of the imaginary, with its 
symbols and beliefs, Magical Realism ensues. In 1924 André Breton wrote the 
famous ‘Manifesto of Surrealism’, which gathered the fundamental ideas of the 
movement:  
I believe in the future resolution of these two states which are dream 
and reality, into a sort of absolute reality, a surreality. 
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Surrealism […] is a pure psychic automatism by which it is intended to 
express […] the true function of thought. Thought dictated in the 
absence of all control exerted by reason, and outside all aesthetic or 
moral control. 
 
Surrealism is not a new means of expression […] It is a means of total 
liberation of the mind and everything resembling it. 
 
Automatism […] remains one of the two major trends of surrealism. 
 
Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point 
of the mind at which life and death, the real and the imagined, past 
and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, high and low, 
cease to be perceived as contradictions. 
 
The well-known lack of frontiers between non-madness and madness 
does not induce me to accord a different value to the perceptions and 
ideas which are the result of one or the other.53  
 
Surrealism was much influenced by Freud and saw in the practice of automatic 
writing an authentic outlet for the unconscious. It is interesting that this 
practice was first used by Victorian spiritualists as a technique of communication 
with the spirits or the ‘collective memory’.   
On the other hand, Magical Realism intends to distort and change our 
perception of the world, by challenging the Western commonsense view of 
reality. The origin of the term is disputed, but it has been tracked back to 
German art critic Franz Roh and Italian writer Massimo Bontempelli, both 
particularly active in the twenties and thirties. In its transmigration to Latin 
America and later to other international contexts, Magical Realism has become a 
sort of political flag to oppose European rule over the colonies, but has been 
also exploited by European artists for its destabilizing potential. Magical Realism 
brings together realism and elements from non-Western world-views, presenting 
them without surprise or hesitation. Magical Realism is more explicitly political 
than Surrealism and has been associated with postcolonial struggles since the 
sixties. However, both forms of literature, in their more radical and politically 
engaged examples, are subversive in that they suggest that reality can be 
perceived anew through imagination and magic, and they reject bourgeois 
commonsense. Both forms of literature refer more or less explicitly to different 
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ways of experiencing and knowing, usually favouring the imaginary over 
intellectual abstraction and analysis, which are regarded as belated 
epiphenomena of the human consciousness. 
 
1.4 A New Approach: Mythos, Logos and Literature 
I have described above what I intend by the term ‘ritualization’. Indeed, 
there is some degree of ritualization in all fiction, but it is hidden in completely 
realistic or fantastic fiction. In fact, while strictly realistic fiction has in it an 
element of reification of the factual world, formulaic fantasy fiction is 
characterised by the ‘ossification’, a term I borrow from Iser (1993), of the 
fictional world. In hybrid fiction, however, ritualization is played out fully in the 
interaction between logos and mythos and its workings are revealed purposely. 
While realistic and fantastic fictions work through ‘the willing suspension of 
disbelief’, subversive hybrid fiction does not require the reader’s belief. It 
requires him to be open to new ways of ‘seeing’ and to look at the workings of 
his own mind and emotions while ‘playing’ the text, in order to activate the 
imagination in critical thought and sensibility, and provides him with a 
potentially transformational experience. In ritualization, the mode of logos 
entails following the patterned logic of the narrative, while mythos appeals to 
the emotions through images, thus setting in motion the flow of the imagination, 
an enhanced image-making process, which constitutes a habitat through 
landscapes, soundscapes and other imaginary creations involving all the senses. 
It thus constitutes a virtual space which is experienced as liminal, and also 
directs the logical dimension through a sort of subliminal entrainment or 
undercurrent.  More has to be added regarding the integration of these two 
modes of consciousness: mythos and logos.  
Susan Greenwood states that ‘magic is a natural process of the human 
mind’.54 Drawing on her personal experiences of practicing magic in her 
anthropological fieldwork, Greenwood also elaborates a convincing ‘dynamic 
model’ (2009, 148) for reconciling magic and science as two bodies of knowledge 
to be included to the vast web of different kinds of knowledge elaborated by 
humans. The image of the web, which can be laid across a flowing river, 
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representing historical time, is drawn from the work of anthropologist and 
physicist Geoffrey Samuel.55 Through this model it is possible to maintain a 
historical perception of how the various bodies of knowledge evolved through 
history, including magic and science. Borrowing these insights, it is possible to 
see literature and art in general as yet another kind of knowledge, a kind of 
expressive and experiential knowledge that acts at the same time on the 
reader’s emotions, cognition and imagination. If we take a cross-section of the 
river image we can see how at different historical periods, different bodies of 
knowledge evolved and crystallized. Greenwood also refers to anthropologist 
Gregory Bateson’s ideas of ‘ideation’ and ‘abduction’, in order to reconcile 
everyday consciousness, scientific rationality and magical consciousness: 
Abduction is the patterns we make in our minds to understand and 
explain a given phenomenon or set of beliefs (ideation) and the web is 
a metaphorical conceptual space where all the abductive patterns can 
be examined. This includes areas of experience that have been 
restricted due to the history of emphasis on rationality and reason. 
[…] The very fact that we all have the potential capability for magical 
consciousness means that this orientation of human experience must 
be incorporated into the wider picture. It opens up the imagination in 
a manner previously unrealized. […] Imagination gives the human 
world an intrinsically dynamic order which self-conscious individuals 
are continually in the process of forming and designing. We can make 
a shift from examining magic only through its sociological or 
psychological effects, or solely as a logical classificatory mode of 
thinking akin to the older conceptualization of science, to a highly 
specific human mode of mind. (2009: 156-57) 
 
We now come full circle in our definition of magic: magic is both (1) a 
technology in the form of rhetorical art and (2) a mode of consciousness, which, 
I would like to add, makes use of image-making. This is what happens in ritual, 
art, poetry56 and hybrid fiction, the kind with which this study deals. Indeed 
reading hybrid fiction is a practice which by enabling us, to conceive the 
‘unconceivable’ Other, allows us to find the Other in ourselves. 
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1.5 Methodology 
I have stated that this study focuses on the reader’s experience. To be 
more precise, it focuses on the process of reading, as something which unfolds 
phenomenologically. This means that an encounter between reader and text 
happens and in hybrid texts this encounter takes the form of ritualization.  
Contemporary philosopher of science Bortoft states: 
If we watch a bird flying across the sky and put our attention into 
seeing flying instead of seeing a bird which flies (implying a separation 
between an entity, ‘bird’, and an action, ‘flying’, which it performs), 
we can experience this in the mode of a dynamical simultaneity as 
one whole event. By plunging into seeing flying we find that our 
attention expands to experience this movement as one whole that is 
its own present moment. (quoted in Greenwood, 2009: 150) 
 
In the same way, this study approaches literary reading as a holistic encounter, 
and the reading of hybrid fiction as a ritualization process. In order to attain this 
goal, I develop a methodology which is inspired by the ‘emergence of narrative 
ethnography’ as a shift ‘from participant observation to the observation of 
participation’, as explained by the anthropologist Barbara Tedlock in an article 
of the same title:  
In the ethnographic memoir, an author takes us back to a corner of his 
or her life in the field that was unusually vivid, full of affect, or 
framed by unique events. By narrowing the lens, these authors 
provide a window into their personal life in the field, a focus which 
would not be possible in a full-length autobiography. The author of a 
narrative ethnography also deals with experiences, but along with 
these come ethnographic data, epistemological reflections on 
fieldwork participation, and cultural analysis. The world, in a 
narrative ethnography, is represented as perceived by a situated 
narrator, who is also present as a character in the story that reveals 
his own personality. This enables the reader to identify the 
consciousness which has selected and shaped the experiences within 
the text. In contrast to memoirs, narrative ethnographies focus not 
on the ethnographer herself, but rather on the character and process 
of the ethnographic dialogue or encounter.57  
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In order to explore the experience of reading the novels by Ortese, Gray and 
Kehlmann, I adopt a method analogous to that of narrative ethnography in that I 
practice what I call ‘creative reading’ and regard the text as ‘alive’, because of 
its ability to ask the reader questions and responses, which can lead to epiphanic 
experiences too. Here, although I agree with Burke (2011) about the real 
possibility for the reader to experience an epiphany, I don’t agree with him 
when he sees in epiphany the manifestation of emotions which are prompted by 
the text but ultimately shaped by the reader’s memory of his personal past, and 
particularly, his childhood. Instead, I argue that epiphanic reading experiences 
can also be progressive, that is present and future-oriented, not always and 
exclusively about nostalgia for the past and fear of death. 
While anthropologists deal with other selves, the literary critic deals with a text. 
However, the meaning-making in the reading process is always socially situated, 
communal and inter-subjective, as the encounter between reader and text is 
also an encounter between the reader’s subjectivity and the creative product of 
the author’s subjectivity. 
By ‘creative reading’ I mean a reflexive process in two stages, preceded 
by a preliminary phase in which I clarify how as a reader I am situated towards 
the chosen texts, my mood and previous acquaintance with each of them, and 
how many times I have read them, and followed by a reflective comment after 
some time has elapsed since the reading proper.  The latter is articulated in the 
following two stages. The first stage is reading which is slow and entails taking 
quick notes or marking passages which provoke emotive reactions and thoughts. 
During the reading I mark with a coloured crayon the passages which spark 
affective associations and strike my attention because of particular macro-
metaphors and motifs and clusters of motifs. The second stage entails a reading 
journal to be compiled immediately after the reading session, in order to report 
the associations sparked by the marked passages, and not to lose the immediacy 
of the experience as far as it is possible. During this stage, I practise a sort of 
focused report writing: the focus is provided by the experience of reading, but I 
cannot raise the pen from the sheet, and, I write quickly, so that I don’t 
elaborate and add non-relevant and later elements to it. As observed, the 
purpose of this is to preserve the immediacy of the reading process. After the 
‘creative reading’, the last stage is the writing of comments on the reading 
journal entries, some time later, in order to allow for some reflective distance. 
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Thus I report my personal experiences, but do not indulge in solipsism: I 
interrogate the text and let the text interrogate me. In other words, I focus on 
my experience of reading the three novels, because of the immediacy of the 
data thus available to me, in order to show how as a reader of hybrid fiction it is 
possible to be in the liminal space I have already mentioned and be at once 
inside and outside the text.  
 
1.6 Some Concluding Remarks: Anthropology of Literature 
or Literary Anthropology? 
Throughout this study I use the two expressions interchangeably. However, a 
clarification is needed. My endeavour is to provide a framework that can bridge 
the gap between expressive or aesthetic theories and functional theories of 
literature. Therefore, it is founded by definition in what Richard van Ort in his 
essay entitled ‘The Critic as Ethnographer’ (2004) calls ‘originary anthropology’, 
the acknowledgement of the fact that ‘it is culture that itself originated in 
symbolic-mimetic paradox. Culture is both a representation and a performance, 
a ‘model of’ and a ‘model for’: 
Scientific definitions of the human ignore this paradox as a matter of 
course. From a purely scientific vantage point, attributing an 
exceptional status to human origin seems like false hubris. But from 
an anthropological point of view, we have no choice but to consider 
human origin as exceptional because the very fact that we are self-
conscious of this origin, in a way that other species are not, compels 
us to seek an explanation for it. Whether the explanation for human 
origin be conceived in the form of a myth, a science or a literary 
anthropology, all are equally attempts to respond to the fundamental 
mimetic paradox that led to the origin of the cultural scene of 
symbolic representation.  (653)  
In my readings of the novels, as I have already mentioned, my focus is twofold, 
in that different chapters track the issue of modernity in the texts and report my 
practice of a ‘creative reading process’.  The reason for this is that I am 
interested in showing how anthropology of literature can cover a wide scope, 
ranging from more traditional text analysis to the unearthing of epistemological 
foundational issues in the reading process, understood as an interaction between 
reader and text. Thus anthropology of literature as conceived here is per se a 
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literary anthropology, rather than an external application of anthropological 
ideas to literature. 
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2 A Step Beyond the Mimetic Bias  
2.1 Performative Fantasy Impulse 
In the previous chapter I dwelt on the concept of magic both in 
anthropology and literature. It is now necessary to spell out what a magical view 
of fantastic and hybrid fiction entails and how mimesis and fantasy interweave 
in such fiction. Accordingly, this chapter deals with a performative idea of the 
fantastic impulse in some contemporary magical realist58 and postmodern 
fictions: the chosen novels (The Iguana by Anna Maria Ortese, Lanark by Alasdair 
Gray and Measuring the World by Daniel Kehlmann) do not ‘depict reality,’ 
rather they enact those dynamic forces and processes that we essentialize as 
common sense ‘reality’. Therefore, by doing so, they expose realism in its 
arbitrariness and selectiveness, while also pointing to the fluidity of human 
meaning-making. While the mimetic impulse fills up the gaps in the reader’s 
imagination, providing an apparently solid background and a ‘reliable’ narrative 
context, the fantastic impulse is ‘visionary’ in that it unfolds its possibilities 
according to the reader’s imaginative powers, in this sense it is always 
‘romantic’, acknowledging the existence of the ineffable and the creative 
struggle to catch a glimpse of it. The two impulses coexist and complement each 
other in differing measures in all fiction. As Kathryn Hume in Fantasy and 
Mimesis (1984) argues, fantasy, in its non-formulaic manifestations, is much 
more than a secondary and frivolous phenomenon.59 In order to understand it, it 
is necessary to go beyond the assumptions which have conditioned its study, 
namely: 
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(1) That the essential impulse behind literature is mimesis, (2) 
that fantasy is a separable and peripheral phenomenon, (3) that, 
because separable, it is pure and best defined by exclusion. (20) 
Here is Kathryn Hume’s definition of mimesis and fantasy: 
Literature is the product of two impulses. These are mimesis, felt as 
the desire to imitate, to describe events, people, situations, and 
objects with such verisimilitude that others can share your 
experience; and fantasy, the desire to change givens and alter reality 
[…] [W]e have many genres and forms, each with a characteristic 
blend or range of blends of the two impulses. […] Fantasy is any 
departure from consensus reality, an impulse native to literature and 
manifested in innumerable variations, from monster to metaphor. […] 
As long as the departure [from consensus reality] is recognizable to 
the reader, we are talking about fantasy. Fantasy and mimesis 
together are equally important impulses, and their interaction must 
be studied if we are to progress in our understanding of literature. 
(20-5) 
As anthropologist Tambiah says, magic is ‘a rhetorical art,’60 a ritual 
performance that cannot be judged on the basis of so-called ‘objective’ 
principles. The ‘magic’ employed in the texts of Ortese, Gray and Kehlmann 
functions in a similar way, and in their particular cases serves the purpose of 
demystification of a ‘reality’ constructed on psychological repression and social 
oppression. Thus while Lanark blends vision and dystopia, Measuring the World 
employs humour and magical motifs to rewrite history, and The Iguana is a 
terrible oneiric fable of oppression, they all attempt their exposure and critique 
of the construction of ‘Western modernity’. It is for this reason that it is 
enlightening to read these European magical realist and fantastic texts as 
located on the ‘inner frontier of colonialism’, and therefore as a supplement to 
postcolonial and cross-cultural magical realism, from which they differ greatly. 
By referring to the ‘inner frontier of colonialism’, it is meant that these texts 
expose those European events and currents of thought that are a counterpart to 
the unfolding of the colonialist enterprise outside Europe and are especially 
connected to it. 
Indeed the internationalization of the magical realist mode, in its many 
facets and strands, is a complex phenomenon. As Faris states in Ordinary 
Enchantments (2004), in postcolonial magical realism there are ambiguities 
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which cannot be easily dismissed, such as the easy commercialization of the 
mode on the market, due to its alleged catering for exotic taste.61 
The European texts investigated here are not particularly ambiguous in 
this regard. Given their relative lack of substantial reference to ‘traditional’ 
beliefs, they provide exotic escape only in part, as this escape soon turns into 
something alien. They refer to myth in a less pervasive way than their Latin 
American or postcolonial counterparts, yet they employ it as a structuring mode 
of thought which, far from being totally incompatible with historical narratives 
of linearity and progress, show how they both rely on the same logic: that of 
‘narrativity,’ or the fact that all human ‘reality’ is fictionalized throughout, and 
that homo sapiens is, deep down, homo narrans. ‘History’ is thus made up, like 
a patchwork quilt of different ‘stories’, some of which are embroidered in 
stronger colours than others and therefore more ‘visible,’ but always involving 
human struggles, pain, victories and defeats. Thus for these writers ― and for 
many others ― myth is not, as Barthes would have it, ‘depoliticized speech’,62 
because ‘myth’ is the very way humans think. These novels take on myth at a 
much deeper level than ‘traditional’ beliefs. They take myth as a much broader 
phenomenon than folklore and mythology, in the sense that they recognize the 
workings of human imaginative thought as mythical. The texts point to the 
diversity of uses of mythical thinking as a deconstructive tool in these writers’ 
hands.  
 
2.2 Myth and Fantasy 
In his 1991 article on ‘Myths and the Fantastic’, Andras Sandor draws a 
distinction between ‘myths’ and ‘mythology’ and points out how the two cannot 
be reconciled.63 Mythology is totalizing and systematic and as such it is the death 
of myths because it imposes on them a continuity and coherence which 
underplays their characteristic and discontinuous overlappings of ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ dimensions of experience, while the latter are non-systematic, and 
express a peculiar and idiosyncratic view in the community that invent and 
transmit them. In his opinion they express the discontinuities and continuities 
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between two worlds, that ‘within’ and that of ‘nature’ in their enigmatic 
character. However, ritual has the function of integrating and bridging the two 
worlds, thus ritual and myth are ‘true’ for the community which practices them. 
‘Moderns,’ on the other hand, have turned myth into ‘untrue fantasies’, the 
inverse of ‘true stories’, of realistic fiction: we make up our reality through 
daily fictions, yet we want these to be ‘realistic’, mirroring something ‘out 
there’ that we are confining into conceptual straitjackets. Thus for the 
‘moderns’ fantastic tales signal a scar between the child-like status and adult 
consciousness which is not to be healed. 
Yet the fantastic, which is a deviation from a ‘represented’ reality, is also 
an unveiling, or revelation of a dynamic reality. The fantastic can be a sort of 
epiphanic experience for the reader. The way literature appropriates myth is 
fundamental to the dynamics of fantasy and works between the two poles of the 
narrative, or hero-quest, and the epiphany or revelatory moment inscribed in it. 
This journey can yield unexpected results: the journey of the hero can be open-
ended, baffled, delayed, closed, frustrated, etc. The fantastic impulse is what 
propels the revelation beyond the given, the bare facts. It explores the hidden 
folds of both the individual and the collective psyches. 
In order to be able to study novels which mix the fantastic and the 
realistic, labels such as ‘postmodern fiction’ and ‘magical realism’ are too 
general and leave open the question of what these texts do and how they work 
in the reading process. The question is why, as human beings, we like to read 
fantastic or hybrid fiction and how the experience can be likened to a 
ritualization process, whereby we, as readers, are suspended in a liminal space 
and time, as it happens in ethnic tribes, where the youth undergo rites of 
passage through the enacting of mythical stories. To this end, the concept of 
‘magic’ as both a good rhetorical art and a state of consciousness has been 
introduced, as the text performs its magic in the reading process, in its 
interaction with the readers’ consciousness.  
Gary Wolfe in ‘The Encounter with Fantasy’ comes to the conclusion that 
‘fantasy is in many ways closer to daydreaming or reverie than to cognitive 
thought’ and goes on to quote Bachelard’s ‘irreality [sic] function’ in order to 
account for what he calls ‘the affective sense of the impossible’.64 Thus fantasy 
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writers try to achieve ‘a balanced tension [...] between cognition and affect, 
[...] between the impossible and the inevitable’(11). Finally, Wolfe lists eight 
features that a good fantasy work should evoke in order to show that ‘the 
impossible is, after all, the real’(13):  
 ‘cognition of the impossible’, when the reader realizes that the 
laws of reality are being contradicted; 
  ‘location of the impossible’, the conjuring of a world that is half-
way ‘between private psychological fantasy and culturally shared 
myth’;  
 ‘delimitation of the impossible’, which ensures that some coherent 
rules inherent to the fantasy world are in place;  
 ‘feeling of the impossible’, or the feeling of being in a totally 
‘other’ dimension which involves the reader emotionally;  
 ‘awareness of affective significance’, which makes sure that the 
emotional involvement of the reader ‘will be rewarded’ in the 
affective dimension; 
 ‘awareness of cognitive significance, or ‘deeper meaning;’’ 
 ‘belief in the fantastic world’, stemming out of the interplay 
between the affective and the cognitive dimensions;  
 ‘deeper belief’, which makes some fantasy works into ‘analogues of 
inner experience virtually as valid as events of the ‘real world’, 
and which expresses the author’s own most fundamental 
convictions’.  
These reflections are particularly perceptive and susceptible of being widened 
into considerations of fantasy as a liminal space, a sort of limbo which is always 
in the process of becoming, fluid and open to different interpretations. Its 
aleatory character is a potential which takes shape with each new reading. 
Furthermore, this kind of fiction, which swings between fantasy and 
mimesis (and therefore can be defined as ‘hybrid’), either in a jarring, dissonant 
fashion or seamlessly blending the two, appropriates and deforms the strategies 
and structure of the quest romance.  In this sense, even apparently more 
realistic texts can yield some surprises. The mythical is an element of all fiction, 
both as a ‘narrative’ and a ‘second-order sign’.65 In hybrid fiction, a process of 
remythicization happens, whereby the myths that had first been recognized as 
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such or demythologized get inscribed and reworked in the narrative, according 
to a new artistic vision. In fact, while mythologization involves a systematization 
according to an official and scholarly point of view, remythicization menas that 
after myth has been stripped of the systematic elements (demythologization), it 
is once again a free-floating narrative that can be co-opted for specific artistic 
purposes. 
This study goes in a different direction from Todorov’s rationalistic 
structuralist definition of the fantastic (1971) and its re-adaptations (Christine 
Brooke-Rose: 1976, Neill Cornwell: 1990), as well as Jackson’s psycho-analytical 
post-structuralism (1981), in that the former three locate the precincts of the 
fantastic solely in the reader’s inability to decide between a ‘supernatural’ and 
‘natural’ explanation of the events, while the last sees the fantastic as 
concerned exclusively with themes of morbidity, death and dissolution.66 On the 
contrary it is argued that the fantastic, while dealing with these themes too, is 
ultimately about life and that non-realistic fiction can lead to (meta)-knowledge 
and insight, to a restructuring of our perceptual habits. Structuralist and 
psychoanalytic critics privilege an external ‘etic’ view of the fantastic, positing 
themselves as the rational subjects per antonomasia. In anthropology an ‘etic’ 
view is a ‘scientific’, ‘detached’ view, external to the phenomenon being 
studied, whereas an ‘emic’ view is that of an ‘insider’. Indeed, as readers, we 
are called to use both modalities at different times, and sometimes, 
paradoxically, even simultaneously.  
Another ‘etic’ point of view is that of Emily Apter (1981). She is cautious 
in applying classical psychoanalytical readings to literary texts, and rightly so. In 
her reading of The Uncanny and Der Sandmann she provides an alternative idea 
of the uncanny and of the source of fear for the protagonist of the tale: ‘the 
fear of being unable to distinguish among perception, fear and desire’ as 
‘central to the uncanny effect.’67 This point implicitly highlights the horror of 
merging and instability inherent in many cultures which theorize strictly about 
what constitutes ‘purity’ and ‘impurity’and consider what is liminal as dangerous 
and disruptive because of its ambiguity.  
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In her opinion Freud’s reading is more puzzling than a solution in that it 
does not explain ‘the nature of the mind that constructs such meanings, or the 
terror involved in such constructions’ (39):  
It is arbitrary to relate the uncanny to the arousal of repressed 
material, for in fact the uncanny touches upon material that is 
frequently ignored because it is too elusive to fit into the normal 
framework of thought – elusive not because the material is unwanted 
but because it is unstable, incoherent and indefinite.’ (42) 
 Apter shows how the psychoanalytic critic proceeds according to three 
different methods: either s/he considers the work as an allegory, so that its 
structure is ignored and the images treated singularly, or the work is seen as a 
‘coherent allegory’(45), therefore the interpreter follows its structure, or, 
finally s/he chooses ‘one dominant image’ (46) and goes on to interpret all the 
others in its light: ‘thus the psychoanalytic critic proceeds as a creator of 
fictions, interpreting fictions by constructing other fictions of a biographical, 
historical or clinical nature’ (47, my emphasis). All the same, Apter sees fantasy 
‘not as an escape from reality but as an investigation of it’ (2). She links the 
term directly to its psychoanalytic usage and shows how the fantasist and the 
psychoanalyst share a common ground, in that: 
The aim is to catch out unexpected ignorance, thereby exposing 
general limitations in perception and knowledge; the limitations also 
reveal the strange purposes and desires of the medium of knowledge‒ 
the mind. The need to show up the gaps in a world commonly 
perceived as a whole requires the creation of associations and 
patterns which utilise the representations whose strangeness is 
mitigated by normal inertia. The language of psychoanalysis, like the 
language of fantasy, is figurative but not conventionally metaphoric, 
since there is no means of tracing one’s way back to original terms. 
(11) 
Her emphasis on the fictionality of the psychoanalytical endeavour can be 
a healthy reminder for the literary scholar too: indeed this is what I mean when 
pointing out the necessity to assume also an ‘emic’ view as critical readers of 
fiction. 
This present study also differs from the works of literary scholars that 
define the fantastic in stark opposition to ‘reality’ (Irwin: 1976, Rabkin: 1976), 
because it considers the fantastic as an explorative tool of our world, both 
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inward and outward.68 Fantastic and hybrid fiction de-structures mechanical or 
automatic assumptions, setting in motion creative and divergent thought-
processes, which help reframe our dispositions or gestalts and realize the 
conventionality of much alleged ‘reality’. In this perspective it is possible to 
understand Frye’s statement about the conservative character of much realism.69 
Mainstream realism relies on the likeness of the textual world to our consensus 
reality, whereas hybrid fiction displays its literary conventions deliberately, in 
order to trigger an active cognitive and affective response from the readers and 
show the constructs of our social conventions, rules, ideas. Thus, ultimately, 
hybrid and fantastic fiction can be read as a celebration of flux and an attempt 
at de-reification of the real. 
It is, therefore, particularly apt at being read anthropologically, as a 
divining rod useful to detect the hidden currents of history and the ‘Other’ 
inside one’s own culture.  This thesis looks at some European contemporary 
fiction and uncovers the uncanny in a European context. Mythologization, 
demythologization and remythicization are fundamental processes whereby 
cultures live on and change. The way fantasy rewrites mythos into history sheds 
light on the narrative and constructed character of historical discourses too, 
therefore implying a processual outlook on social, natural and historical life. By 
emphasising ‘process’ over ‘being’, non-formulaic fantasy is potentially 
subversive in its play with received norms and their parody. This interaction has 
its roots in the power relations that the fantastic text expresses and /or subverts 
as a way of rejecting or upholding tradition and reacting against or at least 
exposing oppressive, crystallized structures, be they of an ideological or 
material sort. 
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3 Reading Fiction: Myth-Making and Ritualized 
Consciousness 
3.1 Ritualization: the Creative Process of Reading 
In this chapter I argue that reading fiction is acting out a ‘ritual’, in the sense of 
performing a set of patterned actions, which, in the case of literature, are 
mental and imaginative and allow for the ritualization of the reader’s 
consciousness.  
 
3.1.1 Hybrid Fictions 
The novels I have chosen are ‘hybrid fictions’, where the fantastic and 
performative impulse works together and against the mimetic one, in order to 
show the incongruity and limitations of human knowledge and perception when 
bound to a completely rationalistic perspective. Mimesis, with its emphasis on 
representation and imitation of what is tangible in the world according to a 
commonsensical point of view, is undermined or shown as a surface covering a 
vast unknown dimension. Fantasy works through parallelism to and deviation 
from realism in order to probe this very aspect of human experience which 
eludes neat classifications and rationalizations. Allegory and metaphor in these 
novels work as bridges between the two realms, although the abyss or rift in-
between remains visible under the bridge itself. An overview of the novels 
cannot but be shaped by my particular concerns and positions as a reader, even 
while taking into account the most salient or fore-grounded episodes in the 
narratives. 
 
3.1.2 The Magic of Metaphor and Symbol 
Following Catherine Bell in her endeavour to de-reify ‘ritual’ (1992), I define 
ritualization in the following pages as ‘the strategic manipulation of context in 
the act of reproducing it’.70 But how does it work? What are its tools?  Metaphor 
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and symbols are the ‘magical tools’ with suggestive and subliminal powers in 
hybrid fictions. In fact, in these fictions, metaphor spans two widely different 
worldviews. More than that, metaphor is a means of enabling human 
consciousness to bridge the incommensurability between the real and our own 
limited knowledge of it, while the unknown and the partially (un)graspable 
evokes in us readers a wide range of emotions which we cannot always classify 
neatly and explicitly. These emotions in turn manifest themselves in our body-
mind continuum. While metaphor is a heuristic tool working through a 
redundancy of information and attributes that convey an affective and emotive 
quality for the recipient, it also can be subsumed in the wide web of symbolism 
and imagery. While there is no agreement on what a symbol is, Dan Sperber has 
shown that it is nonetheless possible to state a theory of symbolism in general as 
‘knowledge about knowledge’ (1975), rather than follow the (post)structuralist 
and Lacanian idea of symbolism as a language of signs in its own right.71 In fact 
while a language is made up of arbitrary signs that only have relational 
meanings, a web of knowledge, or metaknowledge, has deeper cultural 
implications, as it reaches the very core of what Cornelius Castoriadis calls 
‘magma’, the creative imaginary, which alone is ‘real’ and at the base of 
whatever is.72  
Metaphor, as the staple of symbolism, provides redundant information, 
both connotative and denotative details that work together as a surplus of 
sensorial knowledge affecting all the human senses and sticking in human 
memory.  As an epistemological structure, metaphor endeavours to conceive and 
articulate the inconceivable, while working both on thought and emotion 
processes. As Ortega y Gasset said in The Dehumanization of Art and Ideas about 
the Novel: 
The metaphor is perhaps one of man's most fruitful potentialities. Its 
efficacy verges on magic, and it seems a tool for creation which God 
forgot inside one of His creatures when He made him. All our other 
faculties keep us within the realm of the real, of what is already 
there. The most we can do is to combine things or to break them 
up. The metaphor alone furnishes an escape; between the real things, 
it lets emerge imaginary reefs, a crop of floating islands. A strange 
thing, indeed, the existence in man of this mental activity which 
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substitutes one thing for another‒‒from an urge not so much to get at 
the first as to get rid of the second.73 
Metaphor has usually been seen as ‘merely’ a rhetorical figure of speech, which 
can be more or less artificially/mechanically devised by writers and orators in 
order to capture the audience’s attention. Even Tambiah in his forceful revision 
of the logic of Trobriand magic emphasises the ordinariness of the language of 
metaphor, drawing attention to the fact that among Tobrianders recitation of 
magical spells goes hand in hand with technical work.74 However, this is no 
endorsement for the argument of the ‘flat’ ordinariness of metaphor. Rather the 
opposite is true. In fact, if Trobrianders work on canoe-making while repeating 
mantras or chanting spells, it is because their culture codifies a space for the 
subliminal power of metaphor over consciousness, a power which starts from and 
goes beyond its ‘simple’ linguistic aspect, with powerful results. In fact while 
the manifest purpose of their ritual magic is to endow everyday objects with 
specific properties, its latent purpose is to work through suggestion in order to 
renew the specifics of their cultural worldview as embedded in their social 
institutions  and to empower the people who take part in the work. Thus their 
magical ritual itself is a social institution which bears culture both on a 
collective, communitarian level and on an individual one. It facilitates the 
enculturation of the individual as much as it inscribes his objects into his own 
cultural universe of socially constituted meanings. 
Metaphor as magic is embedded in a heightened but ‘natural’ state of 
mind or mode of consciousness, which is accessible to all human beings. It is 
predicated on the emotions evoked by contact with a certain object, whose 
qualities the recipient envisions and experiences in his/her body-mind 
continuum. This also happens in hybrid fictions where a sort of connection, 
participation and sharing of ‘being’ or qualities between the reader and the 
worlds created in the novel takes place. However, while participation takes 
place, there is no full identification. This happens particularly in hybrid fictions, 
where the fantastic and the realistic run parallel and comment on each other, as 
macro-metaphors that expand and feed on each other, enabling the reader to 
experience imaginatively an aesthetic condition of liminality. Hybrid fictions 
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thus constitute transitional objects (Winnicott)75 that project the reader into a 
world-making situation, where s/he can experience a world model, the 
paradoxical situation of a natural simulation. According to psychologist of fiction 
Keith Oatley, ‘[...] fiction does not really imitate’ because it is too ‘stagey’, 
instead: 
Fiction provides context to understand the elliptical. It offers the 
context of characters’ goals and plans. It gives a sense of how actions 
lead to vicissitudes. It allows, too, the reader to experience 
something of emotions that can arise. All of these elements are 
omitted from a faithful, empirically unexceptionable copy of real 
life.76  
All the more the reader of ‘hybrid’ fiction knows she is having a ‘lucid 
dream’, and enjoys the experience even more for it. She experiences stylized or 
formalized emotions because of what can be called ‘double-distancing’, and 
because of the indeterminacy of ‘hybrid’ fictions, she experiences more 
composite emotions‒‒whether they be baffling or positive‒‒than when reading 
‘realistic’ fictions. 
Hybrid fictions foster the de-structuring of ingrained and limiting belief 
systems through the use of destabilizing metaphors, which open up a window on 
the workings of our own minds and emotions, as mediated through the body. 
Indeed, mind, body and emotion can be seen as a continuum or a network where 
material and immaterial factors are involved.  
Rejecting Lacan’s idea of an unconscious structured as a language and a 
consciousness predicated on a lack of ‘substance’, it is possible to endorse the 
alternative vision of a continuum of ever-shifting ‘becoming’, where conscious 
and unconscious processes communicate continuously and quickly, before we are 
even aware of it. While for Lacan in ‘The Mirror Stage’, first presented as a 
paper in 1936 and then published in French in 1949,77 the imaginary is the 
illusory terrain of the ego enmeshed in mirror-reflections and a futile struggle to 
regain a unity which, in the first place, never existed, Castoriadis ([1975] 1987) 
speaks of the imaginary as the essential creative ground of all that is. If we take 
this idea on board, instead of considering consciousness as a reified substance 
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or, conversely, a lack of substance, we can view ‘it’ as a complex web of 
processes and relations, which are continuously shifting, expanding or shrinking, 
depending on different circumstances. This complex web of consciousness has 
both an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, in the sense that it is diffuse and not 
‘contained’ in our brains or skins only. Mind, body and emotion tie in with each 
other and with the surrounding environment in complex and subtle ways. This 
continuous, ongoing communication and exchange of information between 
conscious and unconscious processes happens through metaphor (and metonymy)  
most of the time. Anthropologist Gregory Bateson explains the cybernetic 
concept of ‘information’ in this way:  
In fact, what we mean by information‒‒the elementary unit of 
information‒‒is a difference which makes a difference, and it is able 
to make a difference because the neural pathways along which it 
travels and is continually transformed are themselves provided with 
energy. The pathways are ready to be triggered. We may even say 
that the question is implicit in them. […] The mental world‒‒the 
mind‒‒the world of information processing‒‒is not limited by the 
skin.78                                                                          
 In hybrid fiction it is precisely the differential between mimesis and fantasy 
which carries important information for the reader’s ‘world-modeling’, the 
latter being a concept outlined by Oatley (2011).79 While not denying the usual 
translation of mimesis as copying and imitation, Oatley refers to a second 
meaning of the word which has been forgotten throughout Western aesthetic 
history: ‘the idea of ‘world-simulating’ or ‘world-creating’’. 
[The second idea of mimesis] depends more on coherence among its 
elements than on correspondences between specific elements of the 
model and elements of the ordinary world. It works because certain 
relationships among things in the model world correspond to certain 
relationships among things in the ordinary world […](2011:14)   
On the other hand, it is the differential between mimesis and fantasy which has 
subversive potential, in that, when activated, it makes for a destabilization of 
the status quo and facilitates change in the reader’s perceptual gestalts.  
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3.1.2 Metaphor, Symbol and Emotion 
Since 1980 cognitive linguists have proposed several theories of metaphor. 
Here I deal with the seminal ideas of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,  Mark 
Turner’s extension of their theory and Gerard Steen’s objections to Lakoff, 
referring the reader to Zoltán Kövecses for an overview of the most ‘recent 
developments in metaphor theory’.80 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphor is not a mere linguistic 
phenomenon, but it is conceptual in character and pervades all thought.81 Thus 
specific metaphorical linguistic expressions are ‘surface realizations’ of a 
conceptual generalization. From this point of view, literary metaphorical 
expressions are still based on everyday conceptual metaphors. This theory 
explains the workings of conceptual metaphor in terms of cross-domain 
mappings: a source domain in the conceptual system is mapped onto a target 
domain. For example, the linguistic metaphor ‘Love is a journey’ has as source 
domain JOURNEY and as target domain LOVE. This conceptual mapping is 
conventional and fixed, but it can be realized in many different metaphorical 
expressions, such as ‘our relationship has come to a dead end’, or ‘our 
relationship is not going anywhere’, etc. 
Mark Turner’s extension and reworking of this theory suggests the 
phenomenon of ‘conceptual integration’ or ‘blending’ of mental spaces. 
According to Turner, metaphor generation and understanding are far from being 
uni-directional, as the source and target domains terminology implies. In Patrick 
Colm Hogan’s succinct illustration, 
 
[…] Turner argues that concepts may blend so that metaphors operate 
indirectly, in more than one direction, and negatively. Thus, in 
contrast with theorists who employ source/target models, Turner 
argues that metaphor‒‒and, indeed, all thought‒‒involves two or 
more inputs or input spaces, as he calls them. These input spaces 
project some properties to a blended space‒‒thus the projection does 
not go directly from a source to a target. The resulting blend may 
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then project back to a particular input. That input may be then 
considered the target. In other cases, there is no backward 
projection, thus no target. In still other cases, the blend may project 
back to more than one input. In those cases, the blend is not 
unidirectional, for it may involve indirect projection from input A to 
input B and viceversa. Moreover, the blend is  not confined to the 
mere combination of the projected (or, equivalently, transferred) 
combination itself. Finally, Turner emphasizes that blending is 
recursive and thus a blend may itself operate as an input to another 
blend.82 
In his Understanding Metaphor in Literature: an Empirical Approach 
(1994), Gerard Steen objects to a strong (biological) version of Lakoff’s 
conceptual metaphors, as stored in an individual long-term memory, and argues 
for their application to our cultural store of knowledge instead, because, 
according to his own experiments individual language users do not necessarily 
map linguistic metaphor onto conceptual ones automatically.83 Instead, even if 
these conceptual metaphors may be active in one’s memory, it is not really clear 
how they work in practice, i.e. in actual language use. Steen also argues that 
literature provides a context for ‘metaphor online processing’ that is, in reading.  
These theories are the staple of contemporary research in metaphor, but, 
as Zoltán Kövecses underscores, they‒‒and all the others‒‒can only explain 
specific aspects of metaphor. Therefore it is desirable to integrate and consider 
them as different facets of the same stone. In fact, I am not sure Lakoff’s and 
Steen’s positions really need to be opposed and contrasted. While mine is not a 
quantitative study, it is both theoretical and empirical, and it is an attempt to 
establish an anthropological approach to literature and fiction reading, whereby 
the fundamental juncture where nature becomes self-reflexive and turns into 
culture can be upheld. With this I highlight that biological and cultural 
conceptual metaphors may be interdependent and co-developed, given that the 
human being is the only creature who recognizes and represents, but also 
fantasises about, himself. 
Jung’s Collective Unconscious and Rupert Sheldrake’s idea of 
morphogenesis and biological memory are two ways to account for the same 
phenomenon from different but related points of view. Conceptual metaphor as 
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both biological and cultural adds a further layer of interpretation to (linguistic 
and visual) metaphor, symbolism, analogical thinking and literature.  
Steen’s neat division between ‘reading as critical interpretation’ and 
‘reading as everyday reception’ (30) is somewhat overstated and artificial. He 
describes ‘literary reception’ as being characterised by ‘subjectivity,’ 
‘fictionality’, ‘polyvalence’ and ‘form-orientation’ (34). He adds that ‘in literary 
reading, metaphors may function as important crystallization points for the 
feeling of subjectivity, polyvalence, fictionality, and form-as-meaning. This is 
the general theoretical proposition which I will develop for empirical research’ 
(36). However, I don’t agree with his description of the characteristics of 
literary reading and his distinction between irrelevant ‘situations’ and relevant 
‘contexts’:  
For literary reading, situations are usually irrelevant. They 
predominantly offer ‘noise’ in the form of processes competing for 
the attention of the reader, such as a television programme or a 
record playing. Situations can hence interfere with the performance 
of the readers by distracting them from reading. Contexts are not 
irrelevant, because they define the reading process as literary. As a 
result, although I regard reading as involving an interaction between 
three material entities: text, reader, and situation, for literary 
reception, it is the context-affected interaction between text and 
reader which is fundamental. 
At each moment of reading, readers are busy executing three 
analytically and empirically distinguishable types of psychological 
process, singly or in combination: 
(1) They have to attend to the text as a semiotic, in particular 
linguistic object of signification. 
(2) They have to build a conceptual representation of ‘the world’ it 
refers to in order to grasp it. 
(3) They have to accept the text as the result of an intentional, 
meaningful action on the part of the writer. 
These processes can be designated as decoding, conceptualization, 
and communication, respectively. (87) 
 
There is no need to advocate the ‘death of the author’ in its strong 
version, in order to object that the author is not necessarily aware of all of the 
implications and manifestations of his creative processes. He may start with a 
general idea in mind and then some process other than complete planning and 
rationalization may take charge of the micro-phases of the creation process. 
Moreover, the idea that ‘literary reading’ is impermeable to ‘situations’ seems 
to me unfounded and in contrast with the experience of reading.  
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Steen’s main criticism of Lakoff is that ‘what can be analysed as a 
linguistic metaphor in texts is not always realized as a conceptual metaphor‒‒ 
by retrieval or construction‒‒ in discourse processing’ (28). 
This criticism, however, only invalidates Lakoff’s insight, if we argue for the 
conscious decoding or realization of a conceptual metaphor. My argument, 
instead, is in favour of a sort of subliminal entrainment in the way metaphor 
works, where conscious realization is not necessarily the main factor at play; 
hence, metaphoric images work at a much deeper level than their 
rationalizations and conscious explanations.  
Moreover, while the quantitative methods used by Steen can be useful for 
the gathering of statistical data and average calculations, there are a few 
problems with such wide generalizations and the neat division between ‘ordinary 
reader’ and ‘literary reader’, or even with the general methodological 
framework he takes for granted. Quantitative methods cannot account for the 
experience of reading literature. For that a phenomenological approach is 
needed. Steen and others in his field take for granted the computer – brain 
computational analogy, where reading becomes ‘online processing’. That is an 
epistemological metaphor I argue with, because computers do not have emotions 
and feelings.  
Steen’s criticism of Lakoff’s position from within the same paradigm of 
cognitivism, namely that his theory can only account for the cultural dimension 
of metaphor, rather than the cognitive one, not only can be circumscribed, as 
recent studies about literary universals have shown,84 but can also be seen as not 
irreducible, because metaphor works through suggestion. 
In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to emphasise that a literary 
metaphor works in a peculiar way. Paul Ricoeur’s essay ‘Metaphor and the 
Central Problem of Hermeneutics’ (1981) is particularly helpful in this respect.85 
According to Ricoeur, literary metaphor has the characteristics of a narrative in 
nuce, thus we could say it is a micro-narrative or a potential narrative. 
Furthermore, it is an ‘event’, in the sense that it is enacted in reading and never 
loses its power, even in several readings. But what is this ‘power’ of the literary 
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metaphor? And why not talk about metaphor in general? What is the relation 
between metaphor and symbol? 
My definition of symbol is the following: a metaphorical condensation of 
diverse associations, connotations and sets of relations between them, sets 
which are partly culturally specific, partly universal and partly idiosyncratic to 
the individual. Culturally specific sets of relations are domain specific: they 
encode chunks of knowledge pertaining to different domains and their relevant 
discourses. Considering symbol in this way entails going beyond the alleged 
opposition between the ‘old’ rhetorical school (from Aristotle to Ricoeur) and 
the ‘new’ cognitive school represented by Lakoff’s and others’ works.86 
I find it is necessary to distinguish everyday language from literary 
language because the latter is richer in patterning and creative metaphoricity 
and symbolism. In this respect, I distance myself from Gerard Steen’s position 
and even those of Lakoff, Turner and Johnson. David Miall’s arguments for 
‘literariness’, or the distinctive character which makes literature itself and his 
study of neuro-psychological indicators of literariness (2007) in readers are 
convincing, in that they account for the fundamental capacity of literary 
language to surprise and elicit heightened emotions and feelings, its 
characteristic function of ‘defamiliarization’, to use a term first introduced by 
Russian formalist scholar Viktor Shklovsky in 1917.87 Literary language (like all 
artistic and ritual language) is characterised by its high occurrence of 
patterning, which makes all the difference (in the sense outlined by Gregory 
Bateson) between itself and daily language. 
It follows that, as far as literary metaphor is concerned, even the 
traditional linguistic distinction between dead and living metaphors is not sharp 
enough. In fact, even cognitive poetics, whether in the argument of mentalists 
such as Lakoff, or those of the culturalists like Steen and others, does not go far 
enough to account for the power of metaphor, a power which is reduced to mere 
cognition through the above mentioned theories of cross-domain mappings of 
source and target and of conceptual blending and other cognitive metaphor 
theories. On the other hand, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with its emphasis on 
interpretation and meaning-making, although profound, lacks a focus on the role 
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played by emotions. This lack leads us to the specific question of how a literary 
metaphor works, what is its ‘power’.  
Here Hogan’s study of Hindu aesthetic theories helps us advance further. 
Indian theorists define the theory of what Oatley (2011) calls the ‘structure of 
suggestion’: In classical Hindu aesthetics‒‒as defined in the Sanskrit text, the 
Natyasastra and by the prominent theorist Bharata around 2000 years 
ago‒‒there are eight Bhavas (imitations of emotions that actors perform) and 
corresponding Rasas (the audience members’reactions). These eight emotions 
are: Astonishment, Comedy, Love, Disgust, Heroism, Sadness, Fear, and Anger, 
while Peace was added later. According to this approach, the storyteller or 
writer presents the representation of the emotions, the Bhavas, while the 
readers, accordingly, experience the Rasas, which are not the natural emotions 
we experience in lived life, but rather stylized or formalized emotional 
responses and feelings, which can be more or less enhanced. Some 
commentators state that writers may blend different Bhavas to some extent, but 
should choose to play out a dominant one. 
Literary metaphor works through suggestion, in that it triggers and evokes 
these kinds of stylised emotions in the reader. Thus, both hermeneutics and 
cognitive poetics need to take into account the role of emotions and feeling in 
literary reading, as indeed Keith Oatley (2011) and Patrick Colm Hogan (2003) 
have been doing in their respective fields: psychology of fiction and the study of 
world literatures. 
What relevance has the suggestive power of metaphor for my argument of 
the specific characteristics of what I have called ‘hybrid fictions’ and their 
reading as an act of ritualization? It has enormous import. 
A realistic fiction is based on the iconicity of the narrative it represents. 
In other words, a realistic fiction is based on the illusion of its own plausibility, 
in that it postulates its own transparency as an artistic form, its language also 
‘poses’ as ‘self-evident’ and ‘natural’. In this way both the genre and its 
linguistic medium, although based on accepted conventions, hide their own 
conventionality. Thus, a reader of realistic fiction can more easily identify with 
the characters of the narrative and experience ‘catharsis’, or emotions ‘by 
proxy’. In the case of ‘high fantasy’, or thoroughly fantastic fictions, the 
conventions of realism are totally denied or reversed in an explicit manner, but 
in so doing they replace these conventions with new ones, which can be more or 
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less idiosyncratic. The point, however, is that the reader is alerted to the 
establishment of such conventions and demands their coherence. 
The case of ‘hybrid’ fictions is different. In fact, what happens is that 
they prompt a process of ‘double-distancing’, in that the reader can neither 
identify himself fully with the character nor look for alternative ‘rules’. In other 
words, ‘hybrid’ fictions play with and thrive in indeterminacy and tend to stage 
their own fictional character, to expose their own narrative and linguistic 
devices, thus becoming self-reflexive and therefore performative. Here I 
understand ‘performativity’ as a fundamental characteristic of these texts. Even 
when they seem to point to some event analogous to those in the ‘outer’ world, 
their language is no simple index, no simple referential sign; rather, it is a web 
of webs made of infinite interpretants. If this is so, the symbols contained in 
these fictions are more explosive than those in realistic ones, because their 
power of suggestion is heightened by their open-ended potential for 
connotations and the proliferation of their interrelations. They in fact appeal to 
several systems of reference, rather than one only. Thus not only is the reader 
moved to cognitive ‘action’ but he also hesitates, is suspended in a liminal 
region where s/he experiences aesthetic emotions, in a way different from when 
s/he reads realistic fictions. Since the reader is both outside and inside the text, 
he feels the emotions, but cannot identify totally with the character; he 
empathises and yet, he experiences the distance between the two sets of 
clashing conventions (realistic and fantastic) as a ‘formalization’, or ‘stylization’ 
of the emotions triggered by symbols and metaphors: this means that his reading 
experience is ritualised. 
Ritualization is both a formal act and a search for a content, a specific 
kind of experience on the reader’s part, a sort of ‘ritual vision quest’‒‒a Native 
American practice which will be explained later‒‒whose symbolical contents are 
capable of altering the reader’s self-concept and/or outlook on the world he 
inhabits. The tension between distancing irony and empathy is sustained 
throughout these ‘hybrid fictions’, precisely because it facilitates the 
ritualization of the reading experience: the reader is both inside and outside the 
text, interacting with it actively. In this way the text supplements magically the 
reader’s conception of inner and outer reality. Here my idea of magic as both a 
rhetorical art and a ‘natural’ (i.e. universal) mode of consciousness potentially 
available to every human being  comes full circle: magic as a bringing to full 
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fruition the potentialities of human feeling, rather than as a manipulative, 
propagandistic (and reductive) set of (misplaced or superstitious) techniques. 
In Ricoeur’s lucid account, a metaphor does not exist as a word, but it is 
given meaning and actuality by its context (1981: 169-70). If to its semantic 
aspect we add an evocative dimension, metaphor is finally seen as a rounded 
‘phenomenon’. Not a mere rhetorical device in the sense of mechanical 
transposition of a word from one domain to another, but as Ricoeur says an 
‘interaction between semantic fields’ (1981: 170), when not a blending of whole 
semantic fields and, I add, a carrier of emotion, a catalyst which sets in motion 
emotional energy and feelings, and therefore is truly magical in the best and 
most appropriate sense of the word, as it mediates a transmutation of the 
reader’s own emotions. Thus, words are literally the material carriers of magic.  
The reader enters a spatial-temporal continuum given by the time and 
setting of the novel, which are enacted in the so-called ‘durata’ (durée) of the 
reading: that is, the time involved in the reading is the time of the ‘ritual’ of 
the novel. The readers’ consciousness adds a third dimension to the time and 
space of the novel by enacting them. The reader acts out this ‘ritual’, which is 
not only ‘profane’ but also existential, it has to do with the reader’s experience 
and meaning-making as much as with the possibilities offered by the text. 
The imagination is a sort of multidimensional matrix that works out 
different possibilities, which are inherent in the text. As a special action which, 
among other things, sets up a marked space, ‘ritual’ enables the mind to linger 
in the shadowy precincts of myth, which is an archetypal conglomerate of 
patterns that situates itself in illo tempore, a time of origins, of endings or of a-
historical character. And yet history is not to be set up hard against myth, 
because history makes possible the enactment of myth, and, moreover, history 
as a linear progress is itself a myth which informs the modern mentality. The 
performative character of fiction in its interaction with the reader’s mind is 
underscored and enhanced within the mythic-ritual framework. 
Human beings make sense of the world through ‘fictionalizing acts’.88 For 
example, when talking about our day in the office, we are fictionalizing the 
events, of which only effects remain. The novel is a ritual space and event in 
continuous time. It is the very medium of experiencing another life, place and 
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time without negative practical side-effects. In this sense then, a novel is a 
‘magical’ script that waits to be performed, a tool which facilitates a change in 
the readers’ minds, when they are reading with some engagement. Fiction and 
the reader interact with each other, and the effects can be partly common and 
partly personal to different readers. Fiction can be viewed also as a specific kind 
of rhetorical art, which through the ‘aesthetic semblance’ (Iser 1989), makes the 
reader believe, even though s/he is aware of it being ‘just’ reading, and through 
this it performs ‘magic’.  
Fiction is about effecting change, be it for pleasure of for other purposes; 
it works with words, rhetorical devices, narrative techniques that are the tools 
of its performativity in the reader’s mind: a mind which is necessarily embodied 
and not abstract, which elaborates sensations, emotions, and feelings too. 
According to scientist Antonio Damasio (2000),  
[…] Emotions are complicated collections of chemical and neural 
responses, forming a pattern; all emotions have some kind of 
regulatory role to play, leading in one way or another to the creation 
of circumstances advantageous to the organism exhibiting the 
phenomenon; emotions are about the life of an organism, its body to 
be precise, and their role is to assist the organism in maintaining life. 
[…] Notwithstanding the reality that learning and culture alter the 
expression of emotions and give emotions new meanings, emotions are 
biologically determined processes, depending on innately set brain 
devices, laid down by a long evolutionary history.89 
[…] Emotions cannot be known to the subject having them before 
there is consciousness. [….] We know that we have an emotion when 
the sense of a feeling self is created is created in our minds. […] But 
we only know that we feel an emotion when we sense that emotion is 
sensed as happening in our organism. (279) 
After stating that ‘emotional states’ are defined by bodily changes, Damasio 
emphasizes that emotions and feelings are two distinct, but inter-dependent, 
phenomena: 
To the simple definition of emotion as specifically caused transient 
change of the organism state corresponds a simple definition for 
feeling an emotion: it is the representation of that transient change in 
organism state in terms of neural patterns and ensuing images. When 
those images are accompanied, one instant later, by a sense of self in 
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the act of knowing, and when they are enhanced, they become 
conscious. They are, in the true sense, feelings of feelings. (282) 
According to these definitions, emotions have their locus in the 
organism’s body and feelings are conscious, and more lasting. Furthermore, they 
are characterised by the occurrence of images that correspond to the induced 
emotions. Indeed, our psychological make-up is such that a good story tells us 
much more than piles of rules, procedures and abstractions. A good story 
imprints itself on our minds and makes for the subsequent apprehension of more 
abstract or intangible levels of ‘meaning’. 
It is my persuasion that all of fiction relies on a mythical and ritual 
dimension far beyond the grasps of an exclusively thematic approach. And I think 
this holds true even when it is not directly evident. Sometimes this mythic 
structure is latent in the possibilities of the novel, while at other times it is 
consciously made explicit by the author. In either case, it is dynamic, not static. 
However, in the case of hybrid fiction, where the reader has to play with 
different conventions, the ritualization process is enhanced, as the diversity of 
said world-building conventions situates the reader in a peculiar cognitive and 
affective dimension of ‘liminality’, a concept I borrow from Victor Turner and 
explain later in the chapter. 
I have chosen to work on different authors and genres, ranging from more 
or less fantastic to magic-realist novels, across three different linguistic areas. I 
proceed in this way in order to show this ‘magical’ dimension inherent in fiction 
as performative and intend to advance a processual conception of fiction, as 
something which is not ‘out there’ and cannot be reduced to ‘unreality’. Rather 
fiction is a ‘process’ of reality, it is a creative processing, direct or indirect, of 
reality. It is its implied or evident mythic-ritual dimension which makes for its 
potentialities as an experiential tool. Fiction is intangible but none the less 
‘real’ for it. Indeed each of us is a Homo narrans to different degrees. Fiction 
can be a ‘rite of passage’ and initiation and is always liminal and transitional. 
In order to show the ‘magical’ dimension inherent in fiction, I point out 
those elements that have a mythic-ritual significance in the texts, as an active 
working principle that enlivens and merges structure, function and content in 
the texture of the narrative. I draw on anthropological theories and ideas 
concerning ‘ritual’ and ‘myth’ in order to unveil some of the characteristics of 
the novels chosen and take myth as a wide frame of reference for all of life and 
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fiction and the mind’s workings when dealing both with fictions and the great 
existential questions, much in the same way anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski 
did. Therefore I do not subscribe to accounts that try to fit myth into a 
teleological framework, which is yet another product of different myths 
combining in order to give a certain ‘progressive’ perspective on life and history. 
    
 
3.2 Why Myth and Ritual 
For a very long time now, post-structuralists and de-constructionists, among 
whom Derrida is particularly prominent, have remarked on the ‘violence of the 
letter’ and its bad conscience in the logic of erasure that the text itself exerts 
on its own silent assumptions and presuppositions. Derrida has also shown how 
from the oppositional logic ingrained in the linear written text it is possible to 
detect conspicuous traces that unmask its implicit ‘order’ of thought and base of 
power. However, Derrida referred to a specific kind of text, which I have called 
‘linear’, Rousseau and Lévi-Strauss being some of his examples: he points to 
texts that set up an opposition between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ (and their subsets 
of oppositions), and as a consequence either romanticize or make ‘nature’ 
exotic.90 He exposes, in other words, the unconscious or repressed side of human 
culture, its creation and objectivising of the ‘Other’ and the endless deferral of 
meaning in the text. To Derrida and his followers, all begins and ends in 
language, yet this theory paradoxically turns out to be a sort of linguistic 
mystique, in other words, yet another myth. 
‘Myth’ is a word that has been variously used in such diverse fields as 
literature, anthropology, psychology, religious studies. In current usage ‘myth’ is 
considered to mean ‘lie’ or ‘falsehood’. This is because Western culture has 
gone into the direction of a conspicuous demythologization of the world, our 
attitude being that of seeking for ‘knowledge’, ‘meaning’, the ‘fact’, which is 
the ‘abstraction’ behind a specific event. Yet, as all the above disciplines have 
shown, myth is a complex phenomenon. Scholars have been discussing the origin 
and function of myth and its relation to ritual and have not reached a definitive 
or conventional definition of this elusive phenomenon. For the purposes of the 
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present research, which is about literature, I will regard myth as an archetypal 
process inherent in the human consciousness, unfolding as a way of experiencing 
life, an image-making process which accounts for and gives insight into specific, 
concrete experiences, be they personal, communal, related to nature or to the 
transpersonal domain. 
I agree with Coupe (2009: 195), who sees myth as ‘imaginative exploration’, 
rather than ‘literal exploration’, and with Birenbaum: 
A myth, then, is a symbol, in the form of a story, expressing (or 
producing) a confrontation between the limited perspective of the 
self and the unlimited context in which it exists. […] 
The single fundamental archetype (or originating form) is the 
structure of consciousness itself. It is thus the structure of 
consciousness, and not its specific contents, that myth is all about’.91  
Thus myth is both a ‘process of image-making’ and an ‘image’, embodied in a 
‘story’, the product of that process. Yet, as Birenbaum remarks, ‘we have only 
versions of the myth’ (1988: 148). Art and literature have thrived on the re-
interpretation and re-writing of myths, whose origins are lost to us. What 
matters is how literature as a code both activates and is activated through 
reading by the reader’s mind, which is inherently mythic, as Jung taught about 
the human psyche. Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of participation mystique defined in 
Primitive Mentality‒‒first published in Paris in 1922‒‒according to which 
‘primitive mind’ (that is mythical mind) blends natural and supernatural in a 
continuum, overriding logical concepts, is particularly suggestive.92 By the same 
token, Cassirer’s view of myth as a constitutive ‘symbolic form’ of human 
consciousness is very fruitful.93 Yet, in my understanding, myth is free from the 
latter’s evolutionist stance that relegates it to an inferior status when compared 
to art, religion and science. From Cassirer’s point of view, it is so because he is 
arguing, as a philosopher, through linear logic. However, this kind of logic is 
disrupted by myth, which produces an alternative logic: what Birenbaum (1988) 
calls ‘non-linear’ or ‘qualitative’ logic. This is something which does not 
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interpret ‘fact’ but embodies a concrete experience. It is in this sense that 
Coupe can claim ‘the primacy of myth […] over abstract ideas of eternal truths. 
Mythos produces logos’ (2009: 84). By different means, Derrida has exposed 
logos too. 
Indeed, when I see literature as a code which both activates and is being 
activated by the reader’s consciousness, I am stating a principle of ‘resonance’ 
between the two, as myth is unfolding in the reader’s internalized space-time 
continuum. With this assertion I come closer to my main argument: namely, that 
literature is ritualized activity, both in the sense that the reader is performing 
and taking part in a ‘ritual’, and in the sense that different texts adumbrate 
specific ‘rituals’. I would like to underline how the opposition between oral and 
written text, and communal performance and individual reading is less rigid than 
usually thought or implied. In fact, a reader does not exist in a vacuum; not only 
is s/he part of a wider socio-cultural context, but also a web or a small 
community constituted by all the people who are reading, have read or will read 
the same book. In this respect space and time are contingent. Also, human mind 
and nature are not opposed, as the most recent developments in science are 
increasingly recognizing.94 According to scientists, matter is energy, both at 
microscopic and macroscopic levels: space is not empty but a matrix, a field of 
conscious, intelligent energy, which configures itself according to different 
probability patterns, shaped as waves. This means that nature is consciousness, 
and human consciousness is contained within it. Nature is in and around us. 
As Birenbaum points out, ‘myth establishes an imaginative field in the mind’ 
(1988: 171)‒‒and he makes clear that he intends the notion of ‘field’ in the 
sense used in physics: myth ‘also extends this field to include the world around, 
so that the three levels of reality‒‒the myth-making mind, the community, and 
the realm of nature‒‒blend into a single assertion of life’. This in literature 
happens, as I shall explain, through ‘ritualization’. 
Let us go back to my assertion that reading literature is ritualized 
activity. Why? What is ‘ritual’?  
If consciousness and myth are regulated according to a principle of mutual 
resonance, and art revitalizes and reactivates myth, this happens through 
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language seen as ‘symbolic action’.95 Morevoer, according to the philosopher of 
language Austin (in a paper first read in French in 1958 and then translated and 
published in English in 1963), it is possible to perform actions with words: he 
refers to ‘performative verbs’ as those verbs that by being spoken actually act 
(ex. To promise something verbally is the very action of promising).96 In an 
extended way, it is possible to state that the version of myth revitalized in a 
specific literary text gets enacted through and in the reader’s consciousness, 
which is being in its turn acted upon, influenced and changed. Thus the reader 
herself is undergoing a ‘rite of passage’, a sort of initiation, parallel but not 
identical with that of the characters. She has to lose something in order to gain 
something else: from the material time necessary for the reading and her 
prejudices or presuppositions to greater insight or sheer, liberating enjoyment. 
Indeed, I would say that sacrifice plays an important part in the process of 
reading fiction, because fiction is a process whereby we have to create the 
whole situation in our minds, and in order to do so, we have both to bring our 
experience, or knowledge of the world to the reading process, but also try to 
empty our mind to some degree, in order to let the reading experience act on 
and through us. As Birenbaum has remarked, ‘[p]articularly important to the 
structure of myth is the logic of sacrifice, for this central ritual act conveys the 
continuity through mankind, nature and deity’ (Birenbaum: 1988, 28). In reading 
literature we are bringing ourselves, in a sense sacrificing ourselves, to the 
experience. This does not happen in reading a newspaper article, because this 
relates about something in the external world, something ‘given’, so to speak. In 
literature instead, we have to co-create it all, and in so doing we engage in 
dialogue, negotiation and we re-instate our interest for the human world, in its 
interaction with the great forces of nature and mystery. Thus a sacrificial 
tendency is at work in myth as well as in literature conceived as ritualized 
activity. 
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3.3 Some Anthropological Theories of ‘Ritual’ and 
Literature 
Many anthropologists agree in seeing ‘ritual’ as a set of formalized actions 
which have the function of re-instating the social order. There are rituals that 
appear to be destructive of that very order, like Southern Europe’s Carnival for 
example, but even that ritual’s ultimate aim is cohesive. And it seems to be so 
not only on the social level, but also on the intra-psychic dimension, as the 
partaker experiences his being ‘part’ of a ‘whole’ as having his ‘proper place’ as 
an individual.  
The anthropological literature on ‘ritual’ (and on ‘myth’ and ‘magic’) is 
huge. Here are some of the most relevant definitions. According to Geertz, ‘any 
religious ritual […] involves [the] symbolic fusion of ethos and world view’: 
 
 […] For it is in ritual‒‒that is, consecrated behaviour‒‒that this 
conviction that religious conceptions are veridical and that religious 
directives are sound is somehow generated. It is in some sort of 
ceremonial form […] that the moods and motivations which sacred 
symbols induce in men and the general conceptions of the order of 
existence which they formulate for men meet and reinforce one 
another. In a ritual the world as lived and the world as imagined, 
fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to 
be the same world […]97 
In ‘Symbols in African Ritual’, Victor Turner provides the following definition: 
A ritual is a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, 
words, and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed 
to influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors’ 
goals and interests.98 
However, in Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure (1969), he 
concentrates on the structure of ‘rites of passage’ and uses the term 
‘communitas’, or ‘community’ to signify an anti-structural bond between 
participants of the ‘ritual’. By the term ‘anti-structural’, Turner means a bond 
which eludes social hierarchies and structures, and even subverts them. 
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‘Communitas’, a renovated sense of existential community and belonging, is 
always liminal and renews vision and creative processes that from the ritual 
context will later be brought back to the social structure, hence the creative, 
renewing function of ‘ritual’. 
When reporting the example given by Jung about ‘the Hopi ritual dances’, 
Birenbaum comments on ‘the function of ritual’ as ‘[…] one of orientation, 
sustaining the community’s relation to the revolving world of nature, not simply 
as a fact but as a process of experience. Ritual is not simply magic used to 
control nature’ (1988: 154). In fact the natives chant and plant seeds: they 
perform ‘ritual’ as a preparation to other activities. But what sort of 
preparation? It is an inner, psychological preparation, a process of alignment to 
the rhythms and cycles of nature, in the specific case.  
As to the formal characteristics of ‘ritual’, Stanley Tambiah defines 
‘ritual’ as a performance characterized by ‘formality’, ‘stereotype’, 
‘condensation’ and ‘redundancy’.99 
In a similar way to the tradition of ritual magic, where ritual acts upon 
and is acted by consciousness, literature acts and is acted by the readers’ 
consciousness through the enactment of the former’s mythical elements. Fiction 
and poetry are different media from a painting, a film, or even a play on the 
stage. Although the audience is emotionally involved, theatre provides the 
audience with images and/or movements that are only to be perceived, not 
created in the observer’s mind. In this sense, they are ready-made. In theatre, 
in the case of experimental theatre, interaction between actors and audience is 
possible. The spectator gets involved either physically or through verbal 
response. In either case, there is a certain space for image-making but to a 
much greater extent do literature and myth (not only written, but also through 
story-telling), provide the human consciousness with the unique task of image-
making, creating a setting and a life situation in the mind. And no two readers 
produce the same images. Moreover, while a lot has been said about the 
involvement of the body in ritual and its theatrical aspects, what I have called 
the ‘ritualized consciousness’ has not been addressed. I suggest that a specific 
kind of ritual consciousness is evoked in and by literature and myth, through the 
image-making they require of the readers. 
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What do I mean by ‘ritualized mind’? 
I mean a mind that (re)-creates and performs images (in so far as it 
weaves narratives out of images it is a ‘mythical mind’) in order to accomplish 
symbolic tasks, whose ultimate significance lies in aesthetic and/or existential 
insight. In order to broach this issue more cogently, it is useful to adopt Coupe’s 
distinction between ‘allegory’ and ‘radical typology’ (2009: 93). We could say 
that allegorical texts, or allegorical readings of texts, are still connected to a 
linear logic of univocal correspondence between the ‘letter’ and the ‘meaning’ 
behind it, while texts that embody a ‘radical typology’ are open to a sense of 
‘permanent possibility’, an ‘ongoing dialectic of the sacred and the profane’ 
(Coupe 2009: 98). Thus, while allegory corresponds to ‘realism’, the spirit of 
‘hierarchy’ and ‘perfection’, radical typology is linked to an apprehension of 
reality which is mythical, i.e. non-realist. At this point it is important to 
remember that it is possible to have ‘reality without realism’ (Curry, quoted in 
Coupe 2009: 89) and that ‘if realism is the illusion of truth, then non-realism is 
the truth of illusion.’ (Coupe 2009: 91) 
This point is extremely relevant to my research because I am looking into 
contemporary texts that question to different degrees the viability of 
mainstream realism as a literary mode. They question its claim to truth and 
show how it is itself implicated in the problem of ‘representation’ as mimesis, 
and the limited logic of literalism, its search for an absolute abstract ‘meaning’ 
behind the changeability of the events’ patterns. This abstraction is the problem 
some writers are trying to address: the means of demythologization and the 
destruction of the imagination in mass culture. 
My analytical stance rests on the presuppositions of process philosophy as 
expressed by Whitehead, Langer and others, namely the fundamental insight 
into the nature of reality as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘substance’ or ‘entity’. 
Everything flows, Heraclitus said first.100 And contemporary science seems to 
confirm it. The texts I have chosen to study show directly or indirectly the limits 
of linear logic and/or the frustration of the characters (and the readers) who 
stick to it. 
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3.4 The Dynamics of ‘Ritualization’ 
In her Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, anthropologist Catherine Bell states: 
The notion that ritual resolves a fundamental social contradiction can 
be seen as a type of myth legitimating the whole apparatus of ritual 
studies. […] Ritual is not some basic mechanism for resolving or 
disguising conflicts fundamental to socio-cultural life. (1992: 37) 
Although she does not agree with the ‘performance theory’ about their 
definitions of reified ‘ritual’, to her ritual is a strategic activity, a ‘way of 
acting’, and she speaks about the ‘ritualization of activity’ (1992: 219). 
Indeed ritualization is the strategic manipulation of ‘context’ in the 
very act of reproducing it. […] ritualization cannot be understood 
apart from the immediate situation, which is being reproduced in a 
misrecognized and transformed way through the production of 
ritualized agents. (1992: 100) 
The above statement can be applied also to the reading of literature. In 
fact, together with invariance of its elements, a ritual cannot be performed 
exactly in the same way all the time: even small changes in setting, situation, 
etc., can alter the effective significance and impact of the ‘ritual’ for the 
individual participants. In a similar way, a fictional text is a script that 
generates a great number of potential readings. If the dichotomy between 
‘thought and action’ has to be demystified‒‒as Catherine Bell argues‒‒then 
reading literature is an open-ended process, which generates multifarious 
meanings and possibilities of meanings which resonate, through the archetypal 
configuration of the individual’s psyche, with the indefinite character of 
mythological elements present in the text. These elements are indefinite from 
the point of view of ‘meaning’, hence multi-vocal, yet they embody an 
experience, a concrete apprehension of the world through images, feelings, 
sensations. 
In this sense, a fictional text can be seen as a ‘magical script’ whose 
‘meaning’ is not absolute and given once and for all but that needs to be 
activated and also activates different aspects in different readers’ 
consciousness. The main point of Catherine Bell’s book is that there is not such a 
thing as ‘ritual’ ‘out there’, but that instead ‘ritualization’, as a specific way of 
marking off certain activities from others, is ‘a strategic way of acting in specific 
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social situations’ (67) and this is what anthropology, according to her, should be 
observing. As far as the study of literature is concerned, reading is such a 
ritualized activity. This is not only obvious in institutionalized contexts in which 
certain texts are upheld as allegedly expressing certain ideal values. On another 
level, it is also obvious in the way people share and dip into popular texts of 
literature (external ritualization). However there is another level where reading 
a text can be seen as a ritualized activity’: when somebody is reading by herself 
(internal ritualization).  
In this case the individual reader is engaging in an activity which is well 
marked off from more mundane ones, and it has strong implications for 
negotiating her own identity, knowledge and spaces of freedom within social 
constrains: reading happens in a social context; no matter how isolated a reader 
is, s/he is still making a performative statement of her own position, situating 
herself and being situated within a social dimension. 
While Catherine Bell rejects symbolic and cultural interpretations of 
‘ritual’ such as Geertz’s, Turner’s and Tambiah’s as not being capable of 
resolving the antinomy between thought and action, she does so because she is 
concerned with the study of social actions. She states that these anthropologists 
are inscribing into the object of their study‒‒the social actors‒‒the method of 
theoretical speculation that they are employing: ‘the object and the method are 
actually intrinsic to each other, one demonstrating the naturalness and validity 
of the other’ (1992: 49). Yet, I am not convinced that this is ‘wrong’, as we all 
approach reality through our own frame of reference, and she does so by 
mentioning ‘practice’ rather than ‘performance’, or ‘text’. 
However, since the object of my reflection is literature, and I see it as a 
‘social activity’ too, I intend to build on the asymmetrical relationship between 
language and ‘ritual’. As Bell herself states, ‘[w]hereas the use of language or a 
particular mode of speaking does not appear to be intrinsically necessary to 
ritual as such, the opposite holds‒‒namely, that ritualization readily affects the 
way language is used and the significance it is accorded’ (Bell 1992:113). While 
some theorists, starting from Ricoeur, have seen meaningful action as a text, I 
see a text as a ‘magical script’ which engenders a process, indeed becomes a 
process, a specific kind of unfolding activity in the reader’s consciousness. Thus, 
while I subscribe to Bell’s view that there is no such thing as ‘ritual’ in the sense 
of a specific ‘object’ of observation, but only as a practice or, from my point of 
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view, as an action continuum which is more than the sum of its single elements 
and sequences, I am convinced that we perform ritual activity when reading. In 
this way, the term ritual is an adjective qualifying different actions, as 
embodying a certain quality of consciousness, which I have called ‘ritualized’ 
and describe in more detail in the sections 3.6 and 3.7 below. 
Bell explicitly says that she has not intended to offer another ‘theory of 
ritual’, as the afore-mentioned anthropologists have done. But to be fair to 
them, although they have somewhat reified ‘ritual’, they have also pointed out 
the ambivalence of ‘ritual’ as a set of actions and its potential for power 
negotiation within the limits of social constraints. For my part, I believe that 
Bell’s insights can be enhanced by adopting some of Turner and Tambiah’s views 
on ‘liminality’, ‘communitas’ and ‘magic’, views which are fruitful for reading 
literature too. 
 
3.5 Reading and Socialization 
Here is Victor Turner’s definition of ‘communitas’ and ‘liminality’ in some 
detail: 
For me communitas emerges where social structure is not. […] For 
communitas has an existential quality; it involves the whole man in his 
relation to other whole men. Structure, on the other hand, has 
cognitive quality, it is essentially a set of classifications, a model for 
thinking about culture and nature and ordering one’s public life. 
Communitas has also an aspect of potentiality, it is often in the 
subjunctive mode. Relations between total beings are generative of 
symbols and metaphors and comparisons; art and religion are their 
products rather than legal and political structures. […] Prophets and 
artists tend to be liminal and marginal people. […] Liminality, 
marginality, and structural inferiority are conditions in which are 
frequently generated myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, 
and works of art. These cultural forms provide men with a set of 
templates or models which are, at one level, periodical 
reclassifications of reality and man’s relationship to society, nature 
and culture. But they are more than classifications, since they incite 
men to action as well as thought. Each of these productions has a 
multivocal character, having many meanings, and each is capable of 
moving people at many psychobiological levels simultaneously. (1966: 
126-29, emphasis mine) 
Reading‒‒alone or together‒‒is an act of socialization and identity 
building. It can reinforce the sense of belonging‒‒through communitas and 
liminality‒‒to a specific group. Even when we are rejecting this sense of 
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belonging, we are defining ourselves in the context of a wider social dimension. 
We cannot get away from this base: a sense of self and a sense of belonging are 
interdependent and relational. And the extent to which a reading empowers or 
dis-empowers us is a function of its potential for power renegotiation and 
creativity.  
When a text is radical-typological, it goes beyond the literalist search for 
the only ‘meaning’ and its corollary, the opposition between thought and action 
(and the devaluation of the latter). The possible readings of this text are 
embodied experiences, with potentialities for meaning, patterns that will be 
more or less evident and actualized with each reading and each individual 
reader. When instead allegory is at work in a text, our possibilities for reading 
are in some ways precluded. Reading is action. Thought is action too: their 
ultimate separation may be a matter of linguistic categories (and maybe there 
are languages that do not oppose the two?) 
Reading as a process is grounded in bodily experience, because our ability 
of image-making is mediated by bodily experience from which ‘the ungraspable 
forms of imagination [which] profoundly affect human reasoning’ emerge (Bell 
1992: 95); and, I would add, these same forms of imagination affect human 
feelings too. I mean that reading (re)-evokes certain feelings, because we 
experience them in the body or, better still, in our body–consciousness 
continuum. As Bell puts it, ‘the body ‘mediates’ all action’ (1992: 97). 
 
3.6 The Reader and the Text 
As already pointed out, when I state that fiction reading is a process of 
ritualization, I have in mind that the reader acts out a ‘rite de passage’, and 
finds himself in a liminal situation. It is in a way a ‘ritual’ of initiation which 
makes for the de-structuring or reinforcing of the configuration of the self, from 
a rigid ‘structure’ or something which is perceived to be so, to a conglomerate 
of processes. In this interaction, the reciprocal resistance of both reader and 
text has to be taken into account, as well as the potential for their creative 
‘positive’ action as opposed to ‘negating’ action. For example, in Lanark, the 
consulting of the oracle lays bare Lanark’s life as Thaw, but the very nature of 
the oracle as depicted in the story exposes a certain view of the omniscient 
narrator as an abstraction. This in turn has different effects on different 
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readers: they may find it reassuring or they may resist this narrative device. In 
either case, they are obliged to follow the oracle’s account as authoritative (up 
to a point, but I will return to Lanark in due course), while acknowledging the 
artificiality of its omniscient voice. In this process, the readers may experience 
cognitive dissonance or accept the provisional, transient nature of the ‘ritual’ 
they are undergoing. This ritualization may be, among other things, therapeutic, 
in that the reader’s self is released from over-logical, literal constraints. I mean 
that this ritualization has no pre-emptive ‘meaning’ but generates different 
‘meanings’, and as such can be both a locus of resistance and innovation. I do 
not see ritualization as invariably conservative, although it is cohesive, in the 
sense that it allows for a certain degree of reconfiguration of power patterns 
within the limits of certain given constraints. These constraints are given by 
different texts, which together with being a magical script or code to be acted 
out and on, are also a ‘controlled environment’. Thus there are many possible 
readings of a text, but some are more ‘appropriate’ than others, according to 
the features of the single texts.  
There is yet another way in which ritualization shapes the embodied 
consciousness of the reader: by an act of ‘modelling’ through the textual 
strategy of the ‘implied reader’, as defined by Wolfgang Iser (1978). The reader 
comes to the text with certain expectations. Whether these are met or baffled 
determines a point of friction between the reader’s projections and the resistant 
intentionality expressed in/by the text. On the other hand, as Iser has shown, a 
text constitutes and requires an ‘implicit reader’, who may or may not coincide 
with the actual, embodied reader. It can remain an ‘ideal’ the text is striving or 
tending towards, or can be incarnated in the present reader. However, this 
characteristic of the text, the presence of the ‘implied reader’, requires that 
each reader fulfils, at least in part, the criteria set out by the text, if an 
‘appropriate’ reading is to unfold. The reader has to perform certain tasks 
encoded in the text. But there is more than one appropriate reading. In this 
sense, consciousness ritualization happens as that process which organizes a 
field of interacting forces within which resistance and compliance take shape. 
Thus ritualization offers a certain space for negotiation, strategy and innovation. 
Since (not despite) the ‘implied reader’ is strategic to the text’s 
intentionality, the embodied reader has some options: to comply with or oppose 
it, to differentiate herself from it in part or in toto, and to question its function 
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and status (critical reading), and provide alternative readings (divergent or 
creative reading). For example, in Lanark the author says in the ‘Epilogue’ he 
has written a story which should be read in the way it is laid out but should be 
thought about in a different order; but what if a reader decides to defy this 
instruction? And is this not a trick or a trap, after all, given that the author 
decided to lay the story out the way he did? It is this ambiguity which adds depth 
to the reading process. 
 
3.7 The Role of Ritualization in Literature 
Catherine Bell dissociates rituals from beliefs: 
Ritualized activities specifically do not promote belief or conviction. 
On the contrary, ritualized practices afford a great diversity of 
interpretation in exchange for little more than consent to the form of 
the activities. […] It is exactly this sort of formal and thereby 
noncommittal participation that ritualized practices do allow. (1992: 
186) 
From her point of view, ‘ritual [as a practice rather than as an entity] is the 
thing itself. It is power; it acts and it activates’. (1992: 195) Reading literature 
as a ritualized activity would entail recognizing both its potential for self-
empowerment and the dynamics of power and resistance between the reader 
and the text. If ‘ritual symbols and meanings are too indeterminate and their 
schemes too flexible to lend themselves to any simple process of instilling fixed 
ideas’ (1992: 221), it follows that in reading literature in this way, the ambiguity 
and the power-balancing process of ritualizing mark it off as a special activity. 
Wolfgang Iser talks about ‘fictionalizing acts’ as ‘operations’ (1989: 237) 
and distinguishes ‘the fictive’, ‘the imaginary’ and ‘meaning’. ‘The fictive’ is 
conceived as ‘an act of boundary-crossing’, an ‘overstepping’ of the world, 
which is nonetheless incorporated in the background of a fiction; ‘meaning’ is 
the properly semantic, plurivocal and existential element of fiction, while the 
imaginary is difficult to define: 
The imaginary is not semantic, because it is by its very nature diffuse, 
whereas meaning becomes meaning through its precision. It is the 
diffuseness of the imaginary that enables it to be transformed into so 
many different gestalts, and this transformation is necessary 
whenever this potential is tapped for utilization. Indeed fiction, in the 
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broadest sense of the term, is the pragmatically conditioned gestalt of 
the imaginary […] Fiction reveals itself as a product of the imaginary 
insofar as it lays bare its fictionality, and yet it appears to be a 
halfway house between the imaginary and the real. It shares with the 
real the determinateness of its form, and with the imaginary its 
nature of an ‘As if’. (1989: 232) 
In this interpretation, ‘the fictive’ is not literature by itself, but is what makes 
literature possible. The fictive is the process whereby humans make sense of 
reality, yet literature is special in that it makes the readers aware of its 
fictionality. In doing so, it provides a specific gestalt for the imaginary, what 
other authors throughout history have called ‘imagination’, ‘fancy’, or ‘fantasy’. 
Iser is not interested in saying what the imaginary is, but how it works in 
literature, and recognizes it is inherently ‘diffuse’ and elusive. He also talks 
about ‘the play of the text’ (1989: 249) and asks why we need to play. 
I suggest that playing the textual game is an act of ritualization, in the 
sense proposed by Catherine Bell in the quotations I have cited, where ritual 
acts are dissociated from beliefs and promote a certain degree of self-
empowerment within the constraints of the text set by the author’s 
intentionality. Thus, I would say that reading literature as ritualization it is a 
strategic play of power, domination and resistance in the reader’s embodied 
consciousness. Only external adherence to the form of the text is required in 
order for coherent, multiple interpretations to be constructed or played out in 
the reader’s mind. Also, ritualization, intended in the sense outlined so far, is an 
act which is different but not opposed to that of fictionalization. The latter 
produces ‘meaning’, the first is a threshold to the imaginary. This is so because 
the imaginary, the act of imagination as creative shaping faculty, is a search for 
(self)-enhancement, whereby the consciousness experiences itself at its most 
heightened state and meanwhile knows its potentialities. 
Now, ritualization, as an act of power, formalizes that which is beyond 
the various worldviews (gestalts, frames of reference), what Iser calls the 
‘ungraspable’. This means that ritualization does not explain anything, nor is it 
tied to specific beliefs, but is a patterning action which performs according to a 
gestural principle. It is ‘expressive’ in a gestural sense, rather than conveying 
‘meaning’. And it is through this gestural principle of ‘modelling’ that 
ritualization approaches the ‘ungraspable’, as a formalized practice of power 
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which plays out the psyche’s potential for enhancement of its faculties and its 
environment. 
Thus ritualization tells us something about our make-up as human beings – 
and in this sense I am going further down the direction pointed out by Iser. 
Ritualization tells us something about the imagination as an act of free play and 
creativity, but cannot solve the unsolvable problem of its origins. Yet 
ritualization is important because it both structures and de-structures the 
reader’s consciousness through glimpses of the inarticulate ‘imaginary’. 
Ritualization is an activity which integrates reader and text in the same dynamic 
process; it is an alternative to ‘play’ but also encompasses it. Indeed it is a 
better explanatory tool than ‘play’ because it recognizes both the formalization 
of rules and the free play inherent within the constraints provided by the rules 
and also the balancing of power between reader and text. Thus ritualization is 
itself a reading process: people ‘see’ or construct certain rules in order to 
‘play’, to make sense and empower themselves. These reading ‘rules’ are the 
basics for making sense of fiction: the reader engages in a peculiar pattern of 
action in order to ‘win’ something, to find the unique contribution he can give as 
a reader and engage in a conversation with himself and with the author.  
If ‘play’ is directed to gaining or winning something, however, it follows 
that there must be a winner as well as a loser. In ritualized games, instead, 
there’s a balancing out of power and formalization of practices which involve 
staging the appropriate response, so that there is a distance between the player 
and the play, and simultaneously an identification of the player with his role. In 
reading, this special aspect is given by the threshold, or boundary-crossing, 
stepping into ‘another world’ that in turn oversteps and reveals some aspects of 
the real world, according to the principles of ‘selection’ of certain features of 
‘outer’ reality and their ‘combination’ within the text, as outlined by Iser when 
speaking about the nature of ‘fictionalizing acts’.101 
Can ritualization be specific to art and spirituality more than the fictive? 
We perform ‘fictionalizing acts’ all the time in everyday life, yet we do not mark 
off all these activities as special. Literature has this distinctive feature in that it 
places us, as readers, in a liminal dimension, in the ‘beyond’ of the literary text, 
where we live emotions, experiment situations, feelings and thoughts which 
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affect us ‘on many psychobiological levels simultaneously’ (Turner 1969: 129). I 
would add that ‘the fictive’ follows ritualization. Only when ‘fictionalizing acts’ 
are produced within a ritualized framework, are we dealing with a literary text 
(oral or written); otherwise we have other phenomena. I suggest therefore that 
the interplay of the fictive and the imaginary is not enough to account for 
literature, as it occurs also in other daily activities without bringing about 
literature.  
So far, then, I have been suggesting that by entering the game/play of the 
text, our embodied consciousness is performing a ritualized activity, because of 
the following factors: liminality, self-empowerment, identity-building and 
social/communal positioning effected through the reading act, performativity. 
Literature indeed plays games with and on the reader but in a ritualized way 
brings about a relationship between reader and text (with its characters, heroes 
and heroines). However, the reader never loses in the practical sense of the 
world, but always gains some insight and extends herself. She, however, is 
performing a ‘self-sacrifice’, which will bring about greater gain. Each individual 
reading is a creative enactment of the literary script and entails accepting a 
‘make-believe’ scenario, a simulation whereby the reader removes himself from 
what Iser calls his own ‘disposition’ and enters in another’s shoes. It is only 
partial identification though, because the reader at the same time distances 
himself both from what he is reading and his world, and is present in an in-
between condition. In this sense, reading is based on conventionality and 
distancing.  
The ‘player’ simultaneously becomes the ‘play’ and the ‘played’, in that 
by stepping out of herself in the reading, the reader momentarily puts in the 
background what she is, in order to be something other in three movements: she 
is one with the text, she is played by the text in that the text brings out new 
configuration of the reader’s experience of herself, and she negotiates power 
‘positions’ with and in the text (both receptiveness and resistance have to be 
taken into account). These movements are not a pre-ordained sequence, but can 
occur at any time, even simultaneously. Ritualized reading involves the setting 
up of a space between the reader (with her disposition) and the text (with its 
dynamic requirements). In this space both identification and distancing take 
place. In this ‘ritual space’ of the text’s enactment, the reader learns the 
appropriate response through this double movement of identification and 
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distancing. This is what makes different ‘meanings’ possible, in that the reader’s 
imagination is involved at different levels: through the double movement of 
performing the text and being performed by the text, the reader is drawn into 
several emotional trasmutations and metamorphoses. In other words, ‘magic’ 
happens. 
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4 Chapter 4: Magic and Performativity 
In this chapter I outline the relation between the theoretical construct of 
‘magic’ and modernity. Following Styers (2004), I am going to show briefly how 
since the beginning of the modern age the much debated category of ‘magic’ has 
served as a foil for a clear-cut demarcation of the secular realm of politics and 
science on one hand and of that of institutionalized religion on the other, which 
have indeed ended up reinforcing each other in delimiting their respective 
domains of influence. After drawing distinctions among different ‘kinds’ of 
magic (supernatural or ‘real’ magic, natural magic, secular magic, fetishism and 
magic as a rhetorical art), I apply ‘magic’ to literature. Finally, I explore 
Kenneth Burke’s ideas on literature as symbolic action and ‘magic’ as the very 
basis of language, and expand my reflections with the support of linguistics, in 
order to pinpoint a performative conception of fiction. 
 
4.1 Magic and Modernity 
In his compelling analysis of Western theories of magic, Randall Styers 
(2004), shows how ‘magic’ as a reified concept has served a number of purposes 
since the emerging out of the distinctive institutions of the secular capitalist 
West: the ‘state’, the ‘market’, ‘religion’ and ‘science’. In their numerous 
attempts to define ‘magic’ as something other than ‘religion’, scholars have 
tried to define the latter as a spiritualized and disembodied practice which can 
be easily set apart from more pragmatic concerns and practices. In David 
Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757) for example, religion is a universal 
phenomenon and a matter of ideas and beliefs which can be assented to 
rationally and inwardly. This apparently transparent and reasonable definition of 
religion, however, masks more than it reveals, as it is based on the culturally 
specific presupposition which has shaped Western history, from the Jewish 
distinction between ‘true’ religion and ‘false’ idolatry, to the Greek 
differentiation between ‘religion’ and ‘science’, ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’. In-
between there is ‘magic’, a sort of buffer between the two domains, which 
nicely mutually exclude one another and let the other live according to its own 
specific interests and concerns. And of course, Hume’s and subsequent ideas 
concerning religion also bear the brunt of Post-Reformation rationality and 
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religiosity, often eager to define itself in contrast to the ‘magical’ practices of 
that big Other, Catholicism. Thus this highly abstract concept of religion can live 
side to side and indeed support liberal thought, capitalism, the ethics of the 
state, and rigorous empirical research into an increasingly inanimate matter. 
‘Magic’ is the grey area of dissent, of un-policed desire, of deviance and refusal 
to be ‘modern’. From Frazer’s conception of magic as ‘bastard sister of science’ 
onwards, in anthropology as well as in religious studies, scholars have been 
concerned with setting boundaries and containing ‘magic’ as the domain of the 
radically and inconceivably Other, whereby the West, the State, the Market can 
take shape by the logic of differentiation and opposition. Abstract religion is also 
an accomplice to this process, in that it is content with reclaiming the private 
conscience of the subject, while shaping it in compliance with social norms. In 
addition, the moment that the boundaries between human and non-human are 
set hard against each other, ‘magic’ with its blurred categories becomes that 
obdurate irrational practice that denies order, hierarchy and opposes the logic 
of rationalization and efficiency, the very base of ‘modernity’.  
Recently, discourses on ‘magic’ have been appropriated by 
anthropologists (for example Michael Taussig102)  and activists alike, in order to 
show their subversive potential in the context of (post)colonial cultures. On the 
other hand, in the West, there has been an ongoing sense of how, as an 
underground practice, magic serves to de-structure consciousness and 
compliance to power constraints. Thus, pagan activist Starhawk103 has been able 
to state:  
Magic is another word that makes people uneasy, so I use it 
deliberately, because the words we are comfortable with, the words 
that sound acceptable, rational, scientific, and intellectually correct, 
are comfortable precisely because they are the language of 
estrangement. (1982: 13. Emphasis in original) 
Beyond the flagrant provocation, I am quoting a pagan feminist as a marker of 
the peculiar enterprise I have set out to attempt: that of an ‘anthropologizing of 
the West’ through the reading of literature and the reading of literature as an 
invariably anthropological concern. Thus quoting somebody who is beyond the 
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establishment is a declaration of intent and a way to rethink and re-appropriate 
‘magic’ for literary discourse, as a fluid tool, not a reified category used to 
police the limits and boundaries of the acceptable and the ‘norm’. 
In the previous chapter I have stated that to read consists of undergoing a 
ritual, hence reading sets up a marked off space and time where a magical 
experience can take shape. The text is the tool and locus of enactment of this 
magic, and insofar as it is something to be acted, a script to be performed, it is 
fully wrapped up in the concept of performativity. It is my contention that magic 
is very much at the heart of the ‘modern’ enterprise, however we try to dismiss 
and mask it. Literature is a kind of magic: that kind that tries to affect a change 
in consciousness through an as if. Thus, I am not conceiving magic as a domain 
of ‘pure’ desire and instant gratification, rather as a discipline and a practice 
which is murky, ‘contaminated’, but not in the negative sense propounded by 
early theorists of magic. Rather, it is contaminated in the sense that it entails a 
rethinking of the modes of subjectivity and of the interactions between the 
subject and its environment, a hands-on approach to knowledge, cognition, 
imagination and action.  
As ‘modern’ citizens, we are not so different from ‘traditional’ peoples: 
we have only shifted our attention and refined our magical practices. Only, at a 
certain point, our desire for self-legitimization and power has turned into ‘the 
language of estrangement’ and domination. It is for this reason, I believe, that 
unearthing the magic inherent in literature is important: to show that literature 
is a magical supplement to reality, that it is important because it is ‘parasitic’ 
on ‘serious’ language. This, however, does not mean that, by implication, I am 
still advocating a bankrupt ontology of Presence or a metaphysical endowment 
of Being; on the contrary, I am basing my assessment on a vision of flux and 
change as the only basis for reality. To debunk ‘seriousness’ and to advocate 
‘playfulness’ means nothing less than expose the gravity and pompous self-
importance of much cultural discourse; it is to believe that literature can get us 
in touch with the power of the imagination and creativity, as practices which go 
against the received wisdom of reification, compliance and conformity. 
 
  91 
4.2 Supernatural, Secular Magic and Fetishism 
Simon During (2002) distinguishes among supernatural, natural, folk and 
secular magic.104 From his point of view, the latter is at the very core of the 
modern enterprise, with its emphasis on gratification, illusionism, 
commercialism and triviality. He states that secular magic is a hollow and 
deliberate doubling of ‘real’ or high magic, that is supernatural and natural 
magic. While folk magic with its beliefs is to be confined to the realm of popular 
superstition and healing, natural magic is concerned with nature and the levels 
of causation possible within natural laws. Supernatural magic, on the other 
hand, is concerned with spiritual or invisible causes, but can blend into natural 
magic depending on the conceptualization of causal agents such as angels and 
demons, as belonging to ‘nature’ or to ‘supernature’. The different types of high 
magic include alchemy, the Jewish Kabbalah and astrology, just to mention a 
few. Indeed, many heterodox systems of knowledge devised by learned magic 
practitioners belong to this class. 
For our purposes the distinction between ‘(super)natural’ and ‘secular’ 
magic is particularly fruitful and important, as it can be applied to the broad 
concerns of various types of literature. According to During, ‘a literary 
equivalent to secular magic does exist, and […] it can be found in writing which 
solicits the heterogeneous modes of reception that characterize the magic 
assemblage’. (178-79) His definition of the latter is the following:  
By ‘magic assemblage’ I mean that motley of shows in the public 
spaces where magic was performed: theatres, fairs, streets, taverns 
and so on. Magic assemblages are defined less by virtue of any formal 
or abstract features that they have in common than by their 
contiguity to one another in day-to-day commercial show business. At 
one time or the other, the magic assemblage included optical illusions 
like magic lantern shows or early film, feats of strength, juggling, 
posture mastery, ventriloquism, puppet shows, trained animal 
exhibitions, comic routines, automata displays, lotteries, and joy 
rides. It names, in other words, a historically developing sector of 
leisure enterprises which began to consolidate during the seventeenth 
century, at first alongside traditional and ritual festivals and revelries. 
[…] The amazements and pleasures of conjuring are at once so 
powerful and so slight that they escape even carnivalization, for they 
work more on the mind than on the body. Because the doubleness and 
                                         
104
 Simon During, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
  92 
elusiveness of conjuring constitute its core, the magic assemblage 
twists and turns in its orientation to the wider culture. (66-7) 
Thus, its ‘literary equivalent’ ‘is exemplified in fictions which undercut and 
strain literature’s spiritual mission (and often the ‘suspension of disbelief’) by 
deploying both tricks and effects. At one level, all fictions use tricks and aim at 
effects, but only some of them use the same sort of tricks and effects as secular 
magic. Those are the kind that eschew ethical or spiritual gravity and are 
principally based on surprising techniques designed to intensify various readerly 
reactions’ (179). During mentions Edgar Allan Poe and E.T.A. Hoffmann as 
exemplary writers of this kind of fiction. 
Likewise, I think that there is enough evidence in literature of a sort of 
‘(super)natural’ magic, whenever a fiction tries to overcome given 
epistemological constraints and to reach beyond the reified ‘real’, the 
commonsense, the assumption that the world out there can be trivially reduced 
to a set of known laws and rules valid in all circumstances. In this kind of 
literature the tension between ‘playfulness’ and ‘seriousness’ is of paramount 
importance: the engendered irony is a carrier of an ethical stance or quest, a 
tool for the exploration of the incommensurably (hyper-)real. As an example of 
this kind of fiction I would mention Wuthering Heights. Whereas secular magic 
does not conceal its being based on illusionism, but rather displays it, 
supernatural magic rests on the presupposition of the full pregnancy of its 
practices and of the nameless phenomena it tries to unveil or at least to hint at. 
The same distinction I see as relevant to literature.  
In the discourse on the ‘sublime’ and the ‘fantastic’, the emphasis has 
always been on the inexpressible, the ineffable other side of things and the 
effort to articulate it. ‘Magic’, both secular and (super)natural, illusionist or 
serious, while polymorphous and flexible, is an interpretive tool at once more 
precise and open-ended. It defies and de-structures the rigid logic of binary 
oppositions, and it makes for the co-existence of apparently contradictory 
conditions. This is what happens technically and stylistically in much 
contemporary fiction, where multiple and contradictory narratives are mounted 
upon or against each other, and thus made to resonate in the reader’s mind. 
These works not only investigate the status of reality but also the process of the 
creative imagination per se. 
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While in the first instance, that of fiction which is equivalent to secular 
magic, illusionistic devices convey the sense of their artificiality and 
constructedness, and elicit sensational responses and guilty pleasures, in the 
case of fiction equivalent to (super)natural magic, the words are romantically 
endowed with power which can affect and change consciousness. This fiction can 
be understood better if we think of magic as a ‘rhetorical art’. William A. Covino 
(1992) states:  
Magic is not the instant and a-rhetorical product of an otherworldly 
incantation; it is the process of inducing belief and creating 
community with reference to the dynamics of a rhetorical situation. 
Magic is a social act whose medium is persuasive discourse, and so it 
must entail the complexities of social interaction, invention, 
communication, and composition. (para. 2 of 21) 
He points out that the rise of current ‘‘plain rhetoric’ that mesmerizes 
audiences with its seeming clarity and simplicity […] coincides with the 
destruction and disappearance of the magical consciousness that makes 
participatory, exploratory, generative rhetoric possible’ (para. 3 of 21). Now, 
literature that is worth the name consciously tries to subvert and rework ‘plain 
rhetoric’, in order to open up onto the realm of the imaginary, with its potential 
for envisioning change and alternatives to the given. Literature too goes through 
‘the complexities of social interaction, invention, communication, and 
composition’: not only is reading, as I have already stated, a social, or 
communal act, but also making literature entails positioning oneself within or 
without a certain socio-cultural context. Covino talks of ‘inducing belief’ as the 
staple of magic.105 However, from my point of view, this is not the only pivotal 
element, both in magic and literature: it is the re-structuring and change of 
consciousness, through the imagination, which is of paramount importance too. 
 Secular and high magic can also blend with each other to some degree, as 
the secular always doubles the (super)natural, pre-emptying it of its force and 
virtue. Secular magic fiction is a sort of machine, producing doubles, automata, 
and artificial ghosts. The other, in its most distilled form, smashes the machine, 
and opens onto the cosmos. Although it may seem that I am giving value 
judgements, I am not: rather, I am trying to convey what I see as an ongoing 
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tension between the requirements of the literary market and those of literary 
art, between the necessity to accept the given before recasting it, and the urge 
to explore and de-essentialize reality. 
At the juncture between supernatural and secular magic, I would place 
the phenomenon of fetishism. The fetish is an object endowed with power or 
mana, something that is usually inanimate takes on life because of the particular 
investments of energy and intent that its worshippers attribute to it. Moreover 
the properties of its parts add on one another, but their sum is more powerful 
than the parts themselves. In the worshippers’ mind, the fetish is a locus of 
special agency or a catalyst. Something that is man-made, and thus an object, 
becomes more than itself. In modern society, fetishes are everywhere. Money 
itself is our foremost fetish. ‘The State’, for example, is an abstract entity made 
up of individuals and institutions, which is endowed with strong evocative power 
through the rhetorics of national authority. Likewise, piecemeal objects, 
endowed with mystical power, transmute themselves into abstractions. For 
example, such is the case of saints’ relics, which, by metonymy, take on 
miracle-working powers, or, in a more secular perspective, ipods coud be 
considered as fetishes too.106 In this sense, the fetish is both hollow and over-
full, empty and over-brimming with its capacity for signification and 
unsettlement.  
Literature too can unveil the uncanny fascination with the fetish in 
modern society, as I will show in my readings of the novels. The historical 
contingency of the fetish becomes opaque, while a sort of daily mystique seems 
to point to a dimension of unchanging properties. Yet, at the same time, 
literature that deals with fetishism unmasks this apparent contrivance in order 
to show the deep historicity of the fetish. Analyzing literature as a discourse on 
fetishism sheds some light on the mechanics of modern culture and society, 
while also penetrating in the domain of the collective imaginary and its 
individual manifestations. Fiction that shows, through dystopia or deformation, 
the mystical qualities of abstract entities turned into ‘bodies’ traces a sort of 
genealogy of the culture that has produced it.  
So far I have been highlighting those characteristics of magic which can be 
extended to literature, in the attempt to show how this flexible practice, magic, 
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is symbolic action, in the same sense that literary language is, as advocated by 
Kenneth Burke in his The Philosophy of Literary Form, first published in 1941.107 
 
4.3 Literature as Symbolic Action and Magical Enactment 
of Language 
In a perceptive passage from the afore-mentioned work, Kenneth Burke 
states: 
The magical decree is implicit in all language; for the mere act of 
naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as 
such-and-such rather than something other. Hence, I think that an 
attempt to eliminate magic, in this sense, would involve us in the 
elimination of vocabulary itself as a way of sizing up reality. Rather, 
what we may need is correct magic, magic whose decrees about the 
naming of real situations is the closest possible approximation to the 
situation named […]. The choice here is not a choice between magic 
and not magic, but a choice between magics that vary in their degree 
of approximation to the truth. (1973: 4-6, italics in the original) 
These different types of magic are, indeed, linguistic in character and are part 
and parcel of the distinctions that I have tried to define for the purpose of re-
conceptualizing literature. It goes without saying that once we trespass outside 
the narrow circle of light of rationalist discourse and mimetic bias, a whole new 
uncharted realm lies before us. For one thing, the construction of the ‘fantastic’ 
as a reversal of rationalist laws appears to be a straitjacket; the same goes for 
‘magical realism’ intended as a blend of ‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’ narratives, or 
‘fantastic’ and ‘realistic’ elements. More importantly, the dimension of literary 
language as a specific kind of symbolic action comes to the forefront. Burke 
defines the ‘poet’ (the writer) as a ‘medicine man’ (1973: 64) and enumerates 
three magical aspects of the poetic act which characterize a literary work: 
Dream (the unconscious or subconscious factors in a poem‒‒the factor 
slighted by the Aristotelians […]), prayer (the communicative 
functions of a poem, which leads us into the many considerations of 
form, since the poet’s inducements can lead us to participate in his 
poem in so far as his work has public, or communicative 
structure‒‒the factor slighted by the various expressionistic doctrines, 
the Art for Art’s Sake school stressing the work solely as the poet’s 
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externalizing of himself, or naming of his own peculiar number), chart 
(the realistic sizing-up of situations that is sometimes explicit, 
sometimes implicit, in poetic strategies – the factor that Richards and 
the psychoanalysts have slighted). (1973: 5-6) 
Dream, prayer and chart, in Burke’s terminology point to the 
multidimensionality of the literary work, where the mimetic function is just one 
of its various shaping factors. The imaginary and the communicative also 
interweave with the mimetic rendering or, better, the indexical pointing of the 
literary script to a specific situation in the real world. The function of literary 
magic is thus an ‘approximation to the truth’, its partial disclosure and the 
exposure of what is fake. Literature as secular magic, by enhancing and stressing 
its own artificiality, points to the uncanny conventionality of our rules. 
Literature as (super)natural magic adopts another strategy, that of trying to get 
nearer and nearer to some kind of existential truth, elaborated on the basis of a 
reworking and recasting of experience through reflection and imagination. Both 
express dissatisfaction, although in more or less playful ways, and make a 
diagnosis of the status quo. 
Referring back to the notion of ‘radical typology’ as defined by Laurence 
Coupe (2009) and described in a previous chapter of this dissertation, I suggest 
that literature that refuses to be just mimetic (indeed the greatest part) is 
bound to enact itself as magical. This is so for all those literary works which go 
beyond flat, one-to-one allegory, not just those overtly ‘fantastical’. The 
literary text can be conceived as a performance, a magical script being enacted 
and taking on flesh according to the workings of the imagination, which fills the 
gaps left in the text itself. These reflections lead us to the concept of 
performativity. 
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4.4 Language and Text: Performativity, Metaphors, 
Metonymy and Magic 
The first to advocate a performative concept of language was the 
analytical philosopher Austin,108 who stated that indeed to speak is to act: 
Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but 
the issuing of an utterance in a speech-situation, there can hardly be 
any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act. 
(1975: 139) 
Austin had started (1963) by distinguishing between constatives and 
performatives,109 the first being true or false statements or descriptions, the 
second being sentences or utterances that actually do something, such as a 
promise, which is enacted in the very moment of being uttered. However, in his 
later work, he went beyond this distinction and went further in the direction of 
showing how the two blur into each other and all language is essentially 
performative. He concentrated specifically on ordinary language and defined 
literary language as ‘non-serious’. Here is the statement that was to arouse 
strong reactions on the part of Stanley Fish, Derrida and their likes: 
A performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way 
hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a 
poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in any and every 
utterance‒‒a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstances is used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its 
normal use‒‒ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of 
language. (1975: 22) 
Austin’s characterization of fictional language as ‘non-serious’ and ‘parasitic’ on 
ordinary language has been vehemently attacked, as it has been read as a 
disguised theory of metaphysical presence embodied in language, whereby 
literature would just be a hollow shell, an empty form and mirror of the more 
substantial, ‘original’ reality informing ordinary language. For Derrida (1988), 
language is characterised precisely by the iterability of its marks, and its 
citationality, which makes each utterance both unique and repeatable at the 
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same time, according to different contexts. This aporia is what, in Derrida’s 
point of view, underlies the performativity of all language.110  
However, it may well be that some confusion about Austin’s intended 
meaning ensued when his follower Searle (1977, 1979) defined literature as 
‘pseudo-performance’ or ‘pretence’, against the ‘serious’ intentionality of 
ordinary language.111  In his attempt to systematize his master’s thought, he 
tried to distinguish ‘serious’ from ‘non-serious’ language on the basis of 
intentionality: whether the speaker is sincere or insincere and really means his 
or her statements. It is against this negative notion of pretence that Stanley Fish 
commented: 
‘Shared pretence’ is what enables us to talk about anything at all. 
When we communicate, it is because we are parties to a set of 
discourse agreements which are in effect decisions as to what can be 
stipulated as a fact. It is these decisions and the agreement to abide 
by them, rather than the availability of substance, that make it 
possible for us to refer, whether we are novelists or reporters for the 
New York Times. One might object that this has the consequence of 
making all discourse fictional; but it would be just as accurate to say 
that it makes all discourse serious, and it would be better still to say 
that it puts all discourse on a par.112 
Derrida’s and Fish’s readings both take for granted that ‘seriousness’ is to 
be accorded foundational import. Yet, as Loxley (2007) puts it, both Derrida and 
Fish shared a common mistaken attitude, that of ‘focusing on Austin’s 
characterization of the non-serious and its opposition to the ordinary’, while 
missing out on Austin’s critical reflection on the ways traditional philosophy has 
always searched for a ‘solid foundation underlying the matrix of our linguistic 
lives, what Cavell calls its ‘chronic false seriousness’ […].’113  
Going one step further, I would like to suggest that literary language is 
important precisely because it is parasitic on ordinary language. And because it 
is parasitic on ordinary language it is magical yet in another sense.  
Reflecting on the nature of the text, Paul De Man states: 
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We call text any entity that can be considered from such a double 
perspective: as a generative, open-ended, non-referential 
grammatical system [i.e., as a machine] and as a figural system closed 
off by a transcendental signification [i.e. as a linked chain of 
metaphors traceable to a final or literal meaning] that subverts the 
grammatical code to which the text owes its existence.114 
In this perspective, the text ‘performs the interference’ (Loxley, 2007: 97) 
between two incompatible systems and is a sort of machine, rather than an 
organic unity. Thinking of magic as a technology, devised by humankind to attain 
certain results, can replace the idea of the mechanical machine and bring 
together the two systems by its very contradictory nature. Magic embodies both 
kinds of systems at once and works by drawing its materials for transformation 
from ‘ordinary’ reality and language. The space of the so-called ‘interference’ 
wherein the text enacts itself is marked off space, and the interference is 
played out in the act of reading, laid bare in the text, which is a truly magical 
script that works on the reader’s consciousness, enhancing, hypnotizing, 
focusing, refreshing, provoking, and at the same time is modelled by the 
reader’s idiosyncratic disposition. In this way the ‘interference’ is the matrix of 
manifold possibilities, and the reader’s disposition is the lens that refracts and 
makes them converge and diverge. 
But in what way is literary language ‘parasitical’ on ordinary language? 
The use of metaphor and metonymy is at the base of language, both ordinary 
and literary. Literary metaphors are special because they rework ordinary 
metaphors. The same is true of magic, if we remember its definition as a 
rhetorical art. The linguist Kövecses (2010) states precisely that literary 
metaphors draw on ordinary ones115:  
Ordinary metaphors, […] are not things that poets and writers leave 
behind when they do their ‘creative’ work. On the contrary, 
accumulating evidence suggests that ‘creative’ people make heavy 
use of conventional, everyday metaphors and that their creativity and 
originality actually derive from them. (52) 
Thus, ordinary language is metaphorical per se, and it is a kind of constraining 
grid within which each speaker of that language can perform creative speech 
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acts. By reworking and transmuting materials of ordinary language, literary 
language is ‘parasitical’; it appropriates and reworks conventional metaphors by 
the same devices used in magic. In particular the writer employs various ways of 
working on metaphors, such as ‘extending’, ‘elaboration’, ‘questioning’, 
‘personification’, ‘combining’, ‘image-metaphors’ and ‘mega-metaphors’ (53-9). 
In ‘extending’ the writer adds some new connotation to an otherwise familiar 
metaphor, such as for example that of ‘life as a journey’. There are myriads of 
famous poems that play on this metaphor, such as Dante’s first lines of The 
Inferno. In ‘elaboration’, there is no adding of new elements but a reworking of 
the conventional metaphor in a new or unusual way. In ‘questioning’ writers can 
make a sort of meta-linguistic reflection on the very appropriateness of our daily 
metaphors. ‘Personification’ is a usual device both in ordinary and literary 
metaphors, while ‘combining’ entails the bringing together of different ordinary 
metaphors in such an original combination as to extend our conceptual system 
itself. ‘Image-metaphors’ are ‘one-shot images that require the mapping of 
several elements of one image onto another’ (Kövecses, 2010: 59). Finally, 
‘mega-metaphors’ or ‘extended metaphors’ can run as a subterranean river 
throughout a whole literary work, only surfacing at certain junctures through 
‘micro-metaphors’: 
Some metaphors extend through entire literary texts or large portions 
of them. These are called ‘extended metaphors’ or ‘mega-
metaphors’. They may not explicitly ‘surface’ in the text at all but 
tend to appear in the form of what we call ‘micro-metaphors’. (59) 
In fact, in the readings of the novels that make up the second part of this 
dissertation, I intend to trace their mythical-ritual elements and magical themes 
and show to what extent they are ‘mega-metaphors’ that inform the whole net 
of the text. 
At the beginning of his book, Kövecses underscores the difference 
between ‘conceptual metaphors’ and metaphorical usages of language: 
We have made a distinction between conceptual metaphors and 
metaphorical linguistic expressions. In conceptual metaphors, one 
domain of experience is used to understand another domain of 
experience. The metaphorical linguistic expressions make manifest 
particular conceptual metaphors. The conceptual domain that we try 
to understand is called the target domain, and the conceptual domain 
that we use for this purpose is the source domain. (2010: 14) 
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I suggest that this distinction is fruitful when applied to the study of literary 
texts and can be well combined with a focus on those mythic-ritual elements 
that form various metaphorical clusters.  
Another way of using language which is relevant to our study is 
metonymy: 
Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the 
vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the 
target, within the same domain, or idealized cognitive model (ICM). 
(Kövecses, 2010: 173) 
Metonymy and metaphor differ in important ways. Metaphor, as we have seen, 
works by bringing together two distant domains by the rule of perceived 
similarity, which is usually grounded in lived experience. Hence, one of the two 
domains is abstract and the other is (more) concrete. Metonymy, instead, works 
by contiguity: two elements belong to the same conceptual domain and one 
gives access to the other according to different relations of contiguity, for 
example, whole and part, part and part, cause and effect, and so on. Both 
metaphor and metonymy are the foundation of magic, as anthropologist Tambiah 
has forcefully demonstrated in his essays on the study of magic and ritual, 
particularly the one on Trobriand magic.116 
Following George Lakoff’s definition of ‘the neural theory of language,’117 
Kövecses explains: 
The extraordinary value of this theory derives from the suggestion 
that metaphor can also be found in the brain. Thus, the theory 
continues the extension of metaphor from language (linguistic 
metaphors) to mind (conceptual metaphors) to body (bodily basis of 
metaphor) and to brain. […] The brain is made up of neurons. In the 
neural theory of language, neural groups are modelled as ‘nodes’. 
Each neuron can function in different neural groups. Researchers in 
this paradigm think of semantics as simulation. […] In this view, as 
regards the meaning of physical concepts, meaning is mental 
simulation. What this means is that we activate those neurons that 
are needed to perform or imagine an action. […] Thought occurs when 
two groups of neurons, A and B, fire at the same time and activation 
spreads outward along the network links connecting them. […] One 
neural group can activate another neural group […] Neural bindings 
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occur when two or more conceptual entities are taken to be a single 
entity. […] As mentioned, there are different types of neural circuits. 
One type of neural circuit is what is called a ‘linking circuit’, which 
characterizes metonymy. […] The circuit that characterizes metaphors 
is called a ‘mapping circuit.’ In this type of circuit, there will be two 
groups of nodes corresponding to source and target, and a number of 
linking nodes that connect elements in node one to elements in node 
two. It follows, then, that neural mapping circuits that link the two 
domains (nodes one and two) will constitute a metaphor. In the neural 
theory of metaphor, primary metaphors have special significance. […] 
These are metaphors that we learn just by functioning naturally in the 
world. (Kövecses, 2010: 87-8)  
I have quoted this passage at some length because of its mind-blowing bringing 
together of linguistic, mental and bodily processes in regard to metaphor and 
metonymy. According to this theory, metaphor and metonymy are not only 
‘tropes’, or ‘figures of style’ but are indeed constitutive of the way we are in 
the world, we think, act, experience, make literature and art, among a plethora 
of other things. These claims support my argument for a performative concept of 
fiction, as literature entails a heightened and playful deployment of metaphor 
based on everyday experience and utterances, because meaning is recognized as 
‘mental simulation’, or, to use another word, ‘performance’. ‘Simulation’ is a 
word that may be interpreted in a negative way, ‘performance’ instead is more 
neutral. Moreover, it is evident that literary ‘performance’ is not hollow or void, 
but an enactment of language and text in a mental space which works inwardly 
with the same principles applied in magic. 
The object of simulation is the characters’ narrative quest with its twists 
and turns, while the emotional import of the story acts through both the 
character’s and the reader’s epiphanies, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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5 Quest and Epiphany 
In this chapter, I reflect on the relation between myth, the fantastic and 
epiphany in fiction, in order to propose that some contemporary hybrid fiction 
can be understood as ‘deformed romance’ and swings between the re-
appropriation of the quest myth and its elaboration, in order to describe the 
character’s epiphany on one  hand, and to provoke the reader’s own subjective 
epiphanic experience, on the other. Moreover, assessing both Frye’s and 
Jameson’s contributions about romance, I argue for the subversive potential of 
some contemporary ‘hybrid fictions’. In concluding the chapter, I also provide a 
definition of epiphany.  
Mircea Eliade, the famous comparatist and historian of religions, thus 
commented on myth in the modern world: 
A whole volume could well be written on the myths of modern man, 
on the mythologies camouflaged in the plays that he enjoys, in the 
books he reads. […] Even reading includes a mythological function, not 
only because it replaces the recitation of myths in archaic societies 
and the oral literature that still lives in the rural communities of 
Europe, but particularly because, through reading, the modern man 
succeeds in obtaining an ‘escape from time’ comparable to the 
‘emergence from time’ effected by myths. Whether modern man 
‘kills’ time with a detective story or enters such a foreign temporal 
universe as is represented by any novel, reading projects him out of 
his personal duration and incorporates him into other rhythms, makes 
him live in another ‘history’.118  
Indeed, it is the potential for more life and for the escape from one’s 
determined conditions of existence that make literature so appealing and 
rewarding worldwide. It is a race against time interpreted as mere linear 
progression from birth to growth, decay and death, a means to stating the 
negotiating power of imagination in regard to the inexorability of death and the 
perils of meaninglessness. Moreover, it is a life-enhancing experience that 
provides epiphanic moments of realization, which in turn contribute to reshaping 
and reconfiguring the reader’s disposition. The reader experiences the hero’s 
journey with the advantage of having the ability and possibility of detaching 
herself from the character’s vicissitudes, or effecting differing degrees of 
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identification with the protagonist. However, the reader’s and the character’s 
epiphanies may or may not coincide. The character’s quest may end up in failure 
or in a totally different realization of meaning than s/he had attributed to his or 
her situation at the beginning of the novel. The reader, on the other hand, may 
gain a bird’s-eye view, which in turn may trigger an in-depth meditation on a 
specific theme or situation. In the texts chosen for this study, however, it is 
difficult for the reader to identify himself with the characters, as so many 
strategies of estrangement are employed. This allows for a negotiation of 
meaning and empowerment through ritualization. 
In the various balances between mimesis and fantasy of some 
contemporary  works, a fundamental dramatization of the processes inherent in 
the interaction between reader’s ‘mind’ and narrative/referential ‘worlds’ takes 
place. The blurring of the dividing line between inner and outer leads to the 
creation of an imaginative fluid space: an in-between space of hybridization 
between text, reader’s mind and world that interact and act upon each other. 
By blending fantasy and mimesis, the text triggers and evokes both an insider’s 
view and an outsider’s view, through association and oxymoron on one hand, and 
logic and cause and effect on the other. This in-between space is the realm of 
the ‘daimonic’, the dimension of flux and becoming that to modern sensibilities 
has grown into the uncanny, both because of its displacement (in the Freudian 
sense) and because of its vengeful return as a too-demanding neighbour. This 
uncomfortable sense of a strange return and a singular displacement is enacted 
in the works this study analyses and has far-reaching implications for a 
genealogy of the West as we know it today. 
Brian Attebery provides a polymorphous definition of fantasy ‘as mode, 
genre, formula,’119 which from his point of view allows for flexibility of approach 
when dealing with such a complex phenomenon. According to this critic, fantasy 
as ‘formula’ is characterized by easily recognizable plot structure and stock 
characters that make for its commercial definition; the fantastic as a ‘mode’ is 
entirely another matter, as it includes a vast number of texts, and can be at 
work also in ‘realistic’ texts (and this is the focus of this study). Between the 
two, there is fantasy as a ‘genre’: ‘Genres may be approached as ‘fuzzy sets’, 
meaning that they are defined not by boundaries but by a centre.’ (304) In his 
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opinion the prototypical fantasy novel to an English mind is Tolkien’s The Lord of 
the Rings, which would thus constitute the centre of the ‘genre’ but not its 
boundaries. His idea is based on the consideration of readers’ response when 
questioned about what novels belong to the genre. This, however, posits the 
question of cross-cultural comparison and perception, as the ‘centre’, as he calls 
it, can shift depending on the culture involved. 
The novels analysed in subsequent chapters are approached from the 
point of view of the fantastic as a ‘mode’ or ‘impulse’ rather than as a genre. 
These novels display a tension between quest and epiphany: in fact, while the 
structure of the hero-quest and the strategies of romance are assumed, they are 
deformed, and epiphany goes in the direction of frustrating, diverting or 
delaying the quest, yielding alternative, jarring or discordant insights into the 
hidden motives and the results of the quest itself. Thus genre is diffused into an 
anarchical ‘mode’ or ‘impulse’.  
In a 1961 article, Frye defines ‘displacement’: 
The opposite extreme from such deliberate exploiting of myth is to be 
found in the general tendency of realism or naturalism to give 
imaginative life and coherence to something closely resembling our 
own ordinary experience. Such realism often begins by simplifying its 
language, and dropping the explicit connexions with myth which are a 
sign of awareness of literary tradition. Wordsworth, for example, felt 
that in his day Phoebus and Philomela were getting to be mere trade 
slang for the sun and the nightingale, and that poetry would do better 
to discard this kind of inorganic allusion. But, as Wordsworth himself 
clearly recognized, the result of turning one’s back on explicit myth 
can only be the reconstructing of the same mythical patterns in more 
ordinary words […] 
 To this indirect mythologizing I have elsewhere given the name of 
displacement. By displacement I mean the techniques a writer uses to 
make his story credible, logically motivated or morally acceptable― 
lifelike, in short.120  
Frye expounds on works, such as those by Trollope, that follow the dictates of 
‘critical naturalism’ and display ‘the highest degree of displacement and the 
least conscious explicit relationship to myth’, but the more we study them, the 
more we realize that ‘literature is a reconstructed mythology, with its structural 
principles derived from those of myth’ (605).  
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The chosen novels, be they somewhat ‘displaced’ or otherwise, are ‘a 
reconstructed mythology’ in that they are the result of an appropriation of the 
hero-quest, and its subsequent remythicization according to a new vision. 
 
5.1 Fantastic Impulse, the Imaginary and Epiphany 
Wolfgang Iser (1993) defines literature as the ‘paradigmatic interplay’ of 
the fictive and the imaginary, the former being ‘an operational mode of 
consciousness that makes inroads into existing versions of the world’, while the 
latter is ‘basically a featureless and inactive potential’ (xvii), which cannot be 
grasped cognitively and needs to be activated. It has a history which has 
variously called it ‘fancy’, ‘imagination’, or ‘fantasy’, which however are only 
‘specific context-bound demarcations of the imaginary’ (xvii). Thus, the fictive 
is ‘an act of boundary-crossing, which, nonetheless, keeps in view what has been 
overstepped. As a result the fictive simultaneously disrupts and doubles the 
referential world (xv). Iser concludes that literature allows ‘the staging of the 
human condition in a welter of unforeseeable patterns’(literary staging) : ‘the 
impossibility of being present to ourselves becomes our possibility to play 
ourselves out to the fullness that knows no bounds’, ‘literature becomes a 
panorama of what is possible’ and ‘makes the interminable staging of ourselves 
appear as the postponement of the end’ (xviii – xix). 
In spite of these insights, Iser sees fantasy literature as a reification of 
fantasy itself and myth as ‘ossified’ (91–2). Although Iser talks about the 
‘ossification of the imaginary in fantasy literature’ (240), he also distinguishes 
between two forms of fantasy literature: 
[...] since fantasy is reified by being thematized, and since it 
constitutes the reality of the impossible, it brings about a latent split 
in the reader’s consciousness. In the context of this split, we may 
discern two different types of fantasy literature. One uses rhetoric 
and psychology to give the reader a homeopathic dose of the split in 
order that it may be sustained, and the other always incorporates ‘a 
break in the acknowledged order, an irruption of the inadmissible 
within the changeless everyday legality’ so that the reader is plunged 
into a state of ‘hesitation’. In the first case, the split is to be 
concealed, and in the second it is played out. (245–46) 
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While referring to classical studies of the fantastic such as those of 
Jackson and Todorov, Iser does indeed acknowledge the difference between 
what can be defined escapist fantasy literature and subversive fantasy 
literature. He also defines fantasy as an ‘event’ (172) and refers to Husserl’s 
definition: 
‘Fantasy’, says Husserl, ‘is through and through modification, and it 
cannot contain anything other than modification.’ [...] For fantasy, 
one should add, has no objects of its own; instead it manifests itself in 
consciousness by altering the latter’s relation to objects through 
changing a realizing consciousness into an ideating one. (202-3) 
As it is evident from the quote on the two kinds of fantasy fiction, Iser 
sees fantasy literature as a reification of fantasy itself. Yet, if fantasy is not 
reduced to a mere formula for the marketplace, it can be read as a protean 
stage of a process of de-reification which engages the reader in an active way 
in so far as, through hybridization and boundary-crossing, it unveils the 
ideological constructs of the dominant or prevalent episteme, and in the case 
of fiction that tries to rewrite history by re-inscribing myth and fable into it, it 
can also criticize this episteme, and offer its genealogy and emergence in 
history. Even single epistemes are not written in stone, but are ‘magmatic’ (a 
term borrowed from Castoriadis) in nature, that is they are fluid or can 
coagulate at different stages of the socio-historical dimension.  
 As we shall see, the texts analysed here show quite a different kind of 
fantasy from Iser’s: the fantastic impulse complicates fictional boundary-
crossing, because it displaces a version of the world that we take for granted 
and refracts it into a myriad of diffused details. This new refracted version is 
independent  because it is constructed through the various combinations of 
textual games, different forms of play that Iser, following Caillois, defines as 
agon, mimicry, alea and ilinx: the first representing the contest between 
alternative viewpoints, events, or even characters’ actions; the second playing 
out the taste for deformation and the grotesque; the third, embodying the 
principle of chance and chaos in the narrative; and the fourth expressing a 
peculiar sense of kaleidoscopic vertigo. Thus in fantasy the extra-textual world 
is mirrored in a deformed way and in a refracted version. If staging is a 
fictionalizing act that can be expressed through mimesis, whereby the co-
presence of the mutually exclusive is vouchsafed (the textual world is both 
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different from itself and still itself, pointing to what it eludes in an adumbrated 
fashion), fantasy makes our versions of the world figuratively differential. It 
articulates the ungraspable aspect of the imaginary in yet another fictional 
version. Fiction is no longer representation, but becomes ‘intervention’ in 
whatever version of the world we live in. Thus fiction is ‘actual’ and exists, 
albeit ‘unreal’. 
Iser conceives the anthropological category of ‘staging’ in order to 
account for the meaning of being human. He declares that human beings cannot 
‘have’ themselves, and by staging the infinite possibilities inherent in their 
ungraspable condition, they continually repattern their culture-bound shapes. 
This process is particularly evident in literature: 
Staging in literature makes conceivable the extraordinary plasticity of 
human beings, who precisely because they do not seem to have a 
determinable nature, can expand into an almost unlimited range of 
culture-bound patternings. The impossibility of being present to 
ourselves becomes our possibility to play ourselves out to a fullness 
that know no bounds, because no matter how vast the range, none of 
the possibilities ‘will make us tick.’From this we may infer a lead as 
to the purpose of literary staging. If the plasticity of human nature 
allows, through its multiple culture-bound patternings, limitless 
human self-cultivation, literature becomes a panorama of what is 
possible, because it is not hedged in either by the limitations or the 
considerations that determine the institutionalized organizations 
within which human life otherwise takes its course.121  
 In The Fictive and The Imaginary, Iser compares ‘literary staging’ to 
‘evidential experiences’ (epiphanies), such as love, that is, situations ‘when 
human beings are in full possession of what is or what they are in’, experiences 
‘characterized by instantaneous certainty’, as ‘the exact opposite of 
inaccessibility’ (1993: 299). More precisely: 
Evidential experience is almost like an assault; it happens to us, and 
we are inside it. But the experience awakens in us a desire to look at 
what has happened to us, and this is when the evidence explodes into 
alternatives. The alternatives cannot make themselves independent, 
they remain linked to the evidential experience to which we want to 
gain access. But this means that instantaneous certainties trigger the 
need for staging in the exactly the same way as the cardinal mysteries 
[of human life i.e. birth, love, death]. [...] Staging then entails giving 
them [evidential experiences] form, but this form can only be a 
                                         
121
 Wolfgang Iser, ‘Staging as an Anthropological Category’, New Literary History, Vol. 23 No. 4 (Autumn, 
1992), pp. 877-88 (here p. 881). 
  109 
simulacrum that highlights the inadequacy of form when it comes to 
providing appearance for such an experience, which far exceeds the 
capacity of consciousness. [...] the simulacrum is a product of 
sophisticated invention that reveals the artificiality of endowing a 
phantasmic figuration with form. [...]Staging is thus the absolute form 
of doubling, not least because it always retains awareness that this 
doubling is ineradicable. [...]It does give form to the inaccessible, but 
it preserves the status of the latter by revealing itself as a 
simulacrum. (300–1) 
Here Iser refers to literature in general and not to fantasy 
specifically. In fact, we have seen that for him fantasy is reification rather 
than ‘a simulacrum’. Yet, what if not the literary fantastic stages the very 
process of staging? The fantastic presents the reader with alternatives, 
different points of view thus mimicking the very process whereby we gain 
and produce knowledge, perceive and ideate through the ungraspable 
‘magma’ of the imaginary. The fantastic makes use of proliferating signs, 
symbols, mythical elements in order to stage our condition of human beings 
craving for alternatives, and by so doing it exposes our socio-cultural 
presuppositions and biases. In so doing, it provides the reader with the 
possibility of an epiphanic experience of vast affective and intellectual 
impact. It is a possibility only available to sophisticated, perceptive 
readers, yet it is of subversive import. By fanning out simulacrum after 
simulacrum and continually discarding one after the other, the fantastic 
reveals the power of the epiphany as an emergence from an ineffable 
unconscious dimension, both at collective and individual levels. 
 
5.2 The Re-Appropriation of the Quest Myth 
The hero-quest myth has been analyzed and described by scholars of religion, 
folklorists and psychoanalysts, who have considered its narrative value and its 
function in society: from Rank’s Freudian interpretation of the hero-quest 
(1909), wherein myth serves a regressive symbolic fulfilment of an oedipal 
repressed wish, which society cannot countenance, to Lord Raglan (1936) and 
the myth-ritualists, for whom myth is a ‘script’ for a corresponding ritual. In this 
view the hero-quest encompasses the whole life of a heroic  king in twenty-two 
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stages.122 For Jung, myth has a positive psychological function, that of helping 
the individual integrate the dangerous drives of the unconscious. He links the 
archetype of the child both to a god and a ‘young hero’, whose characteristics 
blur into the typical invincibility of the child-hero who slays the dragon of 
darkness and achieves individuation.123 Joseph Campbell ([1949], 1993) 
summarizes the hero’s quest in the following stages:124 the hero is called to 
adventure, he crosses the threshold of adventure and encounters a helper, he 
may go through a battle with his brother or with a dragon, or there may be 
dismemberment, crucifixion, abduction, a night-sea journey, a wonder journey 
or may be swallowed in a whale’s belly. He undergoes tests and meets other 
helpers. A sacred marriage, recognition by his father or creator, an apotheosis or 
an elixir theft takes place. He flees and reaches the threshold back to the 
ordinary world where he may struggle to go back, he can be rescued or 
resurrected if dead and returns with the elixir of boon, in order to benefit his 
community. As Campbell himself says, the hero mono-myth can be reworked ad 
infinitum: ‘Many tales isolate and greatly enlarge upon one or two of the typical 
elements of the full circle […], others string a number of independent cycles into 
a single series […]’ (246). 
Canadian critic Northrop Frye states in a 1951 article: ‘It is part of the 
critic’s business to show how all literary genres derived from the quest-myth’.125 
He refers specifically to medieval romance as his model, thus implicitly denying 
any strong opposition between the novel and romance and advocating their 
continuity.  
Indeed, the narrative structure of many contemporary non-realistic novels 
is that of ‘deformed’ romance, whereby the hero or heroine’s aspirations are 
either baffled or deflected into various unpredictable directions. Drawing both 
on Frye’s and on Parker’s work, Barbara Fuchs considers romance as 
a literary and textual strategy. Under this definition, the term 
describes a concatenation of both narratological elements and literary 
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topoi, including idealization, the marvellous, narrative delay, 
wandering, and obscured identity, that, as Parker suggests, both pose 
a quest and complicate it.126 
Romance is based on conflict and adventures, and it is possible to see it 
as that which underlies all fantasy: even its contemporary rewritings start from 
this mythos in order to rework it and recombine or transmute its components.  
Interestingly, Frye talks of a ritual aspect pertaining to the mythos of romance, 
which he assimilates to summer: ‘Translated into ritual terms, the quest-
romance is the victory of fertility over the wasteland’.127 He thus points to a pre-
modern tradition that can be useful as a reading key to literature, as he 
identifies what can be called the basic drives behind the human need to create 
art and literature. It is important to stress this need for ritual, for a meaningful 
pattern and integration of meaning for human activities: the re-inscribing of the 
ritual, that is, the communal dimension, into the process of producing 
literature. Now, in contemporary novels which deform romance and make use of 
its strategies with the intent of questioning hegemonic ideological assumptions, 
this ritual dimension becomes problematic in that it no longer signals a ‘victory’ 
but rather the ambiguity of the relationship between author and audience in a 
post-industrial society. 
In his famous critique of Frye, Frederic Jameson states that both the 
semantic (i.e. Frye) and the structural or formalist (i.e. Propp) schools of 
criticism need to be historicized in order to account for the workings and origin 
of literature within its context of production in a dialectical perspective.128 
Jameson exposes, in Frye’s notion of romance, what he calls ‘this particular 
ideologeme – ethics, or the binary opposition between good and evil’ as ‘the 
ideological core of the romance paradigm’ (Sandner 2004: 190). In his impressive 
treatment of romance, Jameson shows what historical conditions of medieval 
times were dramatized in the form of the romance or chanson de geste. In a 
previous version (1975) of the same essay, Jameson states that ‘romance comes 
to be seen as the struggle between the higher and lower realms, between 
heaven and hell, or the angelic and the demonic or diabolic’ and he writes of 
‘the conceptual opposition between good and evil’ as being anthropological, 
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historical and ideological, rather than natural.129 Jameson believes that such a 
belief is closely linked ‘to the social structure’ in which it ‘fulfils a crucial 
function’ (140) and adds: 
In the shrinking world of today, indeed, with its gradual levelling of 
class and national and racial differences, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the concept of evil is at one with the category of Otherness 
itself: evil characterizes whatever is radically different from me […]’. 
(140) 
Thus, in Jameson’s assessment the limit of Frye’s otherwise rich approach is to 
naturalise ethic categories of good and evil, which Nietzsche had already 
exposed in their ideological function and historical formation in his Genealogy of 
Morals (1887). Furthermore, for Jameson this binary opposition within romance 
has ‘the function of drawing the boundaries of a given social order and providing 
a powerful internal deterrent against deviancy or subversion’ (140). 
The social antagonism involved is therefore quite distinct from the 
conflict of two groups or classes within a given social order, as in the 
case in recent times, say, between labor and capital; and the archaic 
character of the categories of romance (magic, good and evil, 
otherness) suggests that this genre expresses a nostalgia for a social 
order in the process of being undermined and destroyed by nascent 
capitalism, yet still for the moment coexisting side by side with the 
latter. (158, emphasis in the original) 
 In his later reworked essay, Jameson re-iterates this point: he sees how 
in romance the moment the villain is unmasked and no longer dangerous ‘raises 
a new and productive dilemma for the future development and adaptation of 
this form’, because ‘evil’ is ‘projectively reconstituted into a free-floating and 
disembodied element, a baleful optical illusion, in its own right’, ‘the ‘realm’ of 
sorcery and magical forces’ (in Sandner, 2004: 193). 
Now, in many contemporary non-realistic re-workings of romance ‘the 
seme of evil’ is re-appropriated both in its projections onto an ‘Other’ and in 
its social and cultural manifestations. More often than not, the ‘Other’ is 
exposed as being at the very heart of that which constitutes the norm. Thus in 
The Iguana the protagonist Daddo projects onto other characters alternative 
and strange identities, only to discover with a shock of horror, that he himself 
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is the culprit and perpetrator of injustice. In Lanark, ‘Otherness’ is posited as 
being at the very core of that complex institutional web of rationalism, 
scientism and capitalism embodied in ‘The Creature’ and ‘The Institute’, those 
ruling bodies of science and politics that feed on people, both literally and 
metaphorically. In Measuring the World the realm of otherness is located 
within the irreducible character of reality, and even more in Humboldt’s 
alienating attempts at grasping and measurement. This means that romance is 
no longer an escapist hegemonic expression of the ruling class but is invested 
with subversive verve.  
Castoriadis (1987) shows how both Marxism and capitalism subscribe to 
the same paradigm of the fundamental importance of economy in order to 
construct social institutions that make human beings into productive units.130 
He criticizes the whole of Western philosophy for going in this direction and 
argues for the social imaginary as the indeterminate ground for all institutions, 
customs, laws and traditions. He shows how both capitalism and Marxism 
subscribe to the same imaginary idea of ‘progress’, whereby the economy is 
the key to human life, and he objects to this view as reductive. Castoriadis 
sees creativity as the indeterminate basis of manifestation of both social 
imaginary and individual imagination. At the same time, psychoanalysis too, 
both Freudian and Lacanian, has blundered in seeing fantasy either as wish-
fulfilment of something already lived and experienced, or as the ‘other’ of the 
self, thus being already over-determined. For Castoriadis the imaginary is a 
radical, indeterminate ‘magma’. He questions the definition of time given by 
Western philosophy throughout its history and points out how, since Plato, time 
has been spatialized according to a notion of being conceived as determinacy,  
and regulated by an ensemblist and identitary logic, whereby time can only be 
defined as immutable totality, ‘a system and a hierarchy’ (1987: 198).  
In his book on the imaginary (1987) Castoriadis depicts the way the 
imaginary significations and the ‘social-historical’ self-instituting society work 
according to the principles of ‘legein’ and ‘teukhein’ typical of the ‘ensemblist-
identitary logic’ of the metaphysics of substance, or being, which has always 
been at the base of rationalism and scientism:  
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Legein: distinguish-choose-posit-assemble-count-speak; at once the 
condition and the creation of society, the condition created by what 
itself conditions. […] In order to speak of a set or an ensemble, or to 
think of one, we must be able to distinguish-choose-posit-assemble-
count-say objects. The nature of these objects is of little matter, 
universally is here […] absolute […]. (223) 
Teukhein signifies: assembling-adjusting-fabricating-constructing. It 
is, therefore, making (something) be as… starting from … in a manner 
appropriate to …and in view of … What has been called techne, a 
word that derives from teukhein and that has given the term 
technique, is but a particular manifestation of teukhein and concerns 
only secondary and derivative aspects of it. For example, ‘before’ 
there can be any question of ‘technique’ of any sort, the social 
imaginary must assemble-adjust-fabricate-construct itself as society 
and as this society, it must make itself be as society and as this 
society, starting with itself and with what ‘is there’, in a manner 
appropriate to and in view of being a society and this particular 
society. Teukhein is implied in instituting, just as legein is. […] legein 
and teukhein refer to one another and circularly imply one another. 
[…] Teukhein intrinsically implies legein, is in a sense a legein, for it 
operates and is able to exist only by distinguishing-choosing-
assembling-positing-counting. Teukhein separates ‘elements’, fixes 
them as such, orders them, combines them, unites them into 
totalities and organized hierarchies of totalities within the field of 
doing. And in this field, it operates under the aegis of determinacy 
and as actual determination and the condition for all determination.‐‐ 
Conversely, legein intrinsically implies teukhein, is in a sense 
teukhein. For it assembles-adjusts-fabricates-constructs the ‘abstract 
–material’ elements of language along with all the ‘objects’ and 
‘relations’ corresponding to them. (260) 
In this sense, Castoriadis recognizes the needs of the homo hierarchicus, 
the human need for structure and order in its manifold guises, but only to 
relativize them as a particular expression of the radical imaginary. From this 
point of view, when Kenneth Burke says that the spirit of hierarchy is 
characteristic of man, the symbol-using animal, he is following the same 
identitary logic based on the presuppositions of ontology, while according to 
Castoriadis even this specific kind of logic is not pre-given but a manifestation 
of the radical imaginary both in society and in the individual subject. 
Therefore, Castoriadis goes much deeper than Burke in acknowledging an 
eidetic dimension which is magmatic and goes beyond the symbolism of the 
sign too, in a way structuralism cannot.  
These ideas are obviously relevant to the study of the subversive 
potential of fantastic literature and can be also linked to yet another view of 
epiphany, as an event related specifically to the fantastic: in fact both 
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epiphany and fantasy have their common etymology in the Greek verb phanein, 
to show, to reveal.  
Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1976) shows how even the Marxist 
materialist conception of history has been ‘naturalized’ in Western culture, 
when he points out how in Capital Marx takes for granted the reason why 
‘certain commodities are produced and not others’ and explains how even the 
consumption of certain goods rather than others is determined by and 
undertaken ‘within a symbolic order, within culture.’131  
Commenting on the introductory pages of Marx’s Grundrisse, where the 
philosopher sets out to define ‘the relations between production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption’ (1976: 153), Sahlins states: 
Consumption, which started out in mutual interdependence with 
production, is in the end subordinated to production: a change of 
status to which corresponds a change of time, from the ‘pre-existing 
image’ to the objective consequence. This redefinition of the 
relationship depends on assigning consumption all the vagueness of an 
‘impulse’, while allowing to production all the definiteness of the 
object. Here then is a condensed symbol of the anthropological 
deception in Marx’s program: the relapse from ‘imagination’ to 
‘perception’, and so from culture to nature. As ‘want’ or ‘impulse’, 
consumption is at this moment situated in the realm of the natural; 
while as the source of the object-form, production alone is historical. 
The need-without-shape, moreover, is realized as content by 
perception of the object; thus all consumption, including its influence 
upon production, depends on the historical movement of production. I 
stress the ‘perception’. The seeing eye here is not the organ of 
tradition but the instrument of desire. The mind, therefore, does not 
organize experience but follows it. (1976: 155) 
In the quote above, Sahlins, like Castoriadis, questions the primacy of 
economic production as the first and foremost given ‘fact’ in shaping human 
cultures. In fact, by showing that at the basis of the Marxist conception there is 
a split between the previously interdependent production and consumption 
processes and the consequent primacy of production, Sahlins points the finger at 
a specific culture-bound and biased way of conceptualising the organization of 
human experience. In other words, homo economicus, in the classical western 
sense of the word, is only a culture-specific abstraction, which has ended up 
shaping and conditioning a certain ‘global culture’ at large. 
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These observations about Marxist presuppositions are particularly fruitful 
and relevant: although a Marxist approach to literature has its merits, as 
Jameson and others’ works testify, it also needs to be historicized and placed in 
the context of the culture which produced and continues to shape it. Moreover, 
it is possible to re-appropriate the role of ‘imagination’ over ‘perception’ and 
‘culture’ and ‘nature’ as whole by studying the demystifying powers of some 
literature that employs fantasy in conspicuous ways and in doing so destabilizes 
old perceptive habits and assumptions. 
 
5.3 Epiphany and the Double-Sidedness of Myth 
In his book (1971) on the subject, Beja defines epiphany in the following way:132  
a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from some object, scene, 
event, or memorable phase of the mind – the manifestation being out 
of proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance of 
whatever produces it. (18)  
Beja does not clarify how epiphany manifests and constitutes itself: is it an 
object/event revealing itself fully or is it a synchronistic event whereby an outer 
object or circumstance strikes the subject with inner significance? Beja seems 
indecisive and highlights how many authors oscillate between the two. A second 
author, Nichols (1987) tracks the origins of the ‘moment of vision’ in 
Wordsworth’s work and pursues its development in poetry throughout the 
nineteenth century.133 Both Beja and Nichols differentiate between religious 
revelation (Augustine, Bunyan, Wesley, etc.) and secular epiphany (Modernism, 
Joyce, Woolf and Faulkner in particular), showing how the former is a revelation 
of external, divine grace, whereas the second is a manifestation of the mind’s 
inner power, triggered by the contemplation of a seemingly trivial object, or by 
a sudden flash of recognition of the same. 
Nichols quotes lines 1288–1296 of the 1799 two-part ‘Prelude’ by Wordsworth 
about the ‘spots of time’ and states: 
The Wordsworthian epiphany declares an otherness outside of the 
self, while at the same time acknowledging a self-conscious self, 
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aware of this otherness and open to connections with the world. (43-
4) 
He then quotes a letter by Wordsworth: 
Objects ... derive their influence not from properties inherent in them 
... but from such as are bestowed upon them by the minds of those 
who are conversant with or affected by those objects. Thus the 
Poetry, if there be any in the work, proceeds whence it ought to do, 
from the Soul of Man, communicating its creative energies to the 
images of the external world. (Quoted in Nichols, 1987: 54) 
It is possible to link this definition of epiphany to Frye’s notion of the ‘oracular’ 
(1951). For his part, Frye assimilates literature to both music and painting: ‘we 
may call the rhythm of literature the narrative, and the pattern, the 
simultaneous mental grasp of the verbal structure, the meaning or significance.’ 
(102) Although Frye overstates the ‘pull of ritual’ as altogether unconscious, the 
important point is that narrative is connected to the temporal unfolding of 
fiction. Frye continues:  
Patterns of imagery, on the other hand, or fragments of significance, 
are oracular in origin, and derive from the epiphanic moment, the 
flash of instantaneous comprehension with no direct reference to time 
[…]. And just as pure narrative would be an unconscious act, so pure 
significance would be an incommunicable state of consciousness, for 
communication begins by constructing a narrative. (103) 
Can epiphany be considered a mythicizing process in the text? Kenneth Burke in 
his Language as Symbolic Action (1966) notes about James Joyce’s story ‘The 
Dead’: 
The final twist, what Joyce would call an ‘epiphany’, is contrived by 
the transforming of ‘snow’ from a sensory image to a mythic image. 
That is, in the first part of the story, the references to snow are 
wholly realistic (‘lexical’ snow, snow as defined in a dictionary). But 
at the end, snow has become a mythic image, manifesting itself in the 
world of conditions, but standing for transcendence above the 
conditioned. It is a snow that bridges two realms – but, as befits the 
behaviour of snow, this Upward Way is figured in terms of a Downward 
Way, as the last paragraph features, the present participle, ‘falling’. 
(Quoted in Coupe 2005: 162) 
In this perspective epiphany becomes a way of experiencing the mythical 
dimension; epiphany transforms its object into a myth, reworking ordinary time 
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into kairos or ‘imaginative time’ (Nichols 1987: 24). If epiphany is triggered by 
apparently trivial objects or situations, it sparks off our inner response which is 
mythic or mythicizing. In the novel the mythical dimension is made secular 
(Eliade’s ‘secular myths’) and can be accessed inwardly, while shaping people’s 
collective imaginary too. Epiphany had originally a religious meaning, and 
secular epiphany still has its sacred counterpart in ‘hierophany’, as defined by 
Eliade in The Sacred and the Profane (1959):  
To designate the act of manifestation of the sacred, we have 
proposed the term hierophany. It is a fitting term, because it does not 
imply anything further; it expresses no more than is implicit in its 
etymological content, i.e. that something sacred shows itself to us. 
(Quoted in Marderness 2009: 42) 
In a similar way, secular epiphany is the revelation, ‘the manifestation’ of 
the mythical aspect of an ordinary phenomenon. Myth, in this sense, transcends 
its narrative aspect in order to become a sign for something ‘other’. Thus the 
mythical is closely linked to the linguistic, a characteristic which is proper of 
man, ‘the symbol-using animal’: 
Close to the essence of this animal is the problem of the negative, of 
words for nothing, minus, thou-shalt-not, hence the yes-and-no of 
‘polar’ terms which, since man is an organism living in time whereas 
logical relations as such are timeless, can provide mythic-narrative 
equivalents for non-temporal aspects of symbolism (equivalents 
which, if pursued persistently enough, are found to track back upon 
themselves, thus ultimately denying the very progression whereby 
they seemed to progress. (Burke 1960: 304) 
Thus ‘imaginative time’ is articulated through the linguistic ‘negative’ and is 
thoroughly inscribed in the human make-up as an ‘organism’. Though by 
different means, Roland Barthes makes a similar point when he states ([1957], 
2009: 137) that myth is ‘a second-order semiological system’, in which the link 
between ‘form’ and ‘concept’ is motivated, that is, artificial and invented.134 
Ultimately, according to these authors, the regaining of the mythical dimension 
happens through language.  
We have just distinguished between two aspects of myth: myth as a 
narrative and myth as a second-order sign. How are the two to be reconciled for 
our purposes of reading fiction? It is necessary to follow Burke, Barthes and 
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Marderness through their respective arguments in order to reconcile the two and 
show the relevance of epiphany. 
In his ‘Myth, Poetry and Philosophy’ (1960), Kenneth Burke refers to 
literary myth as a narrative which operates according to the Aristotelian 
principle of entelechy, whereby any narrative aims at the fulfilment of its 
perfect form. In other words, myth as a narrative moves in the direction of its 
poetic formal fulfilment, staging the dialectical opposition of a ‘Favoured 
Principle and an Unfavoured Principle’ in terms of primordial first occurences, 
what Burke calls ‘the temporizing of essence’ (284). Discussing the folkloristic 
approach to the ‘combat myth’, as analyzed in a 1959 book by Joseph 
Fontenrose, Burke asks:  
Regardless of where the ‘combat myth’ came from, and how many 
transformations it may have undergone, to what extent can we derive 
its form from the logic of that form? […] In brief, Poetics would ask: in 
order to be a ‘perfect combat myth’, what form ‘ought’ the story 
have? (286) 
Burke shows how the two principles described by Fontenrose as Eros and 
Thanatos, forever struggling with each other, are a recombination of the logical 
antithesis life-death, love-hate, founded on ‘that peculiarly linguistic marvel, 
the negative’ (288).  
[…] once you have translated the logical principle of antithesis into 
terms of narrative combat, by the same token you have set the 
conditions for a purposive development. Thus, for instance, the 
principle of disorder can be pictured as aiming to win over the 
principle of order, and vice versa, so that the purely directionless way 
in which polar terms imply each other can be replaced by schemes 
intensely teleological, as with ‘quest-myths’ recounting the earnest 
effort to attain some greatly desired object or destination, a category 
wide enough to include all mythic narratives insofar as such narratives 
involve action and all action implies purpose. (289, my emphasis) 
This explains myth as a narrative. On the other hand, in ‘Myth Today’, Barthes 
defines myth ‘as a second-order semiological system’ ([1957], 2009: 137), which 
appropriates a sign (either linguistic or an image) and transforms it in the first 
term of a second semiological chain. In the process, this sign or ‘language-
object’ is emptied of its historical meaning to become a form whose meaning is 
put at a distance. To this form impoverished of meaning corresponds a concept 
which elaborates on a certain ‘knowledge of reality’. The less rich the meaning, 
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the more condensed the concept, such as, for example, a red rose becoming a 
general symbol for passion and losing all its specific attributes. The association 
of form and concept is the ‘signification’, which is characterised by a relation of 
‘deformation’: ‘Myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make 
disappear.’ (145)   
Are Burke and Barthes talking about different phenomena? 
In his study of the dynamics of myth, William Marderness (2009) re-
appropriates and extends Barthes’ model and terminology, providing a 
comprehensive theory of how to read a myth. In his interpretation, myth is both 
a second-order sign and a narrative. According to Marderness, myth can be read 
in four different ways: ‘mythical reading’, ‘cultural reading;, ‘extra-mythical 
reading’, and ‘mythological reading’. In a mythical reading, such as the Christian 
attitude towards the Bible, a language-object which is both a meaning and a 
form is ‘naturally’ linked to a concept, which provides a prototype or 
‘archetype’. In other words, a mythical reading delimits a form and a concept 
and elaborates a narrative providing a historical context which gives access to 
‘archetypes’. These in turn give meaning to the believers’ lives. Thus the 
attitude in a mythical reading is that of belief in a ‘Scripture’. 
In a cultural reading, instead, a myth is considered literature, tale or 
legend. It is an uncritical reading in that the link between a form and its concept 
happens by convention: the concept is a conventional idea and the relation of 
signification is therefore explicit and disambiguated through lexicalization in the 
same way a metaphor becomes institutionalized and disambiguates its meaning. 
In an extra-mythical reading the attitude is that of curiosity: myth is 
considered a curious story in a strange context because, unlike the cultural 
reading, an extra-mythical reading sees myth outside of a meaningful cultural 
context. In other words, form and concept are indefinite and are linked to each 
other by speculation. This kind of reading takes place when we do not 
understand or know the cultural matrix which has shaped a certain myth. 
Finally, a mythological reading provides a theoretical system for the 
analysis of myth. Therefore, as a study of myth, or mythology, it is a third-order 
sign which explicates the link between form and meaning. Thus it is a critical 
reading that ‘deciphers’ myth and makes the meaning prominent and 
distinguished from the form. This is the scholarly or erudite attitude. Deciphered 
myth may be remythicized, therefore mythological reading gets outside one 
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myth and inside another. Deciphered myth is seen as a mythical narrative aiming 
at persuasion, rhetoric, or propaganda. 
As Marderness says in the conclusion to his book: 
Diverse interpretations of myth can be understood through one 
system. The ideas that myth is a sign and that myth is a narrative are 
complementary. Barthes studies myths as signs, yet his interpretation 
accommodates Saussure’s idea of value, that a sign is defined through 
its relation to other signs. The signs that contextualize a given sign as 
a myth are often carried by a narrative. Mythologists who study myths 
as narratives expound mythical narratives, the narratives that 
contextualize myths as signs. Yet these scholars also explain the signs. 
For example, Eliade explicates a sacred stone, a myth (as sign) 
contextualized by a mythical narrative. (126) 
Following the implications of Marderness’ mythological reading, it is 
possible to state that many contemporary non-realistic novels make use of post-
mythological textual strategies, and can be approached as remythicized 
narratives of deformed romance and subversion. Fiction that employs post-
mythological strategies swings in various ways between the poles of narrative 
theme and textual form. The hero-quest corresponds to the pole of myth as 
narrative and is characterized by recurrent or more or less hidden motifs, what 
Frye calls ‘archetypes’. On the other hand, at the level of textual form fiction 
tends to appropriate and fulfil the poetic principle of Aristotelian entelechy, 
while it can also add mimetic details which make the story more ‘life-like’. In-
between these two poles the two processes of epiphany as insight and 
‘manifestation’ and of myth as a second-order sign take place. More precisely, 
epiphany is the process that hypostatizes ordinary or trivial elements into myth 
as a second-order sign. Here is a diagram to summarize the whole process: 
 
 
 
 
 
Myth becomes the pliable tool of the fictional magic, offering multifarious 
possibilities in the novels which make use of post-mythological narrative 
strategies, which rework myth by deformation and, in so doing, can either 
demythologize or remythicize it according to new agendas. For example, in 
Ortese’s The Iguana form is rather indeterminate and the quest is refracted 
Narrative theme      Textual form 
Quest ---epiphany (hypostatization) myth as sign---entelechy 
Mythical Motifs    Mimetic details  
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through the protagonist’s perception of other characters’ metamorphoses, while 
some images provide motifs that have an epiphanic function in the story. In 
Lanark, instead, the two poles of form and theme are rather balanced, while in 
Measuring the World the double quest of its protagonists is structured around 
clusters of magical or supernatural motifs enriched with ordinary details. This is 
a structuralist explanation, which, moreover, entails that we take myth and the 
fantastic as merging or flowing into each other. Moreover, if a pre-linguistic 
dimension is taken into account, the landscape acquires considerable depth. To 
the idea of myth as both a narrative and a sign, and epiphany as a mythicizing 
process, bringing together structuralist and formalist insights, we can add some 
insights of cognitive linguistics, in order to understand the phenomenon of 
epiphany better and see how myth is not only a linguistic product or result, but, 
qua narrative, a structuring principle of thought. 
According to Mark Turner in his The Literary Mind (1996), ‘parable 
precedes grammar’, and ‘the linguistic mind is a consequence and a 
subcategory of the literary mind.’ Both the literary mind and everyday mind 
are founded on parable, what he calls ‘the projection of story’.135 In other 
words, Turner declares that the literary mind is not derivative and that story 
projection is fundamental for the way we think every day. By ‘story’ he means 
image-schematic structures that can be spatial or non-spatial (especially based 
on actions). An example of the former is ‘life is a journey’, the latter, instead, 
can be exemplified by ‘the sailor was beaten mercilessly by savage winds’ (28). 
In real life, a journey takes place in space and when we understand life as a 
journey we project a spatial image-scheme on life. In the second case, instead, 
we project action on the winds, which are turned into agents and the sailor 
becomes a victim.  
According to Turner, everyday language is based on parable-like 
projection of image-schematic stories, which shape basic conceptual 
metaphors that structure our understanding of the world and of our 
experience. Conventional metaphors are basic metaphors where we no longer 
perceive the blended space where a source input and a target input produce 
something new. Literary metaphors start from basic conceptual metaphors, but 
then they elaborate the blended space resulting from the interaction between 
the source and target domains. Turner says that literary fantasies are rich 
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elaborations of blended spaces. Both conventional and literary metaphors rely 
on parable: the projection of image-schematic stories onto other stories.136 
In Chapter 3 on myth-making and ritualised consciousness, I defined 
myth as a structure of consciousness and an image-making process. Images can 
only be conceived in space, whether internal or external. This is in keeping 
with Turner’s insight into the projection of basic spatial stories onto other 
domains of experience. Spatialisation is also our way of understanding time: 
linear, circular, spiral-like. Epiphany is an inner ‘manifestation’ which brings 
together our categories of space and time and seeks to overcome contingency: 
an epiphany is an insight whereby our psychic structures make temporal the 
eternal and eternalise the temporal through language, making something 
apparently trivial mythical in character. This is so in order to understand, give 
meaning and importance to our human, transient experience and it happens 
through what Lakoff in Philosophy in the Flesh (1999: 566) calls ‘empathic 
projection’, a phenomenon typical of mysticism, spirituality, and, of course, 
magic. 
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 6 Reading and Ritualising 
Academic discourses have tended mostly to intellectualize and to repress 
the affective and somatic dimension of the reading encounter. However, reading 
happens not only at epidermic level, but ‘under the skin’, whenever readers live 
the reading experience in full engagement. I see reading as an unfolding event, 
to be considered as a social behavior and a creative action which needs to be 
foregrounded in its phenomenological and processual dimension.  
Following a brief exposition of the cognitive and anthropological accounts 
of emotions,  I provide an overview of three novels selected for their 
characteristic blending of fantasy and mimesis, and finally set out to do an 
‘autoethnography’ of reading, a phenomenological case study. In ‘the reader’ 
section, which opens the ‘autoethnography’, I have included elements about my 
social and cultural backgrounds and my relation to reading, writing and 
literature, as well as hints at the environments I have interacted with in my life. 
In the course of the chapter this observational practice and writing about 
my own experience as a reader of the chosen novels is clearly laid out in its 
anthropological foundations. I follow the lead of many anthropologists who, 
after the representational crisis in anthropology, have explored alternative 
modes of writing ethnographies. The list of names would be too long.137 
However, the novelty is that I employ these explorative tools to account 
for my personal reading experience, rather than for an account of some hard 
fact ‘out there’ in the social arena. By doing this, I endeavour to offer an 
alternative reading of the process of reading itself, as an encounter where 
emotions hold a fundamental place, quite different from the abstraction and 
disembodiedness of much academic discourse. This is important in order to go 
beyond the Subject/Object divide that has been fostered throughout centuries 
of western scientific and academic discourse and has deformed our very 
perception of our embeddedness in processes which are both social and natural. 
My second intention is to account for the specificity of non-realistic fiction, 
whose blending of fantasy and mimesis needs to be underscored and analyzed in 
its subversive psychological function. In fact, throughout my work, I have made 
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the case for the importance of what I call ‘hybrid fiction’ as a magical 
supplement to the reader’s life. 
 
6.1 From Interpretation, through Affect, to the Social-
Relational Dimension of Reading 
English Professor and Comparatist Patrick Colm Hogan (2011) has drawn on the 
most recent cognitive studies in psychology in order to account for emotions, 
and show how literature can provide a body of data for their study and play a 
fundamental role in developing the reader’s empathy.138 He distinguishes 
between ‘hedonic emotions’ (61) and ‘nonegoistic emotion’ (62) and, talking 
about empathy, he states: 
A number of authors have suggested that the origin and ultimate 
grounding of ethics is found in empathy. […] The fundamental source 
of nonegoistic emotion, by the preceding account, is almost 
necessarily the sensitivity to emotion expressions of others. That 
sensitivity is the first and most basic inclination that motivates us to 
act in ways not guided solely by our own emotional interests. In this 
way, the preceding account has a somewhat surprising implication. 
The basic sensitivities that form the groundwork for our ethical 
behavior are also the only emotion triggers that absolutely must be 
innate for us to be able to develop emotionally through critical period 
experiences. (62) 
However, while there are ‘innate’ triggers that must be activated in order for 
empathy to unfold, the embodied and socio-relational dimension of the emotions 
needs to be emphasized more. In his account of ‘the neurological substrates of 
emotion or the underlying structural organization of our emotional architecture’, 
Hogan states: 
First, there is the level of individual neurons, which may be 
specialized for different aspects of emotion initiation or response. 
Above this, there is the level of neuron populations, particularly those 
densely interconnected in emotionally specialized regions of 
functional neuroanatomy. These regions, are of course, not isolated, 
but linked with regions governing motor routines, attentional focus, 
autonomic nervous activity, and so on. We may refer to these large, 
interconnected networks as ‘systems’. Finally, above the level of 
systems, we have relations among systems. These relations may be 
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excitatory, inhibitory, or neutral. Moreover they may be  symmetrical 
or asymmetrical. In other words, two systems may affect one another 
equally (symmetrical); alternatively, one system may arouse or inhibit 
the other more than the reverse. Our emotion terms [the words we 
use to describe and classify emotions] may isolate phenomena at the 
second or third level. In addition, our emotion terms are often 
ambiguous or vague with respect to these systems and relations 
among systems. Moreover, we invariably lack terms for some 
emotions. In part, this results from the possible idiosyncrasy of 
particular emotional episodes, with their potentially diverse 
populatations of activated neurons. (71-2) 
This account, while being in line with the last scientific findings, and pointing to 
the problem of ambiguous terminology when it comes to defining what 
emotion(s) (and feelings) are, only hints at the role of the body in experiencing 
emotions. According to this influential author, ‘physiological outcomes may be 
the somatic substrate for what we experience as the phenomenological tone or 
feeling of an emotion’ (emphasis mine, 73).  
If we turn to the anthropology of emotion, we find that for decades it has 
been ‘construing’ emotion(s) as ‘cultural’, due to a conflation of the concept of 
‘culture’ and that of ‘society’ and what anthropologist Margot L. Lyon has 
defined as the ‘ideational bias’:  
In constructionist treatments, emotion is generally understood in 
primarily ideational terms, that is as a cognitive or mental 
phenomenon that is subject to cultural production.139   
Furthermore, the distinction between culture and society is helpful in order to 
unravel the problem of emotion. In this discussion, culture is to be intended as 
values, practices and customs, while society is made up of institutions and 
individuals, minds and bodies. The emphasis on the body and the mind is not 
misplaced if we think about the Foucauldian ‘bio-power’ that the 
institutionalization of bodies and minds is capable of wielding. A non-dualistic 
account of the problem of emotion has to explore the interconnections between 
social institutions, individuals and cultural values. 
 If we want to go past the old dualisms of nature and culture, or innatism 
and nurture, emotion has to be considered as a ‘force’, yielding a kind of power.  
According to Lyon, an  
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expanded understanding of emotion must take account of the body 
qua body not simply as it is mediated by ‘mind’ but as part of the 
conception of emotion itself. Such an approach need not give priority 
to an innate biology of being. Biologies themselves are socialized, as 
Mauss, for example, so clearly showed in his account of ‘techniques of 
the body’ (1973 [1935]). (256)  
In her account, ‘emotion cannot be conceived as entirely separate from 
either psychophysiological or social phenomena’ (257): 
An important implication of a truly social-relational perspective on 
emotion is to see not only how emotion has social consequences, but 
how social relations themselves may generate emotion. Emotion has a 
social ontology. That is, the experience of emotion, which involves 
both physical and phenomenal dimensions, has also a social-relational 
genesis. And, what is subject to social relations is not merely 
cognitive faculties, but living human bodies, for society is also bodies 
in relation. (258) 
In taking onboard both Hogan’s and Lyon’s perspectives on the cognitive 
processes, and the social dimension of emotion respectively, I would like to 
underline the psychophysical and embodied dimension of reading, as generating 
and releasing emotion as a kind of magical force. In the preceding chapters, 
following anthropologists like Tambiah and Glucklich140, I have defined magic as 
both a rhetorical art and a mode of consciousness accessible to all human 
beings. In this chapter, I observe and report my reading experience as a 
contribution towards an anthropology of literature that attempts to uncover the 
affective and embodied dimension of the the encounter between reader and 
text and, partly, its author: in fact, contrary to dogmatic interpretations of 
Barthes’ statement about the ‘author’ and his ‘death’, it is possible to hold a 
middle ground, endorsed by Derrida in Of Grammatology: 
the writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, 
laws and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. 
He uses them only by letting himself, after a fashion and up to a 
point, be governed by the system. And the reading must always aim at 
a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what what he does not command of the patterns of the 
language that he uses. (apart from the first two instances, the 
emphasis is mine)141 
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In Seán Burke’s succinct statement, ‘though the dominion of intention is 
to be rigorously refused, intention itself is not thereby cancelled but rather 
lodged within a broader signifying process’.142 
 Indeed I suggest that the ‘reader’, considered as body, mind, emotions 
and (con)text, should be looked at as an active part within this ‘broader 
signifying process’. 
When I first selected the three novels for this project—―L’Iguana by Anna 
Maria Ortese, Die Vermessung der Welt by Daniel Kehlmann and Lanark by 
Alasdair Gray―—I knew they would seem quite unrelated to each other in terms 
of structure, themes and style. Instead, what connected them in my perception 
was their ironical stance towards their objects, coupled with an intense feeling 
for possible alternative visions about history and a deeply original sense both of 
the harshness or drudgery of the economic compartmentalization and 
rationalization of modern life, and of the possibilities of the imagination. Indeed 
the tension between utopia and dystopia or between order and chaos in these 
novels is their overarching, albeit protean, characteristic. 
The first time I read each one of them, the impressions I received were 
varied and complex. During my second reading, I came to recognize these texts 
as some of the focal points in my reading experience, as my personal and social 
history on one hand, and the characteristics of the texts on the other hand 
interacted and impinged on each other, bringing about effects and epiphanies 
that would have not been such, had these two variables been different. 
Indeed, I am supporting the idea of bringing back emotions into the 
process of reading, as a fundamental element towards what Susan Sontag in 
‘Against Interpretation’ ([1964] 1983: 95-104) calls an ‘erotics of art’, and also 
as a fundamental basis to processes of comprehension, intellectualization and 
experiential appropriation of art. In the same essay, Susan Sontag states that 
‘interpretation is the revenge of the intellect upon art.’143 Sontag refers 
precisely to the disembodied intellectualizing characteristic of academia. 
However, following the narrative turn, based on the fundamental premise that 
all kinds of representation are always a secondary or even tertiary phenomenon 
because they are inevitably mediated by the ethnographer-author, 
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interpretation needs not be seen in this way any longer; rather, it can be part 
and parcel of a holistic and multidimensional project, whereby the reader and 
the text communicate through a permeable membrane. 
As Bruno Bettelheim argues in his The Uses of Enchantment (1976), 
children know, when they read a fairy-tale that it is both real and not real.144 In 
what I call ‘hybrid fictions’, both a child-like and a new, forward-looking self-
awareness is fostered through a spiral-like reading process, whereby memories, 
thoughts, sudden associations, quirks and details all intervene and contribute to 
the unique processual experience of reading. 
A long time has elapsed since Wimsatt and Beardsley (1954) admonished 
scholars against the ‘affective fallacy’: 
The Affective Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its 
results… It begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from 
the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and 
relativism. 145 
On the other hand, Wolfgang Iser has more recently spoken in The Act of 
Reading (1978: 61) of ‘the quality of performance’ inherent in the reading 
experience, and in Prospecting: from Reader-Response to Literary Anthropology 
(1989), he states: 
A second reading of a piece of literature often produces a different 
impression from the first. The reasons for this may lie in the reader’s 
own change of circumstances, but all the same, the text must be such 
as to permit this variation. […] The increased information that now 
overshadows the text provides possibilities of combination that were 
obscured in the first reading. Familiar occurences now tend to appear 
in a new light and seem to be at times corrected, at times enriched. 
But for all that, nothing is formulated in the text itself, rather, the 
reader himself produces these innovative readings. (10) 
While I agree with Iser’s position regarding the active role of the reader in 
performing and producing various readings, I affirm that the reader encounters 
the text emotionally and intellectually by means of stylized emotions that the 
writer has encoded in the text. In this way, the experience of literature is 
profoundly ethical because it is based on intersubjective communication. 
Reading a literary novel is a dialogue whereby the reader encounters alterity 
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both inside and outside herself. In order to be truly ethical and intersubjective, 
an encounter must not subsume the other into the self, but must allow for their 
reciprocal otherness. The literary text’s performativity enables a 
defamiliarinzing dialogue whereby intersubjectivity and subjectivity enhance 
each other.  I also find necessary to underscore that, in the words of Miall (2007: 
53), ‘feeling plays the primary role in directing the reading of literary 
narratives.’146 
Before pursuing my emotions as a reader, it is necessary to give 
information about the novels themselves: what follows is an overview of the 
novels for the benefit of those readers who do not know them at all or read 
them some time ago. 
6.2 Overview of the Novels 
6.2.1 The Iguana, or the phenomenology of oppression. 
In The Iguana, which was first published in Italy in 1965, the author Anna 
Maria Ortese sets out to depict her personal vision of Nature, conceived as an 
elemental yet inarticulated force, and its mysterious power.147 Nature 
encompasses humanity, yet the pure natural is a condition of abjection and 
brutality. Men, on the other hand, oppress and persecute natural creatures. 
Facts and events, the narrator seems to say, are rarely what they seem to be at 
first and their innermost reason is most mysterious and impossible to grasp. The 
Iguana is both a degraded woman and an animal, ‘a beast’: she is the 
embodiment of the oppressed and what Ortese calls ‘the little ones of the 
earth’.148  
Aleardo, alias Daddo, Count of Milan, sets out to sea in order to look for 
new lands to buy, and also, to comply with a friend’s request (a publisher’s), to 
find new juicy stories for Milan’s thriving publishing industry. Although he is 
described as not very intelligent, Daddo has both the qualities of a good 
‘Lombardo’: a practical mind, and a compassionate heart. At the very start, 
when his friend Adelchi asks him for something new to publish, Daddo says: ‘Ci 
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vorrebbero le confessioni di un qualche pazzo, magari innamorato di un’iguana’. 
(L’Iguana, 2007: 17): ‘What you need are the confessions of some madman, how 
about the story of a madman in love with an iguana?’ (The Iguana, 1987: 3) The 
themes of disease and animalism emerge in connection with what Adelchi calls 
‘qualche poema, qualche canto, […] dove si esprima la rivolta dell’oppresso’ 
(2007: 17): ‘a series of cantos expressing the revolt of the oppressed’ (1987: 4), 
a topic capable of attracting the public’s attention in its search for exotica and 
sensationalism.  
However, once Daddo and his captain Salvato sail beyond Gibraltar, they 
reach a forlorn and almost abandoned little island, named Ocaña, where three 
brothers and a little creature, an iguana, live in poverty and decadence. Two of 
the Segovia-Guzman brothers are rough and inhospitable; the third is a frail 
young Marquis—Don Ilario—whom extreme poverty and disease have made old 
before his time. This young man welcomes Daddo with some enthusiasm into his 
ruined mansion. Daddo, however, in his goodness would like to do something to 
relieve everybody’s condition, particularly that of the sensitive Marquis and of 
the little iguana, as tall as a child, that at first Daddo takes to be a frail elderly 
woman. He soon realizes she is not old, but dejected and overworked, and falls 
in love with her. She is also the centrepiece of a family mystery that Daddo tries 
to make sense of: she is mistreated and hated by all the brothers. Daddo also 
realises the Marquis’ alienated condition by discovering that he was once deeply 
in love with a little monkey, named Perdita (Loss). He then discovers the 
iguana’s den in the cellar below his own room and is displeased when he sees 
that the iguana collects mock-money in the form of coloured pebbles received 
by the brothers for her domestic services. After dinner, the Count goes back to 
his room, but being unable to fall asleep, he stays on the balcony observing the 
moon. In the moonlight he witnesses a profound and disturbing metamorphosis in 
the Marquis, who appears younger and radiant and is sumptuously clothed, 
looking his own image in a mirror. He and his brothers, also transformed, leave 
the house to reach the beach. Daddo looks for the iguana and finds her in the 
henhouse, where the brothers have locked her. He ends up proposing to her, 
after blaming her for her avarice, but she declines his offer. 
In the meanwhile, on the beach, the brothers welcome new guests, the 
‘typical’ little family of the Hopins and an archbishop, who has made a match 
between the Hopins’ daughter and Don Ilario, hoping to gain the island for 
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himself; together they enter the house and Daddo sees them while they try to 
exorcise the spirit of evil in the little cellar where the iguana lives. The latter 
comes back from the henhouse and fat Mrs Hopins is so afraid that she faints. 
Thus the prospective marriage is still uncertain. Daddo goes to sleep but cannot 
rest. Later he comes to know that once the Marquis had loved the iguana 
tenderly but now he would rather forget the past in order to lead a comfortable 
life. 
The day after, Daddo meets Don Ilario on the beach and tries to persuade 
him not to sell himself. He offers him his help, asks to see his many poems and 
offers to see to with their publication in Milan. A philosophical dialogue takes 
place between the two about reality, good and evil and death. When the bishop 
comes by, Don Ilario flees away perplexed, and Daddo recognizes the bishop as 
an old acquaintance. 
The iguana, who was once loved and cherished by the Marquis, has now 
been repudiated as the very embodiment of the ‘devil’. Daddo gathers his 
money with the aim of helping the Marquis or the poor iguana, but Salvato, 
whom the Hopins’ maid has informed about everything, makes us infer that the 
iguana’s secret is simple and terrible at the same time. At this point Daddo’s 
state of mind changes abruptly. Between dream and reality, he sees the iguana 
sweeping the floor and talking about a paradise which is forbidden to her. The 
Count is moved and offers her all his money, but the iguana just goes away. 
When the marriage between the Marquis and the young Hopins girl is 
secured, Daddo asks him for an explanation of the iguana’s deep pain, but Ilario 
answers by bringing in the topic of trade unions and the fact that the iguana had 
not joined in, so that she could not claim any further economic refund or pay. 
His cynicism and the different plains on which the two young men place the 
reasons of the iguana’s discontent make Daddo hallucinate and confuse reality 
and dream again. Indeed the reader and the narrator themselves are not sure 
what reality is and what is dream either. Soon, Daddo feels that this cynical 
aspect of Ilario’s personality is a ‘fantastic’ mask and he is suddenly near the 
well, together with the Guzman brothers, where they fear that the iguana has 
committed suicide. 
Now the Count realises that the iguana is not an iguana, but a poor maid, 
a girl reduced to an animal-like state by poverty and ignorance. Another sudden 
change of scene leads Daddo, and the reader, into Ilario’s study, where he talks 
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about the death of God at the hands of a killer who has fled somewhere. The 
Count looks for this killer and soon takes part in his own trial for the murder of 
God, a huge, white butterfly, who nonetheless is still alive. The unaware killer, 
the Count himself, is finally absolved, as the real killer is the economic power 
and money he is capable of wielding. Daddo is again at the very bottom of the 
well, where he has jumped in order to save the iguana. He saves her, but he 
wakes up in his bed, wrapped up in bandages, close to death. He realises that 
his real voyage starts with death itself. 
After Daddo’s death, Don Ilario leaves as a married man, while the 
brothers Guzman and the iguana stay on the island, which has been transformed 
into a tourist resort. However, the island is as bleak and as windy as ever and 
does not cater for the bourgeoisie’s taste. The brothers and the iguana, though, 
help each other in learning to read and write. Only the iguana-girl has not 
enough concentration to learn, so that the two Guzman write a prayer to Christ 
and the Count in order to please her and to be remembered and acknowledged. 
The iguana no longer loves the Marquis but the Count, whose sacrifice has saved 
her life and given her serenity and the hope of a new resurrection. 
However the question remains, to what extent has the Iguana become a 
self-aware subject? She remains on the margins of an unconscious life, forever 
on the border between bestiality and humanity, a perfect hybrid condition.  
The Iguana articulates the themes of disease and of what constitutes a 
beast or a human being; together the two converge in giving an account of the 
phenomenology of oppression. In fact the Count is ill because of 
unconsciousness, while Ilario, although himself oppressed, ill and melancholic, 
also exercises his own power over the iguana-girl, whose degree of oppression is 
such that she, as victim, does not even exist as a conscious and self-aware 
(human) being. The central statement of the novel is the following:  
e, insomma, I Lombardi avevano per certo che un mondo oppresso 
abbia qualcosa da dire, mentre, se l’oppressione è antica e autentica, 
l’oppresso non esiste neppure, o non ha più coscienza di esserlo, ma 
solo esiste, sebbene senza una vera coscienza, l’oppressore, che a 
volte, per vezzo, simula i modi che sarebbero legittimi della vittima, 
se ancora esistesse. (L’Iguana, 2007: 18) 
Briefly put, the Milanese were persuaded that some world of 
oppression had something to say, whereas the oppressed don’t even 
exist, or can’t, at least have any awareness of being oppressed when 
their condition is authentic and a legacy from a distant past. The only 
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thing left is the oppressor, who likewise has no knowledge of what he 
is, even while sometimes, out of habit, aping the stances and 
behaviour that would legitimately befit his victim, if any such victim 
had escaped extinction. (The Iguana, 1987: 4) 
 
Technically, The Iguana can be defined as self-reflexive magical realism, 
in that in its combination, without privileging any, of different planes and 
accounts of reality, it also exposes its internal narrative strategies. Is Daddo 
becoming crazy? Yet, his madness is not explained away or reduced to silence; 
indeed it is the restoring point of a degree of coherence in a reality that to him, 
and to the reader up to that point, appears ungraspable. The very categories of 
sanity and madness are reversed. The fact that at the end the iguana is revealed 
to be a girl, who had been reduced to beastly state by abjection, poverty and 
pain does not explain things. Furthermore, the iguana is ensnared in a black 
magic of fear and pain, a spell which only a sacrifice, a death, can break.  
The status of ‘reality’ and what is ’fantastic’ are being questioned in their 
own assumptions: they increasingly appear to be the same thing, as the narrator 
deliberately denies knowing any more than the reader does and leaves him/her 
in a state of confusion and perplexity.  
L’iguana is a text where the ontological opposition of ‘reality’ and 
fantastic dimension is overcome by the bridging perception of an overarching 
strangeness, that very ‘stranezza del reale’ Ortese talks about in her non-
fictional texts and is highlighted by the vague reference to Unamuno at the end 
of the novel. Her definition of the real is given by Daddo himself: realism should 
be  
‘un’arte di illuminare il reale. Purtroppo, non si tiene conto che il 
reale è a più strati, e l’intero Creato, quando si è giunti ad analizzare 
sin l’ultimo strato, non risulta affatto reale, ma pura e profonda 
immaginazione’ (2007: 60) 
‘an art of illuminating the real. But people, unfortunately, don’t 
always affirm the awareness that reality exists on many levels, and 
that the whole of creation, once you analyse the deepest levels of 
reality, isn’t real at all, and simply the purest and profoundest 
imagination.’ (1987: 52)  
Ortese moves past the psychological definition of the fantastic as a 
moment of psychological uncertainty in front of an apparently irrational event, 
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and transfers the uncertainty onto the formal, narrative plane, that is, on the 
way the novel is constructed. If we accept Marie-Anne Rubat Du Merac’s149 
hypothesis of the novel’s extra-diegetic narrator as a double of the protagonist 
Daddo, another epistemological and interpretative frame comes to mind: the 
space and time of narration are the narrator’s inner space and time, which 
means that The Iguana develops as an account of an inexplicable inner 
experience too.  
The reader knows from the start that Daddo is already bent on meeting 
and falling in love with an iguana, as his friend’s request for a sensational poem 
to be marketed in Milan makes clear. What if the mysterious narrator is really a 
double, a ‘spectre’ of the Count, trying to make sense of his experience? In that 
case the space of narration is itself uncanny and it is constructed by bringing 
together either repetitive or contradictory events. The act of telling the story is 
uncanny in itself.  At this point, the novel takes on a wider significance: a 
Jungian perspective helps identify the iguana with the archetype of the ‘anima’, 
with whom the Count falls in love to the point of dying for her: something 
primordial and forgotten comes back, pervading the Count’s memory and very 
being, asking for his acknowledgement and love.  
The iguana is a reptile, a watery and chthonic creature at the same time, 
both elements being related to the feminine: that which is encompassing and 
not differentiated, and whose power of attraction brings about death for the 
Count and only half a redemption/recognition for the iguana herself. She never 
actually emancipates herself. Self-awareness can only be the result of an act of 
existential pondering on own’s own condition, followed by emancipation and 
later integration of the raw power of the feminine. This, however, cannot 
happen in the novel. In fact, the final ‘canto of the oppressed’ is written by the 
Guzman brothers; the iguana, we are told, is not able to concentrate and learn 
to read and write. This is the end: something which does not belong to 
‘normality’ has been revealed and brought to light, even cherished and loved, 
but nonetheless, it can never be fully acknowledged, without bringing about ruin 
and displacement, becauseit has its place outside human order.  
On the other hand, The Iguana is also the account of a collective 
experience, the experience of western cultures, of the direction they have 
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taken, inasmuch as in their rationalizing and reifying discourses they have 
repressed their connection to nature, the borderline and mystery, and their fear 
of death. Now all these come back, haunting the Count (and the reader) as 
ghosts, making for that uncanny feeling of strange familiarity and familiar 
strangeness that turns the Count into the very double of himself, as a narrator. 
This is a possible interpretation only if we overcome the divide between rational 
and irrational, or realistic and fantastic: in the words of one of Ortese’s 
characters in Alonso e i Visionari, ‘the whole of reality is supernatural’. That is, 
conversely, all is real. 
The theme of the double recurs throughout The Iguana, as the Count and 
the Marquis seem to be different instances of each other, and later the Marquis 
himself undergoes a night metamorphosis into a sumptuous and beautiful youth, 
and a day metamorphosis into ‘the terrible Mendez’, which is also Daddo’s 
alienated projection of himself as an oppressor. Their destinies are also the 
inversion of each other’s: the Marquis will go into a state of bourgeois 
tranquillity, while Daddo will find death in the attempt to pay for his previous 
unconscious tranquillity in Milan, and ignorance of the economic laws of the 
world, of which he is nonetheless a perpetrator. 
Thus The Iguana, can be read on different levels. On one hand, it is the 
account of an individual and an epochal experience, in which the iguana-girl is a 
subaltern in the sense outlined by Spivak, in that at the end of the novel it is 
clear that she can never speak and represent herself. On the other hand, she is 
representative of a whole collective dimension repressed within western culture 
too, a border whose trespass is a taboo. Once its nature comes to light, the 
uncanny quality of the ‘real’ is fore-grounded, and the shifting inner frontier of 
colonialism, of what is central and what is marginal in the geography of the 
human heart gets exposed in its ambiguity. Ortese thus exposes the difficult and 
unsolvable problem of how Daddo, the western subject, can learn to locate 
himself as ‘other’ rather than as always positing Otherness in contrast to 
himself.  
 
6.2.2 Lanark: A Life in Four Books 
As the title states, Lanark is ‘a life in four books’, being the story of the 
eponymous hero in two different lives or, possibly, a life on earth and a descent 
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into hell, the former described according to the conventions of realism (the hero 
is called Duncan Thaw and is loosely based on Gray’s autobiographical memories 
as a young man), the latter being fantastical (the hero’s name is now Lanark).150 
It is worth noting that the novel begins with the fantastical narrative, which 
serves as the frame around the realistic narrative. In fact, as the author himself 
in the ‘Epilogue’ says, Lanark is ‘divided into books three, one, two and four’ 
(Lanark 2007: 483), number three and four containing Lanark’s adventures and 
books one and two, in the middle, being his life as Duncan Thaw in the city of 
Glasgow. Apparently, the reason for this strange arrangement is that Gray wants 
Lanark ‘to be read in one order but eventually thought of in another’ (Lanark 
2007: 483). 
Lanark ends up in the grimy city of Unthank, where he develops a skin 
condition called dragon-hide in the novel, other people develop other strange 
illnesses, such as having speaking mouths on their hands. All these conditions 
depend on the spiritual conditions the people are in: dragon-hide, for example, 
is the illness of those who are self-enclosed and unable to love others. These 
metaphors of alienation have a strong estranging effect, while also arousing the 
reader’s curiosity. 
When Lanark realizes he is in hell (46) he prays for a way out and at the 
top of a hill a mouth appears saying ‘I am the way out’ (47). Lanark has to enter 
the mouth ‘Naked, and head first’ (47). It is interesting that Lanark enters 
through a mouth, rather than a door, signifying that he is being literally 
digested, an allusion to the Freudian ‘oral stage’ of development, and to the 
fact that the world Lanark lives in is characterised by greed and harsh limitation.  
This way he lands into the Institute, a strange sort of place, a mixture of 
hospital and laboratory, where he is cured of dragon-hide and becomes himself a 
doctor helping a dragon, whom he recognizes as his girlfriend Rima at a late 
stage of the disease, to recover her human form. When she is healed, he decides 
to leave the Institute with her and look for a city where the sun shines. 
However, before they manage to leave the Institute, they discover that people 
who are affected by these strange diseases and cannot be healed disappear: 
they either become food or explode and provide fuel for the Institute and the 
Council, the two profit-making institutions which govern and lead the city of 
Unthank. In this part of the novel Gray criticises the capitalist economic system 
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by using the conventions of dystopian fiction, thus amplifying and metaphorically 
reworking the worst traits of capitalism. 
At this point book three is over and a ‘prologue’ is introduced, telling the 
story of the oracle which is going to tell Lanark his life as Duncan Thaw, as a boy 
and art student in Glasgow in the sixties. This story is the subject matter of 
books one and two, the former telling of Thaw’s childhood, while the latter 
deals with his life as a young man. Books one and two are divided by the 
interlude, where the oracle tells Lanark more about his life as Thaw. This 
realistic narrative has the function of anchoring the critique of capitalism to a 
specific location and time, and also serves as a seemingly factual narrative of an 
ordinary life, which leads inevitably to Lanark’s plight. 
As the ‘Table of Contents’ at the very beginning points out, the 
‘interlude’ is in fact written ‘to remind us what we are in danger of forgetting: 
that Thaw’s story exists within the hull of Lanark’s’. The fourth and last book 
resumes the narrative of Lanark’s adventures within the meanders of the 
Council, his passage through the intercalendrical zone, where he and Rima 
wander through different time dimensions in the attempt to reach Unthank and 
eventually Provan‒‒a town where the sun shines, but they come across people 
who are demonstrating against the Council and the Institute. Lord Monboddo is 
the president of the Creature, an institution that joins the Council and the 
Institute together, and gives a speech which is the apotheosis of the hyper-
capitalist society, with its system of research institutes, and foundations for the 
advancement of science and ultimately for profiting a few powerful tycoons.  
After Lanark and Rima’s separation and the political assembly in Provan, 
where Lanark is to go as a delegate from Greater Unthank, Gray inserts an 
‘epilogue’ which is meta-fictional and revelatory of the overall design of the 
novel. Here Lanark meets the author, who tells him he has to be a failure in 
order to please the readers who identify with him. Lanark exits the epilogue 
banging the door. There follows the climax, where he and his son Alexander 
walk uphill and Lanark has his moment of glorious epiphany while basking in the 
sun and looking at Alexander. In the last page of the novel, Lanark is approached 
by an uncanny chamberlain sent by the ‘ministry of the earth’, announcing the 
imminent time of Lanark’s death. In the end, Lanark is ‘a slightly worried, 
ordinary old man but glad to see the light in the sky’ (560). 
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If we don’t follow Gray’s advice about mentally re-arranging Lanark’s two 
lives in chronological order, we choose to be entangled in the text in a rather 
chaotic way, where the allegorical element is being amplified in both narrative 
directions: the hero’s two lives are figurae and mirrors of each other, they may 
be thought of not only in sequence but simultaneously. This can have a mind-
boggling effect, in that the reader is transported through different layers of 
explanation, from the causal to the synchronic, where the world as we know it is 
shown as deeply uncanny and unfamiliar, where everything is the reverse side of 
everything else.  
In the case of The Iguana and Lanark we are confronted with symbolic 
texts which try to found an alternative mythology, as ‘situation’, which is both 
individual and paradigmatic, but that makes space for the uncanny quality of 
reality and storytelling, as the authors recognize the displacement of what they 
describe as a necessary condition for the decolonization of the unknown and 
foreign realm of the ‘real’. In The Iguana, Ortese depicts ‘reality’ as a broken 
mirror full of contradictions and alternatives. Her conception of an ungraspable 
world of meanings stages difference and otherness as constitutionally inscribed 
in the world and in the text. On the other hand, in Lanark the insubstantiality of 
the written text and the material import of the book as an object are 
interwoven through such powerful metaphors that abstractions functioning as 
fetishes end up exploding and displaying their figural status. The difference or 
différance, in Derrida’s terms, opened up in the symbolic text is exactly the 
blank left by the non-identity of name and thing named: 
a ‘text’ is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some 
content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, 
a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to 
other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits assigned 
to it so far […].151 
 Indeed The Iguana and Lanark play out this ghostly, uncanny space of 
displaced identities employing the device of the double as their supplement. 
Robert Louis Stevenson is a model both for Gray and Ortese; not only the 
characters’ identities but also the fictional spaces are a doubling of the 
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geographical ones. The reading process becomes in itself an amplification of this 
continuous displacement.  
Although my standpoint is phenomenological, it also is process-oriented, 
in a way which cannot countenance Husserl’s transcendental ego. For this reason 
I welcome Derrida’s notion of différance as the irruption of non-being and 
otherness at the very core of presence, but extend it in a cybernetic direction. 
In fact, even more than Derrida’s continuous deferral of the end, Bateson’s  
cybernetic idea of ‘difference’ is particularly suited to account for the dynamics 
of reading these texts. In fact, as we have seen in section 3.1.2, the cybernetic 
unit of information is ‘a difference which makes a difference’ and, as such, 
allows us to conceive the gap between two phenomena as a re-instatement of 
productive and creative otherness. Later, in my ‘autoethnography of reading’ I 
endeavour to show how the texts being read feed into a continuous, holistic, 
metamorphic and differential fiction of the self.  
 
6.2.3 Measuring the World 
In the case of Measuring the World (Die Vermessung der Welt, 2005), we 
are dealing with a movement in the opposite direction: the deconstruction of 
science and idealism unfolds by demythologizing the situation in which they 
arose: in fact they are both part of the same enterprise in the Subject/Object 
formation in the sciences and academic discourses of the time, which, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, together with an increasing rationalization of 
industrial production, contributed to the reification of human relationships, as 
well as of those between humanity and the rest of the natural realm.152  
While lavishing irony on the mystical leanings of German Romantic 
culture, Kehlmann’s novel also traces a satirical genealogy of the split 
consciousness of modernity, tracking it back to the Enlightenment ideals of the 
Kantian enterprise and its aftermath.  Yet, as in The Iguana and Lanark, the 
logic of the supplement is still there: the parallel lives of the two protagonists‒‒ 
two great German scientists, Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Friedrich Gauss, 
who met in 1828 in Berlin at the German Scientific Congress‒‒supplement each 
other, without being able to integrate what they lack in different ways. The 
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women in Gauss’s life are a supplement of each other: neither Nina, the 
prostitute, nor his first wife Johanna, nor his second wife Minna are allowed to 
be ‘original’, they are made into replicas of a conventional idea of woman, as 
either prostitute or wife. Although Gauss at a certain point thinks of marrying 
Nina, he is soon led back to ‘reason’ and propriety, and instead of marrying her, 
he promises to learn her language, as a supplement of faithfulness. Johanna 
herself is aware that a life with Gauss means being turned into a ghost; 
nonetheless she ends up accepting his proposal and losing her own voice 
accordingly. All we know about her personality comes from before marriage to 
Gauss; afterwards she is lost in silence. 
Die Vermessung der Welt deals in a satirical tone with Humboldt’s and 
Gauss’ attempts at making sense of reality through science. By wanting to 
measure all the physical phenomena in the world, and advancing respectively 
mathematics and geography, Humboldt and Gauss go through life ‘insulated’. 
Their inclination towards measurements and numbers, quantification and natural 
laws, helps them exorcise their fear of the unknown, the feminine, mystery and 
death. The other great theme of the book, however, is precisely ‘death’ and the 
uncanny dimension of life, that ‘other side’ that they stubbornly refuse to 
acknowledge. And yet, ghosts and the realm of the dead are familiar realities 
from the beginning of the novel.  
Since his childhood, Humboldt has been acquainted with ghosts in the 
castle where he lives, and his decision to become an explorer is from the start 
determined by the ominous story of Crazy Aguirre, who proclaimed himself king 
in the midst of the impenetrable Amazonian regions, and led his men to certain 
death. During his expeditions later in life, Humboldt always draws a line when 
the uncanny threatens to shatter his Kantian vision of reality. This happens, for 
example, when he and his companion Bonpland descend into the Cave of the 
Dead and he sees his dead mother, then when sailing on the Orinoco river, 
where the reflections of dead birds are mirrored in the waters, and finally while 
trying to climb Mount Chimborazo, where Humboldt is hallucinating about the 
faithful dog he placed in a cage with crocodiles in order to observe their 
behaviour.   
In all these cases (which are depicted in the fourth, sixth and eight 
chapters respectively), Humboldt decides to go back when threatened by chaos 
and unknown possible dangers, and yet, all the while, he goes on collecting 
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plants, animals and insects, mostly dead, and fragments of rocks, measuring air 
pressure and other physical phenomena. Gauss on the other hand does not think 
that it is necessary to explore the world in order to be a scientist. He is a 
mathematician, who after his best work on mathematics, knows he will never be 
able to outdo himself, and ends up measuring only land and studying astronomy 
mostly for economical reasons. He marries, but his treatment of women is 
indifferent. He loves Nina best, the Russian prostitute that he will never marry. 
His two wives, Johanna and Minna are voiceless. 
Humboldt has never loved a woman; he lives in his own world of 
measurements. The only women both men feel for are their respective mothers, 
as the source of comfort and consolation. Both are depicted as devoted to them, 
Gauss even more than Humboldt, as he thinks of her on all uncomfortable 
occasions. 
The author’s irony is a good distancing tool that both shows the two men’s 
limits and also makes space for the subtle treatment of the underground theme 
which flows throughout the novel like a subterranean river, that of the uncanny 
dimension of life and reality, which the two protagonists try to ban from their 
own lives. 
Magical realist elements, such as ghosts and communication with the 
dead, crop up in the texture of the novel at strategic points: always opening up 
a chance for the protagonist to acknowledge and deepen his understanding of 
the ‘other’ dimension. It is as if all the time, the unconscious, with its reservoir 
of mysterious elements and events, is being repressed through the act of 
measuring distances and star courses, and collecting samples and evidence of 
physical phenomena, that most of the time involve killing animals and insects for 
science’s sake. The deadness of ‘facts’ and the abstract dimension which this 
cold factuality helps construct is at the base of that epistemological enterprise 
we call ‘science’. In other words, Humboldt and Gauss try to understand and 
contain natural phenomena by imprisoning them in a safe net of numbers and 
measurements. 
At a certain point, Humboldt sets a pet dog in a crocodile’s cage in order 
to observe the latter’s hunting habits. Later on the remorse for the horrible 
death of the loyal dog haunts him, yet he justifies his misdeed as necessary for 
the advancement of science. The dog continues to appear as a ghost. This is the 
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birth certificate of the violence upon which modern technological and scientific 
society is predicated, a ‘necessary’ violence for the progress of humankind. 
On the other hand, Gauss has little consideration for women and his own 
family: he is alienated both from his two wives and his children, particularly his 
son Eugen, whom he sees as not particularly intelligent and not a bit gifted for 
mathematics. Eugen loves poetry and trees; he ends up in a prison because he 
finds himself in a subversive gathering of students in Berlin and in the end 
Humboldt, as a favour to Gauss, obtains his freedom but cannot avoid his exile. 
Eugen is shipped to America, and the moment he realizes that new possibilities 
await him and that the coast of America before his eyes is no chimera, but 
reality, the novel comes to an end. This open-ended conclusion‒‒with the young 
generation about to turn a new page in the book of history, as America is the 
land of new opportunity and fresh starts‒‒is an elusive commentary on the 
ghostly, old European civilization as embodied in the likes of Gauss and 
Humboldt. 
Throughout the novel, Humboldt’s exotic feats are counterpoised to 
Gauss’ s dull life back home, in a country that appears to Gauss as non-existent, 
made up only of forests and little villages. In spite of the diversity of their 
experiences, both Gauss and Humboldt are always somewhat unreal. Gauss 
realizes this for himself in a moment of bitter reflection, while in Amazonia, a 
native looking into Humboldt’s hand sees ‘no past, no present, no future’: he is 
really ‘nobody’. Throughout the story, maps and mathematical formulas cover 
up precariously the fragile and incomprehensible core of life, they give structure 
to Humboldt and Gauss’ lives, but these men appear all the more impoverished 
as human beings. 
Europe and Germany itself are not any more real than Amazonia or Russia; 
whether Gauss measures German forests and lands or Humboldt explores the 
Orinoco or crosses the Russian steppe, it does not make a big difference: the 
unreality they have forced nature into comes back with a vengeance and turns 
on them. Berlin too is a threatening place for them. While Humboldt gets stuck 
into the mundane side of science, conferences and academies and encounters 
with princes, Gauss’ misanthropic views embitter him more and more. He only 
likes the young physicist Weber, whom he deems clever enough to converse 
with. Eugen does not even receive a last letter from his father. Albeit full of old-
fashioned advice, the last letter Eugen receives is Humboldt’s. 
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Looking at the novel in order to define its magical realism, it can be 
remarked that the supernatural always works humorously against commonsense 
as a counterpoint. The author is always very careful not to overdo it; rather he 
employs irony in order to allow a reflective and playful distance among the 
depiction of the protagonists’ weaknesses, the inexplicable they face and the 
readers’apprehension of it. In spite of humour, readers are made aware of a 
serious undercurrent, a chilling watery dimension, which comes up here and 
there and threatens a commonsense perception of life. Water and trees are 
recurring elements in the novel, whether as rivers or sea and forests or gardens. 
Likewise, caves frequently recur. These images can be identified as archetypal, 
wherein contact with the numinous and otherworldly dimension can be made. 
However, only Eugen is capable of establishing such a contact without 
withdrawing, when he leans onto the ancient big tree in Tenerife. Gauss and 
Humboldt always deny or discount their experiences of the uncanny side of 
nature and life. 
Die Vermessung der Welt is philosophical and magical realist at the same 
time: these two dimensions are woven together throughout the narrative with 
light irony. The philosophical German tradition is intensely interrogated, the 
Romantic shadows of Goethe, Schiller, and the Schlegel brothers project 
themselves in the background as influences on Humboldt’s education, while Kant 
is portrayed as an old, almost idiotic man, whose conception of space Gauss 
contradicts: to the Euclidean abstract space of points and parallels he denies 
any reality. To him space is ‘folded, bent, and extremely strange’ (Kehlmann, 
2007: 80). Yet, for all his insight into the complexity of nature, he is frustrated 
in his attempt at communication and sharing. He becomes a land surveyor 
because he has no better chances left. 
Gauss and Humboldt do not have a real sense of belonging to Germany: 
Gauss admires Napoleon, while Humboldt considers Paris, not Berlin, his home. 
Germany is yet in the making, far from being a nation, far from being a reality. 
It exists only in the hopes of the subversive students who meet in underground 
cellars in Berlin. The magical elements that crop up in the text have to do with a 
mythical dimension, both of Germany and Amazonia: whether the German 
Urwald or in the Amazonian rain forest, they are places where primeval darkness 
rules. 
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6.3 Deeper and Deeper I Dive... 
In the following, I engage with the reading of these texts as a process, 
which springs from my changing disposition as a specific reader over time and 
those characteristics fore-grounded in the novels. What I do here is called 
‘autoethnography’ in anthropology, but, rather than reflecting on some personal 
experience ‘out there’ in the social arena, I reflect on the very personal, and yet 
social experience of reading, aiming at overcoming the opposition between 
‘personal’ and ‘social’. Ultimately, reading, even when taking place privately, is 
always social or communal. I find some of Denzin’s sociological definitions of 
autoethnography useful for clarification and provide them below (section 6.4), 
but I am inclined to recast autoethnography through the anthropological lens 
provided by Barbara Tedlock in the quote I cited on pages 44-5, wherein process 
and encounter are the most important aspects to take into consideration in the 
autoethnographic narrative. 
The other divide I intend to debunk is that between theory and praxis: 
reading is both at the same time. I attempt to show anthropology of literature in 
the making — both as theoretical discourse and an ethnographic practice — by 
focusing on reading as an interactive process or encounter. In the preceding 
chapters I argued that something different from catharsis and mere 
entertainment happens when someone reads a subversive hybrid fiction: here I 
engage in what I call ritualised reading. 
 
6.4 Reading and the ‘Sting of Memory’ 
In Interpretive Ethnography (1997), Norman K. Denzin describes different 
‘ethnographic practices for the twenty-first century’, emphasising that 
Ethnography has crossed the liminal space that separates the scholarly 
text from its performance. The text is now given back to those to 
whom it has always belonged —the reader, the other, who finds in 
these texts parts of themselves and parts of others just like them. We 
are all co-performers in our own and others’ lives. (123) 
It is my intention to blend two of these ethnographic practices in the present 
chapter, the ‘mystory’ and ‘ethnographic poetics’, through which I explore my 
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experience of reading the three novels concerned here. I thus engage in 
autoethnography:  
Autoethnography: Traditionally, ‘the cultural study of one’s own 
people’ (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 106; see also Hayano, 1979, 1982), but 
more recently a turning of the ethnographic gaze inward on the self 
(auto), while maintaining the outward gaze of ethnography, looking at 
the larger context wherein self-experiences occur (see Ellis, 1996). 
(Denzin: 1997, 227, n. 3) 
 
While the ‘mystory’ is usually written to be performed or read by 
anthropologists or sociologists in the presence of an audience, I use it here 
together with ethnographic poetics and personal narrative in order to recover 
some of its performative character and show its potential for exploring the 
reading ‘encounter’. Here are the characteristics of the ‘mystory’: 
The mystory is simultaneously a personal mythology, a public story 
and a performance that critiques. […] Of course, the mystory text is 
not easily constructed. It involves the hard interpretive work of 
editing personal, biographical reality (Jackson, 1993, p. 26; Mc Call & 
Becker, 1990, p. 118). Editing biographical reality produces a 
dramatic reinterpretation of what has been felt and lived by the 
person—moments of crisis and pain. What will be edited is determined 
by what has been remembered, collected, and written down: notes to 
the self, the ‘Rashomon’ effect turned inside out. From the several 
layers and versions of the biographical field text, the writer aims to 
tell a story with some degree of dramatic power. Editing, or crafting 
the text, will involve many decisions […] (Denzin: 1997, 116-17) 
The mystory text begins with those moments that define the crisis in 
question—a turning point in the person’s life. Ulmer (1989, pp. xii, 
139) suggests the following starting point: 
Write a mystory bringing into relation your experience with three 
levels of discourse—personal (autobiography), popular (community 
stories, oral history or popular culture), [and] expert (disciplines of 
knowledge). In each case use the punctum or sting of memory to 
locate items significant to you. (p. 209) (As quoted in Denzin: 1997, 
117) 
Ethnographic poetics instead is particularly suited to offer a representation of 
epiphanic moments in lived experience. As Richardson states: 
If a goal of ethnography is to retell ‘lived experience’, to make 
another world accessible to the reader, then, I submit, the lyric 
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poem, and particularly a sequence of lyric poems with an implied 
narrative, come closer to achieving that goal than do other forms of 
ethnographic writing. (As quoted in Denzin: 1997, 209) 
Now, this enterprise is doubly difficult in the case of anthropology of 
literature because what I am attempting is a rendering of my experience as a 
reader of literature to a scholarly and academic audience, who in turn will 
interpret what I write as autoethnography of reading.  Thus the situational 
frame of the experience of reading and interpreting literature within an 
academic context makes me aware of the fact that academic discourse is also a 
ritualising and ritualised frame of interpretation. Ronald L. Grimes in his 
Reading, Writing, and Ritualizing (1993), writes of the various occasions when 
‘[a] story becomes ‘templated,’ and thus ritualized […]’ (141). He identifies 
fourteen cases when readers use the story as a template:153 
(a) Imagining the author to be an oracle or diviner whom they 
consult; 
(b) Meditating on a book’s revelation, awaiting its healing, or 
expecting to be inspired; 
(c) Envisioning one story as uniting with other stories until a kind of 
monomyth, scripture, or encyclopedic cluster forms among the 
totality of readings, and then considering this the single most 
comprehensive story (the story of stories); 
(d) searching for archetypes, that is modulated, recurring images; 
(e) identifying generative metaphors and  imagining the whole as 
having been born of these elemental metaphoric predications; 
(f) identifying with the characters and aspiring to act like them; 
(g) amplifying the story by dreaming about it or imagining it in other 
ways; 
(h) re-reading it; treating it as classical, canonical or required reading 
; using it as an ethical norm or literary paradigm; [my emphasis: what 
happens in an academic context] 
(i) defending it; endeavoring to control what kinds of critical 
attention are paid to it; 
(j) associating with others who regard it as the reader does; 
(k) treating the book itself with extra care, for example, by keeping it 
in a special place or having it bound in expensive materials; 
(l) avoiding actions that do not accord with values or episodes of the 
story; 
(m) allowing the story to judge, convict, or weigh readers in the 
balance; treating a narrative as a trial or test; 
(n) re-enacting the story of taking it as a charter for action. (141) 
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Despite literary critics’ appalled reactions ‘at such anticipated entanglement 
with texts’ (141), Grimes agrees with ‘Wayne Booth, who argues that stories are 
no better or worse than other reasons for acting’ (141). 
I agree, and also add that sometimes stories provide that extra insight in a 
situation of the heart and a creative solution for action too. I myself have been 
practicising a few of the above actions (d, e, g, h, n) in my readings of these 
hybrid novels, which actually call for this different type of treatment and 
engagement on the part of the reader. 
 
6.5 Autoethnography of Reading 
Autoethnography of reading means self-observation, paying attention to 
my various (intellectual, emotional, bodily) responses, while reading or re-
reading a particular text. On a related plane, it is about employing memory as a 
starting point:  memory of personal life events or circumstances which tie in 
with the reading. Thus: reading fictional texts plus memory plus responses plus 
literary and anthropological discourses of knowledge equals autoethnography of 
reading, which is an anthropological practice in itself. Here are the most 
important excerpts from my journal of dialogic readings: as I read the novels I 
wrote down my own responses and did not prevent them from taking their own 
unexpected directions. According to Denzin (1997) autoethonography is a ‘messy 
text’, that is, one which is involved in the phenomenon it tries to convey, 
without ‘purifying’ it. For me, autoethnography is much more than a messy text: 
as I have already stated, it is a process and an encounter. The text as an end 
result has value in so far as it bears witness to the encounter between the 
reader’s self-perceived fiction(s) of identity and the text. 
 In a work about anthropology of literature, it is necessary to situate 
myself as a ‘reader’, and practise autoethnography, beyond the abstraction that 
too often characterises academic discourse and makes existential experience 
irrelevant to our literary encounters. Because of the fact that I defend a 
phenomenological approach which shows the storied nature of all our 
interpretations and assumptions, I have constructed a narrative out of some 
facts of family history. This is inevitable; it is part and parcel of human meaning-
making. If the intention is to relate personal experience and literary reading 
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experience and show to what extent they are interconnected both intellectually 
and emotionally, it is vital to produce some autobiography. 
 
6.6 Here Comes ‘The Reader’… 
I am ‘the reader’ whose consciousness filters and conveys the main 
characteristics of the three texts chosen. My experience of these novels is 
inextricable from the awareness of the fiction of my own identity, as an 
individual and a social being. For as long as I can remember, I have always loved 
reading. My first memory of reading goes back to when I was around two years 
old and my father showed me his favourite comics. Although I learned to read 
when I was five, I could read images much earlier: I was lying on the floor of my 
bedroom, a shaft of light coming through the light yellow curtains on my 
forehead. I was engrossed in a date between Donald Duck and his fiancée, the 
smell of baking from the kitchen floating around my nostrils. I first learnt to 
read words together with my mother and a family friend. Ever since, reading has 
been the most enjoyable activity I engage in. As I grew up I became aware of 
how all the novels and stories I read have shaped me as a person. I could link 
important and specific moments of my life, with their attendant realizations, to 
different stories and novels. My parents, who had done well for themselves in 
society and had ascended into middle-class status, attached a huge importance 
to education, not only as a means of social advancement, but also as a 
cultivation of the whole person. Our family never lost track of its peasant origins 
and its partiality for the natural world. My father, in particular, nurtured this 
love in me, while my mother was somewhat more diffident and reliant on social 
propriety. My grandparents had been sharecroppers in a tiny village of central 
Italy, not far from Rome, the capital city, and yet so much distant from it in 
terms of material conditions and mentality. In the sixties many villagers started 
to move to Rome, following the economic boom and progress. My mother’s 
father, however, opted for a mixed option: while staying in the countryside, he 
took on a job as truck driver for a renowned soft drink factory, whose 
‘aranciata’ can even be found in Scottish cafes nowadays. He would commute to 
Rome every morning, waking up at four, and come back in the evening. He thus 
managed to buy his own land and never wanted to leave his village for the city. 
My father’s father instead had been a seasonal immigrant to Germany, a 
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sharecropper and ambulant vendor of groceries. Both my grandmothers helped 
out in the fields, while also caring for four children each. My parents were the 
first in the family to have the chance to go to school and to take a ‘diploma di 
maturità’: after leaving a boarding school run by Catholic monks, my father 
went on to be an Air Force official, while my mother was to qualify as a primary 
teacher. I was born in Rome, but lived further North for many years. As a 
consequence of my father’s job, we moved across the country, from North to 
Central Italy. My feeling of being rootless gradually changed into a discovery of 
my family origins and its connection to the wider Italian socio-cultural and 
economic context. In this sense, the reading of Paul Ginsborg’s A History of 
Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics: 1943‒1980 (1990) was formative for my 
self-awareness and placing of myself into a sort of ‘lost’ or silenced tradition, 
whose ‘origins’ however struck me as constitutionally irretrievable.154 
The conquest of reading was soon followed by that of writing, and ever 
since the two have being keeping company with one another. I have been a 
reader-writer almost all my life, both in an academic and a more personal sense. 
To me the opposition between the two has never been a real one, but always a 
matter of degree: a reading inspires a poem or a story of my own, and a poem or 
story I have written feeds into my next readings, as in a state of flow, through 
attitudes, emotions, memories and thoughts, which, however, are never entirely 
my own only.  
 
6.7 Fragments of Spiralling Readings 
6.7.1 Subjective Associations in the Reading of Measuring the 
World 
Measuring the World. First chapter: ‘Die Reise’ (‘The Journey’): archetypal title. 
Gauss is introduced as a grumpy old man, only caring for his ‘ancient mother’’s 
judgment (2007: 4). The tone is comic; memories of my train journey to Berlin in 
2001, as I now read about Gauss’ journey to Prussia in a coach. The journey is a 
literal journey, which contrasts with the archetypal undertone of the title. I 
associate the journey with Campbell’s quest, where the hero/Gauss is reluctant 
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and only pulls himself together when his ancient mother encourages him. Old 
age is the theme, then, ‘the pitiful arbitrariness of existence’ (4), the 
limitations of being born in a certain historical time.  Irony plays a fundamental 
role here:  
Jeder Dummkopf in zweihundert Jahren sich über ihn lustig machen 
und absurden Unsinn über seine Person erfinden könne. (9) 
In another two hundred years each and every idiot would be able to 
make fun of him and invent the most complete nonsense about his 
character. (5) 
This is an ironical míse-en-abyme of the author’s programme of drawing on the 
imaginary, unspoken dimension of history, fantasizing and giving narrative flesh 
to historical records. Other theme: the humiliation coming from bodily 
limitations. Scene where the gendarme asks for Gauss’ passport in the inn: I can 
visualize the gendarme in his uniform. This scene provides me with a full 
measure of Prussian atmosphere in September 1828 and its repressive 
environment. The interplay between the given historical situation and what 
some characters have foreknowledge of facilitates the unfolding of irony. As a 
reader, I find this irony effective because of the benefit of hindsight. I can also 
visualize the man with a beard defying the gendarme, as a typical 
romantic/subversive character. This scene evokes in me a sense of the 
underground rebellion running below the surface of Prussian society at that 
time.  
‘Zufall, den Feind allen Wissens’ (13): ‘Chance’ as ‘the enemy of all 
knowledge’ (8): obsession with measuring and finding out the exact shape and 
dimension, the precise causes of everything. Although this is about Gauss as a 
character, it is about the enterprise of science and progress in general, as Gauss 
is an eminent scientist. However, he allows for exceptions to the laws  of 
physics, such as ‘Gespenster oder die Uebertragung der Gedanken’ (13): ‘ghosts 
or thought transference’ (9). His son Eugen has foreknowledge of more down to 
earth phenomena: Berlin will be a metropolis in a few years. I sense a fantastic 
undercurrent, little cues scattered here and there: when Alexander von 
Humboldt is introduced, he looks like a fairy-tale character, ‘ein kleiner alter 
Herr mit schlohweissen Haaren’ (14): ‘a little old gentleman with snow-white 
hair’ (9). 
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The theme of time: the daguerreotype which is meant to ‘der fliehenden 
Zeit entreissen’ (15): ‘snatch [the moment] out of the onrush of time’ (10), but 
fails to do so; it only shows ‘ein Gewirr gespenstischer Umrisse […] die 
verschwommene Zeichnung von etwas, das aussah wie eine Landschaft unter 
Wasser’ (17): ‘a maze of ghostly outlines,’ ‘the blurred sketch of something like 
an underwater landscape’ (12). I have a funny feeling of the frailties of human 
undertakings as the text goes on to display the different technical advancements 
of the time. The image of the underwater ‘landscape’ sticks in my mind as 
conspicuous, and it links up to Ariel’s song in The Tempest: 
Full fathom five thy father lies; 
Of his bones are coral made; 
Those are pearls that were his eyes: 
Nothing of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 
(1.2. 396-401) 
I have the impression that through the fantastic biography of Gauss and 
Humboldt runs a sort of subterranean oceanic force, which neither the one nor 
the other is in charge of. They merely scratch the surface. This first chapter I 
have been reading strikes me as profound in its characterization of human vanity 
and its futility. As a reader, the experience feels like looking at these characters 
and events from an alternative point of view, as if on the other side of a mirror. 
Second chapter: ‘Das Meer’, (‘The Sea’): another archetypal title. It is very 
imagistic and evokes a deep rough sea in my imagination. The sea, both as a 
geographical feature and a symbol of the unconscious runs throughout the 
chapter, although in the first half there is no sea, but a frozen pond where 
Humboldt, as a child,  is almost drowning. His underwater experience is the 
turning point where he decides to be a biologist, in order to investigate the 
mysteries and riddles of life  and measure everything which provokes fear in 
oneself:  
Auf einmal war es still. Er sah nichts mehr, und die Kälte nahm ihm 
fast die Sinne. Erst da begriff er, dass er unter Wasser war. Er 
strampelte. Sein Kopf prallte gegen etwas Hartes, das Eis. Seine 
Fellmütze löste sich und schwebte davon, seine Haare richteten sich 
auf, seine Füsse schlugen auf den Boden. Jetzt hatten sich seine 
Augen an die Dunkelheit gewöhnt. Einen Moment lang sah er eine 
erstarrte Landschaft: zitternde Halme, darüber Gewächse, 
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durchsichtig wie Schleier, einen einzelnen Fisch, eben noch da, jetzt 
schon weg, wie eine Täuschung. Er machte Schwimmbewegungen, 
stieg auf, prallte wieder gegen das Eis. Ihm wurde klar, dass er nur 
noch Sekunden zu leben hatte. Er tastete, und gerade als er keine 
Luft mehr hatte, sah er einen dunklen Fleck über sich di Oeffnung; er 
riss sich nach oben, atmete ein und aus und spuckte, das 
scharfkantige Eis zerschnitt ihm die Hände, er hievte sich empor, 
rollte sich ab, zog die Beine nach und robbte auf das Ufer zu. […] Er 
streckte die Hand aus und half ihm auf die Füsse.  
 In der Nacht kam das Fieber. […]  
Ein Mann ging mit grossen Schritten im Zimmer auf und ab, 
wahrscheinlich der Arzt, und sagte, entscheide dich, gelingen oder 
nicht, das ist ein Entschluss, man muss dann nur durchhalten, oder? 
Aber als er darauf antworten wollte, erinnerte er sich nicht mehr, was 
gesagt worden war, statt dessen sah er ein weit ausgespanntes Meer 
unter einem elektrisch flackernden Himmel, und als er wieder die 
Augen öffnete, war es Mittag am übernächsten Tag, die Wintersonne 
hing bleich im Fenster, und sein Fieber hatte nachgelassen. 
 Von nun an wurden seine Noten besser. Er arbeitete konzentriert und 
nahm die Gewohneit an, beim Nachdenken die Fäuste zu ballen, als 
müsse er einen Feind besiegen. […]  
Er wisse nun, sagte er zu Kunth, womit er sich befassen wolle. Mit 
dem Leben. (24-6) 
Suddenly everything was silent. He couldn’t see anything any more 
and the cold knocked him almost unconscious. Only now did he realize 
he was underwater. He kicked out. His head banged against something 
hard, the ice. His sheepskin hat came off and floated away, his hair 
was loose and his feet hit bottom. Now his eyes were accustoming 
themselves to the darkness. For a moment he saw a frozen landscape: 
trembling stalks, things growing above them, transparent as a veil, a 
lone fish, there for a moment then gone, like a hallucination. He 
made swimming motions, rose in the water, banged into the ice again. 
He realized he only had a few more seconds to live. He groped, and at 
the moment when he ran out of air, he saw a dark patch above him, 
the opening; he dragged himself up, gasped in air, breathed out again 
and spat, the sharp angles of the ice cut into his hands, he heaved 
himself out, rolled away, pulling his legs up after him, and lay there, 
panting and sobbing. […] 
That night the fever started. […]  
A man who must be the doctor was pacing up and down the room, and 
said it’s up to you, you’ll either make it or you won’t, it’s your 
decision, all you have to do is hold on, you know. But when he tried to 
answer, he could no longer remember what had been said; instead he 
was looking at the wide expanse of a sea under skies flickering with 
electricity, and when he opened his eyes again it was noon now days 
later, the winter sun was hanging all pale in the window and his fever 
had broken. 
        From now on his marks improved. He concentrated when he 
worked and began a habit of balling his fists while thinking, as if it 
there were an enemy to conquer. […] 
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      He knew now, he said to Kunth, what he wanted to concern 
himself with: Life. […] He wanted to investigate Life, to understand 
its strange grip on the world. He wanted to uncover its tricks! (18-
20)155  
Later in the chapter the sea is there as a geographical element to be mapped 
and measured in an accurate way. My impression of an undercurrent, of an 
unstated force is reinforced.  
The castle where Humboldt grew up was haunted, but the stories about the 
spirits were spookier than the spirits themselves:  
Niemand konnte leugnen, dass es im Schloss spukte. Nichts 
Spektakuläres, bloss Schritte in leeren Gängen, Kinderweinen ohne 
Ursprung und manchmal ain schemenhafter Herr, der mit 
Schnarrenden Stimme darum bat, ihm Schuhbänder, kleine 
Spielzeugmagneten oder ein Glas Limonade abzukaufen. Unheimlicher 
als die Geister aber waren die Geschichten über sie: Kunth gab den 
beiden Jungen Bücher zu lessen, in denen es um Mönche ging, um 
offene Gräber, Hände, die aus der Tiefe ragten, in der Unterwelt 
gebrauten Elixiere und Séancen, bei denen Toten zu schreckensstarren 
Zuhörern sprachen. Solches kam gerade im Mode und war noch so neu, 
dass keine Gewohnheit gegen das Grauen half. Das sei nötig, erklärte 
Kunth, die Begegnung mit dem Dunkel sei Teil des Heranwachsens, 
wer metaphysische Angst nicht kenne, werde nie ein deutscher Mann. 
Einmal stiessen sie auf eine Geschichte über Aguirre den 
Wahnsinnigen, der seinem König abgeschworen und sich selbst zum 
Kaiser ernannt hatte. In einer Alptraumfahrt ohnegleichen waren er 
und seiner Männer den Orinoko entlanggefahren, an dessen Ufern das 
Unterholz so dicht war, dass mann nicht an Land gehen konnte. Vögel 
schrien in den Sprachen ausgestorbener Völker, und wenn mann 
aufblickte, spiegelte der Himmel Städte, deren Architektur 
offenbarte, dass ihre Erbauer keine Menschen waren. Noch immer 
waren kaum Forscher in diese Gegend vorgedrungen, und eine 
verlässliche Karte gab es nicht. 
Aber er werde es tun, sagte der jüngere Bruder. Er werde dorthin 
reisen. (21-2) 
Nobody could deny that the castle was haunted. Nothing spectacular, 
just footsteps in empty corridors, sounds of children crying out of 
nowhere, and sometimes a shadowy man who asked in a rasping voice 
to buy shoelaces, little toy magnets, or a glass of lemonade. But the 
stories about the spirits were even eerier than the spirits themselves. 
Kunth gave the two boys books to read full of monks and open graves 
and hands reaching up out of the depths and potions brewed in the 
underworld and séances where the dead talked to terrified listeners. 
This kind of thing was just becoming fashionable and was still so novel 
that there was no familiarity that could inure people to the feelings of 
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horror. And horror was necessary, according to Kunth, encountering 
the dark side of things was part of growing up; anyone innocent of 
metaphysical anxiety would never achieve German manhood. Once 
they stumbled on a story about Aguirre the Mad, who had renounced 
his king and declared himself emperor. He and his men traveled the 
length of the Orinoco in a journey that was the stuff of nightmares, 
past riverbanks so thick with undergrowth that it was impossible to 
land. Birds screamed in the language of extinct tribes, and when one 
looked up, the sky reflected cities whose architecture never came 
from human hands. Hardly any scholars had ever penetrated this 
region, and there was no reliable map.     
 But he would, said the younger brother. He would make the journey. 
(15-6)  
I love the dark irony of this passage, the reference to ‘metaphysische Angst’: 
‘metaphysical anxiety’ necessary to ‘achieve German manhood’ and the 
Schauerroman that was becoming fashionable in Germany. Behind this dark veil 
of irony though, there is seriousness about the contact with the unacknowledged 
shadows of existence. The power of story is evident from this passage. Indeed 
the story of Crazy Aguirre is to shape  Humboldt’s intention to measure the 
length of the Orinoco river and to draw a reliable map. ‘Wann immer einen die 
Dinge erschreckten, sei es eine gute Idee, sie zu messen’ (22): ‘Whenever things 
were frightening, it was a good idea to measure them.’ (16) 
I ‘see’ the last scene of Werner Herzog’s film about Aguirre,156 interpreted 
by Klaus Kinski, adrift on a raft in the river, in the deep Amazonian forest. 
Where am I? Sometimes I laugh, or smile while reading about Alexander 
von Humboldt’s education, determined by his family ‘majordomo’ Kunth, 
according to a fanciful interpretation of Goethe’s elaborate advice. Then, I am 
on the edge of an abyss: on the last cliff available, I sense my body muscles 
contract, as I feel the deep, although understated, questioning of high culture 
and the power of civilization. Because of this understatement, this questioning is 
all the more powerful in the narrative. What I have been reading is a trickster’s 
attempt at turning our known historical world upside down. The thought that in 
spite of reason, mystery is still at the core of our choice and will is spine-
tingling, both scary and delightful at once.  
Humboldt in his hallucinations sees ‘ein weit ausgespanntes Meer unter 
einem elektrisch flackernden Himmel’ (25): ‘the wide expanse of a sea under 
skies flickering with electricity’ (19). When he recovers, he has changed and 
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become focused on what he wants to do in life: ‘das Leben erforschen, die 
seltsame Hartnäckigkeit verstehen, mit der es den Globus umspanne. Er wollte 
ihm auf die Schliche kommen!’ (26): ‘To investigate life, to understand its 
strange grip on the world. He wanted to uncover its tricks!’ (20) As if life were a 
conjuror?! The grip of the exotic and the fantastic continues to play a huge role 
in this chapter: see the explorer Georg Forster’s tales of ‘Drachen und lebenden 
Toten’: ‘dragons and the living dead’, and of Captain Cook, who ‘auf Hawaii 
gekocht und gegessen worden sei’ (28): was ‘boiled and eaten on Hawaii’ (21). 
While reading about the wrong theory of the Neptunists, who believed 
that ‘das Erdinnere sei kalt und fest’ (29): ‘the core of the earth was cold, solid 
rock’ (22), I get a sense of the intricacies and mixtures of error and truth that 
make up the search for knowledge and understanding. I am between the past 
described in the text and the present/future, but I am not in time just now. I am 
just poised in-between alternative worldviews and possibilities. I am aware of 
how new scientific models replace older ones, striving always to be more 
‘objective’ or ‘encompassing’, but without ever managing to get past the 
conceptual imagery provided by what is already known. Only an imaginative leap 
can do the job.  
I have to move on the chair, to adjust my position, and my head is taken 
by a sense of lightness, a slight vertigo. I cannot capture all my fleeting 
sensations, I am ‘there’, in ‘the zone’; shivers all over my arms and legs. 
Humboldt’s way of dealing with what he fears, with what is scary, is to 
dissect and measure it, even inflicting pain on his own body and other creatures 
for accuracy’s sake. He writes a letter to his brother which he then throws away: 
‘Unsere Brüderlichkeit, […] wieso erscheint sie mir als das eigentliche Rätsel?’ 
(33): ‘Why, I wonder […] does the fact that we are brothers strike me as the real 
riddle? (26) 
This letter which he tears ‘in winzige Fetzen’ (34): ‘into little pieces’ 
(26), is probably the narrator’s judgment on Humboldt’s achievements. It is 
ingenious that it should be imagined as Humboldt’s own hidden afterthought 
about his own life and achievement. It is a statement about the sweeping flow of 
time, progress, change and chance, the whimsical passing and changing of 
circumstances and priorities.  
When at sea and confronted with ‘a sea monster’, Humboldt says: 
‘Vielleicht die Dünste, […] oder das schlechte Essen. Er beschloss, nichts darüber 
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aufzuschreiben’ (45): ‘Sea mists, perhaps […] or bad food. He decided not to 
write anything down’ (36). 
The other way he deals with pain and what he feels is to ignore it. Only in 
his encounter with the dragon tree in the garden of Orotava, is Humboldt moved 
to tears before its majesty: ‘so wehrte dieser Baum die Zeit ab: eine Klippe, an 
der ihr Fluss sich brach’ (47): ‘this tree warded off time: a crag against which its 
river broke’ (38). 
I am reminded of a big oak tree I used to love as a child. I would go and 
play in its shade. The oak was on the top of a hill above the sea. In that spot in 
my memory, time will never flow away. I am smiling softly now, empathizing 
with Humboldt’s feeling and being at once under the oak branches as I am now, 
not as a child. This imaginative spot brings the different times of my life 
together and transcends them in the experience of kairos. My toes are tingling 
as I run from the oak tree downhill, breathless, against the wind. Humboldt is 
afraid somebody may have seen him while he embraced the trunk of the dragon 
tree. I am not. As I hear the narrator’s voice in my inner ear, I step in and, 
smiling, tell Humboldt that it is ok to hug the dragon tree. Here my memories 
and the narrative clearly blend to form a ‘replotting’ (Gerrig’s term) of the 
episode. 
At the end of the chapter, Humboldt writes down what he sees around 
him and sends its description to his brother, adding: ‘Ich weiss nicht, wann dies 
eintreffen wird, doch sieh zu, dass Du es in die Zeitung bekommst. Die Welt soll 
von mir erfahren. Ich müsste mich sehr irren, wenn ich ihr gleichgültig bin’ (51): 
‘I don’t know when this will arrive, but see to it that you get it into the 
newspaper. The world needs to learn of me. I doubt very much that I am of no 
interest to it’(41). The contrast between the narrator’s voice and Humboldt’s 
own attempts at conquering fame, and vanquishing existential angst through it 
engenders a powerful irony; it also has an effect of the humour lavished on 
Romantic culture. 
Chapter on ‘Die Höhle’: ‘The Cavern’, where Humboldt and Bonpland 
descend into the cave of the dead: 
Es ging steil bergab. Um sie knatterten Flügelschläge, doch nie 
streifte sie eines der Tiere. Sie tasteten sich an der Wand entlang zu 
einem Felsdom. Die Fackeln, zu schwach, um das Gewölbe 
auszuleuchten, warfen ihre Schatten übergross an die Wände. 
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Humboldt sah auf das Thermometer: Es werde immer wärmer, er 
bezweifle, dass Professor Werner daran Freude hätte! Dann sah er die 
Gestalt seiner Mutter neben sich. Er blinzelte, doch sie blieb länger 
sichtbar, als es sich für eine Sinnestäuschung, gehörte. Den Umhang 
unter dem Hals festgeknotet, den Kopf schief gelegt, geistesabwesend 
lächelnd, Kinn und Nase so dünn wie an ihrem letzen Tag, in den 
Händen einen verborgenen Regenschirm. Er schloss die Augen und 
zählte langsam bis zehn. 
 Wie bitte, fragte Bonpland. 
 Nichts, sagte Humboldt und hämmerte konzentriert einen Splitter 
aus dem Stein. 
Dort hinten gehe es weiter, sagte Bonpland. 
Es sei genug, sagte Humboldt. 
Bonpland gab zu bedenken, dass er tiefer im Berg wohl noch 
unbekannte Pflanzen gebe. 
Besser zurück, sagte Humboldt. Genug sei genug. 
Sie folgten einem Bach in Richtung Tageslicht. Allmählich wurden die 
Vögel weniger, das Geschrei leiser, bald konnten sie die Fackeln 
löschen. (2005: 73-4) 
The ground sloped sharply downhill. They were surrounded by the 
clattering of wings, yet no creature ever brushed against them. They 
groped their way along a wall to a rock cathedral. The torches, too 
feeble to illuminate the vault, threw exaggerated shadows on the 
walls. Humboldt looked a the thermometer: it was getting steadily 
warmer, he doubted Professor Werner would be pleased! The next 
thing he saw was the figure of his mother, standing next to him. He 
blinked, but she remained visible for longer than was appropriate for 
an illusion. Her shawl tied tight against her throat, head to one side, 
smiling absentmindedly, chin and nose as thin as they had been on the 
last day of her life, a bent umbrella in her hands. He closed his eyes 
and counted slowly to ten.  
 What did you say, asked Bonpland. 
 Nothing, said Humboldt, and concentrated on hammering a splinter 
out of the stone. 
 Further back there, the passage continued, said Bonpland. 
 They’d done enough, said Humboldt. 
 Bonpland offered up that there must surely be more unknown plants 
deeper inside the mountain. 
 Better to turn back, said Humboldt. Enough was enough. 
 They followed a stream in the direction of the sunlight. 
Gradually the number of birds diminished, their screaming quieted, 
and soon they could extinguish the torches. (2007: 60-1) 
Matter of fact tone: i.e. magical realism. Humboldt’s dead mother is not ‘an 
illusion’, but a presence Humboldt denies. Then, as always when confronted 
with the inexplicable, he turns back: enough is enough. 
This episode and the following one about the naked woman waiting for 
Humboldt in his monastery cell arouse in me some sadness and amusement at 
the same time. Behind this amusing account of one man’s limits and 
  159 
peculiarities, what is happening from my point of view? As a reader, I am 
entertained, and yet, as I ‘see’ the various episodes in my mind, I feel pity, 
disbelief and even ask myself what it is that works so well in this piece of 
fiction. Why do I feel so drawn to it? David Miall (2007) in his empirical study of 
literature states that the character’s and the reader’s interests overlap. He 
distinguishes between ‘evaluative feelings’, ‘narrative feelings’ and ‘aesthetic 
feelings’: enjoyment is an example of the first type, suspense of the second 
type, and fascination is an example of the third kind (2007: 44). Focusing on the 
neglect of the ‘processes of feeling’ (2007: 39) in the readers, he suggests: 
[…] feeling facilitates border-crossing, that is feelings enable us to 
relate concepts in unrelated fields. Second, feeling prompts us to take 
a certain stance towards events, preparing us to interpret incoming 
evidence in a specific way; anticipation of this kind seems to be one 
of the fundamental properties of feeling. Third, a more common 
claim, feeling is generally self-implicating; it occurs when some issue 
of our self-concept is in question. (2007: 45) 
Finally, feeling is self-referential. The most obvious self referential 
effect is the frequent experience of readers that they empathize with 
the experience and motives of the main character or characters in a 
narrative; that is, the reader comes to share a character’s feelings 
and goals. But feeling has a wider scope in narratives than this: any 
feeling response involves self-concept issues. […] Thus, feeling during 
reading not only causes schemata [habitual expectations, perceptual 
gestals, and responses] to be reconfigured, but also constitutes the 
route of access to motives for reading derived from the reader’s self 
concept. (2007: 54-5) 
Although I feel empathy, I cannot identify with Humboldt. The irony in the 
reported episode is foregrounded, and it is a fundamental characteristic of the 
text. It is about distancing my self from the protagonist, while fuelling my 
interest for the subtext of the cavern episode. It seems significant to me that 
the episodes of the cavern of the dead and Humboldt’s unsuccessful sexual 
encounter should be set side by side. The chapter clearly foregrounds the former 
episode, while all others are like minor constellations hovering around it. 
However, this episode tickles my taste for the exotic and the mysterious, while 
defusing the tension of adventure, horror, or mystery narratives through its 
humour. In fact I feel no tension or sense of suspense whatsoever, just a sense of 
hopping around the world with a man who knows a lot about everything 
measurable and very little about himself. I have been smiling repeatedly: a smile 
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which fosters distance and reflection, and a strange sense of being in for an 
adventure, while being safe. Humboldt’s merits as a geographer and explorer 
seem to me trivial when compared to the unexplored continent of the self.  
Maybe this is one of the points of the chapter and of the whole novel. The fact is 
that Humboldt is both one of the protagonists and a ‘flat character’ in the sense 
described by E. M. Forster in his Aspects of the Novel (1927).157 This combination 
is remarkable: usually the protagonist evolves in some ways, but Humboldt is 
practically insulated from deep exploration both outside and inside himself. 
As I turn the pages and pause to write down these notes, I am aware of 
cinematic scenes from films such as The Mission, set in the Amazonian forest, 
where Jeremy Irons and Robert De Niro play the two missionary priests who, 
facing the destruction brought about by the colonial government, choose 
different paths to help the natives. Jeremy Irons stays true to his religious 
vocation and ends up killed while celebrating Mass for the people, whereas 
Robert De Niro takes up arms to help the natives defend their land.158 
This cinematic window gives me pleasure, deepens my appreciation of the 
novel, while the novel itself links up in my consciousness to centuries of history 
in pursuit of knowledge and technological progress. Humboldt himself is an 
emblem of this drive, which denies the actuality of death only to support an 
unnatural vivisection of all phenomena and objects. The mechanical drive, the 
impulse to possess and manipulate something in knowledge is the real death 
drive. Also, I am reminded of Plato’s fable of the men in the cave, mistaking 
their own shadows for the real, the ‘truth’. 
The pages are slightly rough, as I turn them. Contraction, and then, 
expansion of my heart: I am still, I am moved. There is no drama, no pathos. 
This is something that appeals to me: the sense of truthfulness leaking through a 
rather ‘crazy’ narrative: another memory, this time of a sad girl’s face in 
Glastonbury. She was Spanish, making coffee in a stall facing the ruins of the 
Abbey. She said she was happy there but she did not look so to me. It is the 
same feeling I get, when I stop smiling, while reading this episode and the 
chapter as a whole. I find that I wander from emotion to emotion while reading 
the various episodes, to end up feeling this quiet sense of sadness, physically 
felt between my chest and my solar plexus. I can see why some critics have said 
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Kehlmann’s writing has something in common with Brecht, in spite of the 
difference of their tones.  
I am propelled into the narrative, while the narrative itself shapes itself 
through me, in me. As it builds itself into several images, scenes, episodes, 
several layers of memories, hopes, sensations and ideas mingle and colour the 
story itself. When I first read the book in German a few years ago, and came to 
this chapter, I was perplexed. This time is mostly pleasure tinged with pale 
sadness.  And yet, there also is a sense of anticipation, something about things 
to come, which are, however, vague and ungraspable. I am projected in a no-
place, yet simultaneously ‘diffused’, my sense of self blurred in a sense of 
possibility and potential, of alternatives. This is freedom and expansion. Yet, 
physically I am contained in a circumscribed space and located in a specific 
point in time, but this paradoxically enhances my sense of being the author of 
my life, my choices, of what I make of myself, as I read and let the reading seep 
through ‘me’. While reading, the mind stretches the body and the body grounds 
the mind; their bridge is feeling, which expresses itself through layers upon 
layers of a multidimensional reality. It is a sensation of expansion, of 
metamorphic flow. 
‘Der Fluss’: ‘The River’: this is a pivotal chapter. Here Humboldt is 
confronted with himself, but fails to acknowledge his own identity and limits. In 
the soothsayer’s words he is ‘nobody’:  
 Mit einer schnellen Bewegung ergriff der Wahrsager Humboldts 
Hand. Der Wollte sie wegziehen, aber der Wahrsager war stärker; 
Humboldt, zum Mitspielen gezwungen, lächelte säuerlich. Der 
Wahrsager runzelte die Stirn und zog die Hand näher zu sich heran. Er 
beugte sich vor und wieder zurück. Kniff die Augen zusammen. Blies 
die Backen auf. 
Er solle es schon sagen, rief Humboldt. Er habe noch anderes zu tun. 
Wenn da Schlimmes stehe, sei es ihm auch egal, er glaube ohnehin 
kein Wort. 
Da stehe nichts Schlimmes. 
Sondern? 
Nichts. Der Wahrsager liess Humboldts Hand los. Es tue ihm leid, er 
wolle auch kein Geld. Er habe versagt. 
Das begreife er nicht, sagte Humboldt. 
Er auch nicht. Da sei nichts. Keine Vergangenheit, keine Gegenwart 
oder Zukunft. Da sei gewissermassen keiner zu sehen. Der Wahrsager 
blickte aufmerksam in Humboldts Gesicht. Niemand! (2005: 124-25) 
In one swift movement, the soothsayer grabbed Humboldt’s hand. He 
tried to pull away but the soothsayer was stronger; Humboldt, forced 
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to play along, gave a sour smile. The soothsayer frowned and pulled 
the hand closer. He bent forward, then straightened up again. 
Squeezed his eyes together. Puffed out his cheeks. 
 Just say it, cried Humboldt. He had other things to do. If something 
bad was there, it didn’t matter, he didn’t believe a word of it 
anyway.  
 Nothing bad there. 
 But? 
 Nothing. The soothsayer let go of Humboldt’s hand. He was sorry, he 
didn’t want any money, he couldn’t do it. 
 He didn’t understand, said Humboldt. 
 Him neither. It was nothing. No past, no present, no future. There 
was, so to speak, nothing and nobody to see. The soothsayer looked 
sharply into Humboldt’s face. Nobody! (2007: 104-5) 
The other striking element is the pervasiveness of storytelling, as a ‘world-
making’ activity. Humboldt’s life itself, in spite of his instinctive dislike of 
storytelling, is founded on a story, the story of Crazy Aguirre, who proclaimed 
himself emperor in the depth of the tropical jungle, adrift in the Orinoco, ‘the 
river’ of the chapter. The way Humboldt flattens Goethe’s ‘A Wanderer’s Night 
Song’ works a strange effect on me.  His prosaic translation of Goethe’s lines 
highlights the strangeness of the tropical habitat and the displacement of the 
poem itself in this unfamiliar setting, where the natural elements are so strong 
and unyielding. 
Mosquitoes everywhere, as in the Latvian forests in July 2001. Those, and 
the forests in Bavaria, are my prototype for the pristine forest which once 
covered the whole of Europe.  
Images crop up before my mind’s eye, giving me a sense of the elemental, of 
retrieving something vaster than my personal self and history, yet some 
dimension  where I can connect to the universe. I can feel the flow of the 
generations across centuries, and time is flexible and elastic while I am 
envisioning this huge river and the mystery of the Amazonian forest. Here the 
protagonist is the elemental Orinoco, against which all human weaknesses are 
measured in silent irony: Humboldt’s are particularly childish and narrow-
minded. Bonpland feels more human. And my own sense of adventure and awe 
gets stirred excitingly. I smile at Humboldt, at the four oarsmen and at the 
absurdity of the real in the uncanny dimensions of a world―that of the unwieldy 
wilderness―that cannot be reduced to human rules. Maybe that’s why we need 
so much storytelling: only the imagination can bridge the gap for a while, giving 
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shape to ever new images and alternative viewpoints. Images are highly 
metaphorical hypotheses. 
When the native soothsayer tries to read Humboldt’s hand and finds ‘no 
past, no present, no future’, it is a revealing moment. Chaos and preoccupation 
with fame, futility and striving intertwine in my appraisal of this episode: chaos 
is the everlasting enemy of those who strive after fame, meaning and some form 
of glory. Shivers; in the past, I would have agreed with Humboldt’s view. I live 
side by side with chaos now, and am more tolerant of the unknown.  
It is amazing how I smile in amusement, while reading this chapter, and at 
the same time feel the spurs of mystery, of what is vast and unfathomable and 
get excited about it. Magic is everywhere. 
 Der Wind war heiss, als käme er aus einem Ofen.  
Der Uferbewuchs wurde dichter. Unter den Bäumen lagen weisse 
Schildkröteneier, Eidechsen klammerten sich wie hölzerne 
Verzierungen an den Bootsrumpf. Immer wieder strichen Spiegelungen 
von Vögeln übers Wasser, selbst wenn der Himmel leer war. 
Ein wundersames optisches Phänomen, sagte Humboldt.  
Das habe nichts mit Optik zu tun, sagte Mario. Vögel stürben 
unablässig, in jedem Moment, eigentlich täten sie wenig anderes. Ihre 
Geister lebten in den Spiegelungen fort. Irgendwo müssten sie ja hin, 
im Himmel wolle man sie nicht. (2005: 110) 
 The wind was as hot as if it were coming out of an oven. The growth 
on the banks was getting thicker. White turtles’ eggs lay under the 
trees, lizards clung like wooden ornaments to the hull of the boat. 
Reflections of birds kept moving over the water, even when the sky 
was empty.         
  Remarkable optical phenomenon, said Humboldt.  
  Optical had nothing to do with it, said Mario. Birds were 
constantly dying at every moment, in fact they did little else. Their 
spirits lived on in their reflections. They had to go somewhere and 
they weren’t wanted in heaven. (2007: 92) 
 This image reminds me of another I read about in an Italian contemporary novel 
by Licia Giaquinto, about the lost worldview of peasants and country folk.159 I am 
poised between two worlds: culture, the memories of my German summers and 
my readings of Goethe’s Prometheus and Faust, and most of all the beloved 
Hőlderlin, Nietzsche and Rilke ― and the sense of my belonging to the earth, to 
stirrings and emotions which can only partly be evoked and expressed through 
words. And then, I am like a tree, whose long branches stretch towards the sky, 
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on the threshold between memory and aspiration, roots and wings. This is the 
very tension I bear as part of my history, which in turn is contained in a wider 
circle of awareness. At this moment, I am sharply aware of my journey so far, 
from life in provincial towns, to the gaining of a wider horizon. Even before the 
cities I moved to ― Rome, Edinburgh, Munich, Glasgow ― it was an inner 
cityscape that I built brick after brick not far from the sea, and the woods, of 
my childhood. I am cold and have a knot in my throat.  
Reflections: it is remarkable in relation to the reading notes about the 
first chapter of Measuring the World that if I compare them with my first 
impressions of the text, their sense of being confronted with something uncanny 
remains unchanged. The apparently factual is subtly undermined by odd details 
which evoke in me, as a reader, a strange sense of displacement, of being a 
witness and an actor at the same time, and of being told more through the 
subtext of the descriptions and statements than through the factual details 
themselves. The magic is accomplished: I am drawn into the text, with a sense 
of anticipation, humour, but also of something ominous going on between the 
lines.  
In the reading notes about ‘The River’, reflections on the narrative and on 
Humboldt’s role in it and my memories intertwine often, although the latter do 
not have a nostalgic character, but propel my thought process forward in a 
continuous dialogue with the text. Images which well up before my mind’s eye 
foster self-awareness, a sense of who I am in relation to the wider context of life 
and history around me.  
By the end of Measuring the World, a few images and sensations stay with me: 
Aguirre, Humboldt measuring unknown phenomena, a vast expanse of water, 
huge trees, a sense of the power of chaos. These are the metaphorical core of 
clusters of images running through the whole narrative. I have reported my 
associations about a few chapters only, as it is impossible to do so for the whole 
novel. However, these images shape my whole reception of the novel through 
their power of suggestion. 
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6.7.2 On Reading Lanark: Thresholds of Feeling and 
Ethnographic Poetics I. 
What seems quite an unrelated tale in the context of Lanark, the story of the 
Oracle in the ‘Prologue’‒‒which is placed after ‘Book 3’‒‒has a strong emotional 
impact on me. It feels like the bleakness it describes, the disembodied-ness and 
abstraction of the stock market. A whole way of thinking and the direction of 
the global civilization get exposed here in their nothingness, as this former 
stockbroker describes his (or her?) personal hell: 
[…] Death is the only dependable exit, but death depends on the body 
and I had rejected the body. I was condemned to a future of replaying 
and replaying the tedious past and past and past and past. I was in 
hell. Without eyes I tried to weep, without lips to scream, and with all 
the force of my neglected heart I cried for help. […] You know now 
why I am an oracle. By describing your life I will escape from the trap 
of my own. From my station in nonentity everything existent, 
everything not me, looks worthwhile and splendid: even things which 
most folk consider commonplace or dreadful. Your past is safe with 
me. I can promise to be accurate. (Lanark, 2007: 116) 
 That somebody who only likes numbers and abstractions should become a 
disembodied oracle is a wonderful metaphor. In his Ensouling Language, Stephen 
Harrod Buhner distinguishes emotions, feelings and feeling.160 The last one is a 
nonphysical sense of touch which is elicited by our presence in a certain place or 
environment rather than any other. Thus a restaurant or a house, can feel 
strange, or cosy, or welcoming. Lanark is such a place, a topos where I feel 
appalled most of the time, but there is an undercurrent of hope that keeps my 
hand turning the pages. Alasdair Gray describes the Oracle’s tale as just a device 
to connect Lanark’s and Thaw’s lives. Yet, I know it is much more than that. 
How can I be so sure? The words have a texture and an unmistakable feeling to 
them, which reveals their intentions to an attentive reader. Abstraction, fear 
and rejection of the body are what the oracle stands for and hell is where these 
attitudes lead this sexless, disembodied being. It seems to me this also is a 
device to mock and expose the convention of the omniscient and objective 
narrator in realistic fiction as yet another abstraction. 
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To me the structure of Lanark is made of a series of ‘portals’ leading one 
to the other in non-linear succession. Hope is the driving force that propels 
Lanark and me as a reader forward, in spite of hell, and darkness. As I read, I am 
aware that with each passage from one ‘Book’ to another, my feelings shift, 
sometimes very subtly. Each ‘Book’ has a cover designed by Gray himself. And 
each cover brings together the main metaphorical elements contained in the 
novel. As I look at the first cover, that of ‘Book 3’, I have the distinct feeling of 
being in front of a threshold. I hesitate, as I study the images closely. All of the 
symbols depicted here have conventional meanings shared by Western cultures 
with classical roots. Yet, it is the combination of all these symbols which is 
suggestive and moves me.  
By now, I know that Lanark is based on a double narrative, fantastic and 
realistic. The novel begins in a fantasy world but switches to a realistic one and 
then back again to the fantastic dimension. Moreover, the novel is divided in 
four ‘books’, with the first and the last fantastical books which contain the two 
realistic ones in the middle. Why did the author devise such a convoluted 
structure? Is it just ‘random’ creativity?  If the double narrative structure has the 
specific function of provoking critical thinking about issues of fictionality and 
ontological status, the art plates and the artificial division into four ‘books’ not 
only reinforce this function but also facilitate the ritualization of the reader’s 
consciousness. This intangible process can only happen if the reader takes the 
book seriously as a material object or artefact. In other words, what medium 
does the writer use in order to play with the reader’s desire? Anthropologist 
Annette Weiner writes about material objects used in spells as the ‘carrier of 
magic’ (Weiner, 1983), highlighting the unity of function of both words and 
objects manipulated during spell chanting or making. In an analogous way Lanark 
as a book is ‘the carrier of magic’, because it is the book itself as a material 
object,161 as an artefact with a unique graphic structure, which mediates the 
reader’s reading experience. In other words, Lanark’s art plates are integral to 
and not merely illustrative of the narrative content. 
In my personal experience of reading Lanark, I was spellbound by the 
prints placed at the beginning of the book. I would come back to them, as often 
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as I got a new insight about their suggestive power. Here is what I wrote after 
moving back and forth between texts and images:  
 The book with its graphic plates placed at the beginning of each new 
section or ‘Book’ leads my attention along certain patterns or configurations of 
symbols, whose imaginary charge is exploited and exploded in order for the 
imaginal figurations to surface in all their polysemy. I experience a sort of 
cognitive dissonance, which is at the origin of the peculiar pleasure offered by 
the novel, having to switch from fantasy to realism to fantasy again, swinging 
between estrangement and amusement. I am going through different limina, 
(in)visible thresholds throughout the ‘Books’ of Lanark/Thaw’s life. The fourfold 
division of the novel constantly reminds me of its fictionality but also of my own 
enmeshment in it, especially in the ‘Epilogue’. For each crossed ‘threshold’ I am 
invited to pause and enter the pictures placed at the beginning of each ‘Book’ 
having to renegotiate my position and attitude as a reader. These pictures are 
visual hints to the atmosphere of what follows it, and their sarcasm warns me to 
ponder and enter with an ‘appropriate’ response. I see through the arbitrary and 
constructive work of the social and individual imaginary, through the specific 
fictive dimension embodied in this novel. Each art plate draws my attention into 
a specific direction and refers to diverse literary genres with parody.  
The first plate, introducing ‘Book Three’, depicts the figure of a huge 
woman, History, magistra vitae, holding up the globe that contains fabulous 
creatures and names: melancholia for Northern Europe, Atlantis instead of 
America, and Africa, which according to classical reminiscences is already 
fabulous and exotic enough. The woman stands with her feet on Mors (death) 
and Oblivio (oblivion), implying that history is a fragile construction at its very 
base. On the globe the divine eye of Providentia shines, while on the left and on 
the right respectively, there stand the pillars of bona fama as testis temporis 
and experientia, and fama mala as lux veritatis and vita memoriae. A few pages 
into the novel, Lanark does not remember his past. The Social Security clerk in 
Unthank says that they do not know anything because Lanark comes from the 
sea, and they have no jurisdiction on it. The element of water is symbolic both 
of death and rebirth. Lanark is hanging symbolically between the two pillars of 
experience and the truth of memory, literally not knowing who he is. 
The second plate, introducing ‘Book One’, features two pillars with the 
inscriptions ‘Let Glasgow flourish by telling the truth’, in between there is a ship 
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in the sea, a whale (reference to Jonah and the Leviathan), a river and a city, 
all depicting Glasgow and its past imperial glory. In the foreground there are 
faces of ordinary people and probably belonging to Lanark’s memory as Thaw. In 
the background, on the top right corner, we are allowed a glimpse of the King 
from Hobbes’s Leviathan (the State, the Sovereign and his imperial power). In 
this ‘Book’ the life of Thaw as a child in Glasgow is told. 
The third plate introduces ‘Book Two’, Thaw’s life as an adolescent and 
youth at Glasgow Art School, till he drowns in the sea, after killing Marjorie 
(Rima’s alter ego). This plate depicts a dissecting room, where doctors surround 
a corpse during an anatomy lesson and Death stands above them all. At the top 
there is the emblem of the University of Glasgow itself, with its motto Via 
Veritas Vita. This is obviously a savagely sarcastic reference. At the bottom of 
the plate there is the inscription Homo a se coctum esumque crustum est hoc 
fecit separation [Man is a pie which bakes and eats itself and separation made 
it]. This is also Thaw’s statement and his damning moment of epiphany. 
Finally, the fourth and last plate introduces ‘Book Four’. It shows us the 
Hobbesian King, and is also a reference to the meta-fictional author Nastler who 
figures in the ‘Epilogue’. The King’s body is made up of people. He holds the 
sword of force in one hand and the sceptre of persuasion in the other. At the top 
there is the first sentence of Hobbes’ Leviathan: ‘By Art is formed that great 
Mechanical Man called a State’, which is sarcastically dubbed by Gray ‘foremost 
of the Beasts of the Earth for Pride’, a reference to Jonah, Melville’s Moby Dick 
and the Leviathan itself, all at once. Below the King lies the empire with its 
cities and countries. On the left the theme of force is again represented by a 
stick and military caps, a picture of the British army and a scene of war. On the 
right Persuasion is represented by paper scrolls and the university mortar board 
and wig. This is confirmed by a university scene and a scene depicting a car 
assembly plant. In the centre at the bottom, Book four has the inscription ‘The 
Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth’, which is again a reference to 
Hobbes’s text and points to Lanark’s political entanglement. 
The movement of my gaze and absorption of the text is spiral-like: I read 
on, I pause, I go back to the plates and each time they acquire more depth, so 
much so that eyes and pictures become part of the same ‘system’, as Gregory 
Bateson would have said. I am activating the magic of the book, mine is the 
energy feeding it. As the author tells Lanark: ‘[...] Your survival as a character 
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and mine as an author depend on us seducing a living soul in our printed world 
and trapping it here long enough for us to steal the imaginative energy which 
gives us life’ (2007: 485). 
‘The Epilogue’ and its reference to the ‘printed world’ amply 
demonstrate the importance of the materiality of Lanark as a book. By the end 
of the novel, I feel ‘the weight of a large book in [my] hands, an object both 
inside and outside the economic system that makes it possible and negates its 
values at one and the same time’.162 Anthropologist Annette Weiner (1983) 
suggests that in spell magic the material object associated with the words of the 
spell is as important as the words themselves, as it is ‘the carrier of magic’. In 
the case of Lanark, the material, graphic structure of the book is the carrier of 
its verbal magic and as such its layout is as important as the words it conveys.  
All these symbols give me a sense of being overloaded, saturated with 
outworn meanings. But in being crammed together into such a small space, the 
page, they clash and comment on each other in such a way that new meanings 
can arise. Traditionally, history has been defined as ‘magistra vitae’, yet here it 
is shown as crushing, leading to death and oblivion, while time is an arrow which 
points backwards. The ‘magistra vitae’ holds a globe where the continents are 
inhabited by the mythical creatures associated with them since classical times. 
This is a plunge into the imaginal, where saturated symbols mingle and get cast 
in a new light. I cannot explain away what I ‘see’: it is a peculiar experience, 
like being in front of a picture and taking in its shapes and colours, letting them 
‘sink’ in. To me reading Lanark is feeling Scotland as a liminal place, bordering 
on an otherworld of unstated meanings and details. As if the fragile balance of 
my perception of what Scotland is and Scottish historical and cultural self-
images could be tipped over to reveal a luminous dimension of collective and 
individual experience. 
Before each ‘threshold’, each ‘portal’, each ‘book cover’, I pause, gaze 
and wait. It is reading by spiraling stations, a pathway which has been laid out 
through the author’s artistic wisdom. What I call ‘artistic wisdom’ is neither 
rational nor random: it is a different kind of intelligence, one that feels its way 
through words and images as a bodily sensation of movement. The reader comes 
to grips with it in her/his own turn. As I ‘move’ through the novel, the two 
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parallel narratives amplify each other; literalization and metaphorization go 
hand in hand. Thus, Thaw’s skin condition is Lanark’s ‘dragon-hide’, a 
metaphorical name for an illness that becomes a literal and existential condition 
for Lanark. Thaw’s daylight world is the reverse side of Lanark’s underworld. It 
feels like being underwater and seeing distorted objects and properties, 
touching cold and hard surfaces, and warm and jelly bodies.  
In chapter twenty-eight, ‘Work’, Thaw is a painter working on a mural for a 
church. He tells God about his sense of being stuck somewhere at the margins of 
an unwanted form of life: 
But here I am, illustrating your discredited first chapter [Genesis] 
through an obsolete art form on a threatened building in a poor 
province of a collapsing empire (2007: 321) 
God does not answer. He is silent throughout the novel. Instead, something in 
me speaks back: 
I am also here, feeling the pain and wonder of coming into my own 
from heaps of waste and misunderstanding in the past. Who has not 
something to recriminate? And yet, as best as we can, we take charge 
and go in the direction we choose. Global wastelands mirror inner 
wastelands. 
Lanark, a punch in the stomach 
A pleasure delayed 
A sour smile 
A feeling of no respite 
Lanark, a joke goes on and on 
In everybody’s mind 
Like a machine or an engine 
Drumming and droning into your sky. 
Lanark is everyman 
Caught between desire and childishness 
How can this be changed? 
How can we go on and take the lead 
From what Lanark is not? 
The meta-fictional ‘epilogue’ 
Is a savage attack 
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On all those who think 
They can impose on art. 
Yet art is not free 
In an iron-caged world 
Where all that matters 
Is what you score. 
Numbers, measures, abstractions 
Turn into gold in some tycoon’s  
Perfumed hands, 
They turn into burns  
Into a worker’s hands 
This is it then. 
I sit here and feel with Lanark, 
And think with Lanark 
How to get out of hell 
To breathe in the clean sunny air 
 
Lanark hears or believes he hears his story as Thaw from the Oracle. Do we not, 
all of us, need some ‘authoritative’ version or account of our past? And yet, who 
can give it to us, if not what we love and trust? 
Young Thaw says that ‘Men are pies that bake and eat themselves, and the 
recipe is hate’ (2007: 189). All the time, Lanark is looking for a way to find sun 
and love, to make up for that damning thought. As I read again this passage, a 
Shell oil tank is leaking and spilling its black oil in the Caribbean Sea, killing its 
flora and fauna. They are unable to stop the leakage. And nobody is paying for 
it. And even if they were, what difference would it make to the coral reefs and 
the fish of the sea?   
Post-reading reflections: When reading Lanark, I felt that the thematic 
level of magic was being played out in my reading experience around the 
descent to hell, something that also had relevance for my circumstances at the 
time. This universal myth is re-envisioned in a thoroughly futuristic, dystopic 
and, most importantly, original way, as a container, a sort of Chinese box 
containing the smaller box of Duncan Thaw’s life in Glasgow. At the same time, 
as I have already pointed out, ‘hell’ seems to take different and simultaneous 
forms. The theme of life as a dream is a major one in literature. Here it assumes 
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a rebel dimension against predestination and Monboddo’s ideas of progress and 
civilization. As a reader, I am enthralled by the notion that what we see and 
experience as the ‘normal’ world is anything but normal, by the psychotic insight 
that there may be dimensions of dissociation and double meaning that pass us by 
and whose significance may only be realized through the power of fantasy. 
Fantasy as the real ‘other side’, a distorted version of the Celtic sidhe, a place 
which mirrors back our deepest fears and horrors, faults, grudges and misdeeds, 
but ultimately is a positive statement about life in its various aspects.  
 
6.7.3 Ethnographic Poetics II and the Reading of The Iguana 
The sense of an ending, of a nearing secular apocalypse brought about by our 
lacking sense of justice is what I associated with The Iguana, while I was reading 
it. This had to do with the rising of global terrorism all around, and the widening 
gap between the rich and the poor worldwide. I can only convey what it meant 
reading the novel through poetry, because it had to do mainly with an elusive 
feeling, an ungraspable sense of impending doom. The images found in the 
novel, the well, the death of God as a huge butterfly, become amplified 
metaphors, in turn amplifying events in current affairs and my own personal 
crisis. For a very long time, I could feel the proximity of the novel, and I could 
recognize it as a milestone in my life, a resisting rock against a raging sea. This 
has to do with its suggestive and metamorphic images, with the fact that the 
narrator addresses ‘you’, the ‘thoughtful Reader’ with no certainties or absolute 
directions, only offering highly oneiric situations: 
 Dove fosse realmente il conte, in questo frattempo, se al pozzo a 
guardare con gli altri se vi era traccia del Corpo di Dio, o in giro per 
l’isola, con la pistola nella povera mano, sulle orme dei colpevoli; se 
in fondo al pozzo o in quel freddo e allucinato tribunale, noi, Lettore, 
se pure ciò ti parrà strano, non possiamo dirti. Ma tu, se di questi 
continui passaggi da un luogo all’altro, e mutamenti di scena, e 
spezzati dialoghi, e rapido inserirsi di un luogo in un altro; se di questi 
intarsi di casa, di vento, di pozzo, di sentieri frementi e muti interni, 
di vive foglie e di morti muri, di raggi di sole e raggi di lampada, di 
cammino e di stasi, di immobilità e movimento, e soprattutto di un 
crescente dolore, di una tristezza senza requie, di una rabbia 
indicibile, mista a parole usuali, e anche della scomparsa della nostra 
Iguana, come di quei prodigi e quelle risa che hanno caratterizzato 
finora la nostra storia, sarai portato a chiedere spiegazione, rifletti, in 
attesa che possiamo dartene una (ammesso che vi sia una spiegazione 
  173 
a questo mondo di imperscrutabili fenomeni, dove tu anche vivi), 
rifletti, pensieroso Lettore, alla particolare ristrettezza mentale del 
giovane architetto, dove però s’annida una generosità di cui egli non 
era, prima di sbarcare in questa dolorosa isola, al corrente. (2007: 
160-61) 
The Count’s real location in this frangent of time, whether at the well 
along with the others, to see whether there was any vestige of the 
Body of God, or wandering about the island with the pistol in his hand 
on the trail of the culprits, or at the bottom of the well, or in that 
cold hallucinated court room, is something, Reader, though it may 
strike you as strange, that we are unable to tell you. If you’re inclined 
to petition for an explanation of these continuous passages from one 
place to another, changes of scene, broken dialogs and rapidly 
telescoping locales, if you want to know the truth of these interplays 
of houses, winds, and wells, of trembling paths and mute interiors, of 
leaving leaves and dead walls, of sunrays and lamplights, of progress 
and stasis, of immobility and movement, and above all of a waxing 
pain, of a sadness knowing no repose, of unspeakable anger 
intermixed with commonplace words, and as well of the 
disappearance of both our Iguana and those prodigies and peals of 
laughter that have characterized our story up to now, in that case you 
ought to reflect‒‒while awaiting whatever explanations we yet may 
prove able to furnish (presuming the very existence of explainability 
within this world of inscrutable phenomena where you too make your 
home)‒‒you should reflect, thoughtful Reader, on the particularly 
narrow mind of our young Lombard architect and on how it 
nonetheless harbored a generosity of which he had never been aware 
previous to debarking on this tragic island. (1987: 170) 
Such as the trial for the death of God: 
‘Si introduca la Vittima’ disse il Giudice. E si alzò in piedi lui 
stesso, e tutta la sala si  alzò piangendo e tremando.  
Entrarono due uomini spingendo un carrello bianco, e sul 
carrello era deposto l’Altissimo.  
Era, Lettore, se mai sei stato desideroso di conoscere le vere 
sembianze di colui del quale favoleggiamo da secoli, senza mai essere 
certi di averlo ravvisato, era, arrimpicata e addormita su una foglia, 
una semplice farfalla bianca. (2007: 164) 
‘Bring in the Victim’, pronounced the Judge, rising to his feet. 
The whole hall of quivering, weeping people rose with him. 
Two men entered, pushing a white trolley that bore the corpse 
of the Highest and Most Holy. 
  Surely you’ve longed to know the true semblance of this Being 
whom the centuries have surrounded with fables while leaving us 
always uncertain of having been faced with the undeniable. What lay 
there, curled up on a leaf and asleep, was a simple white butterfly. 
(1987: 174) 
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Or Aleardo’s final recognition of the iguana at the bottom of the well and his 
attempt to save her: 
Ed egli, di colpo, la rivide.  
Non era una Iguana, e nemmeno una regina. Era una servetta come ce 
ne sono tante nelle isole, con due occhi fissi e grandi, in un volto non 
più grande di un chicco di riso. Ed aveva i capelli neri aggiustati come 
una torricella intorno al volto severo e timido. La sua bocca non 
sorrideva. Non era vestita di merletto bianco, ma di semplici cenci 
grigi. E su quei cenci, tutti sparsi intorno a lei come petali di fango, 
sembrava dormire, sognare. Gli occhi erano aperti e fissi. L’acqua 
saliva sempre.  
‘Perdita!’ gridò il conte. 
E sentì una voce, dal fondo, umile e strana, rispondere: 
‘Signore, sono qui’. 
‘Tieni fermo. Scendo’. 
Da allora era cominciata la sua discesa, che finiva ora. (2007: 172) 
He saw her  again, quite suddenly. 
She was no iguana, nor even a queen. She was a servant girl like so 
many to be found in the islands, with two large staring eyes in a face 
no larger than a grain of rice. She had black hair arranged like a little 
tower around a severe, timid face. An unsmiling mouth. Rather than 
white lace, she was dressed in simple grey rags. Lying on those rags, 
scattered all around her like petals of mud, she seemed to be 
sleeping, dreaming. Her eyes were open and fixed. The water kept 
rising. 
  ‘Perdita!’ cried the Count. 
  He heard a strange, humble voice rise up from the bottom to 
answer him: 
  ‘I’m here, o senhor conte.’ 
  ‘Hold on! I’m coming down.’ 
  That was how his descent had begun, and now it was ending. 
(1987: 184) 
And here are my personal epiphanies, expressed in the form of a poem, where 
historical and subjective times meet: 
And as I walked along the beach whispering 
This time they won’t get me, I was in for a big mistake 
As the wound of that September day had branches 
Casting shadows on the world, reflected in my vanity’s lake. 
 
Somebody else, whose name I can’t remember, 
Came for me like rain and thunder seeping through my veins, 
Like quick poison turning green leaves into silvery 
Rocks and bones, I was left stranded with fragile remains. 
 
I turned dying embers in my unbelieving hands, 
As the radio broadcast shattered trust and dreams 
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Across the globe, my book fell on the sand 
Terror had just begun, red was the colour of people’s screams. 
 
The Iguana lay there, only half forgotten, 
Windy fingers leafed through its whistling pages 
I had nowhere to go but home 
Again I would read about long-lost ages. 
 
This time, I thought, the show is coming to a close 
And I, as I had known myself, was another I had left  
behind; again I searched among the ruins 
like a seagull among the garbage, with no hope left. 
 
It was then that Aleardo’s madness became a sign,  
But his coming to reason was too late: 
We had been waiting too long, as if hiding 
Hints and cues would make the world a place without hate. 
 
A few months later, in May, God was dead. 
His body was nowhere to be found. 
His body was dead in my crumbling life, 
My lying mirror fell to the ground. 
 
God was a butterfly, huge and white, 
I was a butterfly, tiny and white, but caged 
In a tight cocoon of darkness, I could not see  
the light, blundering around my old self, enraged. 
 
Lost love and hope paraded on the highway 
In the wilderness of my mind. Again 
The news was full of terror and pain 
I could hear the same old song’s refrain. 
 
War on terror was priority worldwide 
No place to hide; only endless pursuit and flight. 
For all the iguanas in this world of lies 
A savior failed to come out in the light. 
 
At the well Perdita was alive 
Pulsing with the rhythm of a wounded heart 
Falling short of the tests of life. 
Somewhere, everywhere, joy was a lost art. 
 
The intertwining of reading and other situations is an instance of 
‘anchoring’, whereby ‘life’ and ‘reading’ interface, ground and interact with 
each other. The novel, by its openness and metamorphic outlook, worked on my 
sensations and emotions in a complex way. As D. Miall (2007), Keith Oatley 
(1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2009), and others have shown, the cognitive 
approach to literary reading can be one-sided when feeling is not taken into 
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account.163 Feeling is the starting point for the comprehension and retaining of 
reading as an experience, the only possible basis for further interpretation and 
intellectualization. 
 
6.8 Reading as Ritual Vision Quest 
While reading The Iguana, I became interested in the idea that as a reader I 
could be involved in a sort of vision quest, following the unique vicissitudes of 
the main protagonists of the respective narratives. Following Ricoeur, I state 
that a metaphor is a narrative in itself, at least a narrative in nuce. The idea 
that struck me is that the more or less formally deformed quest of the 
protagonists can be explicit or well concealed, for the reader to unravel and 
ponder on. I identified diverse layers of ‘magic’ in the narratives under 
examination which worked at different levels towards different effects.  
Here is what anthropologist Robin Ridington says about the vision quest 
among a Native Canadian Nation, the Dunne-za, in his essay Telling Secrets: 
Stories of the Vision Quest: 
Dunne-za stories of personal vision quest experiences and traditional 
Dunne-za myths are private and public versions of the same 
information. To a young person, the myths are public information 
while stories of the vision quest are personal secrets. During the 
course of a person's life, his or her identity becomes more myth-like 
until, as an old person, the events of the medicine story encountered 
as a child become public information. Story telling is a form of 
communication of great antiquity. In small scale band level societies 
stories are an important channel for interpreting and communicating 
personal experience.They are a bridge between subjectivity and the 
intersubjective realm of culture.The anthropologist's distinction 
between myth and narrative obscures the interpenetration of these 
two levels of symbolic communication in band level societies. In 
communicating a personal experience to others, the storyteller 
uses the same system of meaning found in traditional myths. At least 
among the Dunne-za, personal and cultural communications are 
systematically related to one another.164  
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Another anthropologist, Michael Oren Fitzgerald, reports on this tradition in 
Crow tribal life: 
One of the main rites of the Sun Dance religion is the vision quest. It is 
a period set for solitary prayer at a remote place. A person will 
usually spend three or four days of fasting on the vision quest, saying 
his prayers during all that time. He goes away up in the hills, gets 
away from people, and goes off by himself, and there fast and prays 
for either the three-or-four-day period he selected before he began 
his quest.There are many intentions that a person may have when he 
prepares to make a vision quest. He may want medicine, some kind of 
power to help him in battle or in all of his life.165 
It is evident that to the vision quest there is a strong ritual element which is not 
only spiritually conceived but also linked to cultural norms. The vision quest has 
relevance for the individual, and at times for the whole community. What 
Ridington writes about the misleading distinction between narratives and myths 
is insightful: what makes the difference is the secrecy or public import of the 
message received during the quest. If storytelling is in its essence connective 
and visionary, story reading cannot but be a modern way of continuing to receive 
a sort of vision which makes the reader experience feeling and emotion, and 
later think about this experience. The book is public but also private in a way, so 
it joins the two dimensions of public myth and private narrative. I suggest that in 
our times it is at the juncture between the public-private domains that the 
reader’s vision quest can take place. This is how I conceived of the reading of 
The Iguana. I saw how its themes and its quest spoke to me about events which 
were actually happening in the world around me, or evoked emotions which I 
found relevant for situations I was living in my own life at the time of reading. 
Furthermore, each re-reading brought new experiences, new visions, which had 
an impact on me. To use metaphors by Richard J.Gerrig (1993), I was being 
‘transported’ by the book but at the same time I was not passive because I was 
‘performing’ its narrative.166 
In The Iguana, the action is prompted by the Count’s search for new lands 
to buy, and partly because of the publisher his friend’s search for sensationalist 
stories of oppression. As the novel unfolds however, the reader is constantly 
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 Michael O. Fitzgerald, Yellowtail, Crow Medicine Man and Sun Dance Chief, An autobiography as told 
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baffled by strange fictive phenomena and rhetorical references and devices that 
need to be dwelt upon in some detail. I soon realized that there was a quest 
within a quest, or at least a rhetorical rendering of a quest, within the more 
prosaic motivation which offered the occasion for the whole narrative, namely 
the acquiring of lands and stories. The quest I am referring to works as a magical 
theme which structures the whole novel: Daddo as a knight, trying to rescue a 
damsel in distress, an iguana-girl, and finding instead his own fateful death, and 
in the process the meaning or relative meaninglessness of his own life. 
The first time we hear of the theme of knighthood and chivalry is almost 
at the beginning: 
E insomma il rispetto, quel sentimento sottile e un po’ doloroso 
dell’altrui dignità, che un tempo suggeriva ai cavalieri, di fronte alla 
donna, tante imprese mirabili, e che il nobile Lombardo dedicava, 
senza saperlo, alla terra tutta […] (2007: 21) 
Knights once undertook redoubtable adventures on behalf of women 
who inspired this subtle, slightly painful feeling of the dignity of 
others, and now this noble Lombard felt it, unknowingly, for the 
whole face of the earth. (1987: 8)  
More explicitly, at first seeing the Iguana, we are told:  
Immediatamente il Daddo, con quello spirito di cavalleria che lo 
rendeva così amabile, senza perdere tempo a chiedersi, come avrebbe 
voluto la religione che egli professava, se quella creatura era cristiana 
o pagana (come più sembrava) […] (2007: 30) 
Chivalry was one of the qualities that made Daddo so likeable, and he 
didn’t even stop to ask himself, as his religion would have told him to 
do, if this creature were Christian or pagan (the latter more likely). 
(1987: 17) 
However, it is only half-way through the novel, in the thirteenth chapter, at the 
beginning of the second part of the narrative, that the young Don Ilario, 
apparently troubled by his own miserable condition, reads a passage from a 
poem by Captain Jorge Manrique to Daddo: 
Nella sua città di Ocaña 
venne la morte a bussare 
alla porta,  
dicendo: ‘Buon cavaliere 
lasciate il mondo fallace 
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e i suoi beni, 
mostri l’indomita forza 
il vostro cuore d’acciaro 
nel trapasso. 
E poiché vita e salute 
in così poco conto aveste 
per la fama, 
faccia cuore la virtù 
per subire quest’oltraggio 
che vi chiama. 
Non vi paglia troppo amara 
la battaglia paurosa 
che attendete, 
che una vita assai più lunga 
per la fama sì gloriosa 
qua lasciate. 
Se la vita dell’onore 
neppur essa è eterna e vera, 
sarà sempre 
ciò malgrado, assai migliore 
di quell’altra temporale 
peritura… (2007: 114) 
 
 
In his city of Ocaña, 
Death came to knock 
At the door, 
  saying, ‘Good Cavalier, 
take leave of this faulted world 
and its goods; 
let the steel of your heart  
show its untamed strength 
in the crossing; 
  and since you have held 
both life and health of slight account 
in favour of fame, 
let virtue nerve your heart 
to suffer the affront  
that calls you. 
‘Think not of the frightful battle 
you await 
as overly bitter, 
since a life all the longer 
for glorious fame 
is what you leave behind you. 
  Even the life of honour 
is neither eternal nor true 
though, all the same, far better 
than that other, temporal 
and quick to perish…’ (1987: 114-15) 
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Now, this poem is a catalyst in the story. Daddo is enchanted by its words in a 
way that reveals to him the direction that he has to follow. Only ten pages later, 
we know that: 
[Egli] si trovò a ripetere come in sogno quei versi del Commendatore 
Jorge Manrique […] era ciò che il conte udiva distintamente, 
mescolato al suono più vivo del mare […]. Mai il conte aveva udito 
parole più alte, come uno che abbia passato l’intera esistenza 
cercando di ricordarsi un motivetto angelico, che gli riporti il primo 
amore o chissà che. Ed ora l’aveva dentro. Così forte era la sua 
emozione, che non poté aggiungere sorriso a quella seria ed intensa 
espressione del volto […]. (2007: 122) 
the Count found himself dreamily repeating those lines by Captain 
Jorge Manrique […it] was all the Count could hear distinctly, mixed 
with the more lively sound of the sea […]. These were the noblest 
words the Count had ever heard. He was like a man who had traversed 
the entirety of a life always trying to remember some angelic tune 
that would carry him back to the first time he fell in love, or else to 
who knows what. Now he had it inside of him. His emotions were so 
strong that he couldn’t add a smile to the intense and serious 
expression on his face […]. (1987: 124-25) 
After his attempt to rescue the iguana-girl in the well and the trial for the death 
of God, we are told that ‘Cortesemente come’era vissuto, il conte morì’ (2007: 
173): ‘Courteously, just as he had lived, the Count died’ (1987: 185). The 
description of the dead Count re-instates the chivalric theme, as sealed in the 
unfathomableness of death: 
Disteso in una specie di barca di quercia, che il suo marinaio e I 
fratelli selvaggi avevano con grande amore approntato, giaceva in un 
nero abito da società, mai messo prima d’allora, con una rosa di siepe 
tra le magre mani e sparsi I piedi eleganti di tanti altri gialli fiori. Il 
libro di Manrique e un crocifisso d’argento erano a un lato del 
guanciale. (2007: 174) 
In a kind of oaken boat that his sailor and the two rude brothers had 
lovingly prepared, he lay in a suit of black evening dress he had never 
worn before, a briar rose within his slender hands, his elegant feet 
scattered over with an abundance of yellow flowers. Manrique’s book 
and a silver cross were arranged at the side of his pillow. (1987: 186) 
Quel sorriso, che turbò tutti, e li rese partecipi di non so che altezza 
di questo mondo, che pure si crede merce o altro, all’alba finì.  
 Il viaggiatore apparve più stanco e come segreto.   
 Pioveva. (2007: 175) 
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Everyone present was deeply moved by that [the Count’s] smile and it 
made them participants in who knows what summit of the glory of the 
world, no matter that the world is so commonly taken for 
merchandize, or something even less. The smile ended with the 
arrival of dawn. The voyager seemed more tired, and somehow 
secretive. It was raining. (1987: 187) 
Count Aleardo thus is repeatedly evoked throughout the novel as a knight 
and a ‘voyager’. But in the last chapter, he is more prosaically defined ‘nessuno, 
e a ciò lo aveva portato la sua curiosa modestia (2007: 176): somebody who 
‘despite aura and possessions, had been a nobody, and he had been brought to 
that pass by his curious mediocrity’ (1987: 188). Indeed Aleardo himself, during 
the trial for the death of God, recognizes as his only worthy deed having given 
his life to save the Iguana. Through his strange delirium he saw things at once as 
they were, as they had been, and as they should have been. 
As a reader, I had been first absorbed by the vicissitudes of the Iguana 
herself, who to me was the protagonist, but as an oppressed maiden servant, 
shown in the scene of the well, she is revealed beyond any enchantment as an 
inarticulate being whose redemption is only partial. It was in my second reading 
of the novel, that I started to make sense of Aleardo’s character as the 
centerpiece, the deforming mirror of whatever happened on the island. He is the 
unaware magician who filters what he sees and experiences through his 
‘carattere fantastico’ (2007: 170): his ‘fantasizing mind’ (1987: 181). When I 
started to collect the cues about the condition of the Count as knight and 
voyager, the novel unfolded before my eyes as a remarkable metaphor: Daddo 
on his futile quest lands on a fallen island, a place he perceives as primordial but 
that in fact cannot escape the effects of the black magic of real estate 
transactions of which he himself is an agent. Thus the fall from grace of the 
Iguana is necessary to Aleardo, the Count, to pursue his own fate, and his own 
epiphany regarding his oppressive role in the socio-economic system. The 
iguana, who gives the title to the book, is nothing more than instrumental, a 
tool, and a wild inarticulate voice of nature. 
As a reader the quest within the quest struck me as ironical and baffling. 
And yet, I too had my own epiphanic experience, my own vision quest as the 
text acted and constructed me as somebody different from how I was used to 
knowing and experiencing my own self. My emotions were shifting all the time 
according to the recognizable intentions of the narrator, who had taken pains to 
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depict the continuous transformations and metamorphoses of the iguana, the 
Guzman brothers and especially the young Don Ilario. In particular, the passage 
describing the rejuvenation of the latter, before meeting the Hopins family, is a 
piece of narrative magic, where the magical know-how of illusionism, costumes 
and refractions is fully depicted: 
Lo specchio, rettangolare, era incorniciato d’oro vecchio, o bronzo, o 
qualcosa che luccicava, dov’erano scolpite delle foglie. […] e, girato 
verso Aleardo, permetteva a questi di scorgere, come in un fatato 
ritratto, il volto del marchese, che nella realtà era celato. Ed era, 
convenne il conte, un volto di una grazia e luminosità meravigliose. Le 
rughe, e gli affanni che le avevano causate, completamente 
cancellate, sparite. Liscio come un cammeo, ma accesso di rosa sulle 
guance sfilate, quel volto raccontava soltanto la gioventù, la forza, la 
gloria dei diciott’anni. Svaniti anche i cenciosi abiti, il marhcese 
portava sulla testa un cappello di velluto azzurro, ornato di una vera 
cascata di piume scarlatte, che gli venivano fin sul collo, mentre, 
sulle spalle, una corta cappa di raso nero, non nascondeva un radioso 
giubbone millecolori, disegnando le spalle erette, eleganti nel gran 
vigore. Il resto dell’abito era nero, e una bassa cintura d’argento, 
come una catena, lo serrava, mostrando, sull’anca, l’impugnatura di 
una raffinata arma anche d’argento. Come zaffiri appena incastonati 
nell’alabastro del volto, i suoi occhi brillavano, fin quasi alle lacrime, 
di fierezza, di gioia. Più nessuna traccia della sua tremenda 
vecchiezza. (2007: 69-70) 
The mirror was rectangular and framed in old gold, or bronze, 
something that gleamed, and this frame was sculpted with leaves. […] 
Turned towards Aleardo, it allowed him a vision, an enchanted 
portrait, of the Marquis’ face, which otherwise was hidden and could 
otherwise not have been seen directly. The Count had to admit it was 
a face of marvelous grace and luminosity. The lines and the worries 
that had caused them had been entirely cancelled out. Had simply 
vanished. Smooth as a cameo, but with accents of pink on its finely 
smoothed cheeks, that face spoke solely of the youth, the strength, 
and the glory of living in an eighteen-year-old body. The raggedy 
clothing had likewise disappeared, and the Marquis wore a hat of blue 
velvet, adorned with a cascade of scarlet feathers down to the side of 
his neck; a short, black satin cape covered his back but offered no 
hiding to a gloriously pied blouse: a thousand radiant colors over 
finely outlined shoulders, erect, elegant, and full of vigour. The rest 
of his clothing was black, and a low silver belt, chainlike, hung across 
his flanks and held up the grip, silver again, of a refined and elegant 
weapon. Like sapphires loosely fit into the alabaster of his face, his 
eyes shone brightly enough to be full of tears, but in fact overflowed 
with pride and joy. There was no longer so much as a trace of the 
devastations of aging. (1987: 63) 
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Here the reader is a ‘side-participant’, to use Richard Gerrig’s term 
(1993: 128-32). In this case, I, as a reader, could see the whole scene of the 
enchanted reflection in the mirror, without being its primary recipient. This 
scene is one of the many examples in the narrative that stages remarkable and 
incomprehensible ‘transformations’.  It is also a scene that alludes to one of the 
elements of magical know-how, the mirror with its game of reflections which 
can be more or less true to the object or deformed. The narrator offers no 
explanation for Ilario’s sudden transformation: it is just presented as self-
evident and ‘enchanted’. Personally, I took it to be a reflection of the Marquis’ 
hope of a better destiny. But even this more plausible explanation is beside the 
point. The point here is that as a reader I am in the scene itself, maybe next to 
Daddo, or on a hidden balcony that helps me see the actions and reactions of 
both characters. In fact I not only see the described scene, but in the 
meanwhile, what is not said about Daddo, I do imagine: his astonishment, his 
bewildered look and disheveled hair, his pale countenance framed by doubt and 
tiredness. Through this remarkable scene, and the gaps left by the narrator I can 
occupy, as a reader, an evocative space, where the interwoven gazes of 
characters, narrator and reader circulate, creating a magical flow of imaginative 
power. 
Linguistically and rhetorically, the use of poems, invocations and stage 
directions creates a peculiar effect for me as a reader, of being called to take 
part in a sort of psychodrama, imagining the whole scenario of the island, of 
which a map is provided at the beginning of the ninth chapter, where I may well 
walk around in a cloak of invisibility and yet see both what the characters see 
and much more too. Consider for example the following passage, following the 
statement that the Count’s mind was in delirium: 
Egli udì ancora queste parole, in cui realtà e simbologia erano, 
purtroppo, come nei romanzi di avanguardia, disperatamente 
commiste, e lo agghiacciavano:  
CUCINIERE. Ormai, il tempo non è più buono; già le onde sparano, e i 
Hopins hanno deciso di salpare immediatamente. Perciò, sbrigati. Si 
attendono da te le ultime disposizioni. 
MENDES (Irritato). Non mi direte che non sapete cavarvela senza di 
me, no? Sto parlando con questo signore.  
FELIPE. Chiamalo signore! 
MENDES. C’era il Segovia, fino a pochi momenti fa in corridoio. Non 
l’avete incontrato? Non è a bordo? 
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COLE (meravigliato). Quale bordo, signore? Scostatevi dal pozzo. 
Potreste cadervi. (2007: 155) 
He managed nonetheless to discern these words, in which reality and 
symbol were desperately, unfortunately intermingled, as in avant-
garde novels. They made his blood run cold: 
THE COOK: ‘By now the weather has broken. The swells are cresting 
and  breaking, and the Hopins have decided to sail immediately. So 
hurry up, everybody is waiting for your final instructions.’ 
MENDES: (irritated) ‘You mean you are incapable of taking care of 
things without me? Can’t you see I am talking with this gentleman?’ 
FELIPE: ‘You call him a gentleman?’ 
MENDES: ‘Segovia was here until just a few minutes ago, out in the 
corridor. Haven’t you seen him? Isn’t he already aboard?’ 
COLE (surprised): ‘Aboard what, sir? Stand back away from that well! 
You could fall!’ (1987: 141) 
Here the characters are revealed to Aleardo and to the reader as masks of 
different aspects of ‘reality’, masks which are none the more insubstantial for 
that, but all the more terrifying in their being agents of a terrible and 
ineluctable hardness. Earlier on, the reader is informed that to Aleardo ‘the 
terrible Mendes’ discloses itself as ‘il più profondo nome’ (84): ‘inner name’ (80) 
of the young Don Ilario. The doctrine of the inner name is in itself magical and 
mystical and points to inner qualities of being of a person or entity, of which the 
latter can be unaware.  What is striking here is that the staged dialogue 
produces a strange, alienating effect, as well as facilitating the reader’s vision 
quest. In my reading experience, it set me on a chain of images of situations of 
inauthentic contact between human beings, some of them remembered, some 
just evoked on the canvas of my imagination, and as a consequence led me to 
envision a web of connectedness through story: I evoked how differently the 
story could have unfolded and generally, how we, as human beings, can be 
connected through sharing narratives empathically.  
The final ‘invocation’ is the materialization of the ‘canto of the 
oppressed’ looked for by the Milanese publisher Adelchi (named after Manzoni’s 
tragedy published in 1822), but it is anything but sensationalist.  If Manrique’s 
poem had acted as a spell on Aleardo and on the reader likewise, now this 
invocation-prayer, composed of ‘presentation’, ‘invitation’ and ‘salutation’ is a 
humble song of good omen for the forgotten and oppressed of the world. It 
mentions again the well, and indeed the motif of the well is found in many folk-
tales and fairy tales, where it is connected to the earth goddess. As we saw, in 
our novel, the well is the place of realization, of sacrifice, of dispelling of the 
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evil magic of oppression and hardness. Here is the whole ‘canto’, which very 
aptly ends the novel: 
INVITO SCRITTO DAI FRATELLI GUZMAN PER AMORE DELLA IGUANA ‒ ACCIOCCHÉ 
L’ANIMA IMMORTALE DEL CONTE ‒ SIA SOLLECITATA A RAMMEMORARSI DI OCAÑA: 
Presentazione del luogo 
Questo è il mare 
Questo è il cielo 
Grigio e giallo 
Pioggia e gelo. 
 
Invito vero e proprio 
I 
Aiutami. 
Riconoscimi. 
Salutami. 
Col mio nome chiamami, 
non con quello del serpe. 
Voglio risorgere. 
 
II 
Conte di Milano 
non aspettare, 
non voglio smeraldi 
voglio essere 
come te 
pietoso e giusto. 
 
III 
Signore caro, 
buono, pietoso! 
Grande conestabile, 
per amore del Re, 
di Carlo V, 
salva la Spagna, 
e il Portogallo, 
i Paesi vinti, 
che dormono 
nelle alghe 
nella pietra 
nella montagna 
nella Meseta 
e la Murcia, 
in Estremadura. 
Salva il toro, 
la mucca, l’agnello. 
Salva il pellegrino. 
Porta il lume,  
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porta il sole, 
acqua, giardini. 
 
IV 
Conte di Cristo 
non resistere. 
Vieni al pozzo,  
l’acqua non c’è. 
Non ci sono fiori, 
non c’è alcuno. 
C’è silenzio. 
Il serpe piange. 
La rana s’acquatta. 
C’è paura. 
Porta il lume. 
Porta il sole. 
Ci hanno giudicati 
Senza giudizio. 
Guarda nel pozzo. 
Se ci chiami 
Rispondiamo. 
 
V 
Non siamo morti. 
È novembre. 
Giallo e rosso 
dalla cisterna 
spunta il sole. 
Noi tremiamo. 
 
VI 
Salva il toro. 
Proteggi la mucca 
e l’agnello 
e la stella 
che cade. 
 
Saluto 
In Estremadura 
resterai 
conte caro 
sopra i monti 
ci guarderai, 
griderai. (2007: 181-84) 
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INVITATION WRITTEN BY THE GUZMAN BROTHERS FOR LOVE OF THE IGUANA – SO 
THAT THE COUNT’S IMMORTAL SOUL – WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO REMEMBER 
OCAÑA: 
Presentation of the place 
This is the sea! 
This is the sky 
Grey and yellow 
Rain and cold 
 
True and proper invitation 
I 
Help me. 
Know me. 
Greet me. 
Call me by my name, 
Not by the serpent’s. 
I want to come to life again. 
 
II 
Count of Milan 
You are not to wait, 
I don’t want emeralds, 
I want to be 
Compassionate and just, 
Like you. 
 
III 
Dear my lord, 
Good and compassionate! 
Grand Constable, for love of the King, 
Of Charles the Fifth, 
Save Spain 
And Portgual, 
The vanquished countries 
Asleep 
In the algae 
In the stone 
In the mountain 
In Meseta 
And Murcia, 
In Estremadura. 
Save the bull, 
The cow, the lamb. 
Save the pilgrim. 
Bring the light, 
Bring the sun, 
Water and gardens. 
 
IV 
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Count of Christ 
You are not to resist. 
Come to the well, 
There is no water. 
There are no flowers,  
There is no one. 
There is silence. 
The serpent weeps. 
The crouching frog. 
There is fear. 
Bring the light. 
Bring the sun. 
Without judgment  
They have judged us. 
Look into the well. 
If you call us  
We will answer. 
 
V 
We are not dead. 
It is November. 
Yellow and red, 
The sun rises 
From the cistern. 
We tremble. 
 
VI 
Save the bull.  
Protect the cow 
And the lamb 
And the falling  
Star. 
 
Salutation 
You will remain 
Dear count 
In Estremadura 
You will look at us 
From above the mountains, 
Crying out. (1987: 195-97) 
 
Again,the well is a place of confinement but, more importantly, of 
recognition: the humble of the earth are at its bottom, but long to be called by 
their names and to answer back to the call. 
The last paragraph of the novel appeals directly to the reader: 
 E con ciò, Lettore cortese, ci congediamo […] da Ocaña e dalla sua 
umile umanità. E se del mare che si è chiuso così facilmente su questi 
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mali e questi sorrisi, e sulla figura di un cupo gentiluomo, se del 
tempo che passa senza sosta, a Milano come nelle isole, tutto 
trascinando, diretto alla eternità, ti sorprenderai, ricorda, per favore, 
le pressanti domande di Unamuno, così alle tue simili, e vedrai che 
almeno tale sorpresa rimane uguale. (2007: 184) 
And with that, dear Reader, we will take our leave […] from Ocaña 
and its humble human family. And if you are surprised by the sea that 
closes so easily over these evils and these smiles, and over the figure 
of a dark-minded gentleman, or by time that endlessly passes, in 
Milan as in the islands, pulling everything into its wake and directed 
towards identity, then please remember Unamuno’s pressing question 
and the similar questions you yourself have asked, and you will see at 
least this sense of surprise remains the same. (1987: 198) 
The reference to ‘Unamuno’s pressing question’ is enigmatic enough and could 
range from Unamuno’s ‘Christ,  our Christ! Why have you forsaken us?’ (La 
Agonía del Cristianismo, 1925), given the partial assimilation of Aleardo to 
Christ, to ‘…the longing for immortality, is it not perhaps the primal and 
fundamental condition of all reflective or human knowledge?’ 167  
In my reading experience, the novel itself becomes a ship that leads me 
into a voyage, a journey through the hidden sea of my psyche. Indeed, the 
images and metaphors of departure, navigation, journeying, traversing one’s life 
are prominent throughout the story. The island is that magical primordial, yet 
fallen place where even ancient blessings of nature turn into a curse. This island 
is everywhere inside our human hearts, as well as embodied in the innumerable 
islands of the world. Now I totally agree with Miall’s statement about ‘the 
modifying powers of feeling’ that, ‘at times, narrative feelings interact to 
produce metaphors of personal identification that modify self-understanding’ 
(2007: 44, emphasis in the original).  
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7. History, Magic and Flux 
 In the previous chapter I focused on my experience as a reader, from a 
phenomenological point of view. However, because of obvious space constraints, 
I could only account for specific moments of my reading as I had lived through 
and in them. The subject matter of this chapter stems from the same 
experience: here what I experienced as the main concerns of the three novels is 
analyzed in detail and these concerns are shown in their narrative workings. 
More objectively, they may be defined as the ‘themes’ of the novels, but I would 
like to keep the phenomenological tone of my reading encounter, by focusing on 
what I perceived and received from the texts as actual and urgent concerns. The 
Iguana, Lanark and Measuring the World opened up a space where I could 
glimpse and experience history and modernity as narrative constructs in constant 
flux, through the concepts and techniques of magic. This statement needs some 
qualification: I am not stating that certain facts did or did not happen, but that 
the way they were emplotted and narrated through the ages makes all the 
difference and constitutes differing historical and collective memories, 
depending on who is telling the story and who is listening to it. The debate 
about narrative and history is a complex one and has by no means been 
exhausted. This is not the right place to impinge on the domain of historians.168 
However, a few observations are necessary. History as a domain of 
knowledge and writing, or more properly ‘historiography’ is a domain of human 
knowledge regulated by its own methods, practices and rules as much as any 
other domain of academic research and knowledge. As such it is a ‘literary 
artefact’ and a narrative construction.169 However, as psychologist Jerome 
Bruner has stated in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (1986) and Acts of Meaning 
(1990), and as historian David Carr has reiterated, we, as humans, already live in 
the storied world of our human experience, in the sense that we are cognitively 
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endowed with the ability to organise our world and our experience of it through 
narrative and we do it all the time.170 In Munslow’s apt words: 
Human beings are story tellers who exist ontologically in a universe of 
narrative making. Narrativist thinkers like Jerome Bruner hold that 
narrative making is wired into the human brain as the key mechanism 
for representing reality (i.e., not added on after we have analysed, 
explained and produced meaning). For Bruner, narrative is the a priori 
concept through which we apprehend reality. This suggests narrative 
is the mode of cognition.171 
Thus, we process the flux of reality and give it structure and shape through 
narrative. We never process raw data, but we mediate and shape their flux 
through our own cognitive narrative-making, which is in its own turn manifests in 
certain specific forms rather than others because of our specific social and 
cultural backgrounds. Munslow continues: 
Moreover, in acknowledging this [the point made in the preceding 
quotation] we are forced to consider Hayden White’s famous 
metahistorical argument concerning the functioning of the trope, 
which is the metaphorical (linguistic) turning of one thing into another 
in order to create meaning. As Bruner suggests, narrative is a form of 
cognition (knowing), one that is particularly applicable to story telling 
disciplines like history. (2007: 16) 
And, of course, literature: in the previous chapter we have considered 
how metaphor is much more than a linguistic phenomenon, but, indeed, a 
conceptual one. Here, The Iguana, Measuring the world and Lanark, qua specific 
hybrid novels, are shown in their epistemological value, in their unsettling 
capacity to deconstruct precisely the notion of ‘reality’ and the category of the 
‘individual’ as given, rather than as ongoing historical conquests of human 
beings. Ortese employs irony, critique of civilization and narrative magic to this 
end.The metamorphic magic of the novel and its depiction of the shifting 
boundaries of ‘reality’ articulate Ortese’s reflection on the complex relation 
among what we can know, a sense of identity and history. In Ortese’s hands 
magic is an epistemological tool, which points to the fluidity of ‘presence’ in the 
historical dimension. This very theme is at the core of anthropologist Ernesto De 
Martino’s thought too. 
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Italian anthropologist Ernesto De Martino in his Il Mondo Magico. 
Prolegomeni a una storia del magismo, first published in 1948, was critical of 
much British and French anthropology because, in his view, it failed to 
historicize the cultural phenomena of the ‘primitive people’ it observed. He 
maintained that magic is the first human attempt to state our own being in the 
world, a struggle for our own existence in a precarious world that more often 
than not undermines human life. De Martino outlined the theme of the ‘loss of 
presence’ as a coming out of the historical dimension‒‒a dimension that is 
specific to human individual and social existence‒‒while magical practices give 
the individual the possibility to overcome the very risk of losing one’s social and 
historical identity. Furthermore, it is only through the risks connected to magical 
practices that the individual and his community can overcome the risk of non-
being  and affirm their own existence in the historical world. Thus magic is the 
first step in the conquest of human self-awareness as a historical being and a 
system of guarantees for his being in the world. The individual and reality are 
seen as historical conquests by the human being, who through magic lays out a 
first stepping stone towards his spiritual self-liberation. De Martino’s view is 
interesting because it goes beyond an evolutionary paradigm that had 
characterized British anthropology from its inception. In fact De Martino was 
profoundly critical of labelling of magic as superstition or regressive and ignorant 
practices, and showed how positivist science was repelled by the very possibility 
of the existence of the paranormal and supernatural, thus exposing a prejudice 
typical of our rationalist western societies.  
It is precisely the complex phenomenon of modernity with its concomitant 
rationalism, scientism, capitalism and institutionalised religion that is at the 
centre of a deconstruction attempt in the three novels discussed here. Ortese, 
Gray and Kehlmann deconstruct precisely the notion of reality and the individual 
as givens, by employing the critique of civilization, satire and narrative magic. 
We will see how the novels are capable of dealing creatively with the issues of 
history and reification. 
Reading the novels was a powerful experience for me because they all 
appropriate specific historical moments and attempt a de-reification of the 
category of ‘history’ itself through the use of magical means of narration. Not 
only that: the novels pushed me as a reader to enact an imaginary confrontation 
with the fluid process of reality, in all its ambiguous shape-shifting. In fact, it is 
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my contention that as hybrid novels, Lanark, The Iguana and Measuring the 
World stage a sort of metaphysics of art, envisioning themselves as artistic 
endeavours that deal with and perform the very flux of reality: hybrid art as 
dealing with process and change as the very core of the real, rather than with 
questions of substance and Being. Thus, as shown below, Lanark deals with the 
hybrid by employing alchemical concepts and the principles of the magical 
assemblage, The Iguana thrives on shape-shifting and metamorphosis, while 
Measuring the World shows how chaos rules supreme beyond illusions of 
scientific control and quantification, as Gauss himself, during his balloon voyage, 
realizes when he catches the first glimpses of non-Euclidean geometry.  
These techniques and concepts of magic make for a peculiar reading experience, 
whereby history and modernity are seen as narrative constructs in flux. 
The foundations of the philosophy of modernity rely on a sharp distinction 
between the domain of intellectual and private belief on the one hand, and 
social institutions with sanctioned correct and accepted public practices, on the 
other. The public citizen and the private individual are not necessarily 
reconciled. This way of conceptualising human existence leaves completely 
unresolved the issue of the imagination as a matter of creative practice, rather 
than mere belief: in fact, imagination has been defined down the centuries in its 
relation to belief, whether as a make-believe or a ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief’. However, our very conceptualisations, including those at the base of 
‘modernity’ as the novels show in their different ways, arise from the creativity 
of the imagination, which according to Castoriadis is the very ‘magma’ whence 
every idea, practice and institution cristallize. As we shall see in the next 
section, Western imagination has shaped an unassailable ‘Constitution’ as the 
very foundation of ‘modernity’. 
 
7.2 Have We Ever Been Modern? 
In a seminal essay entitled We have never been modern ([1991] 1993), 
sociologist and anthropologist of science Bruno Latour sets out to describe the 
philosophical and scientific origins of modernity in Western Europe: he identifies 
Hobbes’ political theory in the Leviathan and Boyle’s work on the pneumatic 
pump, which won the approval of an emerging community of scientists, as the 
two founding moments of what he calls ‘the modern Constitution’. In fact the 
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division of competences between physical sciences and political science is 
predicated upon the separation of the non-human objects on one hand and the 
human subjects on the other. Yet, in order to exist, these two sets of practices 
need the mediation of a laboratory and a social contract, respectively. However, 
neither the laboratory nor the social contract can be assimilated entirely to the 
fields of non-human objects and of human subjects: they are both hybrids 
because in the laboratory the technical instruments and also animals are used by 
scientists sticking to agreed conventions, while in the social contract human 
subjects are being represented by non-human objects, creations such as the 
political institutions of the State. Nonetheless, to the ‘modern’ worldview the 
two realms of subjects and objects, natural sciences and social sciences, nature 
and society are neatly distinguished and separated. This means that ‘modernity’ 
is based on a double process of mediation and depuration: while we believe in 
the thorough separation of human subjects and non-human objects (depuration), 
the ‘Constitution’ of our modernity entails that a continuous process of 
mediation takes place between the two realms, in the form of hybrids whose 
existence we deny all too promptly. 
The ‘modern Constitution’ is an ingenious construction, based on two 
strong paradoxes and four guarantees which make it almost impossible to 
overcome. The first paradox is that nature is considered as endlessly 
transcendent and not a human construction, while society is considered a human 
construction and immanent to human action. The second paradox is that exactly 
the reverse is considered to be true: nature is something human beings construct 
in a laboratory by consent and observation, while society is not a human 
construction but something that transcends the individual. These two ambiguous 
paradoxes, which lay at the heart of the ‘modern Constitution’, are what make 
the guarantees protecting the status of modernity so formidable. 
The first guarantee is that even if we construct ‘nature’, it is as if we did 
not; the second guarantee is that even if we do not construct ‘society’, it is as if 
we did; thus the third guarantee is that ‘nature’ and ‘society’ must be 
completely distinct from one another, depuration and mediation must be neatly 
separated. The fourth and last guarantee is that God is elided and removed far 
away from both nature and society, but not completely abandoned: modern man 
can be an atheist without abandoning religion and spirituality in his heart. These 
four guarantees function as ‘checks and balances’ on each other, in the sense 
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that each pertaining domain of thought and action ‘polices’ the others. This is 
the strength and the essence of modernity: such an invincible concoction that, 
other cultures (or what Latour calls ‘nature-cultures’) have become pre-modern 
by contrast and have had no chance of escape or victory against the advance of 
‘modernity’. 
In fact when a modern person says that nature is transcendent, he is 
saying critically that nothing can be done against natural laws; when he says 
that nature is immanent, he is saying that we have endless possibilities; and if 
he says that society is immanent, then he means we are completely free, while 
when he says that society is transcendent, he is stating that nothing can be done 
against the laws of society. Thus the ‘modern Constitution’ allows and is based 
on the proliferation of hybrids, while even denying and removing their 
possibility. This happens because of the fact that the four guarantees, while 
being in opposition, de facto enable the coexistence of all contradictory 
conditions. But this powerful freedom of doing and undoing, affirming and 
denying, which characterizes the ‘modern Constitution’ is what has undermined 
the rigid separation of nature and society advocated by the Constitution itself. In 
this sense modernity has never existed and we have never been modern. 
Depuration on a conceptual level has made possible the proliferation of hybrids 
and ‘monsters’ at all levels; thus the contradictions of modernity, once they 
have emerged and been exposed, make for the defeat of modernity itself. When 
we start to think about the workings of depuration and mediation at the same 
time, we stop being modern, because modernity is based on this vast repression 
of the realm of the hybrid, while factually allowing its existence in a silent way. 
Latour’s critique shows how the history of modernity as a succession of 
technical, scientific, economic, political revolutions which have broken all the 
ties with the Ancien Régime is a faulty representational device, while the very 
proliferation of the repressed hybrids makes for the collapse of modernity. In 
fact while in the history of modern Western philosophy the depuration process 
and separation of subject and object goes on to the end, from Kant down to 
phenomenology, Habermas and the post-moderns, the mediation process also 
continues and causes the proliferation of hybrid ‘almost-objects’, while the two 
poles of society and nature go further apart. 
Postmodern philosophers, according to Latour, are the gravediggers of the 
modern project. In fact by criticizing science and thinking that scientists are 
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‘extraterrestrial’ (Latour, 1993: 61-2), they shoot at the heart of modernism. 
However, Latour says:  
The post-moderns believe they are still modern because they accept 
the total division between the material and the technological world 
on the one hand and the linguistic play of speaking subjects on the 
other […] But they are mistaken, because true moderns have always 
surreptitiously multiplied intermediaries in order to try to 
conceptualize the massive expansion of hybrids as well as their 
purification. The sciences have always been as intimately linked to 
communities as Boyle’s pump or Hobbes’ Leviathan. It is the double 
contradiction that is modern, the contradiction between the two 
constitutional guarantees of Nature and Society on the one hand, and 
between the practice of purification and the practice of mediation on 
the other. By believing in the total separation of the three terms, by 
really believing that scientists are extra-terrestrials, that matter is 
immaterial, that technology is ahuman, that politics is pure 
simulacrum the postmoderns in fact finish off modernism, by 
definitively taking away the mainspring that had been the source of 
its tension. (61-2)  
 
What is interesting in Latour’s analysis is the implication that we have 
never abandoned the one and same a-modern ‘anthropological matrix’ and, for 
the purposes of this study, it provides the possibility to go beyond the ‘modern’- 
‘postmodern’ divide in the analysis of literary works where hybrids and monsters 
proliferate abundantly. In fact these novels explore the peculiar characters of 
our a-modern ‘nature-culture’, which through an abstract conceptual purism 
allows hybridization practices and metamorphic identities. Gray, Ortese and 
Kehlmann all show the emergence and development of the ‘modern’, in its 
various stages, and expose its contradictions in the construction and depiction of 
reality. First, we start with Gray’s novel Lanark. 
 
7.3 Lanark, the ‘Origins of Modernity’ and the Diagnosis of its 
Condition 
Lanark was published for the first time in 1981 and was hailed as the 
contemporary Scottish classic, on a par with James Joyce’s Ulysses in Irish 
literature. As it will be shown, Lanark, as a novel which exposes the various 
processes and institutions of what we call ‘modernity’, mimics through its 
construction, meta-fictional strategies and inter-textual references the very 
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process whereby a society institutes itself in all its aspects, both material and 
symbolic.  
I adopt the concept of an a-modern cultural matrix, and the use of post-
mythological strategies and re-mythicization in its very context, in order to 
analyse the novel and its critique of ‘modernity’. Moreover, in order to uphold 
the claim that the concept of magic, both in its religious and secular forms, can 
help advance literary discourse on fiction which blends conventions and genres, I 
employ a Jungian perspective on alchemy, as well as references to fetishism, 
religious magic and illusionism. Finally, I analyse the novel’s structural logic and 
textual games.  
 
7.4 A Look At Lanark’s ‘True’ Sources in the ‘Epilogue’ and 
their Significance 
The above insight of an a-modern anthropological matrix in Western culture 
finds an uncanny creative correspondence in Lanark. While scanning the ‘Index 
of Plagiarisms’ in small print ‒ contained in the ‘Epilogue’‒ it is easy to be 
carried away by the comic verve of the device of mock-academic notes and 
plagiarized sources. Many of the ‘plagiarisms’ are in fact a pleasure to read for 
their irony and playfulness. They are classified in the following way: 
There are three kinds of literary theft in this book: 
BLOCK PLAGIARISM, where someone else’s work is printed as a distinct 
typographical unit, IMBEDDED PLAGIARISM, where stolen words are 
concealed within the body of the narrative, and DIFFUSE PLAGIARISM, 
where scenery, characters, actions or novel ideas have been stolen 
without the original words describing them. To save space these will 
be referred to hereafter as Blockplag, Implag, and Difplag. (485)  
 
Apart from the parodic intent, and well hidden among the rest, there are three 
fundamental ‘plagiarisms’, which are key to understanding Lanark as a whole 
and need to be quoted at length: 
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HOBBES, THOMAS 
Books 3 and 4 are Difplags of Hobbes’ daemonic metaphor Leviathan, 
which starts with the words ‘By art is created that great Leviathan 
called a Commonwealth or State (in Latin, Civitas) which is but an 
artificial man.’ Describing a state or tribe as a single man is as old as 
society – Plutarch does it in his life of Coriolanus‒‒but Hobbes 
deliberately makes the metaphor a monstrous one. His state is the 
sort of creature Frankenstein made: mechanical yet lively; lacking 
ideas, yet directed by cunning brains; morally and physically clumsy, 
but full of strength got from people forced to supply its belly, the 
market. In a famous title page this state is shown threatening a whole 
earth with the symbols of warfare and religion. Hobbes named it from 
the verse drama Job, in which God describes it as a huge water beast 
he is especially proud to have made because it is ‘king of all the 
children of pride.’ […] (489 – 90) 
 
JUNG, CARL 
Nearly every chapter of the book is a Difplag of the mythic ‘Night 
Journey of the Hero’ described in that charming but practically 
useless treatise Psychology and Alchemy. This is most obvious in the 
purification by swallowing at the end of chapter 6. […] But the hero, 
Lanark, gains an un-Jungian political dimension by being swallowed by 
Hobbes’ Leviathan. (See HOBBES.) (491) 
 
MONBODDO, LORD 
Chap. 32, para. 3. The reference to James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, 
demonstrates the weakness of the fabulous and allegorical part of 
Lanark. The ‘institute’ seems to represent that official body of 
learning which began with the ancient priesthoods and Athenian 
academies, was monopolized by the Catholic Church and later 
dispersed among universities and research foundations. But if the 
‘council’ represents government, then the most striking union of 
‘council’ and ‘institute’ occurred in 1662 when Charles II chartered 
the Royal Society for the Advancement of the Arts and Sciences. 
James Burnett of Monboddo belonged to an Edinburgh Corresponding 
Society which advanced the cause of science quite unofficially until 
granted a royal charter in 1782. He was a court of session judge, a 
friend of King George and an erudite metaphysician with a faith in 
satyrs and mermaids, but has only been saved from oblivion by the 
animadversions against his theory of human descent from the ape in 
Boswell’s Life of Johnson. By plagiarizing and annexing his name to a 
dynasty of scientific Caesars the author can only be motivated by 
Scottish chauvinism or a penchant for resounding nomenclature. A 
more fitting embodiment of government, science, trade and religion 
would have been Robert Boyle, son of the Earl of Cork and father of 
modern chemistry. He was founder of the Royal Society, and his 
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strong religious principles also led him to procure a charter for the 
East India Company, which he expected to propagate Christianity in 
the Orient. (494) 
As these references to Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle show, Gray’s creative 
analysis of modernity is uncannily close to Latour’s argument. Gray highlights 
the hybrid genesis of modernity, pointing to the strange mixture of secular 
endorsements and religious principles at work both in Hobbes’ monstrous 
conception of the state as an ‘artificial man’ and in Boyle’s scientific and 
religious endeavours. The reference to Lord Monboddo, on the other hand, is 
more than ‘Scottish chauvinism’ or ‘a penchant for resounding nomenclature’: 
Iser (1993) reports the real Monboddo’s commonplace idea of the imagination as 
an intermediate faculty between the senses and reason, dating back to Aristotle, 
as current in the eighteenth century. In his Origin and Progress of Language 
(1773) Lord Monboddo states: 
The imagination has … a creative power … is conversant with the 
future as well as the past, and paints … scenes that never did exist, 
and it is likely never will; for it may be said to create even the 
materials of those scenes … formed upon the model of objects that 
have been presented by the sense, and are, as it were, imitations of 
them. (quoted in Iser: 176-77) 
Lanark is also a novel about the destruction of the imagination effected by the 
mechanisms of a (hyper)-capitalist society. Monboddo’s speech in the last part of 
the novel conveys the rhetorical topoi of the apology of science and progress 
through centuries of Western cultural discourse. 
This is the political dimension of Lanark. However, this is linked to an 
individual dimension, as the reference to Jung proves: Lanark’s attempt at 
individuation and the obstacles he meets on the way are intertwined with the 
political ploys of the institute and the council; nonetheless, his journey through 
the night and adventures have a mythical dimension to them, inspired by that 
‘useless’ treatise on Psychology and Alchemy.  It is worth reflecting on the fact 
that the political and the mythical elements work together in the construction of 
the novel, implying that individuation is a feat that cannot be accomplished on 
one’s own only. Being able to be oneself has to be tempered with concern for 
one own’s fellow human beings. But why on earth did Gray select Psychology and 
Alchemy of all Jung’s works? 
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The answer is manifold. First of all, it provides a narrative structure, the 
myth of the hero’s night journey. However, this is only the most evident answer. 
Lanark is obsessed with finding a place where the sun shines. When Ozenfant 
tries to convince Lanark to become a doctor to cure other people from dragon-
hide, Lanark answers in Sartrean fashion: 
‘You want to mix me with someone else’s despair, and I hate despair! 
I want to be free and freedom is freedom from other people!’ 
Ozenfant smiled and nodded. He said ‘A very dragonish sentiment! But 
you are no longer a dragon. It is time you learned a different 
sentiment.’ (70) 
 
Nonetheless Lanark still wants to love and have friends: 
 
‘I want the sun.’ 
Ozenfant began laughing heartily, then said, ‘I beg your pardon, but 
to hear such a sober fellow declare such a strange passion was a little 
unexpected. Why the sun?’ 
Lanark was irritated beyond normal reticence. He said, ‘I want to 
love, and meet friends, and work in it.’ 
‘But you are no Athenian, no Florentine, you are a modern man! In 
modern civilizations those who work in the sunlight are a despised and 
dwindling minority. Even farmers are moving indoors. As for 
lovemaking and friendship, humanity has always preferred enjoying 
these at night. If you wanted the moon I could sympathize, but Apollo 
is quite discredited.’ (78) 
Lanark’s quest for the sun is more than a weather related whim, it’s about self-
realization in a close knitted community, about finding meaning in one’s life. As 
world mythology shows, the Self is in fact represented by the sun or sun-god. It 
is the human eternal quest for fulfilment. Ozenfant’ s answer about the moon is 
not only a possible reference to ambition (‘wanting the moon’) and to historical 
contemporary events such as the first men on the moon. It is something more 
and it is linked to alchemy, and in particular to the occult meaning of the 
interaction between sun and moon, as described in alchemical treatises such as 
the Aurora Consurgens, and explained in psychological terms by Jung in 
Psychology and Alchemy. Before looking at how Lanark’s subtext is alchemical 
and magical, it is necessary to note how the protagonist’s mythical quest is 
reworked. Gray recasts a traditional quest myth, and the theme of the descent 
to hell or into the night, by assembling different elements together but leaving 
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the marks of the assembling on the ‘limbs’ of his work, in a Frankenstein-like 
fashion. In this way the double structure of the novel, both realistic and 
fantastic, is somehow disjunctive and split. Gray takes on the myth of the night 
journey as a frame and leitmotiv but also reworks Hobbes’ mythical Leviathan 
state and shows it in its artificial and split character: ‘The recipe is separation’, 
as one of the characters says. Thus Gray shows how modernity is founded on a 
myth itself, the myth of progress and rationalization, by bringing together 
different myths and ‘nursery tales’172 and juggling them in the main mythical 
frame of the night journey or the descent to hell. In this sense he employs post-
mythological strategies, in that he takes already explained and culturally 
contextualized myths and by a new way of assembling them he deprives them of 
their conventional meaning, in order to re-mythicize them according to a new 
vision. 
In Jungian terms, Lanark and Thaw can be seen as Gray’s answer to the 
Scottish tradition of the ‘Caledonian anti-syzygy’, an expression first used by G. 
Gregory Smith in his survey of Scottish literature in 1919: according to this 
scholar, Scottish fiction has a tradition of split characters such as Jekyll and 
Hyde and is characterized by a strong concern for the workings of a 
consciousness swinging between opposite personality types, like James Hoggs’ 
justified sinner. Lanark and Thaw, instead, are not so dissimilar from each 
other. One is the result of the other. Their problem is their incapacity to 
acknowledge their anima, and their incapacity for emotional contact and love. 
Where Thaw in his adolescence had been a ‘devotee of the moon’ with its 
esoteric cult of emotional self-sufficiency and detachment, Lanark wants the 
sun, a communal life in the day light. Yet they are both baffled in their efforts. 
At the end Lanark has a glimpse of hope: ‘He was a slightly worried, ordinary old 
man but glad to see the light in the sky’ (560). He is ‘ordinary’, so his 
individuation has not been accomplished fully, yet he sees some light. Sun and 
moon are alchemical symbols for the opposite poles of consciousness and the 
unconscious which need to be integrated. Lanark does experience a fleeting 
moment of personal apotheosis while climbing uphill with his son Alexander, 
which Cairns comments upon in the following way: 
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In that one moment the apparently endless repetitions in which Thaw 
and Lanark are caught up become redemptive, because of the figure 
Lanark sees climbing the hill is both Thaw as a child and his own son: 
[…] Thaw and Lanark, son and father, reality and imagination, history 
and the history-less are momentarily fused together […](in Crawford 
and Nairn 1991: 106) 
7.5 The Alchemical Process and the Magic of the Body Politic 
In spite of Gray’s dismissive irony, Jung’s Psychology and Alchemy deserves a 
closer look in order to uncover deeper layers in the novel. In the same way, 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is to be examined more closely. In fact these two works 
provided Gray with alchemical and magical concepts that, although not directly 
evident in the novel, are nonetheless the founding rock on which its overall 
vision of the interdependence of the religious/psychological and the 
secular/political rests. In fact these opposite domains have been elaborated as 
such during the modern period, starting with Hobbes and later the 
Enlightenment, and support each other’s existence as strongly closed and 
separate types of concerns and practices, whose hybrid character has been 
carefully repressed and overshadowed. In Psychology and Alchemy, Jung 
explains: 
Slowly, in the course of the eighteenth century, alchemy perished in 
its own obscurity. Its method of explanation‐‐‘obscurum per obscurius, 
ignotum per ignotius’ (the obscure by the more obscure, the unknown 
by the more unknown)‐‐was incompatible with the spirit of the 
enlightenment and particularly with the dawning science of chemistry 
towards the end of the century. But these two new intellectual forces 
only gave the coup de grace to alchemy. Its inner decay had started at 
least a century earlier, at the same time of Jakob Boehme, when 
many alchemists deserted their alembics and melting-pots and 
devoted themselves entirely to (Hermetic) philosophy. It was then 
that the chemist and the Hermetic philosopher parted company. 
Chemistry became natural science, whereas Hermetic philosophy lost 
the empirical ground from under its feet and aspired to bombastic 
allegories and inane speculations which were kept alive only by 
memories of a better time. (Collected Works 12: 1953, 227) 
Before that time in fact ‘empirical science and mystical philosophy were more or 
less undifferentiated’ (Jung, Collected Works 12: 1953, 228). This statement can 
help us make sense of Gray’s use of an alchemical subtext in Lanark as an 
implicit reference to the plight of the commodified and fragmented imagination 
in a wild market economy. Abstraction, fragmentation, over-specialization and 
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alienation are all faces of this same condition. And of course, there also is an 
individual dimension to be considered. 
Jung’s study of alchemy was of fundamental importance for the 
development of his concept of individuation: 
Through the study of . . . collective transformation processes and 
through understanding of alchemical symbolism I arrived at the 
central concept of my psychology: the process of individuation. (Jung, 
cited in Schwartz-Salant, 1995, p. 23) 
The correspondence between alchemy and psychological integration is 
remarkable. The nigredo, or a certain darkness of the soul, which corresponds to 
melancholy or depression, in an optimal individuation process gives way to the 
albedo, or whiteneing and finally to redness, or rubedo, which is the sacred 
marriage of the opposites, of consciousness and the unconscious, symbolized by 
‘sun’ and ‘moon’ respectively: 
The illumination comes to a certain extent from the unconscious, 
since it is mainly dreams that put us on the track of enlightenment. 
This dawning light corresponds to the albedo, the moonlight which in 
the opinion of some alchemists heralds the rising sun. The growing 
redness (rubedo) which now follows denotes an increase of warmth 
and light coming from the sun, consciousness. This corresponds to the 
increasing participation of consciousness, which now begins to react 
emotionally to the contents produced by the unconscious. At first the 
process of integration is a ‘fiery’ conflict, but gradually it leads over 
to the ‘melting’ or synthesis of the opposites. The alchemists termed 
this the rubedo, in which the marriage of the red man and the white 
woman, Sol and Luna, is consummated.173 
 
In Psychology and Alchemy, Jung clarifies further the significance of the sun in 
attaining the last stage of the alchemical work: 
The sun, by its many millions of revolutions, spins the gold into the 
earth. Little by little the sun has imprinted its image on the earth, 
and that image is the gold. The sun is the image of God, the heart is 
the sun’s image in man, just as gold is the sun’s image in the earth 
(also called Deus terrenus) and God is known in the gold. The golden 
image of God is the anima aurea, which, when breathed into common 
quicksilver, changes it into gold. (Jung, CW 12: 343-44) 
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Marie Louise von Franz in her lectures on Alchemy thus comments on the 
alchemical marriage of opposites described in an important Arabic text: 
Now we will turn to the sun’s love letter to the crescent moon, the 
waxing moon. The sun says: ‘In great and ultimate weakness, I will 
give you from my beauty the light through which one reaches 
perfection’. 
Purely astronomically, the sun has light while the moon only borrows 
from the sun, that is, the sun gives light to the moon, there is quite a 
natural basis of this. The sun in its radiant, emanating  form, intends 
to impart some of its light to the moon so that the moon may reach 
perfection. 
We have to realize what the sun and the moon meant to people at 
that time. The sun in general is an image of the Godhead; it is even 
later said in the text that the sun is the spiritual divinity, and this is in 
beauty emanating goodness, perhaps without shadow. It is beautiful 
and it imparts its light to the imperfect moon. Now the moon is 
feminine, it is a receptacle for the dead, it is responsible for all 
waxing and waning phenomena on earth: the growing of plants and 
their withering, the menstruation of women, the ebb and flow of 
tides, the becoming and dying again, and it therefore rules the 
corruptible world. […] 
Therefore the moon in all feminine humility and submission points out 
her absolutely equal right to existence: the sun needs the empty 
vessel into which its light can be poured, it needs darkness on which 
the light can shine, it needs matter in which the spirit can become 
visible. […] 
Here there is the conflict between the principle of consciousness and 
nature – the unconscious, the unknown. […] 
The sun and the moon say that if they are coupled in a balanced state 
then it is like a man and a woman who are completely there for each 
other. (von Franz, 1980: 149 – 53) 
In Lanark, Thaw’s fascination with the moon gives way to Lanark’s obsession 
with the sun, without the perfect marriage of opposites being realized. Thus the 
protagonist swings between the two extremes without reaching psychological 
integration or achieving a satisfactory relationship with a woman (His hope is his 
son Alexander, and only at the end he has a glimpse of the sun). Moreover, 
Lanark gets swallowed by the political Leviathan, and this is his ‘night journey’. 
Now the alchemical process is deformed and becomes monstrous. In the 
alchemical process, 
Materials were mixed and worked within an alchemical vessel, 
variously known as a vas, retort, or alembic. Materials were combined 
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(coniunctio), separated (separatio), evaporated and distilled 
(sublimatio), and coagulated (coagulatio).174
 
  
But in Lanark the human being is swallowed and literally digested within 
the belly of the political Leviathan: separation is the only process taking place, 
human beings are used as fuel and energy supply for materialistic purposes. 
Matter sways over spirit. Thaw’s damning moment is his negative epiphany about 
the state of society and the individual: ‘Men are pies that bake and eat 
themselves, and the recipe is hate […]’ (Lanark, 2007: 188). This statement is 
taken up again in the frontispiece of Book 2, where it is linked up to the 
alchemical stage of separatio: Homo a se coctum esumque crustum est hoc fecit 
separatio.[Man is a pie which bakes and eats itself, and separation made it] 
In the meta-fictional ‘Epilogue’, the encounter between Lanark and his 
author refers to Hobbes’ Leviathan again: the author is in fact ‘a King with a Bad 
Constitution’ who ‘encounters a critic’ (Lanark, 2007: 480–81). Not only that: 
the reference to the metaphor of the monster’s digesting society and the 
individual is even more explicit. Lanark asks his author: 
‘Are you pretending to be God?’ 
‘Not nowadays. I used to be part of him, though. Yes, I am part of a 
part which was once the whole. But I went bad and was excreted. […] 
Creation festers in me. I am excreting you and your world at the 
present moment. […]’ 
‘I am not religious,’ said Lanark, ‘but I don’t like you mixing religion 
with excrement. Last night I saw part of the person you are referring 
to and it was not at all nasty.’ (481) 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is composed of four parts: ‘Of Man’, ‘Of 
Commonwealth’, ‘Of a Christian Commonwealth’, ‘Of the Kingdome of 
Darknesse’. In our age usually the last two are neglected, while the first two are 
the focus of reflection. Yet they are to be considered together as a whole. In 
fact Hobbes was addressing his contemporaries who lived in an imperfect and 
still young capitalist society. His main concern was providing them with a 
blueprint to peaceful and comfortable living, trying to convince them that if 
they transferred great part of their individual power to the sovereign they would 
avoid new civil wars and secure a safe life, which is the precondition for the 
exercise of all trades. The first part outlines the ‘nature’ of man, the second 
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deals with the ‘State’, the third and fourth take pains to delineate the true 
Christian doctrine against Papist superstition and abuse of power.  
In dealing with man and the state Hobbes applied Galileo’s ‘resolutive-
compositive’ method, which had far-reaching implications for his vision of the 
‘State’ and society at large: 
[…] the resolutive stage of the Galilean method, as applied to political 
science, consisted in resolving political society into the motions of its 
parts––individual human beings––and resolving their motions in turn 
into imagined or hypothetical simple forces which, compounded, 
could be shown to explain them. […] Hobbes’s bold hypothesis was 
that the motion of the individual human beings could be reduced to 
the effects of a mechanical apparatus consisting of sense organs, 
nerves, muscles, imagination, memory, and reason, which apparatus 
moved in response to the impact (or imagined impact) of external 
bodies on it. (Macpherson: 1968, 27–8) 
This determinist vision of the human being could not make much of the 
imagination, which was regarded merely as ‘decaying sense’, and could be 
either ‘simple’ or ‘compounded’ (Leviathan, Chapter Two). Here the ensemblist 
logic of legein and teukhein is at work, managing to disguise a specific form of 
the imaginary, the mechanical image of the world, as self-evident and utterly 
rational.  
Starting from this conception of the human being, the ‘State’ is a 
compound, ‘an artificial Man’: 
For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or 
State, (in latine Civitas) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of 
greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection 
and defence it was intended; and in which, the Sovereignty is an 
Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body […] 
(Leviathan, Introduction) 
 
The State is thus a compound containing, or assembling all men in a certain 
society. This same logic of a mechanical sum of parts or ‘limbs’ making up a 
‘State’ produces a monster, as it is infused with a superior power than that of 
the individuals who constitute it. The state becomes the ‘State’, a super-human, 
sovereign entity that is infused with a sort of mystical power and hovers 
somewhere between the material and the ghostly, what Taussig (1993) calls a 
specific form of ‘state fetishism’, the ‘maleficium’: 
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By State fetishism I mean a certain aura of might as figured by the 
Leviathan or, in a quite different mode, by Hegel’s intricately argued 
vision of the State as not merely the embodiment of reason, of the 
Idea, but also as an impressively organic unity, something much 
greater than its parts. (218) 
It is precisely the coming together of reason and violence in the State 
that creates, in a secular and modern world, the bigness of the big S 
[…] (223, emphasis in the original.) 
The maleficio […] brings out the sacred sheen of the secular, and this 
ability is especially germane to an inquiry into State fetishism in that, 
as I have said, following Durkheim’s view of the sacred, the pure and 
impure sacred are violently at odds and passionately interlocked at 
one and the same time. It is to this ability to draw out the sacred 
quality of State power, and to out-fetishize its fetish quality, that the 
maleficium – as I use it – speaks eons. (237) 
Robert E. Stillman (1995) points out Hobbes’ ambiguity, his ‘battle against 
monstrous texts’ (791) and metaphors through the employment of a more 
extreme metaphor.175 He writes: 
His writing is committed to perform for us (and ultimately, I will 
argue, to have us perform) a transformation of metaphor into logic – a 
transformation, it should be stressed from the start, that aims at a 
strangely magical event, the incarnation of sovereign power.  
 On many occasions, Hobbes effects the transformation of monstrous 
metaphor into geometric logic by erasing figures of speech through 
rational elaboration of their significance. Paraphrase is a great 
purifier. (800, emphasis mine) 
In Lanark this ambiguous dimension is fully explored in the last book, 
describing the protagonist’s political entanglement with the Institute, the 
Council and the ‘Creature’. However, it is the ‘Epilogue’ that links up the 
monstrous character of state fetishism with the author’s farcical illusionism: 
‘A conjuror!’ said Lanark with loathing. ‘A damned conjuror!’ 
‘Yes,’ said the conjuror humbly, ‘I’m sorry. Please sit down and let 
me explain why the story has to go like this. […]’ (484) 
 
‘[…] Your survival as a character and mine as an author depend on us 
seducing a living soul in our printed world and trapping it here long 
enough for us to steal the imaginative energy which gives us life. To 
cast a spell over this stranger I am doing abominable things. I am 
prostituting my most sacred memories into the commonest possible 
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words and sentences. When I need more striking sentences or ideas I 
steal them from other writers, usually twisting them to blend with my 
own. Worst of all I am using the great world given at birth – the world 
of atoms – as a ragbag of shapes and colours to make this second-hand 
entertainment look more amusing.’ (485) 
The printed world conjured up by the fictional author has the status of a 
fetish, hovering between the ‘real world’ and the intangible ‘imaginary’. This is 
also an ironical reflection on the ambiguous relation between the author and his 
audience in a capitalist society, where the former has to spell-bind the readers 
in order to make a living and survive in a competing market. The author is no 
longer a seer, a  high magician or priest of art, but a ‘conjuror’, who fakes 
magic for readers who ask just for that: there is a certain flavour of 
inauthenticity in this relation based on secular magic, on what During has 
defined ‘the magical assemblage’. The very employment and reworking of other 
authors’ texts enacts that logic of assembling and constructing Castoriadis (1987) 
writes about. The stealing of the readers’ ‘imaginative energy’ in the secondary 
world of words points to the parasitical character of the magic of fiction. How 
this ‘magical assemblage’ is achieved in the novel is the subject of the next 
section.  
 
7.6 Textual Games and Logic in Lanark 
Castoriadis’ principles of legein and teukhein are embodied in, performed 
and thus exposed in their arbitrary character by the very way Lanark is 
‘assembled’ together, while the points of artificial juncture of the narrative are 
left visible and exposed for the reader to reflect on. The novel requires that the 
reader engages with the textual game of what Iser (1993) ‒ following Roger 
Caillois in Les Jeux et les Hommes, le Masque et le Vertige (1958) ‒  calls 
mimicry. According to Caillois, mimicry applies to all those games where 
illusion, dissimulation of reality and simulation of another reality, parody, 
satire, transvestism, masks and roles are involved. Caillois has in mind the 
camouflages of the insect world, as the only rule of the game of mimicry is the 
continuous shift into an illusion which is accepted as more real than the real. 
While all fiction is mimicry, the double narrative of Lanark and Thaw is  a 
wonderful example of it, as the author refracts ‘reality’ and magnifies it through 
fantastical lenses at the same time. The fantastical dimension is given as the 
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hyper-real one. The ‘Epilogue’ too is a meta-fictional masterpiece of mimicry, as 
we have seen through the illusionism of the fictional author. 
On the other hand, the story of the Oracle that tells Lanark’s life as Thaw 
is presented as separate from the rest of the narrative, but actually it has the 
function of debunking the conventions of realism and the claims of the 
omniscient narrator, as Rima’s reply to Lanark at the end of the Oracle’s 
account makes clear: 
Rima said,‘what are you talking about?’ 
‘The oracle’s account of my life before Unthank. He’s just finished 
off.’  
Rima said firmly, ‘In the first place that oracle was a woman, not a 
man. In the second place her story was about me. You were so bored 
that you fell asleep and obviously dreamed something else.’ (357) 
The depersonalization of the Oracle is carefully constructed through the account 
of how from human being it became just a disembodied voice. This tendency 
towards depersonalization and complete denpendence on quantitative logic in 
contemporary societies is criticized at all levels in the novel. 
As a writer and artist, Gray works with the imaginary, both individual and 
social, in a way that shows how the relationship between audience and author, 
as foregrounded in Lanark, is a multifaceted phenomenon. Readers come 
gradually to realize how they are being manipulated, amused and provoked at 
the same time in their role of consumers and co-creators of fiction. Their hidden 
desires are being played with at the interface between their private pleasure 
and public image. The importance of working with desire should not be 
underestimated in the shaping of both the social and the individual imaginary. 
This same imaginary, in the sense outlined by Castoriadis, is worked with 
and reshaped still differently by Anna Maria Ortese and Daniel Kehlmann. The 
latter’s novel Measuring the World is yet another example of mimicry. The 
structure of the novel is characterised by parallelism and convergence of the 
two protagonists’ lives, with uncanny motifs cropping up at important points in 
the narrative. In The Iguana by Ortese the reader has to accept what Caillois 
(and Iser after him) calls ilynx, or vertigo, whereby the stability of perceptions is 
undermined and reality as we know it is annihilated. As we shall see next, in The 
Iguana the planes of ‘reality’ are continuously shifting and unreliable. 
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7.7 Strange Metamorphic Art: The Iguana and The Tempest 
As Wood has pointed out,176 Anna Maria Ortese’s rejection of (Neo)-realism 
was due to what she considered its superficiality, because of its attempt to 
account only for the material side of existence, denying the convergence of 
biological and metaphysical concerns that she, on the contrary, makes tangible 
in the very figure of the iguana. Ortese is against ‘dehumanizing capitalism’ and 
its realist art, seen as a consequence of the ‘corrupted ideals of the 
Enlightenment’ (Wood: 1995, 183).  
Apart from the themes, The Iguana explicitly pays homage to The 
Tempest by unfolding as a performative text where the action moves along with 
the ever-shifting identities of its characters and the uncanny atmosphere of the 
island. From the beginning to the end, the voice of the narrator addresses the 
‘Reader’ in a way that undermines its reliability and omniscience, while drawing 
attention to its fictionality and the blanks resisting its own role in packaging the 
story. The theatrical aspects of The Iguana are evident in the descriptions of the 
island, its inhabitants and their house, ‘una grigia e squallida costruzione a un 
sol piano, adorna, su un lato, di una torretta’, ‘parve al conte più un’indicazione 
di una casa, come usa nel modern teatro, che una vera abitazione’ (2007: 28): ‘a 
one-storey construction, ugly and grey, with a small tower against one side, 
which strikes Daddo ‘less as a house than as a stage prop’ (1987: 15). 
In The Iguana ‘conventions of time and space are put aside’ (Wood: 1995, 
175) and geography is more than a set of co-ordinates and maps: the geography 
of the oppression brought about by capitalism is reproduced in the distorted 
relations between the Marquis, the brothers Guzman and the iguana on the tiny 
island named Ocaña (after Manrique’s example in Coplas por la Muerte de su 
Padre, a famous Spanish poem of the fifteenth century, directly quoted in the 
text, referring to a Spanish inland town of this name); it is also reminiscent of 
Treasure Island (1883) by Stevenson in the way its atmosphere is first described. 
Ortese’s reworking of both Shakespeare’s and Stevenson’s imaginary 
islands‒‒the latter destined to excite the passionate interests of children and 
adults alike‒‒and their explicit transformation into a colonial setting is a 
comment not only on the power of money in general but also, indirectly, on the 
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state of the publishing industry in the present age. In fact, whereas Stevenson 
decided to write for a large audience and to please their taste for adventure, 
Ortese turns his island into a foil for the consideration of media’s complicity into 
capitalist injustice. 
The second part of the novel is called ‘The Tempest’, recalling to the 
reader’s mind Shakespeare’s play, also set on an eerie island, with the once- 
loved Caliban now rejected and enslaved by Prospero, whose name means in 
Italian ‘wealthy, full of abundance’. 
Italian writer Anna Maria Ortese published her novel The Iguana in 1965. 
In Italy her novel was apparently alien in its style, form and contents. As such, it 
was ostracized by the intellectual establishment and neglected. Yet Ortese saw 
much deeper into the matter when she declared later: 
Giá iniziava il decennio sessanta. Mi trasferii a Roma, in questo 
periodo, e scrissi un breve romanzo intitolato L’iguana. Era di scherno 
e protesta. Protesta nello stile‒‒improvvisamente abbandonavo lo 
sgradito realismo di superficie‒‒e scherno in quanto mostravo di 
prendere sul serio la insensatezza umana o di classe. Un brav’uomo va 
in un’isola‒‒è molto ricco e puó andare dovunque‒‒e conosce un 
mostro. Lo prende come cosa possibile, e vorrebbe reintegrarlo‒‒ 
suppone ci sia stata una caduta‒‒nella societá umana, anzi Borghese, 
che ritiene il colmo della virtú. Ma si è sbagliato: perché il mostro è 
un vero mostro, anzi esprime l’animo puro e profondo dell’universo‒‒ 
di cui il signore non sa piú nulla, tranne che è merce e vi possono 
apporvi cartellini col prezzo, e contrattare stelle e cosí via. La 
conclusione non era lieta (finiva in una rivolta della Natura), e dopo 
averci pensato un pochino, la sostituii con una piú affabile e lieve, 
pensando cosí che il libro non desse nell’occhio ai critici da strapazzo, 
e si potesse vendere. Invece non si vendé ugualmente. (Corpo 
Celeste, 1997: 80) 
The sixties were already starting. I moved to Rome then, and wrote a 
short novel called The Iguana. A novel expressing scorn and protest: 
the style expressed protest in that suddenly I abandoned the 
unpleasant superficiality of realism, and scorn in that I took seriously 
human or class foolishness. A good man sails to an island, since he is 
very rich and can go everywhere, and meets a monster. He thinks this 
is possible and would like to reintegrate it into the human, bourgeois 
society which to him is the height of virtue. He believes a fall has 
taken place, but he is wrong, because the monster is a real monster; 
rather it embodies the pure deep soul of the Universe, something he 
does not know any longer, except as a merchandize with price tags 
on, and the possibility of bargaining over stars and so forth. The end 
of the novel was not happy‒‒it ended with nature’s revolt‒‒and after 
thinking about it, I replaced this end with a gladder and lighter one. 
In fact I thought that in this way the book would escape the attention 
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of third-rate critics and could be sold. Instead it did not sell any way. 
(My translation) 
Here the author refers to an alternative conclusion which, in an interview of 
1977, she described in the following way: 
 Il libro finiva, dopo tanto gioco e poesia, in un massacro. I fratelli 
Guzman, come in un sogno, azionavano un mitra, e il Conte così buono 
cadeva, senza mai svegliarsi dal suo sogno o peccato. Ma questa 
conclusione mi ispirò un terorre così grande, che la lasciai da parte. 
Preferii invece quella che è stata pubblicata, dove l’innamoramento è 
solo la maschera di una più profonda e vertiginosa attenzione: il Conte 
(Bontà generica, innocente, di ‘classe’) ha intravisto il vero, la 
degradazione e la segregazione dell’essere umano divenuto ‘popolo’ 
ma non può ammettere che sia altro che una bestia fantastica.177 
After so much play and poetry, the book ended in a massacre. The 
brothers Guzman, as if in a dream, set in motion a machine-gun, and 
the good Count fell, without ever waking up from his dream or sin. 
But this conclusion inspired in me such a deep terror that I left it out. 
Instead I preferred the one which was published, where the Count’s 
falling in love is only the mask of a more profound and giddy 
attention: the Count (who stands for the generic, innocent, ‘class-
conscious’ Good) has had a glimpse of the real, the degradation and 
segregation of the human being who has become mere ‘people’, but 
cannot admit that it is other than a fantastical beast. (My translation) 
The Iguana is a complex and multi-layered novel. One of its conspicuous 
themes is the critique of the Italian publishing industry located in Milan and 
catering for an audience hungry for the exotic. Ortese links this issue to the 
wider capitalist economy and particularly the estate market, with its hunger for 
new lands to turn into tourist resorts. By emphasizing this specific connection, 
Ortese explores some of the complexities of Italy’s booming capitalism and the 
stirrings of the anti-colonialist movements. 
The novel is composed of two sections: the first is entitled ‘The Man who 
Buys Islands’, the second is called ‘The Tempest’. Throughout, Ortese reworks 
many of the concerns of Shakespeare’s Tempest. After navigation along the 
Spanish and Portuguese coasts, the protagonist Aleardo, alias Daddo, Count of 
Milan, sees the outline of a horn-shaped island, which is not reported on nautical 
maps. Yet, his boatswain Salvato knows its name‒‒Ocaña‒‒and is reluctant to 
land there. He explains: ‘No, non è segnata […] perché, grazie a Dio, quelli che 
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fanno le carte sono cristiani, e le cose del diavolo non le degnano’ (2007: 23): 
‘It’s not on the map because the people who make maps, thank God, are all 
Christians and don’t much bother about things that belong to the devil’ (1987: 
11). Thus, the island is associated with the devil, much as The Tempest’s 
unspecified island is linked to evil through Sycorax and her intercourse with the 
devil, which produced Caliban, the monster who reclaims the island as his own. 
(The Tempest, 1.2, ll. 331-332) 
Daddo is a capitalist Prospero, whose magic is money, the fetish that can 
buy everything and change the relations among things, animals and humans. 
While Prospero is aware of his own position in the world, and proceeds to reveal 
it to Miranda (The Tempest, 1.2, ll. 58-61), Daddo is not, and sets out for his 
adventure with a feeling that a medieval knight might have shared (1987: 8). 
Prospero retains the power of magic through his books and uses it to justify and 
uphold his claims on the island. Daddo, instead, tries to relieve Ocaña’s 
inhabitants of their sufferings resorting to gifts. However, his superficial 
compassion and unawareness prevent him from realizing his own role in 
perpetrating social injustice.  
He meets the young Marquis of Segovia, Don Ilario Jimenez and his two 
uncouth half-brothers, as well as what appears to him ‘una vecchia intenta a 
fare la calza’ (2007: 24): ‘an old woman busy with her knitting’ (1987: 12). Don 
Ilario is a young, melancholic poet, characterised by ‘già rovinata bellezza’ 
(2007: 27): an ‘already ruined beauty’ (1987: 14), while, on looking closer, 
Daddo finds out that he was mistaken about the ‘old woman’: 
Grande, a questo punto, fu la sorpresa del Daddo, nell’accorgersi che 
quella che egli aveva preso per una vecchia, altri non era che una 
bestiola verdissima e alta quanto un bambino, dall’apparente aspetto, 
di una lucertola gigante, ma vestita da donna, con una sottanina 
scura, un corsetto bianco, palesemente lacero e antico, e un 
grembialetto fatto di vari colori, giacché era la somma evidente di 
tutti i cenci della famiglia. In testa, a nascondere l’ingenuo muso 
verdebianco, quella servente portava una pezzuola anche scura. Era 
scalza. (2007: 29-30) 
Daddo’s surprise was tremendous. He had taken her for a shrunken old 
woman, but he was looking at an animal! In front of him was a bright 
green beast, about the height of a child––an enormous lizard from the 
look of her, but dressed in a woman’s clothes with a dark skirt, a 
white corset, old and shabby, and a multicoloured apron clearly 
patch-worked from the family’s stock of rags. To hide her ingenious 
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little snout, which was a sort of whitish green, she wore yet another 
dark cloth on her head. She was barefoot. (1987: 17) 
This is, then, the master’s first encounter with the oppressed, a ‘beast’, a word 
Ortese uses with a pointed and ironical compassion, to signify the 
unselfconsciousness of Nature. The novel unfolds through the continual 
metamorphoses of its characters. In particular, Don Ilario and the iguana are 
constantly shape-shifting in the eyes of the deluded Daddo, who only at the end 
of the novel is said to be ‘guarito del suo carattere fantastico’ (2007: 170): 
‘healed of his fantasizing mind’ (1987: 181). His illness was his idealism, his 
failure to see ‘che la grazia che lo incantava nelle creature delle isole, era 
costata a quelle creature l’autentico paradiso, il solo che conosciamo, il quale è 
sulla terra, e viene dato dietro versamento di denari’ (2007: 169): ‘that the 
charm he found so winning in the creatures of the islands had cost them their 
expulsion from the one authentic paradise, which is the only one we know, 
located here on the earth and with access conceded on payment of cash’ (1987: 
180-81). 
Before the Count’s delirium in the last part of the novel, whereby he sees 
himself as guilty of the attempted murder of God, the story explores the 
fascination and rejection which characterizes Daddo’s and Ilario’s relationship to 
the iguana. In fact Daddo and Ilario can be seen in this respect as each other’s 
alter ego, in that the former’s compassion and, later, passion, for the iguana, is 
counterpointed by the latter’s indifference and cruelty towards her. In a chapter 
called ‘Little Star’, we learn about the iguana’s fall from grace in Ilario’s eyes. 
Once he had loved and fondled her, when a sudden change in his behaviour 
precipitated her into hell and into the dumb, desperate conviction of being the 
incarnation of evil itself. Here the contrasts with Caliban are revealing.  
Caliban laments Prospero’s change of attitude (The Tempest, I.2, ll. 332-
339). While he learned Prospero’s language, if only to curse him, the iguana 
cannot express herself and will never be able to master language, and thereby 
enter in the dimension of ‘civilisation.’ While in The Tempest Prospero justifies 
his rule with Caliban’s wicked assault on Miranda, thus drawing on the discourse 
of the right of the ‘civilised’ to oppress the ‘savage’ in order to civilize him, in 
The Iguana Don Ilario, and later the archbishop interested in taking over the 
island as a profitable tourist resort, make use of the Manichean and Catholic 
concepts of evil, attributing all its characteristics to the poor iguana. The 
  215 
motives of the archbishop, Don Ilario and his brothers, as well as the Hopins 
family, are far from pure and metaphysical. In fact, the Hopins, an American 
family that Ortese defines ‘Una Famigliola di Tipo Universale’ (2007: 88): ‘A 
Family of the Universal Type’ (1987: 85), represents the bourgeoisie interested 
in acquiring legitimacy and status by marrying her daughter to the poor 
aristocrat Don Ilario and saving his family from poverty in exchange for his 
aristocratic titles (1987: 86). 
While in The Tempest Miranda is preserved for a lawful dynastic marriage, 
in The Iguana Don Ilario is both master and slave, he himself is ‘up for sale’ 
(1987: 83) and vulnerable to the archbishop’s scheming. At the end of the novel 
the ‘true’ iguana’s identity is revealed: ‘Non era un’iguana, e nemmeno una 
regina. Era una servetta come ce ne sono tante nelle isole […]’ (2007: 172): ‘She 
was no iguana, nor even a queen. She was a servant girl like so many to be found 
on the islands […]’ (1987: 184). However, her ‘little bestial soul’ remains 
unenlightened by culture. In spite of Daddo’s sacrifice being assimilated to 
Christ’s in the final invocation-prayer the brothers Guzman write to 
commemorate him and to please the iguana, the latter cannot be reached in her 
deepest natural core. Don Ilario’s brothers learn to read and write, but she has 
no mind for it and gets distracted easily. She clings to sentimentality and 
nostalgia for the Count Aleardo, without ever being able to be humanized. 
The iguana represents to Daddo the longing for something long lost and 
vaguely remembered. In her many metamorphoses, Daddo sees her as a white 
clad menina at the bottom of the well and, later, in throwing away his life to 
save hers, he sees her thoroughly for what she is. He calls her ‘Perdita!’—the 
Italian for ‘loss,’ and a reference to The Winter Tale. Her own inarticulateness is 
nature itself, when not illumined by an enlightened and compassionate culture. 
Thus in Ortese’s assessment, ‘the pure natural’ is a nightmare of anguish, which, 
however, a utilitarian culture cannot redeem. Ortese’s critique of capitalism and 
the subsequent culture is radical and insightful. As we have already seen, she 
states her belief about the oppressed’s inability to speak for themselves in the 
first pages of the novel (2007: 18 and 1987:4). 
Ortese’s feminism is more nuanced than it might be supposed. While her 
iguana stands for the state of nature and those oppressed by imperialism and the 
shackles of ‘civilisation’‒‒in the novel aptly represented by the specifically 
Italian mixture of capitalist enterprise and Catholic religion‒‒Ortese, 
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nonetheless, shows how this stupefied state of nature cannot be idealized, as it 
is synonymous with oppression, exploitation and pain. Thus, the novel upholds 
the need for a balance between nature and culture. However, the Feminine, in 
its vengeful upsurge, demands the very capitalist and well-meaning Count of 
Milan as a scapegoat. Ocaña remains a strange, windy island, which at the end 
produces a canto of the oppressed ironically different from the exotic and 
glamorous ones desired by the publisher Adelchi. A canto that, Ortese tells us, 
causes the little iguana-woman to break into laughter, as she ‘altro che in 
questo modo, o in altri più strambi, riusciva mai ad esprimere la forza del suo 
patire, della […] inumana profondità del suo cuore’ (2007: 184):  ‘since that was 
the only way, if not for others that were even stranger, in which she could ever 
express the force of her feelings, the force […] of her heart’s inhuman depth’ 
(1987: 198). 
As Marina Warner has remarked, ‘The Tempest sees a multiple restoration 
of patriarchal order according to Salic principles. Not only does Prospero regain 
his dukedom, but two daughters are given in marriage to become consorts of 
rulers, not rulers in their own right: Claribel to the king of Tunis and Miranda to 
Ferdinand, future king of Naples’.178 Caliban, instead, is to remain on the island 
alone. In The Iguana, the archbishop does indeed manage to build a hotel for 
tourists. Yet, in spite of a few visitors, the island remains impervious, even if 
imprisoned in the impersonal workings of the money machine brought about by 
the unholy alliance of Church and bourgeoisie. In his delirium Count Aleardo 
feels  
Che non ci sono iguane, ma solo travestimenti, ideate dall’uomo allo 
scopo di opprimere il suo simile e mantenuti da una terribile società. 
Questa società egli aveva espresso, ma ora ne usciva. Di ciò era 
contento. (2007: 168) 
that there are no iguanas, but only disguises, disguises thought up by 
human beings for the oppression of their neighbours and then held in 
place by a cruel and terrifying society. He himself had been product 
and expression of such a society, but now he was stepping out of it. 
This made him content. (1987: 180) 
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In its critique of ‘civilization’ as conceived in modern capitalism, the 
novel displays a poignant irony and accusing tone, far beyond The Tempest’s 
intentions.  
A few words remain to be said about the verbal magic peculiar to The 
Tempest and The Iguana. Magic is thematized explicitly in Shakespeare’s play as 
book-given power for Prospero and a ‘natural’, albeit demonical attribute in 
Sycorax. The Iguana plays with magic all along, by showing a world of shifting 
appearances and flux and by ironically and theatrically depicting the Catholic 
use of exorcism against the poor iguana. As in The Tempest, there is an 
opposition between the ‘natural’, ‘pagan’ enchantments of the island and the 
established, codified magic employed by either political or religious power: 
while dispossessed Prospero uses his magic to dominate the island, expose his 
enemies and regain his kingdom, in The Iguana Catholicism is satirized for 
playing with the oppressed by fostering superstition and subjection, in order to 
gain material advantages. 
Ortese also employs fairy-tale motifs, such as, for example, a butterfly-
God, and the well where Daddo has his epiphany about the iguana’s identity and 
significance. The iguana is a disempowered creature, without the magical power 
of a Sycorax, or the queenly appeal of a Miranda or Claribel. Yet, ‘quando aveva 
gridato: ‘Perdita!’, da quell momento tutti gli strazianti sortilege dell’isola, e la 
stessa sua malvagità, erano scomparsi’ (174): ‘from the moment he had cried 
‘Perdita!’ all of the island desperate spells had broken, and even her 
mischievous perversity had vanished along with them’ (186). In The Tempest, 
Prospero’s fairy enchantments are conjuror tricks evoked to restore patriarchal 
justice. Yet, the native ‘subtleties o’ the isle’ (The Tempest, 5.1, l. 127) remain 
unchanged. While Prospero abjures his magic, Aleardo breaks the enchantments 
of the island by recognizing the iguana-woman. Ortese’s usage of such fairy-tale 
motifs is subversive, in that The Iguana, which she herself defined ‘romanzo-
fiaba’, a sort of ‘fairy novel’, uses the real‒fantastic interplay in a subtle 
manner: the author takes up the structure of the fairy-tale and includes it in the 
novel as a scaffolding, but the fantastic is presented as the plausible at the 
beginning, only to be displaced by the ‘hard facts’ of life at the end. 
Although Ocaña is not on the maps, it cannot escape the global enmeshing 
of profit-making, while its inhabitants can be uplifted from their misery and 
poverty only partially.  Still, the iguana-woman’s heart remains deep and 
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‘inhuman’, a word that for Ortese conveys the profound mystery of the 
Universe. Daddo, unlike Prospero, never returns to Milan and his mundane life, 
but rests like a sleeping beauty in a little chapel on the island, lulled by the 
ocean. Only, the iguana-woman cannot awaken him again. 
 
7.8 Oppression, Flux and Death in The Iguana 
The fifteenth chapter, ‘Little Star’, tells of the state of grace of the 
iguana: a state of symbiosis, when she called the Marquis ‘dad’ and without 
looking her own image reflected in a mirror, she feels beautiful:   
L’Iguanuccia è fuori di sé dall’orgoglio e la soddisfazione. Non si è mai 
guardata in uno specchio da quando è nata, ma non importa: sa di 
essere bella, ora, bellissima, e, come una figlia dell’uomo, ne è 
beata. Ogni cosa che lei fa, ogni passo, ogni occhiata, ogni 
inconsapevole attuccio, sembra gradito al marchese più della 
primavera medesima o di una corona regale. (2007: 124) 
The Iguana was beside herself with pride and satisfaction. Never from 
the time of her birth had she looked at herself in a mirror, but that 
didn’t matter: she knew she was beautiful, and now extremely 
beautiful, and as for every daughter of mankind her beauty was a 
beatification. Everything she did, her every step, each and every one 
of her unassuming, uncontrived and unconscious actions, seemed to 
give the Marquis more pleasure than spring itself or a regal crown. 
(1987: 127) 
To this state of grace, a fall follows. We know the very Marquis falls ill 
and rejects her. Thus illness, the state of disconnection, denial and lethargy has 
fatal consequences for the iguana but leads to the Marquis’ decline too. To this 
blissful state of relational being without mirrors that mediate between the self 
and its own self-apprehension, it is possible to contrast the night scene when 
Daddo sees the rejuvenated Marquis looking into a mirror. 
Under the moonlight the Marquis turns into a magnificent youth, but his 
metamorphosis, far from being a return to grace, is deceptive and artificial, 
made in order to entice the Hopins and secure a convenient marriage. The 
looking-glass has exactly the function to point to the masking of his demise and 
humiliation, reflecting an image that he will have to sell in order to restore his 
material condition. 
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Ocaña, once a paradise, is another silent victim of unequal power 
relations, whereas Milan is the empbodiment of the wealthy capitalist ‘centre’, 
where the new publishing industry is flourishing. Daddo is both a son of that 
progressive city and also a simple soul, an idealist, although he belongs to the 
class of the oppressors. Ilario is noble by descent but is poor, oppressed and 
oppressor in turn, in the same way as the brothers Guzman are both yokels and 
humane. All the characters, apart from the Hopins and the bishop, are in 
constant flux, their identities cannot be defined in a one-sided way. The iguana 
is the apotheosis of this continuous process of transformation and shifting 
identities: she is declared to be an iguana at the beginning of the novel, while 
towards the end of it the reader and Daddo himself recognize in her a poor girl. 
Daddo, during his descent into the well, calls her Perdita and sees in her a 
menina in waiting, an image that recalls to mind Velasquez’s eponymous 
picture. Perdita, the monkey, and the iguana, thus seem to blend into each 
other, and into the emblem of loss: the little girl at the bottom of the well 
waiting to be saved is also what has been loved, cast away and rejected in an 
increasingly alienated life, fuelled by a terribly oppressive society. She 
represents pure otherness, the uncanny dimension once familiar, now lost to 
human comprehension, so much unreachable even to an idealist like Daddo as to 
provoke his death.  
With Daddo, we are still dealing with idealism, the positing of the 
loftiness of the thinking and feeling ‘I’. Yet, this ‘I’ feels the impossibility of the 
objectifying thrust in the form of compassion for an anthropomorphic iguana or a 
theriomorphic girl. The iguana is not a proper subject, but the Count cannot 
treat her as an object either: she is the ambiguous monster repressed and yet 
made possible by modernity, the voiceless oppressed of the earth. Therefore, 
although he falls in love with her, and offers to be her husband and loving father 
in turn, Daddo cannot relate to her, that is, cannot feel her identity. He is 
compassionate and romantic in his idealism to the point of self-sacrifice and this 
will give the iguana-girl a new hope but not a fully human redemption. 
The moment of realization leads Daddo to death, indeed as Kleinhaus has 
pointed out, the undercurrent of the whole novel is Daddo’s preparation and 
encounter with death: the various conversations between him and Ilario hint at 
death, and Manrique’s poetic lines highlight its pivotal centrality at various 
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stages of the narrative, particularly in the middle of the novel.179 Death is indeed 
the other monster repressed by modernity, yet it brings Daddo a revelation, an 
epiphany about himself and the world he lives in, albeit without allowing him to 
establish a sustained interpersonal engagement with the iguana and the other 
characters. 
 
7.8.1 Ortese’s Poetics and The Iguana’s Structure 
Although Pietro Citati has defined the novel as a ‘romantic fable’,180 
Kleinhaus has talked of an allegory and Farnetti and Du Merac have stated that it 
is an example of feminine fantastic. The Iguana baffles every single definition 
because of its complexity and non-canonical state. Luca Clerici in his biography 
of Ortese (2002: 399) defines the novel ‘un’antifiaba sperimentale’ (an avant-
garde anti-fairytale).181 I have shown how this high originality responds to the 
author’s conscious rejection of over-trodden traditions and literary trends and to 
her conviction of the metaphysical strangeness and complexity of the real, 
something which is always in flux and cannot be constrained in rigid categories 
and neat distinctions. Indeed her depiction of hybrid situations and characters 
that double up is a hallmark of magical realism, whose strategies, however, she 
uses only to rework into a unique whole. 
If we consider her statements in Corpo Celeste182 (1997) about nature and 
society, her poetics will appear clearly defined: nature and society have to be 
thought out anew, they have to be recreated in order to become a ‘second 
nature’, capable of raising man and his existence beyond the horror of pure 
nature, or what we may call ‘nature-nature’. Thus her need for ‘espressività’ 
(the need to struggle in order to give birth to expression and not be lost into the 
blue sea of the unarticulated and impossible to be expressed) is part of this 
recreation of a ‘second nature’, where reason has the function of ‘illuminare il 
disordine e il dolore’: ‘illuminating disorder and pain’ (Corpo Celeste 1997: 103). 
These statements cast a new light on the iguana, which too often has 
been seen as an apotheosis of nature: in fact, the iguana-girl is a monster hoping 
to be raised above pain and dejection but never achieving that recreation, that 
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condition of ‘second nature’ that only aware self-expression can bring about. 
Indeed, in the same Corpo Celeste, Ortese talks of being a woman writer as 
being an impossible monster, ‘una bestia che parla’: ‘a talking beast’ (1997: 51). 
Here, in her consciousness of her own difference as a woman and a writer, 
Farnetti183 has seen the mark of her belonging to a feminine tradition. However, 
it is apparent that Ortese’s writing is beyond any ‘feminine tradition’, as she 
struggles to reach the shore of espressività by personal means that she has had 
to craft by herself. Indeed, as a girl she reads D’Annunzio and Leopardi, later 
Poe, Stevenson, Borges, Conrad, Dickens also the Russian, American and French 
novelists, but the only feminine name mentioned is that of Katherine Mansfield, 
from whom, however, she distances herself with humility. As a woman writer 
whose activity spanned almost the entire twentieth-century, from Fascism down 
to the Nineties, she faces the problem of a lack of tradition; hers is a story of 
fight and conquest of expressive means that are denied to her because she 
comes from ‘a family of no social distinction’. 
She conceives of ‘reason’ as a positive force, opposed to the pseudo-
intelligence of industrialism and mass production. The writing of The Iguana is 
her reaction to the levelling of art and literary language in the new wave of the 
economic boom: 
Andai per un po’ a Roma, e scrissi una fiaba, un romanzo-fiaba, e lo 
volli difficile per reazione all’atroce linguaggio corrente. Una creatura 
mezzo bestia, mezzo umana, (come io vedevo buona parte 
dell’umanitá) era al centro––e parlava in modo umano, ma infantile, 
compassionevole. Questo libro, L’iguana, piacque a qualche critico, 
ma come sempre, come era stato con i precendenti, io non 
raggiungevo i mille lettori. Non si parlava piú l’italiano in Italia, e chi 
lo parlava lo scriveva anche, e quindi, ammirato, non leggeva che se 
stesso. (Corpo celeste: 1997, 48-9). 
I went to Rome for a while, and I wrote a fairy-tale, a novel which 
was also a fairy-tale (‘romanzo-fiaba’), and I wanted it to be difficult 
as a reaction to the awful common language. At its centre there was a 
creature which was half a beast and half human (as I saw a great part 
of humanity), and she talked as a human being but in a childish, 
compassionate way. A few critics liked this book The Iguana, but as 
always with my preceding books, I could not attract a thousand 
readers. In Italy nobody spoke proper Italian any longer, and those 
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who did speak and write it, admiringly, read only themselves (My 
translation). 
From a structural point of view, The Iguana employs many devices which 
can be found in many post-colonial magic realist texts, such as an innocent 
focalizer, represented by Daddo, the monster, animal-girl, many catalyst 
objects, that is, objects that have the function of conveying the ambiguous 
message of a two-sided reality (particularly mirrors, but also the hat with red 
feathers, the well, and the white butterfly representing God), a juggling of 
different planes of reality, and a conflation of different literary genres, from 
fable to allegory, to social critique. All these characteristics work together and 
posit the problem of the possibility of knowing the empirical world. In fact 
together with the afore mentioned elements, The Iguana also makes use of a 
shifting focalizer, Daddo and an anonymous heterodiegetic narrator alternate 
their narratives irregularly, and in some cases they seem to coalesce, so that the 
reader receives a strange impression of estrangement and empathy at the same 
time. When the narrator claims that s/he is not able to give any further details 
about Daddo’s condition and whereabouts during his revealing madness 
(chapters XX-XXIV), the reader knows the narrator is not entirely reliable, 
either. Latin American author Marquez, when remembering the way his 
grandmother told her impossible stories, said that she had a deadpan facial 
expression, and that he strove to recreate that effect in his magical realist 
fiction. Indeed to the matter-of-fact tone of much magical realist fiction Ortese 
substitutes a sense of aching wonder. Her approach  is also quite different from 
the ‘lucid amazement’ theorised by  Massimo Bontempelli, an Italian writer 
active in the first decades of the twentieth century, who propounded magic 
realism in fiction in his L’Avventura Novecentista184 and played a role in the 
publication of Ortese’s first collection of short stories Angelici Dolori. 
 
7.8.2 Massimo Bontempelli’s ‘Realismo Magico’ and Anna Maria 
Ortese’s: Differences and Similarities 
Although Massimo Bontempelli plays a key role in the publication of Ortese’s first 
collection of stories Angelici Dolori in 1937, it is difficult to trace any direct 
                                         
184
 Massimo Bontempelli, ‘L’Avventura Novecentista’ In Realismo Magico e altri scritti sull’arte (Milano: 
Abscondita, 2006). 
  223 
influence of his ideas on the young Anna Maria. It is true that, from the very 
start, he has words of praise for her work, which in his opinion bridges the gap 
between prose and poetry, skilfulness and creative inspiration, but he imposes 
his own agenda on Ortese’s rather different poetics. However, it is useful to 
compare Bontempelli’s idea of magical realism with Ortese’s writing practice in 
order to highlight differences and similarities between the two, and reflect on 
the non-canonical status of Ortese’s peculiar brand of magical realism. 
First of all, Bontempelli talks of believing in the re-establishment of ‘un 
Tempo e uno Spazio oggettivi e assoluti’: ‘objective and absolute Time and 
Space’ (2006: 15), whereby the individual can find himself again in a new 
objectivity of his environment. Ortese, on the other hand, has a profound 
perception of time and space as a revelation, an ecstatic experience showing the 
transiency of human experience and dwelling on the earth. In Corpo Celeste she 
voices her amazement at being alive on earth, which she calls a ‘heavenly 
body’, a ‘corpo celeste’. There she goes on to criticize the intellect, which has 
robbed reason of its throne, and states that Space and Time are the very breath 
of any culture worthy of that name. Space and Time are the ‘External’, a 
galactic dimension of the universe, where ‘apparition’ becomes possible through 
time seen as ‘durata’ (the time span experienced in its extension): 
‘substantially, in the dumb and inexplicable ‘strangeness’ of the universe, in this 
estranging reality without signs or directions, without names, the only chance 
given to man is the ‘apparition’, that is the ‘second nature’ or ‘reason’, which 
illuminates and collects the inner and peculiar pain of human consciousness. In 
other words, it is this kind of apparition that can give name, identity, presence 
to the world, through the rising and spreading of the ‘espressività’, which is 
conquest of the ‘second nature’ through the word.’185  
Indeed in The Iguana, Ilario talks about the lack of a demarcation line 
between real and unreal, and Ortese uses many devices in order to play on this 
theme. On the island modern time conventions are not respected and the dates 
reported are unreal, while the brothers Guzman manage to arrive too quickly at 
the mansion, notwithstanding the large space separating it from the beach, so 
that Daddo thinks about the possibility of a subterranean passage. Together with 
an ambiguous playfulness with the dimensions of time and space, the logic of the 
double, the multiplying personalities of all the characters, and the use of 
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estranging objects such as mirrors, the well, coloured pebbles as mock-money, 
all work towards the overall effect of strangeness that Ortese wants to show at 
the heart of reality itself. 
 Ortese and Bontempelli both talk about the prominent role of 
imagination but give different meanings to this faculty. The latter thinks that 
the task of imagination is to dominate and rule over nature: magic is the essence 
of this force, and the creation of objects which will be used to modify the 
features of the world is the artist’s aim. The artist has to become anonymous 
and go beyond beauty and the exploration of inner feelings, which to 
Bontempelli seem mainly feminine characteristics of art. He has in mind a 
masculine art, where architecture is the leading example. The poet has to 
invent new stories and myths which will go in the world quite apart from his 
personal fame. He talks about the magic of daily life and the aim of lucid 
amazement as contrasted with a sense of wonder. The latter is, in his opinion, 
typical of children and primitives. In contrast to this, Ortese thinks that 
imagination is the real, and the real is imagination, that wonder and amazement 
are one and the same response to the magic inside reality, not as a human force 
that man can exert on nature in order to dominate it. Indeed, Ortese wants to 
go past the old dualism of spirit and nature Bontempelli still relies on. They 
agree about the mystery inside the ordinary and the ‘necessity to tell the dream 
as if it were real and tell reality as if it were a dream’ (Bontempelli: 2006, 51, 
my translation), but they have opposite convictions about the means to realize 
this vision.  
Bontempelli’s novel Lo specchio dietro alla scacchiera (The mirror behind 
the chess-board) is an example of his magical realism, where the world of 
objects and artefacts has an independent existence from human life, and where 
the atmosphere is of lucid irony and detachment. In Ortese’s The Iguana, on the 
contrary, a certain outraged empathy always emerges out of the narrative 
texture, a sense of empathic, albeit distant, watching of the uncanny 
phenomena of the world. 
Another major difference is the two writers’ attitudes towards the 
audience. Bontempelli supports the idea of applied art and writing for an 
audience, while Ortese has always found difficult to sacrifice her need for 
espressività to the requirements of the publishing industry and the public’s 
taste.   
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7.8.3 Reason and Double Sight: Ortese’s Animalism and her 
‘Non-Christian Christology’ 
As Luca Clerici has pointed out in an interview with Antonio Motta,186 most 
critics have concentrated on the ‘fantastic’ in Ortese’s work and have left out 
the meaning of her ‘radical animalism’. Her view of nature is compassionate, 
albeit somewhat pessimistic: to Clerici her vision of nature is that of a 
‘macchina cieca e perciò feroce’ (a blind, fierce machine): ‘il valore ‘salvifico’ 
della compagine sociale sta proprio qui, nell’arginare lo strapotere nefasto della 
natura sugli individui e sulla collettività’: ‘The saving purpose of society consists 
in the containment of the awful power nature exerts on individuals and 
communities alike’. However, Ortese’s feelings towards nature are more 
complex and nuanced.  
Ortese sees in the French Revolution the historical moment when 
calculating and selfish intelligence replaced reason, conceived as an intuitive 
knowledge of natural laws which enabled human beings to live in harmony with 
nature itself. Thus, on one hand nature is not being idealized: precisely because 
of the pain inherent in it, it is necessary for men to re-establish their contact to 
it; on the other hand, society has to be re-founded anew according to the 
principles of Ortesian ‘reason’ (not the abstract reason of the Enlightenment) 
rather than those of intellect. She writes in Corpo Celeste:  
la Ragione non agisce, vede, solo l’intelligenza agisce. E l’intelligenza 
paludata di Ragione, aveva giurato di agire e fondare la libertà 
democratica: che non è la libertà del Respiro. (1997: 142)  
Reason does not act, it sees, while intellect acts. And intellect only 
cloaked by Reason had sworn she would act and found democratic 
freedom, which is not the freedom of Breathing. (My translation) 
Thus for Ortese the visionary power of Reason is of paramount importance 
and the freedom which is envisioned through it corresponds to the Breath itself, 
the pulsing rhythm of life in all creatures. In another passage of Corpo Celeste, 
Ortese declares about nature: 
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L’Universo‒‒o gli Universi‒‒sembrano dunque il vero Irreale, il luogo 
non pensabile o non pensato. E davanti ad esso, anche la natura della 
terra‒‒la flora, la fauna, entro l’atmosfera, le acque‒‒diviene, cosí 
giá a lungo pensata dalla ragione, e cosí certamente dolorosa nella 
sua catena di necessitá, e di sopravvivenza del piú nuovo e del piú 
forte, diviene un po’ umana. Spesso, matrice di umano e specchio 
della stessa ragione. Vediamo straordinarie illuminazioni nella natura, 
solidarietá da creatura a creatura, e consapevolezza, in ogni creatura, 
appena interrogate, quasi a livello di sogno. Sí, la natura‒‒animali, 
alberi‒‒sono l’uomo senza la difesa  dell’intelligenza razionale, sono 
l’uomo senza tempo, l’uomo che sogna. Cosí, chi sottomette con 
durezza, o mercifica, o tormenta comunque la Natura, nei suoi figli 
che dormono, o la guarda senza pieta o fraternitá, è ancora e sempre 
il terribile uomo-natura, uomo-pietra, l’uomo appunto che dorme. La 
ragione non sottomette né mercifica nulla. Ma eleva tutto alla propria 
comprensione, e la propria comprensione mette a disposizione di ogni 
vivente. (1997: 102-3) 
The Universe, or Universes, seems to be the authentic Unreal, the 
unthinkable place, that which is not thought. Before it, even earth’s 
nature, flora, fauna, in the atmosphere and the waters, becomes 
somewhat human after being thought for so long by Reason, albeit it 
is so undoubtedly painful in its chain of ineluctable events and its law 
of the survival of the fittest and newest. Often it is matrix of what is 
human and a mirror of reason itself. We can see wonderful 
illuminations in nature, a loving bond from creature to creature, a 
dreamy awareness, just touched upon, in every creature. Yes, nature, 
animals and trees are man without the defence of rational 
intelligence; they are timeless man, man that is dreaming. Thus, 
whoever dominates or sells, or is cruel to Nature, to her sleeping 
children, or looks at her without piety or brotherly love, is still and 
always the awful man-nature, man-stone, therefore sleeping man. 
Reason does not dominate nor sell anything. It raises everything to the 
level of its understanding and makes this understanding available to 
each living creature. (My translation) 
Thus Reason, the ‘second nature’, has a demiurgic role of recreation of the real, 
a dimension where the relations between man and nature can be reshaped 
entirely. When man acts without awareness and mistreats nature he is still 
nature himself, in its most awful aspect, that of unconsciousness and violence, 
whereas, when Reason illuminates the world, man becomes truly human: 
Quando [...] dai il mondo come spiegato, per cosí dire: naturale, ci 
edifichi sopra le cose degli uomini. Quando lo dai come inspiegabile, 
cioè innaturale, e lo definisci come visione del fuggevole, ci edifichi 
l’uomo. Non è una differenza da poco. Edificare l’uomo è gratuito. 
Edificare le cose (dell’uomo e sull’uomo) porta compensi molto alti 
non solo economici. Ma perde l’uomo. (1997: 103-4) 
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When [...] you take the world as already given and explained, as 
natural, you build men’s things onto it. But when you take it as 
inexplicable, that is unnatural, and you define it as a vision of 
something fleeing and transient, you build man on it. This is no small 
difference. Building things for man and on man brings high rewards 
not only in economic terms. But it loses man. (My translation) 
In pointing to the necessary link between man and natural creatures, 
beyond any romanticism, Ortese identifies evil in the pain we cause to other 
living beings:  
il male è prima di tutto il dolore che infliggiamo a un altro‒‒all’altro 
bestia, bambino, vecchio, malato, straniero, povero‒‒sicuri che debba 
e possa accettarlo solo perché noi possiamo, tramite il suo dolore, 
sentirci più liberi, più viventi, felici e sicuri della nostra vita. (Corpo 
Celeste, p. 10)  
Evil is first and foremost the pain we cause to another, to the other: 
animal, child, to the elderly, the sick, the stranger, the poor, in the 
certainty that he must and can accept it, only because we can go on, 
thanks to his pain, to feel freer, more alive, happier and more secure 
in our own life. (My translation) 
 What she is identifying here is the logic of the scapegoat that has taken 
place, at different times, in the history of humankind. The brutal killing of the 
scapegoat is indeed what makes possible life for the rest of society, and seems 
to be justified by the victim’s difference, her liminal condition which turns her 
into a monster in the eyes of the majority, whose power is based in a consensual 
view of the laws and characteristics of reality. Thus Ortese is exposing the very 
necessities of the ‘modern’ condition, where the forbidden hybrid and the 
rejected monster are necessary for the survival of its mechanisms: ‘modernity’ is 
a machine but it is not entirely dependent on pure, inanimate objects and 
mechanisms; indeed the very principle, that of organic and sentient matter to 
subdue and dominate, that makes its life possible, is also the broken link in the 
chain, that allows a leaking, a perdita, and in the long run exposes its hidden 
and contradictory workings. These in turn show that man has never truly left the 
same anthropological matrix, but has only masked it. Perdita, the reader will 
remember, is the name of Ilario’s first love, a little monkey, and then the name 
that Daddo gives to the iguana inside the well: a possible interpretation is that 
what is being shown is the very nature-culture, whereby interwoven 
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metaphysical and biological ‘presence’ is waiting to be redeemed from the pain 
caused by the sweeping currents of history with its selfish interests. 
Ortese’s critique of the Enlightenment and its consequences is ironically 
present in the depiction of ‘a family of the universal type’ (85), the Hopins, who 
represent the typical bourgeois family created by wealthy unconsciousness and 
selfishness in contemporary society, and also the greedy archbishop, who 
represents the arrogance of the institutionalized Church.  
Indeed Ortese’s social critique invests both lay and religious institutions, 
but a Christological destiny is allotted to the protagonist of The Iguana: Daddo 
dies in the attempt to rescue the iguana-girl, whose hybrid nature however 
cannot be erased nor mitigated. He manages to restore her hope of a far distant 
redemption in the future and the last poem, written by the Guzman brothers in 
order to please the iguana-girl, is a prayer to the Count, who is called here the 
‘Count of Christ’ and is invoked as the saviour of the humblest creatures at the 
bottom of the well: the snake, the cow, the frog and others. 
Ortese’s strong animalism is also visible in the scene of the trial for the 
death of God, where she writes:  
Era, Lettore, se mai sei stato desideroso di conoscere le vere 
sembianze di colui del quale favoleggiamo da secoli, senza mai essere 
certi di averlo ravvisato, era, arrampicata e addormita su una foglia, 
una semplice farfalla bianca. (2007: 164) 
Surely you’ve longed to know the true semblance of this Being whom 
the centuries have surrounded with fables while leaving us always 
uncertain of having been faced with the undeniable. What lay there, 
curled up on a leaf and asleep, was a simple white butterfly. (1987: 
174) 
This depiction of God as an aerial and fragile being is well suited to 
Ortese’s belief that ‘freedom is a breath’, is life in its sacred preciousness and 
fragility.  
In her subsequent and last two novels, Il cardillo addolorato (The 
Sorrowing Goldfinch) and Alonso e i Visionari (Alonso and the Visionaries), the 
theme of the scapegoat and of the ultimate sacrifice recurs, and particularly in 
the latter the Christological destiny is transferred onto a ghostly puma, a little 
and defenceless beast, whose death and return evokes Christ’s sacrifice and 
resurrection. Only, in this case, Ortese finds impossible to attribute a Christ-like 
nature to a human being and ends up thinking that the truly innocent and 
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therefore perfect victim and rescuer is a mild little puma cub. The Iguana is a 
novel whose vision Ortese develops in the two later novels, which for this reason 
have been considered as part of a ‘fantastic animal trilogy’. Yet the three works 
present such different characteristics that the definition cannot be applied 
without problems.  
In the same way bracketing Ortese’s work within the frame of the 
‘fantastic’ is limiting: The Iguana is a complex and multilayered novel, which 
encompasses different literary genres and modes, from the fantastic to magical 
realism, to allegory and in so doing it gives voice to Ortese’s unique conception 
of the real, nature and reason. I have tried to unravel some of the major threads 
woven in the lively tapestry of the narrative, and I have maintained that her use 
of magical realist conventions and their subsequent subversion responds to her 
need to express the uncanny character which constitutes the essence of the 
world, once the mechanisms of ‘modernity’ are exposed. I have also shown in 
some detail how themes and structure of the novel correspond to each other, as 
Ortese tries to express the fluent and transient character of the reality which 
runs underneath the bare lines of the story of the protagonist Daddo.  
Reality, Ortese says, has to be thought into being; thereby the artificial 
features of what is ordinarily conceived by the word ‘reality’ emerge on the 
surface of consciousness and this fake ‘real’ is turned upside down and shown in 
its utter conventionality. 
 
7.9 Measuring the World: ‘Die Fremdheit ist 
Ungeheuer’ 
In the chapter ‘The River’ Alexander von Humboldt and his colleague Bonpland 
have dinner with the Jesuit Father in charge of a mission in the Amazonian 
forest. Pater Zea’s long story about the futility of measuring the earth deserves 
to be quoted at some length: 
Linien gebe es überall, sagte Humboldt. Sie sein eine Abstraktion. Wo 
Raum an sich sei, seien Linien. 
Raum an sich sei anderswo, sagte Pater Zea. 
Raum sei überall! 
Űberall sei eine Erfindung. Und den Raum an sich gebe es dort, wo 
Landvermesser ihn hintrügen. Pater Zea schloss di Augen, hob sein 
Weinglas und stellte es wieder ab, ohne daraus getrunken zu haben. 
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Die drei Männer [die Landvermesser La Condamine, Bouguer und 
Godin] hätten unvostellbar genau gearbeitet. Trotzdem hätten ihre 
Daten nie übereingestimmt. […] Eine Wut onhe Grund und Ziel sei 
über die Männer gekommen. […] Täglich habe es Streit gegeben, bis 
Godin den Degen gezückt haben und davongestolpert sei in den 
Urwarld. Das gleiche, ein paar Wochen später, zwischen Bouguer und 
La Condamine. […] Man müsse sich das vorstellen. Derart zivilisierte 
Herren mit Allongeperücken, Lorgnons und parfümierten 
Taschentüchern! La Condamine habe es am längsten ausgehalten. 
Acht Jahre im Wald, beschützt von nur einer Handvoll fieberkranker 
Soldaten. Er habe Schneisen geschlagen, die zugewachsen seien, 
sobald er sich abgewandt habe, Bäume gefällt, welche schon in der 
nächsten Nacht wieder in die Luft geragt hätten; und dennoch, 
halsstarrig, habe er nach und nach ein Zahlennetz über die 
wiederstrebende Natur gezwungen. Er habe Dreiecke gezogen, deren 
Winkelsumme sich allmählich den hunderttachtzig genähert, und 
Bögen trianguliert, deren Krümmung schliesslich sogar dem Flirren der 
Luft widerstanden habe. Dann habe er einen Brief der Akademie 
erhalten. Die Schlacht sei verloren, der Beweis in Newtons Sinn 
geführt, die Erde abgeplattet, die ganze Arbeit umsonst. […]  
So sei, sagte Pater Zea, der geschlagene Mann eben heimgefahren. 
Vier Monate lang, einen noch immer namenlosen Fluss entlang, den er 
erst später Amazonas getauft habe. Unterwegs habe er Karten gemalt, 
den Bergen Namen gegeben, die Temperatur verzeichnet, die Arten 
der Fische, Insekten, Schlangen und Menschen erfasst. Nicht weil es 
ihn interessiert habe, sondern um den Verstand zy bewahren. Nielmals 
habe er danach in Paris über die Dinge geredet, an die der eine oder 
andere seiner Soldaten sich noch erinnert habe: die kehligen Laute 
und perfekt gezielten Giftpfeile aus dem Unterholz, die nächtlichen 
Lichterscheinungen, vor allem aber jene winzigen Verschiebungen in 
der Wirklichkeit, wenn die Welt für Momente einen Schritt ins Irreale 
gemacht habe. Dann hätten zwar die Bäume noch wie Bäume, die 
träge strudelnden Wasser wie Wasser asugesehen, aber man habe es 
schaudernd als Mimikry von etwas Fremdem erkannt. In dieser Zeit 
habe La Condamine auch den Kanal gefunden, von dem der verrückte 
Aguirre berichtet habe. Die Verbindung der zwei grössten Flüsse des 
Kontinents. 
Er werde beweisen, dass sie existiere, sagte Humboldt. 
Alle grossen Ströme seien verbunden. Die Natur sei ein Ganzes. 
 Ach ja?Pater Zea wiegte zweifelnd den Kopf. Jahre spatter, als La 
Condamine, längst Akademiemitglied und alt und berühmt, nur mehr 
selten schreiend erwacht sei und es angeblich sogar wieder 
fetiggebracht habe, an Gott zu glauben, habe er selbst den Kanal für 
einen Irrtum erklärt. Zwischen grossen Flüssen, habe er gesagt, gebe 
es keine Verbindung im Inland. So etwas brächte den Kontinent in eine 
Unordnung, die seiner nicht würdig wäre. Pater Zea schwieg einen 
Moment, dann stand er auf und verbeugte sich. Träumen Sie gut, 
Baron. Und wachen Sie gut auf! (2005: 115-18, my emphasis) 
Lines happened everywhere, said Humboldt. They were an 
abstraction. Wherever there was space as such, there were lines. 
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 Space as such was elsewhere, said Pater Zea.    
 Space was universal!       
 Being universal was an invention. And space as such happened where 
surveyors put it. […] The three men [the surveyors La Condamine, 
Bouguer and Godin] had worked with extraordinary precision [in order 
to measure the equator]. Nonetheless, their data never matched. […] 
An unfathomable, pointless rage had overcome the men. […] There 
were daily battles, until Godin drew his sword and staggered away 
into the primeval forest. Two weeks later, the same thing happened 
between Boguer and La Condamine. […] Imagine! Such civilized men, 
with full perukes, lorgnones, and scented handkercheifs! La 
Condamine held out the longest. Eight years in the forest, protected 
by a mere handful of of fever-ridden soldiers. He had cut trails which 
grew back again as soon as he turned his back, felled trees that 
resprouted the next night, and yet, little by little, with stiff-necked 
determination, he had forcibly imposed a web of numbers over 
reluctant nature. He had drawn triangles which gradually 
approximated a sum of a hundred and eighty degrees and triangulated 
arcs whose curves finally stood strong even in the shimmering heat. 
Then he received a letter from the Academy. The battle was lost, the 
proof followed Newton, the earth was indeed oblate, all his work had 
been in vain. […]        
 And so, said Pater Zea, the beaten man went home. Four months to 
travel down a still-nameless river, which he only later christened the 
Amazon. On the way he painted maps, gave mountains names, tracked 
the temperature, and worked out the species of fishes, insects, 
snakes, and humans. Not because it interested him, but in order to 
stay sane. Afterwards, back in Paris, he never talked about the things 
that one or another of his soldiers remembered: the throaty sounds 
and perfectly aimed poisoned arrows that came flying out of the 
undergrowth, the nocturnal glows, but above all the miniscule 
displacements of reality, when the world crossed over into 
otherworldliness for a few moments. At such times the trees looked 
like trees and the slowly swirling water looked like water, but it was 
mimicry, it was something foreign, and it caused a shudder. It was at 
this time that La Condamine also found the channel that mad Aguirre 
had spoken of. The channel connecting the two greatest rivers on the 
continent.         
 He would prove its existence, said Humboldt. All great rivers are 
connected. Nature was a unity.      
 Oh yes? Pater Zea shook his head sceptically. Years later, when La 
Condamine, long since a member of the Academy and old and famous, 
was able (mostly) to wake from sleep without screaming and once 
again to make himself believe in God, he declared the channel to be 
an error. Great rivers, he said, had no inland connection. Such a thing 
would be a disorder of nature, and unworthy of a great continent. 
Pater Zea fell silent for a moment, then got to his feet and bowed. 
Dream well, Baron, and wake in good health! (2007: 96-8, my 
emphasis) 
This lengthy episode embeds Kehlmann’s poetics: reality as uncanny mimicry, as 
the alienating mirror image of itself, unconquered and unconquerable. Mimicry 
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is intended as nature’s strategy of resistance to human attempts at penetration 
and control. Chaos lurks behind human conceptions of order and rationality. The 
futility of Humboldt’s own attempts is foregrounded with irony throughout the 
novel; however, it is in the episode of Humboldt’s voyage to the Russian steppes 
that the vacuity of the whole enterprise is shown in its macabre monotony: 
Humboldt hatte in so vielen Kutschen gedöst, war von so vielen 
Pferden gezogen worden und hatte so viele krautbewachsene Ebenen 
gesehen, die immer dieselbe Ebene, so viele Horizonte, die immer der 
gleiche Horizont waren, dass er sich selbst nicht mehr wirklich 
vorkam. (2005: 283) 
Humboldt had dozed in so many coaches, had been pulled by so 
many horses, and had seen so many weed-infested plains that were 
always the same plain, so many horizons that were always the same 
horizon, that he no longer felt real even to himself. (2007: 243) 
At the same time, Gauss ponders: 
Der Tod würde kommen al seine Erkenntnis von Unwirklichkeit. Dann 
würde er begreifen, was Raum und Zeit waren, was die Natur einer 
Linie, was das Wesen der Zahl. Vielleicht auch, warum er sich immer 
wieder wie eine nicht ganz gelungene Erfindung vorkam, wie die Kpie 
eiens ungleich wirklicheren Menschen, von einem Schwachen Erfinder 
in ein seltsam zweitklassiges Universum gestellt. (2005: 282) 
Death would come as a recognition of unreality. Then he would grasp 
what space and time were, the nature of a line, the essence of a 
number. Maybe he would also grasp why he always felt himself to be a 
not-quite-successful invention, the copy of someone much more real, 
placed by a feeble inventor in a curiously second-class universe. 
(2007: 242) 
Unreality is the feeling gnawing at the heart of both Gauss and Humboldt.  
The theme of death and futility is introduced at the very start of the chapter, 
when Alexander von Humboldt doubts the usefulness of the channel in the 
Amazonian forest and ‘an der Bedeutung der Flussreise selbst’ (2005: 264): ‘the 
significance of the journey upriver itself’ (2007: 226).  
Kehlmann’s fantastic re-interpretation and deformation of these two 
great historical characters has to do directly with the issues mentioned above, 
history and reification. In an interview for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
dated 9 February 2006, he declared that he wanted to write like ‘ein verrückt 
gewordener Historiker’: a historian gone crazy (in Günther Nickel, 2009: 26-35), 
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thereby refashioning the relation between the exactness of facts and truth: ‘Im 
Dienste der Wahrheit musste ich eben hier und da die Richtigkeit manipulieren’: 
‘in order to serve truthfulness I had to manipulate the factual details just here 
and there’, (interview appeared in Der Spiegel on 5 December 2005, in Günther 
Nickel, 2009: 36-46). Kehlmann’s use of indirect discourse throughout the novel 
has a distancing function: 
Wieso wirken historische Romane trivial, aber wieso wirkt nicht 
trivial, was etwa Eric Hobswam [sic] schreibt? Es liegt daran, das die 
erzählerische Distanz eine andere ist. Ein Fachhistoriker geht nicht zu 
nah dran an die Figuren, an das was er berichtet, und ‒ und das ist 
der entscheidende Punkt ‒ er würde nicht behaupten zu wissen, was 
wörterlich gesagt wurde. Er würde keine wörterliche Rede verwenden, 
es sei den, er hat Dokumente und Briefe, aus denen er zitiert. 
Ansonsten würde er berichten, was inhaltlich ungefähr so geworden 
sein müsste, sein könnte. Er würde also die indirekte Rede 
verwenden. Und da dachte ich, das Experiment müsste eben darin 
liegen, ein Buch zu schreiben, das beginnt wie ein historisches 
Sachbuch, bis es dann plötzlich kippt, weil natürlich Dinge berichtet 
werden, die überhaupt nicht mehr sachbuchhaft, sondern romanhaft 
und frei erfunden sind. Es sollte so klingen, wie ein seriöser Historiker 
es schreiben würde, wenn er plötzlich verrückt geworden wäre. (in 
Gunther Nickel, 2009: 32-3) 
Why do historical novels seem banal, but what an Eric Hobsbwam [sic] 
writes does not? It depends on the fact that the narrative distance is 
different. A historian does not get too close to the characters, to what 
he reports about, and ‒ this is the key factor ‒ he would not claim to 
know the literal words of what had been said. He would not use any 
direct discourse, unless he had documents and letters to quote from. 
Otherwise, he would report the contents of what more or less must or 
could have been. So he would be using the indirect discourse. And so I 
thought, my experiment should consist in this: writing a book that 
begins like a historical textbook, till it suddenly tips over, because it 
obviously deals with things that are not in the least factual, but 
novelistic and freely invented. It should sound the way a serious 
historian would write, if he had suddenly gone crazy. (My 
translation187) 
Indeed, Kehlmann’s reworking of the historical details of Humboldt and Gauss’ 
lives serve the purpose of a light and ironical Zivilisationskritik. Peter Heinz-
Preusser has stated:  
                                         
187
 Where no published English translation exists, I have provided my own. Dr Laura Martin kindly revised 
some of my translations. 
  234 
Die Tragödie des Weltuntergangs kehrt als Komödie zurück. Genau 
darum, so war meine These, wird das Buch gekauft. Es handelt von 
der Konditionierung von Subjekten, die sich selbst, der Natur und den 
anderen um sie herum Gewalt antun, um sich als Ich zu erhalten. Das 
ist klassische Zivilisationskritik, die aber als Genussmittel verkauft 
wird. Man hat den Eindruck von Ernsthaftigkeit, ohne mit den 
drastischen Konsequenzen behelligt zu werden. Was früher ein Stoff 
für Apokalyptiker war, liest man nun amüsiert und gerade so, als hätte 
es mit ethischen Entscheidungen nicht das geringste zu tun. Kehlmann 
ist deshalb nicht schlicht trivial ‒ den dann fände er mit seinem 
Gegenstand gar kein Publikum ‒, sondern anspruchsvoll, ohne das es 
bemerkt wird. Die letzte Welt, die er schildert, ist also nicht für 
Chiliasten, sondern für den Gourmet, der die gehobene Unterhaltung 
liebt.188   
The tragedy of the end of the world comes back in the form of 
comedy. My thesis was: it is exactly for this reason that the book sells. 
It deals with the conditioning of subjects who exert violence towards 
themselves, nature and people around themselves in order to 
maintain a sense of self. This is classical critique of civilisation, but it 
is sold as a semi-luxury product. The reader receives the impression of 
seriousness, without being troubled by its drastic consequences. What 
was before a subject for apocalyptic writers, now can be read with 
amusement, and precisely in such a way as if it had nothing to do with 
ethical decisions. Therefore Kehlmann is not flatly banal ‒ in that 
case, with his object, he would not find an audience ‒ but, rather, 
demanding, without readers realising it. The last world, which he 
represents, is thus not meant for chiliasts, but rather for the gourmet 
who loves the fancy entertainment. (My translation) 
The narrative foregrounds a characteristic blending of comedy, irony and 
melancholic moments, in its depiction of Humboldt’s and Gauss’ attempts at 
‘mathematizing nature’.189 The critique of instrumental reason proceeds 
together with the emphasis on nature’s resistance and on the uncanny character 
of the real. Magical elements, ritual moments and mythical motifs recur 
throughout the novel, not only as a tribute to Latin American Magical Realism, 
but also as a way of introducing the force of chaos‒a theme dear to the 
author‒underlying experience and reality.  
Als ich began, meinen Roman über Gauss, Humboldt und die 
quantifizierende Erfassung der Welt zu schreiben, über Aufklärer und 
Seeungeheuer, über Grösse und Komik deutscher Kultur, wurde mir 
schnell klar, dass ich erfinden musste. Erzählen, das bedeutet, einen 
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Bogen spannen, wo zunächst keiner ist, den Entwicklungen Struktur 
und Folgerichtigkeit gerade dort verleihen, wo die Wirklichkeit nichts 
davon bietet ‒ nicht um der Welt den Anschein von Ordnung, sondern 
um ihrer Abbildung jene Klarheit zu geben, die die Darstellung von 
Unordnung erst möglich werden lässt. Gerade wenn man darüber 
schreiben werden will, dass der Kosmos chaotisch ist und sich der 
Vermessung verweigert, muss man die Form wichtig nehmen. Man 
muss arrangieren, muss Licht und Schatten setzen. Besonders die 
Darstellung meiner zweiten Hauptfigur, des wunderlichen Barons 
Alexander von Humboldt, jener Kreuzung aus Don Quixote und 
Hindenburg, verlangte nach Uebersteigerung, Verknappung und 
Zuspitzung. Hatte er in Wirklichkeit eine eher undramatische 
Rundreise von über sechs Jahren Dauer gemacht, so musste ich, um 
davon erzählen zu können, nicht nur sehr viel weglassen, sondern 
Verbindungen schaffen und aus isolierten Begebenheiten 
zusammenhängende Geschichten bauen.190 
When I started to write my novel about Gauss, Humboldt and the 
quantifying conceptualisation of the world, about Enlightenment 
intellectuals and sea-monsters, about the greatness and comedy of 
German culture, it became immediately clear to me that I had to 
invent. To tell a story means to draw an arc where there is none to 
begin with, to give to narrative developments structure and a right 
sequence of actions exactly in those places reality does not offer 
any‒‒not in order to give the world an orderly appearance, but to give 
its image that clarity that alone makes the representation of disorder 
possible. It is precisely when you want to write about the fact that 
the cosmos is chaotic and refuses to let itself be measured that you 
have to take form seriously. It is necessary to contrive, to set lights 
and shadows. The representation of my second hero, the bizarre 
Baron Alexander von Humboldt, that mixture of Don Quixote and 
Hindenburg, particularly required excess, stringency and pointedness. 
If in reality he travelled around the world for more than six years 
without any remarkable episode, then in order to be able to write a 
story about it, not only did I have to drop many details, but also make 
connections and build coherent narratives out of isolated events. (My 
translation) 
7.9.1 Chaos, Story and Magic 
Mathesis universalis, the endeavour of imposing a grid of measures on nature 
goes hand in hand with the new conception of a universal Man advanced by the 
Enlightenment.191  Science on one hand, and Kant’s philosophy on the other, 
which had made of space one of his a priori categories of the human mind, went 
in the direction of mathematizing the universe. In Measuring the World, 
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Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Friedrich Gauss represent exactly this drive 
toward measurement and quantification. However, for Gauss space is ‘curved’ 
and ‘very strange’, and he understands that in non-Euclidean geometry parallel 
lines do meet, as in the novel itself the parallel lives of the two scientists do. 
Kehmann himself describes Alexander von Humboldt as ‘jener Kreuzung aus Don 
Quixote und Hindenburg’ (‘Wo ist Carlos Montufar?’ in Gunther Nickel, 2009: 15): 
a hybrid of ‘Don Quixote and Hindenburg’, as his idealism and a controlling rigid 
attitude blend seamlessly in his fictional character. Alexander von Humboldt is 
depicted as denying everything supernatural out of intellectual belief, while 
Gauss from the start cannot exclude singular phenomena such as ghosts and 
telepathy. Neither character is a faithful portrayal of the two scientists, as 
Kehlmann takes many liberties with the narrative. Both have in common their 
dislike of art and literature, whereby Gauss dismisses his son Eugen’s ‘Gedichte 
und dumme Zeug’ (2005: 222): ‘Poems and all kinds of nonsense’ (2007: 189), 
and reduces Goethe to ‘der Esel […] der sich anmasse, Newtons Theorie des 
Lichts zu korregieren’ (2005: 158): the ‘ass who considered himself fit to correct 
Newton’s theory of light’ (2007: 134) and Humboldt says that ‘[i]hm selbst habe 
Literature ja nie viel gesagt. Bücher ohne Zahlen beunruhigten ihn. Im Theater 
habe er sich stets gelangweilt’ (2005: 221): ‘as for himself, literature had never 
meant  that much to him. Books without numbers made him uneasy. And he’d 
always been bored in the theatre’ (2007: 188). Yet, during his exploration of the 
Amazonian region, Humboldt is continually obliged to negotiate his take on the 
world around him with the indigenous habit of telling stories, what he dubs 
‘dieses ständige Herleiern erfundener Lebensläufe, in denen noch nicht einmal 
eine Lehre stecke[…]’ (2005: 114): ‘this eternal singsong recital of totally 
invented lives, which didn’t even have a moral in them [...]’ (2007: 95). 
Story in the novel is conceived as the vehicle of a worldview which is 
completely other than the scientific measuring enterprise; story conveys the 
ungraspable and unyielding, incomprehensible aspects of nature and reality, 
those that cannot be caught in the net of measurements. Even Alexander von 
Humboldt’s adult devotion to science and exploration springs from stories of 
‘existential Angst’, and particularly from that of ‘Aguirre the Mad’. This story is 
referred to more than once‒‒first in Humboldt’s childhood, then during his 
exploration of the Orinoco river‒‒and constitutes his ‘personal myth’, what 
propels him into exploration (2007: 15-6). However, after almost drowning in a 
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frozen lake as a boy, he becomes obsessed with science as a way of conquering 
the unfathomable forces of life and death. 
In the novel there are various episodes which entail some form of magical 
belief or action; the Amazonian soothsayer staring at Humboldt’s hand and 
finding ‘nothing’ is such a scene. Humboldt, as we saw in the preceding chapter, 
is said to have ‘no past, no present, no future’, thus he is ‘nobody’, he is caught 
in his own web of abstractions, which prevents him from being a fully fleshed 
individual. From the descent into the Cave of the Dead, to the appearance of a 
sea-monster, from a flying UFO to the dead birds’ reflections in the Orinoco 
river, to the séance in Berlin, the novel displays a fine array of magical motifs, 
which have the function of foregrounding the boundaries of Humboldt’s 
constricted views and attitudes and fostering a sense of humour in the reader, 
together with a certain suspicion or uneasiness about the apparent simplicity of 
facts and reality. Kehlmann blends themes of secular and supernatural magic, 
illusionism and a sense of haunted presence that, while making for an enjoyable 
read, also demands of the reader a certain amount of thought about ideas of 
science and civilization. ‘So viel Zivilisation und so viel Grausamkeit, sagte 
Humboldt. Was für eien Paarung! Gleichsam der Gegensatz zu allem, wofür 
Deutschland stehe’ (2005: 208): ‘So much civilization and so much horror’, 
comments Humboldt in front of the Aztec temple, ‘What a combination! The 
exact opposite of everything that Germany stood for’ (2007: 177), which, with 
the benefit of hindsight, can be read as an ironical comment on German 
twentieth century history. 
Precisely the relation between civilization and violence toward nature and 
toward others is one of the leitmotifs of the narrative, violence which may be 
concrete or abstract, entailing physical action or intellectual grasping, passes 
through the quantitative framing and reduction of nature to mere matter. In 
contrast to this, the stories of metamorphosis that the natives tell each other 
during the navigation of the Orinoco river make space for the ever-changing and 
the mysterious in nature. While Humboldt holds on to drawing exact maps and 
measuring as a way of fixing data forever, metamorphic magical stories allow for 
that mystery that Humboldt refuses to face and acknowledge. On the other 
hand, Gauss’s intellectual arrogance is shown not only in his treatment of his 
family, but also in the encounter with the Count von der Ohe zur Ohe, ‘die 
einzige Person im Roman, die Gauss intellektuell überlegen ist’: ‘the only person 
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in the novel who is intellectually superior to Gauss’, in the chapter ‘Der Garten’: 
‘The Garden’. (Kehlmann, 2007: 34). When the Count, who has read Gauss’ 
work, offers to give away part of his land as a gift, Gauss mistakes his generosity 
for foolishness. 
In a conversation with fellow writer Michael Lentz, reported in Die Neue 
Rundschau (vol. 118, 2007: pp. 33-47), Kehlmann declared: 
Ganz wichtig finde ich, was Michael angesprochen hat: Die Frage, 
inwiefern eine andere Zeit in ihren Alltagsgebräuchlikeiten überhaupt 
für uns noch nachvollziehrbar ist. Ich glaube, die Fremdheit ist 
ungeheuer. Nur Leute, die sehr wenig reisen, meinen, dass die Welt 
überall ungefähr gleich ist, und nur Leute, die sich nicht mit 
Geschichte befassen, meinen, dass die Menschen im Wesentlichen 
immer gleich waren. Die Unterschiede zwischen den Zeitaltern sind 
gewaltig‒‒im Verhalten, im Denken, in den emotionalen Prozessen. 
Das Merkwürdige ist, dass der Zugang zu historischem Material umso 
glaubhafter wirkt, je mehr man sich auf die Fremdheit konzertriert. 
Man kann eine Zeit am besten eingehen durch die Dinge in ihr, die für 
uns fast nicht mehr zu verstehen sind. Wenn man ein paar solcher 
Details der Fremdheit versammelt, ist eine fremde Epoche sofort 
erzählerisch beschworen. (37) 
I find what Michael has addressed very important: the question of to 
what extent we can still understand another age in all its daily uses 
and customs. I believe that the sense of otherness is huge. Only 
people who travel little believe that the world is more or less the 
same everywhere, and only people who don’t deal with history 
believe that human beings have always been essentially the same. The 
differences among the ages are tremendous‒‒in behaviour, thought 
and emotional processes. It is remarkable that the access to historical 
material is all the more convincing the more you concentrate on the 
otherness. The best way to access an historical age is through those 
characteristics that we are almost no longer capable of 
understanding. If you gather some of these strange details, a foreign 
age can immediately be conjured up in a narrative. (My translation) 
And also: 
Ich glaube, dass meine Faszination für Humboldt viel zu tun hatte mit 
meiner Faszination für den südamerikanischen Roman, der eben auch 
die interessanteste experiementelle Strömung unserer Zeit ist. Für 
mich ist der südamaerikanische  Roman auch die Antwort auf die 
ästhetische ‘Was-nun-Frage’. Zugleich hatte ich das Gefühl, ich kann 
das, was die tun, nicht nachmachen. Ich kann  nicht einfach so 
Wunder in die Erzählung einfügen, das ist eine Kultur, der eben 
andere Möglichkeiten zur Verfügung stehen. Aber Humboldt war mein 
Schlüssel zu Südamerika. Humboldt war ein Weimarer Klassiker, der 
wirklich wie eine art Gesandter, mit diesem Weltbild hinausging nach 
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Südamarika. Im Grunde steht er für das ästhetische Programm: 
‘Weimarer Klassik goes Makondo’. Also ja, es war wichting, dass das 
ein Deutscher ist. Man muss zu einer Figur einen klaren emotionalen 
Zugang haben, und den hatte ich eben auch zu seiner sehr deutschen 
Steifheit. […] (46) 
I believe that my fascination with Humboldt had a lot to do with my 
fascination with the Latin American novel, which also is the most 
interesting experimental trend of our time. The South American novel 
is to me also the answer to the aesthetic question about ‘what next’. 
At the same time I had the feeling that I can’t imitate what they do. I 
can’t simply put in miracles in the same way in the narrative, because 
it is a culture which draws on completely different possibilities. But 
Humboldt was my key to South America. Humboldt was a classical 
writer from Weimar, really a sort of envoy who travelled to South 
America with this worldview. Basically he stands for the aesthetic 
programme: ‘Weimarer Klassik goes Macondo’. So, yes, it was 
important that he is a German. It is necessary to have a clear 
emotional access to a character, and that is exactly what I had to his 
very German rigidity. (My translation) 
Indeed, in Measuring the World, the confrontation between the characteristcs of 
German national character and civilization, and, on the other hand, Latin 
American mentality and wonder tales is the object of four fundamental episodes 
regarding Humboldt, depicted in the chapters ‘Die Höhle’, ‘Der Fluss’, ‘Der 
Berg’, ‘Die Hauptstadt’: ‘The Cavern’, ‘The River’, ‘The Mountain’, ‘The 
Capital’, respectively the fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth. This stark opposition 
between Weimar classicism and South American culture and atmosphere, and 
indeed between thought and belief, sustains the narrative tension of the whole 
novel. Humboldt translates Goethe’s poem ‘Wanderer’s Nightsong’ in the 
following prosaic way: ‘Oberhalb aller Bergspitzen sei es still, in den Bäumen 
kein Wind zu fühlen, auch die Vögel seien ruhig, und bald werde man tot sein’: 
‘Above all the mountain tops it was silent, there was no wind in the trees, even 
the birds were quiet, and soon death would come.’ And with some irritation, to 
his fellows’ remonstrations, he answers that ‘Es sei natürlich keine Geschichte 
über Blut, Krieg und Verwandlungen, […] Es komme keine Zauberei darin vor, 
niemand werde zu einer Pflanze, keiner könne fliegen oder esse einen anderen 
auf’ (2005: 128): ‘Of course it wasn’t some story about blood, war, and shape-
changing, […]. There was no act of magic in it, nobody got turned into a plant or 
began to fly or ate somebody else’ (2007: 197).  
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Kehlmann’s treatment of Humboldt’s character has been criticized by the 
admirers of the scientist for not being true to history.192 But, given that the novel 
is an experiment with clashing or incompatible worldviews, its inventions are 
particularly to the point. The irony is not directed toward Humboldt or Gauss, 
but, through them, to our contemporary way of apprehending the historical 
past. As Stephanie Catani states: 
Hier wird der Text von seiner eigenen Figur angegriffen‒‒deutlicher 
lässt sich die Souveränität des Erzählers ironisch nicht unterlaufen. 
Das Lachen, das der Roman, auslöst und das Figuren und Erzählinstanz 
zugleich gilt, zielt keineswegs auf die historischen Figuren, sondern 
fungiert als Brücke zur Gegenwart, den ‘Humor ist nie historisch, 
sondern stets gegenwartsunmittelbar’. Komik, so lautet die 
poetologische Botschaft des Textes, unterläuft die Historisierung 
literarischen Wissens und richtet ihre ‘sehr ernsten Scherze’, nach 
denen Kehlmann nicht zufällig seine Poetikvorlesungen benennt, an 
eine Gegenwart, der die im Roman aufgeworfenen Fragen nach der 
Relevanz einer Wissenschafts- und Aufklärungskritik und dem Umgang 
mit dem klassischen sowie nationalen Erbe noch einmal gestellt 
werden.193 
Here the text is attacked by its own character‒‒the narrator’s sheer 
command could not sneak in anymore cleary and ironically. The smile 
brought about by the novel and concerning both the characters and 
the narrative style, is not directed by any means at the historical 
characters, but it has the function of a bridge to the present, as 
‘humour is never historical but always immediately in the present’. 
Comedy, according to the poetics of the text, undermines the 
historicizing of literary knowledge, and directs its ‘very serious jokes’, 
an expression which is, not coincidentally, the title of Kehlmann’s 
lecture on poetics, at the present, to which the questions raised in 
the novel about the relevance of a critique of science and 
Enlightenment, the relation with the classics, as well as about 
national heritage are once more addressed. (My translation)  
Irony, however, does not eliminate ‘Spuk’(spookiness), which is an irreducible 
element encountered by the writer when he attempts to bring the historical past 
into the present, making it plausible and available for an altogether different 
sensibility and mentality, that of his own age. Thus, the novel plays with chaos 
and magic, the latter being a way of accommodating and acknowledging the 
reality of the former. But, behind the dazzling show of both chaos and magic, 
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old age, decline and death advance and gain centre-stage. At the beginning of 
the ‘Steppes’ chapter, Humboldt says about death: 
Was, meine Damen und Herren, ist der Tod? Im Grunde nicht erst das 
Verlöschen und die Sekunden des Űbergangs, sodern schon das lange 
Nachlassen davor, jene sich über Jahre dehnende Erschlaffung; die 
Zeit, in der ein Mensch noch da ist und zugleich nicht mehr und in der 
er, ist auch seine Grösse lange dahin, noch vorgeben kann, es gäbe 
ihn. So umsichtig, meine Damen und Herren, hat die Natur unser 
Sterben eingerichtet! (2005: 263) 
What, ladies and gentlemen, is death? Fundamentally it is not 
extinction and those seconds when life ends, but the slow decline that 
precedes it, that creeping debility that extends over years: the time 
in which a person is still there and yet not there, in which he can still 
imagine that although his prime is long since past, it lingers yet. So 
circumspectly, ladies and gentlemen, has nature organized our death! 
(2007: 225) 
In his own turn, Gauss, after communicating at a distance with his assistant 
Weber through a device of his own invention, asks himself: 
Wie viele Stunden hatte er vor dieser Empfangsanlage auf ein Zeichen 
von ihr gewartet? Wenn Johanna dort draussen war, genauso wie 
Weber, nur weiter entfernt und anderswo, warum nutzte sie dann 
nicht die Gelegenheit? Wenn Tote sich von Mädchen im Nachthemd 
heran-und zurückholen liessen, weshalb verschmähten sie diese 
erstklassige Vorrichtung? […] Vielleicht sprachen die Toten ja nicht 
mehr, weil sie in einer stärkeren Wirklichkeit waren, weil ihnen diese 
hier schon wie ein Traum und eine Halbheit, wie ein längst gelöstes 
Rätsel erschien, auf dessen Verstrickungen sie sich noch einmal 
würden einlassen müssen, wollten sie sich darin bewegen und äussern. 
Manche versuchten es. Die Klügeren verzichteten. […] (2005: 282) 
How many hours had he waited in front of this receiver for a sign from 
her? If Johanna [Gauss’ first wife] was out there, just like Weber, only 
further away and somewhere else, why didn’t she use this 
opportunity? If the dead allowed themselves to be summoned and 
then packed off again by girls in nightdresses, why would they spurn 
this first clear device? […] Perhaps the dead no longer spoke because 
they inhabited a more powerful reality, because all this around him 
already seemed like a dream and a mere half world, a riddle long 
since solved, but into whose tangle they would have to step again if 
they wanted to move and make themselves understood. Some tried. 
The more intelligent avoided it. […] (2007: 242) 
While old age and death are the concern of the second half of the novel, the last 
chapter depicts Gauss’ son Eugen crossing the ocean in order to reach America 
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and, thus, the novel resists any ultimate closure: it hints at a totally new story, 
that of the young Eugen, to be played out in another setting, beyond the scope 
of the novel. The last word is ‘America’, signifying a continent and  diverse 
cultures that have played a fundamental role in the novel, and a promise beyond 
the old European world. 
  243 
8. Conclusion: Imagina[c]tion and De-Reification  
This study has provided a multifaceted observation and analysis of the 
processes inherent in the reading of what I have called ‘hybrid fictions’. It has 
endeavoured to look at both the characteristics of three sample novels and of 
the reading process itself. Exploring concepts of magic and ritualization, I have 
made the case for the role of the reader’s active role and the subversive 
potential of such fictions, which criticise and expose the reification of ‘reality’ 
and of the imagination, through a stringent critique of the discourses of 
modernity, scientism, institutionalised religion and capitalism.  
By looking at novels which defy neat labels, such as ‘magical realism’ or 
‘fantastic’, this thesis advances a notion of hybrid fiction as blending fantasy 
and mimesis in a performative way, that goes beyond a merely mimetic idea of 
representation. Considering such narratives as magical supplements to the 
reader’s daily lives and consubstantial with them, and, on the other hand, 
introducing the concept of the ritualised role of the reader during the reading 
encounter entails a positive re-evaluation of the role of the reader’s imagination 
and emotions, and of the subversive potential of non-mimetic literature to act 
on the reader’s disposition. Thus, the fundamental role of literary imagination is 
advocated as capable of being not only entertainment, but also a world-making 
practice, whereby nature and culture, both inside and around the reader, are 
seen as co-extensive rather than in opposition. This is an ecological view of the 
(literary) imagination, because it considers creativity as relational and 
generated through the interaction of different discourses, agents, objects, 
practices, environments. Thus, literary reading is seen as imaginative action 
with an impact on the reader’s world, in more or less direct and subtle ways. 
An ecological view of the imagination cannot but take into account 
Latour’s critique of modernity (1993), which has implications also for how we 
view creativity, nature and culture. In fact, only by recognizing the hybrid 
character of our ‘nature-culture’, and the proliferation of hybrids that it entails 
and represses at the same time, is it possible to rethink the role of literary 
fiction in an imaginative and de-reified way. This view, of course, is a political 
statement about the role of the Arts within academia and society at large, in a 
moment when they risk of being marginalised and diminished in their 
psychological, social and communal significance. Imagination, both the artist’s 
  244 
and the reader’s, is action, and can and does have an impact on how we view 
and shape our worlds, and the solutions we seek and come up with in our lives. 
Thus, literature becomes a ‘field’ in the physical sense of the world, interacting 
with many others, not a neat compartment set apart from ‘reality’ and strictly 
confined within institutional boundaries and policed by imaginary or actual 
guardians. This means, among other things, to give literature back to the people 
and re-inscribe its potential for change in our consciousness, both on an 
individual and collective level. 
In order to start this practice, I have brought literary criticism and 
anthropology into dialogue, setting up a space for their interaction in what I 
have called ‘anthropology of literature’. It is one path among many. It is a 
fruitful attempt in so far as it shifts old boundaries and pre-conceptions and 
allows us to reconceptualise and reconfigure the phenomenon we call literature 
in a way that encompasses issues which are relevant to our age, in literary 
criticism and beyond.
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